



“Beyond Conflict”

Peacebuilding in policies and practice of Cordaid and
it's partners in the Great Lakes Region

(The experience of DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi)

Nynke Douma and Dorothea Hilhorst
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The Peace Poem

There's a name for war and killing
There's a name for giving in
When you know another answer
For me the name is sin

But there's still time to turn around
And make all hatred cease
And give another name to living
And we could call it PEACE

And peace would be the road we walk
Each step of the way
And peace would be the way we work
And peace the way we play

And in all we see that's different
And in all the things we know
Peace would be the way we look
And peace the way we grow

There's a name for separation
There's a name for first and last
When it's all of us or nothing
For me the name is past

But there still is time to turn around
And make all hatred cease
And give a name to all the future
And we could call it PEACE

By John Denver: Singer (1943-1997)

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Chapter 1

Introduction

“A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step”
Lao-Tzu: Chinese Taoist Philosopher (c. 600 BC)

Internationally, policy attention for peacebuilding emerged in the 1990s, in particular in those areas where Cold War politics had hitherto dictated non-intervention in conflicts and where conflicts were partly contained in the superpower rivalry of those days. After the fall of the Berlin wall, the United Nations made the development of stable societies a major concern. The Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined “an agenda for peace” which secured a broader, integrated and cross-sectoral focus on human security, combining capacities in peacebuilding and development. In this respect, a distinction is often made between old and new wars where new wars refer to intra-state conflict as opposed to inter-state conflict.¹ The broad attention for these so-called new wars makes it easy to forget that actually since the Second World War over 75 percent of all registered conflicts have been of an intrastate nature (Holsti, 1996: 37).

Consequently, development organizations have always had to find ways of working in, on or around conflict. The world where they worked was full of liberation movements fighting dictatorial states, inter-ethnic strife resulting from processes of nation building, resource wars complicated by international interests, and conflicts about exclusion along religious lines. What has changed, is that the number and intensity of conflicts have increased, that these conflicts have become recognised as more complex, in particular where state structures have broken down, and that NGOs of different pedigree, such as development, relief and peace NGOs, started to develop their ideas, policies and practices around development and conflict.

Cordaid (Catholic Organization for Development and Relief) is the largest Dutch co-financing NGOs with its base in The Hague. It is the only Dutch NGO explicitly combining relief and development work, and the organization is in the middle of a process of identity formation and policy making. The choice for peace and conflict as particular policy focus stemmed from the needs that were identified by Cordaid’s partners in conflict areas. It was also influenced by the need to find a common theme in which the four long-standing relief and development organizations in the Netherlands that merged into Cordaid were “represented” and which offered a good opportunity to attract the attention of the public at large through lobby and marketing activities.²

Cordaid also aims to be a learning organization, which is described as that “the organization should consciously learn so that it can effectively change its practice, and create a learning climate is necessary so people can feel safe enough to take chances”. Consistent with the aim to be a learning organization, the choice for peacebuilding as a policy focus is not imposed on the organization but is allowed to evolve from a process in which different initiatives articulate. Hence, while this research project was undertaken in close dialogue with a support group from within the organization, a peace and conflict policy group was active writing a policy paper and consultation rounds were held with partners in different conflict areas. One of these consultations co-incided with a workshop in Bujumbura as part of the current research. Two important policy documents came out in the course of the research and provided further input: the Cordaid-broad policy documents on Africa (Africa Policy Document 2003-2006) and the Peace and Conflict policy paper (2003-2006).

¹ Inter-state conflicts are often referred to as “new wars or “Complex Political Emergencies” (CPEs) because they include a variety and complexity of actors and have differential causes and effects.

² Cordaid came into being after the merger of four Dutch development and relief NGOs, namely Mensen in Nood (Caritas Netherlands), Memisa Medicus Mundi, the Dutch Bishop’s Lenten Campaign (Vastenactie) and CEBEMO.

Although at the time the research started, Cordaid already had produced a preliminary paper on the theme, our research did not start with *a priori* assumptions about what conflict prevention and peacebuilding is or how Cordaid should address conflict. Instead the research started with analysing the “practical theories” of conflict Cordaid actors work with, their reading of particular conflicts and the translation to intervention practice. It soon became clear from this open-ended elaboration, that Cordaid actors strongly favour an approach that mainstreams peacebuilding in other activities. This led to new questions to probe into, concerning partnership, learning and the interface of peacebuilding with other development themes. Far from reaching final conclusions about these topics, this report aims to contribute to the ongoing discussions and learning processes within Cordaid.

The report takes an actor oriented perspective on the everyday politics of Cordaid and its local counterparts working in the Great Lakes region. It shows that a major challenge rests in the need to bridge the different realities that occur between personal motivations and expertise of staff, organizational needs, bureaucratic demands and the realities of partners and target groups in the field. With the input of four months fieldwork in the Great Lakes region, more insight will be created on the implementing actors, their surrounding networks, and emerging intervention choices.

The Beyond Conflict research process

The Beyond Conflict research is organised on a step-by-step basis and is interactive in nature. This means that the research project is partly planned and partly open-ended, thus building in flexibility and the possibility to change perspectives on the way. The research has been composed by a sequence of steps. Each step contained ethnographic data gathering (accessing the lifeworlds of actors through qualitative interviews and observations) and was concluded by discussing findings with people in Cordaid and the identification of the next step. Crucial in the process was the presence of an active and committed support group in Cordaid. This group consisted of Lia van Broekhoven who co-ordinates the peacebuilding policy process in the organization, Ronald Lucardie who pioneered the theme in the organization and made this research possible, Niek Thijssen the project officer for the GLR who facilitated the local research, Kees van den Broek responsible for the GLR in the emergency aid department, Elly Rijnierse who is project officer on Albania and has a keen interest in participatory research, and Astrid Frey who worked at the policy department and has a special interest in gender and conflict. The group has met around ten times in the course of the research and has played a major role in the discussion of draft reports, the identification of steps to take and the methodological approach of the project. In disaster studies the research was co-ordinated by Thea Hilhorst and mainly implemented by Nynke Douma. Hilde van Dijkhorst has implemented a small research on learning processes.

In October 2002 a start was made with a three-month study on the translation of peacebuilding in projects of Cordaid in Sudan, through interviews with Cordaid staff and the analysis of policy- and project documents. Three themes proved important in conflict intervention,³ namely:

1. the question of partnership (how to support which type of organizations during conflict);
2. peacebuilding in relation to linkage and mainstreaming;
3. and learning processes to respond to complex conflict situations.

These questions were further explored in the second step of the research that consisted mainly of interviews in Cordaid and also comprised the preparation of the fieldwork. From the start of the project it was clear that a major focus should be on how Cordaid’s partners in the field respond to conflict and understand and shape peacebuilding activities. For several reasons, among others to make this research tally other policy concerns such as the linkage

³ See Douma and Hilhorst (2003a)

between emergency and development and the increasing interest in Cordaid to engage in lobby activities, it was chosen to focus on the Great Lakes Region. Within the region, the research was limited to three countries: Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

The third phase included three and a half months of fieldwork between June and September 2003 and focused mainly on the possibilities, perceptions and dilemmas involved in peacebuilding activities of local NGOs. It also focused on the views of beneficiaries and (regional) networks for peace. The research originally conceptualized to do fieldwork in a single country in which case the interactive nature of the research could be upheld by working with a local support group and a local counterpart. When it was considered more meaningful to take a regional focus the interactive aspect became less intensive. In some of the countries collaboration was sought with a local facilitator of the research (Bertin P. Ngeranya, Kinshasa; Jean-Claude Safari Zozo, Bukavu. Special support was given by Centre Ubuntu in Burundi). At the end of the fieldwork a workshop was organised in Bujumbura (Burundi) for which over 20 partners from the DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi were invited. Through the exchange of ideas and experiences a broader reflection was held about crucial issues that relate to the peace processes in the region from a local perspective. The workshop resulted in a separate report⁴ and several recommendations by the participants, including the desire to continue the dialogue on the theme among the partners in the region and with Cordaid and the need to develop indicators for achievements of peacebuilding activities.

While this report concludes the Beyond Conflict study, the project will be continued with a next step which consists of an in-depth PhD research conducted by Mathijs van Leeuwen and financed by WOTRO on the basis of a Cordaid-endorsed proposal of Disaster Studies, to reach a deeper understanding of the vision and practice of actors in peace interventions.

The fieldwork

In cooperation with Niek Thijssen, the responsible project coordinator (PC) for the Great Lakes region, the partner organizations to include in the fieldwork were selected. This choice was based on their focus on peacebuilding (explicit focus on peacebuilding as core business, peacebuilding as combination of activities or their focus on regular development projects without a peacebuilding perspective). Also the type of organization was taken into account, looking at international formalised NGOs, national and local formalised or informal initiatives. In addition to these criteria, the research aimed to incorporate a mixture of partners with regard to their affiliation with a church, whether or not it were women's organization and their specific focus on gender issues. By choosing a mixture of partners a broad and diversified field of peacebuilding initiatives was covered and a base for comparison between the different types of organizations and their foci created.

The fieldwork (June-September 2003) was organised in such a way that four different places and their surroundings could be visited, namely Kinshasa (DR Congo), Rwanda, Bukavu (DR Congo) and Burundi. The choice to "separate" Congo into a Western and Eastern part by visiting the two sides does not imply any support for a division of the country. It was done given the different perspectives and realities of the conflict in a vast country like the Congo and the fact that many studies limit their definition of the Great Lakes solely to the Eastern part of the country. During an average stay of three weeks in each place, numerous NGOs have been visited (partners and non-partners of Cordaid). Also informal (local) activities in the field of peacebuilding and other stakeholders, amongst others embassies and church leaders, were identified and incorporated. Where the security situation allowed it, visits to the field were made in order to grasp the view of beneficiaries of projects and to participate in ongoing meetings and training on peacebuilding related subjects. In order to

⁴ See Douma and Hilhorst (2003b)

focus on the linkage between structural aid and emergency aid, the fieldwork also focused on emergency aid projects.

Structure of the report

Chapter two begins with a background to conflict theory and highlights the need to focus on alternatives to conventional peacebuilding intervention. The role NGOs take in working in, around or on conflict is discussed by introducing the concepts of Track one and Track two, the specialist and mainstreaming approach and do-no-harm. The chapter continues with some crosscutting concerns like how a just and lasting peace can be created in relation to democratisation processes; how peacebuilding relates to a thematic approach of development intervention and how peacebuilding can be integrated in bureaucratic policies and organisational needs of NGOs. The chapter ends with how challenges in peacebuilding and NGO awareness of smart aid and the do-no-harm approach can be related to an actor-oriented approach focussing on the capacities and knowledge of implementing actors.

Chapter three is about the Dutch NGO Cordaid. It begins with a description of the approaches Cordaid has taken with regard to conflict, conflict intervention and peacebuilding. The mainstreaming approach takes a central position. Thereafter the crosscutting concerns (just and lasting peace, thematic approach and bureaucratic and organizational realities), as discussed in the previous chapter, are related to Cordaid. The ways in which Cordaid is dealing with and making choices in partner relations is discussed and criteria that are used for partners in conflict situations. Since the Catholic Church is a special partner, given the Catholic background, its position in conflict situations is addressed in a separate paragraph. The chapter concludes with the importance of learning and the learning organization Cordaid wants to become.

Chapter four gives a detailed background of the Great Lakes crisis, starting with brief country profiles of DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. The causes of the conflicts are described according to a thematic approach, paying attention to the colonial administration, the nature of the state, the ethnicization of conflict, population displacement, land and development issues, economies of war and the (non)engagement of the international community. Then the implications of the conflict on daily life are discussed, paying attention to the increase of sexual violence, poverty, insecurity, disruption of (traditional) social fabrics and the gender dimension of conflict.

Chapter five discusses the practice of peacebuilding in the Great Lakes, drawing upon the fieldwork carried out in the region. Insight will be created on what is already put in place when it comes to peace intervention, or the so-called local capacities for peace. The chapter begins with a description of Cordaid's engagement in the region. Then the concept of civil society is addressed according to the differences of its power and organisation in the three different countries. Especially the impact of the conflict on the possibilities of civil society to become an active actor explains why civil organisation tends to be diversified or marginally present. The following paragraph looks into the view of local NGOs on peacebuilding, highlighting their opinion about the origin of peacebuilding and their motivation to address conflict. Then some cross-cutting concerns of peace, justice and democracy and a thematic approach will be discussed, focusing on the multiplicity of activities and initiatives for peace that have been established on different levels. Thereafter the concept of learning in relation to local NGOs in the Great Lakes region is addressed, followed by a discussion about the feasibility of a peacebuilding approach and peace intervention in the region.

Following the issues raised in the previous chapters, the final chapter presents the conclusions of the Beyond Conflict study. It discusses how an organization can prepare itself for working in a conflict area and how it can develop its projects in a conflict sensitive manner. Some recommendations that followed from the fieldwork will be discussed, which

will hopefully serve as input for the process of future policy development and the ongoing PhD study on civil society and peacebuilding of Cordaid and Disaster Studies.

Chapter 2

Theoretical background

“Peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek, but a means by which we arrive at that goal.”
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.: Pastor (1929-1968)

This chapter starts with a characterisation of causes and consequences of present day conflict, explaining the recent focus on alternatives to conventional peacebuilding intervention. The role NGOs take in working in, around or on conflict is discussed by introducing the concepts of Track one and Track two, the specialist and mainstreaming approach and do-no-harm. The chapter continues with some crosscutting concerns like how a just and lasting peace can be created in relation to democratisation processes; how peacebuilding relates to a thematic approach of development intervention and how peacebuilding can be integrated in bureaucratic policies and organisational needs of NGOs.

Changing conflict, changing peace

Since the end of the Cold War, a large number of conflicts has erupted that differ from the conventional notions and practices associated with interstate conflict. Today's conflicts are typically intrastate conflicts. This development is not as new as is sometimes assumed. Already since the Second World War over 75% of all registered conflicts have been of an intrastate nature (Holsti, 1996: 37). Besides, there was a change in how we label and perceive conflict: During the Cold War all attention was focused on the bipolar divide between the two superpowers. Due to mutual deterrence and the risk of spill-over effects and escalation, Third World conflicts used to be contained to certain levels. After the end of the Cold War this 'brake' on local conflicts disappeared and the so-called 'de-compression effect' occurred. In addition, more attention has been shifted to these kinds of conflicts, not in the least due to modern communication and the media showing the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a number of those intrastate wars over the last decade.

There is a large diversity in the type, scale and cultures of these intrastate conflicts, but nonetheless, we can give some features that generally apply to them (Frerks, 1998: 6-11). There have been many competing attempts to define root causes of conflicts, such as lack of development, the presence of lootable resources, the occurrence of 'ancient hatreds', or geo-political processes of colonialism or globalization. A general consensus is, however, emerging that conflicts are usually caused by a complex of factors, and build up over a long history of tension. Furthermore it is clear that causal factors operate contextual. A good example of this is formed by the contrast of Botswana and Sierra Leone. Even though both countries had in 1961 approximately the same per capita income of about 1.07 US\$, they experienced very different paths of economic development. Botswana's diamonds have become the main source of economic growth where, unfortunately, diamonds from the Congo and Sierra Leone have led to a total chaos and state collapse (Collier et al, 2003). Causes also change in the course of conflict and what appears as effects of conflict, such as the use of sexual violence and the infliction of trauma may turn out to feed into new rounds of violence.

In most cases conflicts occur in societies where the legitimacy and representativeness of the state is low or even completely lacking, at least in the eyes of certain groups in society. These groups have often a different identity from those dominating the state, whether based on ethnic, regional, religious, linguistic or other characteristics. Conflicts usually occur when particular identity-groups are being excluded from power and political participation, are being discriminated against in the distribution of state goods and services, and their cultural identity is being oppressed. This is intertwined and compounded by economic factors such as access to and control over scarce resources, as well as environmental and ideological characteristics. In certain cases the picture is even further complicated due to the breakdown or lack of any meaningful state institutions.

These kinds of conflicts are characterised by the fact that the civil population is often the direct target group of violence and accounts for 90% of all victims. Large groups of people flee their homes, and there is a large-scale and deliberate destruction of houses and other civil targets. International conventions and rules for warfare hardly apply and there is neither a clear beginning nor end of hostilities. Warfare is spread over a large area and fragmented in nature. In the “battlefield”, use is made of light weaponry and “small arms”, while standard war strategies include rape, ethnic cleansing and starvation, which are specifically directed against the civil population at large.

Given these characteristics of present day conflict, it appears logical that conventional concepts and methods of peacemaking do no longer suffice. When the normal rules of warfare change, conventional negotiations for peace lose much of their potential. It is in this context, that new avenues to peace have been explored and that notions like ‘local capabilities for peace’ are welcomed as possible contributions to meeting this challenge of changing war and peace. In this respect, a distinction gained ground between Track One and Track Two diplomacy. Track One refers to official and formal channels and processes established by persons and parties directly involved in the conflict (government representatives, rebel leaders, as well as third parties that have direct access to, and the capacity to influence the parties in conflict, such as the United Nations, regional organizations and neighbouring governments). Track Two refers to an indirect influence on political processes by those actors that are part of civil society such as media, churches, women’s organizations and educational institutions. Herewith it is considered typically the domain of NGOs, as well as churches and corporate organizations to create critical societal support for peaceful conflict resolution (Lewer, 1999). It could thus be said that in the 1990s the role of NGOs in peacebuilding has increasingly been recognised.

NGOs and peacebuilding

Whether providing relief aid, working on structural development or both, NGOs have always had to find ways of working in, on or around conflict. A “reality” shaped by injustice, violence, ethnic strife and malfunctioning governments has posed challenges to the policies and practice of NGOs that work in such situations. In the course of the decade organizations of a different pedigree, such as development, relief and peace NGOs, therefore started to develop ideas and practices around the interface of development and conflict.

At present, three tendencies can be recognised in NGO thinking on peacebuilding. Firstly, peacebuilding has come to be seen as increasingly comprehensive. When Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched its Agenda for Peace in 1992, he defined peacebuilding as: “Action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Lewer, in 1999, presents a much broader definition and refers with the term to:

“Non-violent processes which attempt to prevent, mitigate and transform violent conflict and contribute to building societies in which people have fair access to resources, which are based on social justice, and which respect fundamental human rights recognised under international law. The rebuilding of benign functional relationships is a vital part of this activity. Such processes should be rooted within the communities affected by the conflict and be sustainable locally. Peacebuilding usually requires a long-term commitment from local people and outside helpers, and can involve both cross-cutting (integrated into development and relief programmes) and stand alone approaches, and work at community or national levels, or both” (Lewer 1999: 12).

Secondly, one finds that NGOs are increasing uncomfortable with approaches that provide a standard procedure for peacebuilding based on a perceived ideal-typical cycle of conflict. A consensus seems to emerge that peacebuilding can not be done according to a “one size fits all” approach, which fails to take into account the specific history and context of a conflict (Hulme and Goodhand, 2000). Thirdly, there is a tendency to move away the attention from

what peacebuilding is to *how* it is done. Peacebuilding activities can be very broad in nature. Some examples about peacebuilding activities just after civil strife ends are demilitarization, disarmament, repatriating of refugees, monitoring human rights, institutional reforms and the promotion of political participation. These activities can be complemented by activities that support development in the longer run, such as the delivery of relief supplies, support for health systems, land reform, water sharing and common-economic enterprises (see annex 1) for an exemplary structuring of NGO activities). As these examples show, definitions of peacebuilding, as well as intervention strategies are often so general as to include virtually all forms of international assistance to societies that have experienced or are at risk of armed conflict (Cousens, 2001: 5). The choice for particular repertoires of intervention is then more based on mandates of organizations than on definitions of peacebuilding. Organizations can either define particular domains of peacebuilding interventions in which they specialize or, in the case of multi-mandate organizations, decide to mainstream peacebuilding activities into their general programme. Cordaid has explicitly chosen the second approach.

When any activity can contribute to peacebuilding, peacebuilding is not so much about what to do as about how it is done. Whether peace-related activities, development, relief or capacity building, it must be specifically designed to peacebuilding in order to effectively enhance peace (Cousens, 2000). This also means that any peacebuilding activity that is not effectively designed to enhance peace may turn into its negative and hamper peace or enhance conflict. Examples of these are development projects that inadvertently favour one group over the other or fail to build conflict resolution capacities into its implementation, or peace processes that exclude women or other relevant groups.

The mainstreaming of peacebuilding may be consistent with present notions and experiences of conflict, in the next chapter it will be elaborated how this also raises questions in practice as to how to operationalize the theme (see textbox below for one proposed set of criteria). This question is further complicated when we take into account that a theme like peacebuilding crosscuts several other themes and concerns.

Robert Hay (2001) has proposed the following criteria that can be used to identify whether an activity is peacebuilding or not.

- peacebuilding undertakings must be intentionally directed at promoting peace, not incidentally responsible for doing so. In this regard, we would expect them to take place in situations of high tension, before, during, or following conflict;
- the effort itself must be peaceful in nature;
- it must address root causes, not simply proximate or immediate causes;
- the undertaking must be politically neutral and culturally unbiased. That is to say, it must not favour a particular group or presume a certain type of outcome (other than peace) conforming with Western standards or expectations; and
- the efforts must be convertible, that is they must lead to, or be translatable into follow-on activities (e.g development) and they must be put into the hands of the recipients as soon as possible.

Crosscutting concerns

There are different ways in which peacebuilding is a cross cutting concern: because the concept of peace can not stand alone, because it has to be balanced against other policy themes and because it has to accommodate bureaucratic needs and organizational politics.

a. *Reaching a just and lasting peace.*

From various angles efforts are being done to redefine peace. In these new definitions, peace is more than the absence of war and is given certain qualifications, relating among others to development, democratization and justice. The UNDP, for instance, discusses the

notion of human security in its 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) and UNESCO speaks of “a culture of peace” (Mayor, 1999). There is a call now for “sustainable” peace, i.e. peace that is not limited to ending overt hostilities, but one that includes building conditions for the prevention of future conflict. Sustainable peace is characterised by a stable democracy in which conflicts are solved in a peaceful manner at the background of a working and reliable cadre of justice and equality. Taken up by institutions such as the UN, the promotion of human rights was put higher on the international agenda, translated in the Charter of the UN that focuses on the both the maintenance of international peace and security and the promoting and encouraging respect for human rights (ter Haar, 2000).⁵

The arguments why peacebuilding can not be detached from justice centres on the fact that recent conflicts have featured massive abuses of human rights. It is felt that so long as people’s rights are disrespected and unawareness exists about human rights and how to defend them, justice will never prevail and peace will become an unreachable situation. Justice includes the support to human rights programmes and lobby and prevention of human rights violations. Democracy is often mentioned as a necessary precondition for changes towards a more just and peaceful society. Democratization refers to a restructuring of state institutions and civil participation in decision-making processes. This enables people to articulate their needs and interests, also in defendant for the most vulnerable. Civil society organizations are then important actors that hold the government accountable to its constituencies. A more equal distribution of and access to political and economic power that is inherent to a democratization process, will eventually contribute to building peace and stability (Wood, 1997). In this respect democratization refers to civil participation, a citizen’s critical function in a democracy and the empowerment of marginalised groups.

As we shall see, such integrated notions make perfect sense as policy ends, but in practice the timeliness and compatibility of the different elements may be complicated. An other problem is that these concepts are being used by widely varying organizations and given entirely different meaning in practice. Whereas some aim to contribute to indigenous forms of sustainable peace, others may use the same notion of sustainable peace as an excuse to impose Western democratic standards or even justify military interventions.

b. Cross cutting themes

An NGO like Cordaid which takes up peacebuilding as a focus point in a multi-mandate organization has to balance different themes. Even though peacebuilding may not be incompatible to the other concerns of the organization and ‘peace and conflict’ is more seen as a context rather than a theme, it may put competing demands in everyday practice on time and priorities. In the case of humanitarian NGOs, there has been a lot of discussion about the question if these organizations should stick to their humanitarian mandate or broaden their scope to include peacebuilding and or development objectives to address the causes of conflict. The latter position is paraphrased as maximalists, whereas the first is called minimalist (Goodhand and Leader, 2001). The discussion has flared up recently again with the publication of a report by the Henri Dunant Centre charging NGOs that they divert scarce resources away from live-saving activities in Congo thereby indirectly contributing to the humanitarian disaster in the country (HD, 2003).

c. Accommodating bureaucratic needs and organizational politics

Choices to work on peacebuilding are founded on the value-based politics of NGOs aiming for just and democratic societies. At the same time an intangible concept like “peace” must be translated into bureaucratic policy ends. Much of what NGO people do is inspired by and affects the power politics of internal and external allocation and control of NGO resources, ideas and activities. Internal dynamics, such as the need to be prestigious, competition between departments (e.g. lobby, emergency aid, structural aid, policy, management) and

⁵ See also the Charter of the UN that focuses on the both the maintenance of international peace and security and the promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.

the pressure to have a certain financial turnout per year are intertwined with the policy and practice of peacebuilding. This can be called the everyday politics of NGOs (Kerkvliet 1991:11). At the same time, NGO actions are geared towards legitimation, which means that in order to find clients and supportive stakeholders, NGOs have to convince others of their appropriateness and trustworthiness (Hilhorst, 2003). Of obvious importance in this respect, is the relation of NGOs with back donors who illicit the need for policy choices from NGOs, but politics of legitimation play upon NGO policy making in more complex ways too. Hence, peacebuilding activities may be transformed according to bureaucratic needs or peacebuilding may start to take on diverging realities in practice.

An actor-oriented approach to peacebuilding

In addition to what and how peacebuilding is done, perhaps an equally important question is: Who is doing and can do peacebuilding? From a perspective of do-no-harm (Anderson, 1999), it is vital to “know” the partner and how this partner is situated in a wider institutional and social context. From a perspective of peacebuilding, it is acknowledged that this requires a lot of capacities on the part of the implementing organization. Hence, both do-no-harm and peacebuilding objectives turn the attention to the partners that are supported by NGOs to implement projects in conflict situations. For peacebuilding to become effective, it is important to focus on implementing actors, to build knowledge on these actors and their surrounding network as well as to create good partnership relations.

Fowler (2000) defines some issues that are comprehensive when discussing partnership:

- *Be clear about why?* Not achieving partnership is not a failure and clarity means honesty about how you can relate;
- *Apply the principle of interdependence.* If, as a donor and more powerful party, you are not really dependent on the behaviour of your counterpart for your own credibility and validity, you have probably not moved from dependency and patronage;
- *Adopt a contextual, systems approach and perspective.* Look at the networks of your own organization and your partners now and those needed to be sustainable in the future.
- *Adopt and organizational not project focus.* Looking at a project as a vehicle to explore relationships, not as the basis of them, makes each organization more agile and adaptive.
- *Create a process for local validation and shared control.* Work against the power asymmetry inherent in aid relationships.
- *Invest in your own reform.* Partnership is a two-way process.
- *Employ the achievement of downward accountability as proxy for partnership.* Demonstrate the ways in which you are held accountable from below for what you do and say.

The attention for the importance of capable implementing partners has lately received ample attention with the upsurge of capacity building and learning organizations. *Capacity building* is a recurring issue when looking at NGOs in developing countries, which are often themselves arguing that they lack scientific and material inputs. Capacity building relates to the concept of learning, briefly defined as the individual and organizational learning cycle in which bodies of knowledge gained through studies, evaluations and practical experiences are being employed for future interventions and policy. Learning is an ongoing course of action mainly triggered by stimuli arising from workshops, literature, field visits and day to day contacts with all sorts of stakeholders surrounding the individual or institution. Especially conflict situations bring about constant changes and tease the level of responsiveness of organizations. A point of criticism may be that the concept of capacity building presumes that

Western NGOs have insight in all the issues at stake in processes of change, whereas it is known that people learn easiest in for them familiar surroundings or about known subjects. This means that information imported from elsewhere that is meant to build capacities might not fit the need or want for information in the local context.

An actor-oriented approach to peacebuilding has also particular ramifications that underpin the rationale of this research. In classical organization theory, policy is being formulated and then implemented by staff of the organization. In practice, however, organizations constitute complex processes with multiple domains of work. Policies that emerge from these processes are usually ambiguous and open for different interpretations. Moreover, policy is not merely formulated from above, but is fed by experiences from people within the organization. Hence, policy is a product of complicated processes and gets interpreted at the interfaces of implementation. To understand peacebuilding then requires that one has to look how actors within and around the organization give meaning to peacebuilding in practice. The research thus puts major emphasis on how project officers in The Hague and NGO officers in the Great lakes region raise questions as to the meaning and feasibility of policies proposed by Cordaid and shape peacebuilding in practice.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have explained the recent international interest in peacebuilding and why NGO contributions to peacebuilding can be very effective in the context of present-day conflicts that permeate society in all its aspects, both in their causes as in their consequences. While NGOs may generally not be the most effective in addressing the international dimensions of conflict, they are well situated to deal with the national and local manifestations of conflict.

NGOs tend to view peacebuilding as a mainstreaming activity that needs to be grounded in specific conflict analyses and should be adapted to local conditions. This means that the main question is not what peacebuilding *is*, but *how* it is done. Closely related is the question of *who* implements peacebuilding activities. This realisation that came forward from a first step of this research has further set the agenda of subsequent steps. In these steps we have mainly focused on how different actors define peacebuilding and what practical theories they maintain, and on the question of the partners and target groups of peacebuilding activities.

Chapter 3

Cordaid and Peacebuilding

"Peace is not the same thing for everybody, it is a complex issue in which many actors have different interests"⁶

Cordaid's approach to conflict

As Cordaid's current General Director described, 'Peace is for Cordaid more than just a peace accord, it relates to the spirituality which is the basis of how people place themselves in a context and how they view others'.⁷ Cordaid's view on conflict is in the first place contextual. The project officers of areas in conflict are all expected to make a specific analysis of the conflicts as part of the area policy papers. In general policy papers, the analysis of conflict reflects Cordaid's primary mandate of poverty reduction by focusing in particular on the link between development, poverty and conflict. Poverty and inequality are considered important breeding grounds for violent conflict that often manifests itself along political, religious or ethnical lines (Cordaid, 2002b).

It is further remarkable that Cordaid places conflict in a regional perspective. Since insecurity often bypasses borders of nation states, it is considered of little use to adopt geographically limited intervention strategies. Rather, causes of a conflict need to be addressed in an integral way including neighbouring communities or countries. Cordaid has herewith developed a regional approach to peace, which means for the Great Lakes region that different NGOs work in different countries on conflict prevention, conflict management and reconciliation through a multitude of programs.

Cordaid and conflict intervention.

The need for a thematic approach by co-financing agencies has been imposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of the financing conditions. From interviews it appears that staff members are well aware of this condition, and some convey a certain fatigue with what they feel is the latest "fashion" in development. While being "forced" to choose themes, the question remains why peacebuilding was chosen and what added value is expected from it? In the first place, the international attention for peacebuilding articulated well with the experiences of Cordaid when working in a conflict situation. It also suited well with the double identity of Cordaid which is the only organization in the Netherlands combining development and relief work and seeks to link the two in practice. Interviewees within Cordaid were generally convinced of the importance of the theme. The choice for peace and conflict, in 1999, also stemmed from two considerations inherent to organizational needs of Cordaid. When the four organizations merged into Cordaid it was important to find common themes, which each partner could identify with and yet held the promise of developing new directions. Moreover, the marketing division was tasked to enhance themes that had the potency to attract the interest of the public at large. Peace and conflict did fit both these needs.

In order to develop the peace and conflict theme in a coherent way an "interdepartmental working group" was established. This group comprises enthusiastic people from different regional and policy departments within Cordaid and meets, ideally, once a month to discuss the content and course of the theme. A first outcome of the group was a conflict-handling working document that served to create background knowledge on theories and perceptions on peace and conflict.

In July 2003, the group launched a document with the vision of Cordaid about *conflict sensitive aid* (do-no-harm) and the issue of "*just peace*"⁸. Inspired by its historical

⁶ Interview, PC Western Africa, May 2003

⁷ Workshop, January 2004.

⁸ Note that the policy document appeared after the first two phases of this research were completed. This means that interviews with project officers were held at a time that they had not read the document yet.

background, Cordaid has taken up an *ecumenical approach* to peace. This means that reconciliation and lasting peace can only be achieved through the re-establishment of core values and ethics of life that reinforce the dignity of individuals and groups of people. Since these values find their roots in the evangelic tradition, the (Catholic) Church can play an important role in the dissemination of them, especially since Churches are often the only intermediate agency left in a conflict area. Even though ethical dimensions of reconciliation are not the exclusive domain of Christian Churches, they become an important actor in the strategic planning of peacebuilding activities. Finally, *local capacities for peace* focuses on the connection of different initiatives of civilian intervention. The most important is to draw lessons from local activities and opinions in combination with efforts to build attitudes and institution that are needed on the ground.

In the opinion of Cordaid, peacebuilding is a broad theme that cuts across other development themes. Peacebuilding must become “mainstreamed” by addressing it throughout programs that are directed towards development in general. This means that peacebuilding can not be related to separate activities, rather it should serve as a background idea to intervention.

The project officers interviewed in Cordaid were all committed to the theme of peacebuilding, but also raised some practical concerns. One recurring issue in the interviews was that people in a multi-mandate organization like Cordaid are not clear about the weight the theme of peacebuilding has or should have in relation to other foci. Peacebuilding is not incompatible to the other concerns of the organization, but puts competing demands in everyday practice on time and priorities. When peacebuilding is mainstreamed it was remarked that it can easily become an umbrella under which everything can be placed. It was also stressed that because it is difficult to develop clear indicators on what peacebuilding is, there must be consistently worked towards an organizational broad consistency within country profiles, regional departments and Cordaid as a whole. It is difficult, however, for project officers to grasp the multifold and time consuming learning process taking place in the organization. It was also implied that project officers should continue to be personally engaged in analysing and policy drafting around conflict and peace in their areas in order to internalize the theme. There was also a concern how the partners in the field can continue to be meaningfully involved in the dialogue around the peacebuilding approach of Cordaid. A number of additional concerns about the manageability of the theme will be discussed later.

Crosscutting concerns

a. Reaching a just and lasting peace.

To make peacebuilding operational, Cordaid (like many NGOs) distinguishes three situations of conflict. First, open warfare is characterised by gross violations of human rights and the absence of any form of democracy shape a country. The post conflict situation depicts a transition towards more democratic processes and peacebuilding and reconciliation begins to play an important role. The third situation will be sustainable peace in which one can speak of a stable democracy where conflicts are managed in an accepted framework of justice and international human rights. To recognise the gross violation of rights accompanying conflict and to bring peacebuilding in line with the other traditional core values of Cordaid a triangular bond between peace, justice (human rights) and democratization is introduced that consequently relates to development. In cooperation with IC-Consult (ICCO/Cordaid-Consult) this line of thought has been translated into a policy document (Van Deventer, 2003).

While Cordaid finds the triangulation of peace, justice and democratization important, it is also recognised that conflicts are diverse and that not all three aspects can be in synergy in all areas at all times. In this respect, Cordaid raises the question whether democratization,

justice and peace should be mutually inclusive to intervention and how the triangulation can be made contextual and operational by partners.

b. Cross-cutting themes and activities.

Cordaid has adopted an approach whereby the project departments have to focus their relationships with partners on particular policy themes, called "development themes". Human rights and social justice continue to be guiding policy values, but in the year 2001 four more specific themes were identified, namely quality of urban life, access to markets, health and care, and peace and conflict. Gender and HIV/Aids were from the start "mainstreamed" as overriding themes that cut across the four development themes. Peace and conflict is now also developing as a cross-cutting theme. Depending on country-specific characteristics, one or more of these themes are adopted in country policies, meaning that partners are expected to incorporate the theme(s) in their activities. Of course, the themes are not exclusive and can incorporate a wide range of activities from primary production and food security to human rights and democratization. Working with these different themes raises the question how they can be made functional in relation to each other.

In Cordaid, the thematic attention for peacebuilding goes also hand in hand with attention for linking relief with development. Linking relief to development was originally postulated as a continuum, where in case of a natural disaster, immediate relief was followed by rehabilitation efforts after which development processes could resume. In case of conflict, the idea gained ground in the 1990s that the different approaches should not be seen as sequential, but be used simultaneously. This means that relief is organised as "smart relief", but also that where possible development activities are set up even during periods of open conflict (Richards, 1996). The boundaries between the different activities of relief, rehabilitation and development are not clear, and the approaches are inter-linked in practice, which is the basis of the notion of linkage. In a similar vein, peacebuilding has also become detached from a sequential approach. Instead of viewing peacebuilding as a set of activities following the establishment of the peace accord, such activities may rather be seen as occurring simultaneously or be linked in other ways in nearly any phase of the conflict (Van Leeuwen, 2002: 3).

At the level of Cordaid, linkage is in a process of operationalization in five areas including the Great Lakes Region. The relation between the PCs of structural aid and emergency aid are crucial for linkage, while the Communication department and strategic alliances and networks also play a role. From interviews in Cordaid it appears that the following aspects may hamper linkage:

- nature of projects (not all projects are suitable for linkage);
- the geographical differentiation in the field where humanitarian emergencies may be very remote from the location of structural partners;
- the absence of a Cordaid-broad policy/vision on linkage;
- inadequate definition of target groups (most vulnerable, stakeholders);
- different personalities of people (practical or philosophic)
- hesitance of regional managers;
- different origin of funds for emergency aid and structural aid;
- securing FTEs of departments;
- administrative demands and the manner of project supervision;
- the absence of capable partners that can manage this process once Cordaid withdraws.

Part of these problems are transitional. Cordaid is still working on the policy and at present linkage has to be tested on programmes that were not designed from the start to become linked. Others caution to take the aim of linkage too far. This has among others implications for the question in how far Cordaid should maintain to have operational capacities to directly implement humanitarian programmes. Other aspects point to organizational matters to which we shall return shortly.

Cordaid's practice of peacebuilding further relates to (international) lobby activities, which aim at securing political and societal support for example against conflict in a developing country, campaigns around oil or violations of human rights. Most of Cordaid's lobby activities are done in cooperation with other Dutch or international NGOs and are, according to Cordaid, defined as "initiatives for influencing policymakers to take decisions that contribute to structural poverty reduction" (Minutes Peace and Conflict working group 2002). In the strategy paper of Cordaid lobby priorities for conflict areas are, among others, the exploitation of raw materials in conflict regions (e.g. oil, coltan), (inter)national law (e.g. follow-up of the UN conference on racism, minority rights) and small arms trade (e.g. in the Horn of Africa) (Cordaid, 2002d:16). Cordaid chairs the so-called "Grote Meren Overleg" (The Great lakes Consultation), in which major Dutch NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchange information about each other's programs in the region. Also, it has explored the possibilities to start a strategic alliance with Pax Christi Netherlands around the condemning of the use and plundering of strategic natural resources. The reasons why Cordaid, and by this means the Netherlands as a country, can play a strong role in lobby activities for the Great Lakes region are multifold. First of all, the Netherlands has no historical political or economic relations with either of the countries. Second, the Dutch government has established a Memory of Understanding with the Rwandese government and invested a lot in the demobilization programs carried out under suspicion of the UN. Until now the lobby activities are very much focused towards the Dutch government and are little substantial. It seems that the relationship between the Dutch co-financing NGOs and the government are tentative and geared towards mutual exchange but Cordaid is preparing a more concerted effort on the abuse of natural resources and aims to extend its lobby activities also towards the European Union (Cordaid, 2003a and Cordaid, 2003c). In terms of networking, Cordaid also keeps relations with other NGOs, such as CCAC (Concentration Cretienne pour l'Afrique Centrale), REC (Reseau Europeen Congo), NCB (Nederlands Comité Burundi), Agriterria and many others.

c. Accommodating bureaucratic needs and organizational politics

As we elaborated above, the choice for peacebuilding as a theme followed from value-based experiences from within the organization as well as pragmatic considerations. The thematic approach in itself is imposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This results in practice in a problematic divide between process and manageability. On the one hand, a group of enthusiastic employees sincerely tries to frame peacebuilding in an organizational *process*, and PCs contribute their experience, intuition and personal motivation to forge some changes among their partner organizations. On the other hand, a bureaucratic reality is created where "tasty" cases have to be presented to constituencies. Because of targets, time frames and figures that have to be produced on the proportion of funds devoted to themes, peacebuilding also becomes a "product" or even a statistical mockery where all activities may be headed under peacebuilding, without making clear why this is so and how it differs from similar activities not designed for peacebuilding.

The divide between process and manageability is difficult to deal with for project officers. Even though they are committed to peacebuilding as a theme, they find it hard to accommodate it with demands put on their work concerning output and demonstrable results. It is practically impossible to measure the achievements of Cordaid-supported interventions for peace. It is not easy to maintain whether a project prevents violence/stimulates peace, or whether that should be attributed to other processes. Bureaucratic requirements force them also to allocate particular percentage of their funding to peacebuilding which is contrary to their notion of mainstreaming peacebuilding.

Cordaid and partnership

"Knowing *whom* to work with is as important as knowing *how* to work with them."
(Smillie 2001: 7)

The term "partnership" is often confusing within Cordaid because it is used as a generic term to describe all relations with counterparts while at the same time it is defined to refer to those organizations with which Cordaid has developed a long term and in-depth cooperation. In a more detailed definition Cordaid divides the relations it has with NGOs into project relations; programme relations; preliminary relationship that may lead to partnership; counterparts; strategic partnership or strategic alliance.⁹ What has not been done yet is the formulation of criteria for a clearer differentiation between these types of relationships in order to create more insight into the content and specific intensity of cooperation. The criteria that are currently used for ordering local counterparts is the level in which they are in line with Cordaid's vision and policies, and if they are:

- Realistic in their work in the field;
- Working in the interest of the community/beneficiaries;
- Adopting a long term vision: What will happen afterwards?;
- Being viable and enjoying the respect and trust of the local population.

For conflict situations specific criteria are introduced in the Peace and conflict policy 2003-2006 (Cordaid, 2003b:32). When working in a conflict situation, local NGOs should be willing and capable to:

- make a conflict analysis and indicate their role in further peacebuilding;
- indicate the dilemmas they face in supporting peace and formulating actions deemed necessary;
- look critically at their own role in the peaceprocess, including the commitment to phase out support;
- apply do-no-harm principles in strategising and organising their work;
- collaborate and co-ordinate with other stakeholders in the peace process;
- commitment to a learning and linking approach.

As we shall see in chapter five, both lists of criteria reflect more the approach of Cordaid than those of their partners. The issues mentioned may not be consciously reflected in practice by the organizations in the field.

Engaging with indigenous NGOs (partners) in a conflict situation is complicated for Cordaid. From a "do-no-harm" perspective Cordaid needs to have insight in the ways in which their partners operate. They want to be sure that the partner is not in fact feeding the conflict, and have to take into account the consequences of favouring one partner over other organizations that operate in the same field. Supporting "A" and not "B" can make a big difference in the area. "If "A" gets funding it gives momentum and can place them in a position they would never have been otherwise".¹⁰ Obviously, the need to know partners and consequences of support runs into practical limitations. "You never know if your research is sufficient, you simply don't know everything about your partner and it does happen we are way off".¹¹ Furthermore, it is difficult to delineate where concerns for justice and human rights turn into harmful politics. Cordaid maintains ideals of human rights and democratization, and has a history of taking side for opposition groups. Cordaid commits to peacebuilding, yet, it does not claim to be neutral as in the opinion of many employees neutrality does not exist and choices need to be made. As repeatedly stated in interviews, Cordaid draws the line where partner politics become *ideological*, but this concept is difficult to define in practice.

⁹ An important strategic alliance has been established with Pax Christi Netherlands. This alliance became effective in 1999 and aims at combining the strengths and experiences of both organizations in the field of peacebuilding.

¹⁰ Interview General Director Cordaid, 16-01-2003.

¹¹ Interview staff member Cordaid, 16-01-2003.

Another constraint with regard to choosing partners in conflict situation relates to the capacities required from partners. Paul Harvey noted that it is important to base civil society building efforts on a firm analysis of "how Complex Political Emergencies break down civil society and what implications this has for rebuilding" (Harvey, 1998: 206). Conflict, in other words, does not contribute to the quality and capacity of civil society organizations. In this respect it also has to be taken into account what the history and strength of civil society building has been in an area in time of "normality" as well as during conflict. In the case of Southern Sudan, civil society has always been stifled (van Leeuwen, forthcoming) and partners with sufficient organizational capacity are hard to find. This strongly contrasts with Congo where civil society is also damaged by conflict but nonetheless builds on a long and strong organizing tradition.

Important to mention as well is that personal relationships between individuals usually pre-date and outlast any 'official' contact between parties, and are thus equally (or perhaps more) important. Both in the Sudan case study and in the GLR, intimate knowledge and insights are very much guiding decisions of support. Relations with partners are developed on the basis of personal experience, knowledge, networks and previous commitments. Especially because the PCs are already working for many years with and on a country, they have a broad network from which information can be tapped to make informed choices on the will and motives of (future) partners. Although these personal knowledge bases are highly valuable for Cordaid, the PCs realise that there are some risks involved that need careful reflection. One issue is to be careful to prevent a situation in which partner relations are continued simply because they have been (ideological) partners of Cordaid for a long time and maintain an open view towards new initiatives. An other issue is how to make decisions and choices based on intuition, personal knowledge and experience, transparent to others.

One misconception when talking about partner identification is often that it is possible to "find" organizations in a certain field of intervention. Yet, both in Sudan and the Great Lakes region, the number of NGOs in the field are not very extensive, "there is not an organization waiting behind every corner". Also, many operate in the same area or have the same kind of programs. To set up a new approach is therefore not easy in an established culture of intervention. In this respect it should also be mentioned that given the limited number of possible partners, NGOs in conflict areas may avail of many different donor relationships, making it more complicated for Cordaid to influence the practice of partners.

There is further the difficulty of monitoring and evaluating peacebuilding activities. Of course, it is a difficult and rather subjective task for Cordaid to identify whether or not a partner is dealing with a theme in the "right" way. It hardly happens that contacts were stopped because of the activities done by local NGOs. More often, questions can be raised on financial transparency. If partners submit doubtful budgets, devote large amounts of money on travel expenses and salaries and, for example, pay sitting allowances for workshops, such issues can become a crucial factor in ending support.¹²

Finally, some questions have been raised on the extent of capacity building Cordaid should invest in partners. According to some interviewees, capacity building is indispensable, yet it should not become an automatic choice: "building partnership should not become a mantra". Where a high turnover prevails in NGOs or where NGOs are particular prone to develop financial malpractice, caution is required with investing in these organizations. As was mentioned in the interviews, an alternative approach in these cases is to invest in processes, rather than in partners. This means that smaller contributions are being made to

¹² It is quite common in Africa that personnel of NGOs or other institutions demand "sitting allowances" for workshops or conferences. This means they get paid for attending a meeting or workshop. However, the idea is that participation should start with the people themselves and if such an allowance is given the incentive to attend a workshop from a true interest for a subject disappears. "People go to workshops for the money, whatever the theme is". In such situations a project will never get social support or become sustainable.

initiatives, networks, dialogues, projects and organizations that are in line with a desired process towards just peace and poverty reduction.

A special partner: The Catholic Church

Cordaid is founded upon Catholicism principles and historically almost half of its partners in Africa are Church-related. Although the organization as a whole has moved away from supporting church-based organizations to broader networks of professional NGOs, discussion has sprung up if and how churches continue to be important partners for peacebuilding. The grassroots embeddedness of churches and their provision of basic infrastructure such as schools and health clinics in areas where all other services have often left forms the basis of the argument why the church can be an advocate of peace. In addition, churches in many situations of conflict become the most or only trusted institution. The basic moral of the Church with a commitment to reconciliation, values of life and the politics of forgiveness can make churches good advocates for peace.

On the other hand, one has to remain careful in assessing the role of the church in practice. Especially where conflict partly concerns divisions along religious lines the role of churches may be contrary to their own morale. In this respect, Scott Appleby argues that:

"Religious traditions are internally plural, fluid, and evolving, responsive to new interpretations [...] many religious leaders and communities are capable of rather than committed to promoting tolerance toward outsiders, including the religious or the ethnic other. Too many religious leaders continue to pursue narrow sectarian or ethnic agenda, think only of the needs and rights of their own people and fail to oppose the demonization of the other. As long as this is the case, religion will remain a disrupter of the peace, and a source of conflict" (Scott Appleby, 2000:281).

The role of churches thus can not be taken for granted but has to be analysed and established in context. Notorious is the example of the church in Rwanda during the genocide. The church has not openly opposed the genocide, and some bishops and referents are accused of having participated in the genocide. In contrast, the Archdiocese of Bukavu played an incredible role in saving the lives of Hutus and Tutsis when Rwandese refugees entered the Congo in 1994. "You have to understand that they were more in number than the citizens of Bukavu, nevertheless we have shared everything we had, offering them housing, food and land".¹³ Church involvement is thus differentiated and should be subject to careful analysis.

A point of concern can be the hierarchical organization of churches that may run counter to the ideal of just and democratic peacebuilding. This is important when we recollect the notion that the question is not what peacebuilding is done but *how* it is done. An ambiguous point of discussion is also the rejection by the Catholic Church of the use of modern family planning methods to space pregnancies and lower births rates. Population pressure has been identified as one of the causes of conflict, particularly in the densely populated areas of Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo and the lack of support for safe sex can higher the risk of the spread of HIV/ Aids.

Cordaid is well aware of the ambiguous position of the Church in conflict. Yet, the organization believes it is important to restructure its relation with the Catholic Church and to identify opportunities to engage in a closer collaboration when it comes to peacebuilding. Cordaid acknowledges the crucial role of the Church in reconciliation processes given its presence at the grassroots and its evangelic tradition.

¹³ Informal conversation with the *Vicaire-General*, Archdiocese of Bukavu, 20th August 2003.

Learning in Cordaid¹⁴

Recently Cordaid has set its aim at becoming a learning organization. In the plan of Cordaid for 2003-2006 it is described as a goal that Cordaid learns in a systematic manner with special attention to innovativeness within the organization. Cordaid (2002b) has described the criteria for becoming a learning organization as the following: "the organization should consciously learn so that it can effectively change its practice, and create a learning climate so people can feel safe enough to take chances". At Cordaid there is attention for individual learning as well as organizational learning. Learning is stimulated in the form of workshops, theme-groups, training-activities, etc. These mainly look at learning as a collective process, rather than an individual one. There are however some activities geared towards individual learning which is usually directed by the Human Resource department. This entails for instance language training, agreements on individual learning are also made in the form of "Resultaatafspraken" between the Region Manager and the Project Officers agreements. The special attention for innovation has been translated in a fund that can be spent on innovative projects.

Although learning in organizations is usually measured in the amount of courses, workshops and seminars people attend, learning often occurs by looking at the day to day practice of people's work. Tacit knowledge can be seen as non-formalised knowledge that is based on experience and intuition. Some would describe it as a "gut feeling" (Hatsopoulos and Hatsopoulos, 1999). A lot of decision-making processes within organizations are eventually based on tacit knowledge. However, tacit knowledge seems to carry a negative connotation at Cordaid. This could be explained by the result-oriented goal of the organization in terms of quantifiable impact. Something like tacit knowledge may just be too vague. Relying on intuition and personal deliberations is usually viewed as negative and unwanted. According to one of the interviewed employees "sometimes the choice of partners is too much guided by personal deliberations". These sort of personal deliberations were in general viewed as negative, although in two interviews it was instead experienced as a positive aspect: "Because of someone's long-term commitment to partners, some good results were accomplished". However, the overall sentiment seems that impact from interventions should be as controllable as possible, decision making should preferably be done by standards and frameworks as to eliminate personal influences. A challenge therefore remains to re-evaluate the importance of practical knowledge and then to explore how such knowledge can be made more tangible and transparent without losing its value.

There appears to be a contradiction between Cordaid, as an output-oriented organization and Cordaid as a learning organization. This is apparent in practical constraints, primarily high work pressure, and in ambiguities in the attitude towards learning. Although on the one hand people sincerely aim to create space for risk-taking and open-ended non-normative learning, in practice learning may become subject to the output-oriented culture in the organization. Cordaid, as a funding agency, is organised around the need to reach quantitative goals of financial turnover. As a result, the work tends to become very output oriented and, in order to maintain quality, staff members feel a very high work pressure. This output orientedness has repercussions for the learning culture, which may bend more towards achieving results than towards creating space for reflection. One staff member questioned whether a learning organization could at all exist within a bureaucracy as Cordaid. During one of the interviews it was said: "It should be possible for Cordaid to take the risk and come out of the controlling culture that it has and give departments the opportunity to make mistakes and learn from them".

Seminars and conferences are conducive to learning as it gives time to reflect on personal experiences when focussing on one particular aspect of work. In relation to peacebuilding, several people mentioned a training that was held concerning the do-no-harm

¹⁴ This paragraph is based on the research report "Learning processes within Cordaid" of Dijkhorst and Hilhorst, June 2003.

approach by Mary Anderson as particularly insightful. Yet, most important is considered learning in the field and learning with and through partners. Interviewees stress that learning should be firmly grounded in the existing practice in the field. In conflict areas this is considered especially important given the quickly changing situations that need flexibility in response. This means among others that “seed-money projects are important as they enable you to react and respond quicker to occurring processes and initiatives that arise, without having to waste too much time on formalities”. Also, this observation brings into discussion the importance of having a presence in the field in conflict areas. Humanitarian and peace organization whose core business is to work in conflict areas take it for granted that it is important to have a presence in the field, but for development organizations that rely on partners such presence is not obvious and discredited as a policy. Cordaid is still searching for the optimal practice. It has opened field offices in conflict-prone areas, but the questions the mandate and staffing of these offices is still evolving. In the workshop in Bujumbura a stronger and more supportive local office was a major recommendation of the participants. Cordaid still questions if such local offices should provide service and support directly or rather facilitate that partners can find support structures locally.

Conclusions

In the year spanned by this research, Cordaid has undergone a significant process of elaborating its policy and practice on conflict and peacebuilding. This has among others resulted in a three year policy paper which is partly based on consultations with partners in a number of conflict regions. Some policy choices that have evolved out of this process are the identification of peacebuilding as a mainstreaming theme, the introduction of a value-based ecumenical approach, a regional approach to conflict and peace building, the development of partner criteria and the recognition of churches as important partners in peacebuilding. With regard to the latter, Cordaid is aware of possible adverse roles that churches can play in conflict and the repercussions that the hierarchical structures of many churches may have on the participatory nature of peacebuilding processes.

The project officers that were interviewed in the course of the research are generally highly committed to the importance of peacebuilding, but raise some practical considerations on how to make the theme workable. Some of these are transitional and will resolve themselves once policy issues are further evolved. Other concerns point to the problem that the mainstreaming of peacebuilding makes the theme intangible and difficult to measure for its results and impacts. This is especially problematic in light of what we have called the divide between process and manageability, where peacebuilding is both a grounded process as a product that has to fit into the bureaucratic realities of targets, time frames and figures. Even though project officers may have more affinity with the first approach they realise they have to mould their activities into the bureaucratic realities as well.

Finally, the project officers raise concerns about the need to base the focus on peacebuilding on local realities, perceptions and needs. With the recent merger, Cordaid has engaged in a very intense process of redefining its objectives and working methods. In the eyes of some staff, this has led to a temporary inward-oriented attitude that, if not overcome in time, risks to become detached from the realities on the ground. Given the different realities in which the peacebuilding theme is shaped, it will indeed remain very important to safeguard the organization from putting its own needs over the expressed needs and proposals from partners. One challenge in this respect is to further evolve the role of field offices in bridging Cordaid in the Hague with the partners in the field.

Chapter 4

The Great Lakes crisis

“Let us not look back in anger or forward in fear, but around in awareness.”
James Thurber: Author, cartoonist and humorist (1927-1961)

The Great Lakes region comprises the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Western Uganda. Political, economic and socio-cultural bottlenecks have resulted in a large-scale crisis that is often referred to as “Africa’s world war” and claimed more than 2.5 million lives through combat, conflict-related disease and starvation.¹⁵ Causes of the problematic situation go beyond national borders and effects for the population are comparable. Yet, the countries are generally seen to be in different phases of conflict. For example several parts of Congo and Burundi are still on a daily basis experiencing open violence, whereas Rwanda is in a post-conflict reconstruction phase and Western Congo (around the capital Kinshasa) deals with indirect effects of the war such as large refugee flows that seek protection in town.

This chapter provides short country profiles and touching upon the background of conflicts in the three countries involved in this research. Rather than discussing the triggering factors for each country separately, the chapter takes a thematic point of departure through which the regional implications of the crisis become clearer. Even though several country specific characteristics can be identified, the endemic neglect of political, social and economic development is a common feature of DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

Country profiles

a. DR Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo deals with the presence of a vast number of armed groups. Those with external connections involve amongst others the ex-FAR and Interhamwe (Rwanda), FDD and FNL (Burundi) and the ADLF and UPDF (Uganda). In addition there are indigenous movements in opposition to the central government, such as the RCD-Goma, MLC, Mai-Mai and other local defence forces (Ginifer, 2002: 123-124).¹⁶ The reasons why such a large number of armed factions seem to survive in the Congo can partly be explained as a result of Congo’s history.

The vast territory of the country has for a long time been the synonym to the thirty-year reign of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (1965-1997). During this time the development of the state has been neglected and the country had to deal with severe corruption, personal enrichment, political exclusion and a drastic downward spiral of the economy and standard of living for most citizens. Because Western nations saw Mobutu as a leader that could re-establish unity in the region and oppose Marxist influences at the time of the cold war, he was artificially kept in power until the strategic political interest of Central Africa fell, alongside with the Berlin wall.

During and after the genocide in Rwanda (1994), Eastern Congo hosted over a million refugees, including extremist Hutu militia (Interhamwe) and members of the former national army of Rwanda (FAR). Following continuous attacks by these two groups on Rwandese territory, the first war (*guerre de liberation*) started in 1996 when Rwandan troops dismantled the refugee camps in North and South Kivu. Profiting from disorder in the Kivu’s and the weakening power of Mobutu, the rebel leader Laurent Desiré Kabila established the ADLF with support of Rwanda and Uganda and inflicted a war in the Eastern part of the country. The objective to overthrow the regime in Kinshasa succeeded in May 1997 when “Kabila père” proclaimed himself President after Mobutu had fled.

¹⁵ AFP, reliefweb press release, 17th July 2003, source:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/ca6d501465e6065ec1256d6600556fde>

¹⁶ Also derived from fieldnotes.

After one year of relative peace, the second war started (*guerre de rectification*) when rebel forces backed by Uganda and Rwanda attacked Congo with the aim to overthrow the regime of Kabila who had become disloyal to his former allies. The government army that received support of troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe countered these attacks. When Laurent Desiré Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 his son Joseph became president who advanced steps towards peace, envisioned by the Inter-Congolese dialogue held in Sun City, South Africa. The RCD-Goma did however not accept a political solution and pulled out of the process.

The presence of many different armed groups, especially in the eastern part of the country, has led to a continuation of violence. The most recent outbreak of large-scale murder and plundering has occurred in the Ituri area and led to the strengthening of the MONUC, an international peacekeeping force present in the area since November 1999. Their original mandate envisioned tasks in the fields of disarmament and voluntary repatriation of (foreign) troops, facilitation and channelling of humanitarian aid, promotion of respect for human rights and the monitoring of the cease-fire by all parties in the conflict in order to support a political resolution of the conflict, national reconciliation and the establishment of new democratic institutions. Following the massacres in Ituri, a renewed mandate includes this time the deployment of a larger number of soldiers (up to 10800 in the whole of Congo) and the authorization to use armed force in response to human rights violations, even if there is not a direct necessity for self-defence involved (CCAC/GLAN, 2003:17 and UN, 2003).

The political pillar of the peace accord has, under pressure of the international community, led to the installation of a transitional government on the 30th of June 2003. This political solution, in which power will be shared between the rebel strongholds in the East of the country and the central government of Kinshasa, is the start of a two year period in preparation for free and democratic elections in 2005.

The persistence of armed factions in the DR Congo can partly be attributed to the presence of valuable minerals in Congo such as coltan, diamonds, gold, silver, copper, wood and oil. Triggered by the absence of good governance and transparent administrative systems, a warlord system of exploitation was created based on personal enrichment. Not only Congolese elite are guilty of keeping this war economy alive, also the neighbouring countries Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe are earning their share and became diamond exporting countries in the absence of any known diamond production in their own countries (Panel report S/2001/357 in Emeric, 2003: 11). According to several sources, Rwandese soldiers have been moving as far as 1500 kilometres inland, which is not compatible with their argument of protecting their borders. Congo's treasures are thus uncontrollably pillaged and exported to neighbouring and Western countries, thus becoming a crucial factor in the continuation of the war. The manner in which such an economy is organised has prevented the development of a strong and secure market system of primary resources. Not only has this branch never been supported, also the areas that are mainly producing consumer staple food (Eastern Congo, Northwestern Rwanda, Northeast Burundi) have become physically inaccessible due to the ongoing violence. A city like Kinshasa is nowadays lacking food since it can no longer access the hinterlands from which it is depending in terms of food imports.

b. “Ibuka”: Rwanda’s search for solid ground¹⁷

“Concern about the future cannot be regarded as willingness to forget. Forgetting should never be thought of as a passport to social peace. Memory is part of civil peace.”
Bronislaw Geremek, Polish historian and politician (1932)

¹⁷ “Ibuka” is the Kinyarwanda word for “never forget” and has become the leading word in reconciliation processes and the yearly memorial week between the first and 7th of April, the period in which the genocide started in 1994.

Rwanda, one of the smallest countries on the African continent is known for one of the largest human massacres in history. Interhamwe (Hutu militia) organised the genocide of Tutsi and Hutu political opposition destroying the country in a time period a little over 100 days, leaving over 800.000 people hacked to death and many more in exile. Today, almost ten years after the genocide, Rwanda has done major efforts in reconstructing the country and rebuilding social relationships. Despite these positive efforts, it must be mentioned that Rwanda is a country that has two faces. At the same time it is playing an active role in the war that is still enrolling in Eastern Congo. Not only does it have troops on Congolese territory, it is, like Uganda, also engaged in weapon trade. Even though this is known in the country, nobody talks about it. This is partly related to the repressive human rights records of the government that seems to tolerate no opposition. It also receives little foreign attention. Only recently the Dutch government has raised questions about its support to the Rwandan government and serious discussions have arisen about eventual stopping the bilateral support if Rwanda is not redrawing its troops from Congo (MFA, 2003).¹⁸

The nation is composed of three ethnic groups. The Hutu represent 80 percent of the total population and are mainly employed as farmers. The Tutsi, far less in numbers but more powerful and are by tradition pastoralists. The Twa (pygmies) is the smallest tribe and has until now mainly been excluded from political, social and economic decision making processes. The genocide is generally seen as the combined result of socio-economic processes including land shortage and declining agricultural economies; political processes of elite formation and the threat posed by the RPF; the deliberate fostering of ethnic hatred by the elite; and the strong nature of the state that enabled its organization (Des Forges, 1999).¹⁹

Even though Rwanda is currently in a post-conflict phase of reconstruction and reconciliation, collective trauma and distrust between individuals and between individuals and state institutions are deeply effecting the social organization of the country. The tension is present in the air like an electric current but still it remains difficult to grasp the exact meaning and manifestation of trauma. Several aid workers and diplomats in Rwanda reveal their concern about a lasting peace, “underneath the stifling atmosphere frustration continues to simmer”. Delicate issues are difficult to discuss and people translate and interpret them differently according to their interests. Someone mentioned that statements made by the government to change agricultural policy are by some interpreted as a mechanism to discriminate against Hutus, who are most affected by such policies”.²⁰ Indeed, all state interventions such as the reorganization of the country side through the villagization policy (*Imidugudu*, see Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen, 2000) and different measures to enhance security can evoke silent resistance of people who consider them ethnically biased.

In August 2003 the first multiparty elections since 1994 took place. These democratic elections were won by President and RPF leader Paul Kagame with over 95 percent of the votes. Even though the elections were apparently organised in a transparent manner, the issue of disappearance of opposition leaders (MDR) that were accused of “divisionism” by the RPF was quite often mentioned.²¹ Kagame even threatened his rivals in a speech held on the 21 March:

“I can even say that the outcomes of these elections are known. Those elected will be individuals who are 100 percent in line with the current political agenda, aimed at building the country. This will be the case, and I am sure that it is also your view and

¹⁸ From a letter to the Dutch parliament about a secret report of the UN in which Rwanda is blamed for continuing the war in Eastern Congo.

¹⁹ See: Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, by Des Forges, Alison (1999), Human Rights Watch, New York.

²⁰ Interview Rwanda, July 2003

²¹ Divisionism is a term used for people who threaten to undermine national unity by sowing division and hatred among the people. Other people argue that divisionist simply means “not in line with the ruling regime”.

your wish to have national security, unity, development and democracy. Anyone who would bring division- because I know that the views of those who intend to come back are based on division- will not be elected.”²²

An important step forward in the reconciliation process is the installation of the “Gacaca” tribunal. Traditionally, Gacaca courts (grass courts) were used by communities to resolve conflicts between families or neighboring communities and the heads of households/chiefs were deployed as judges. Parts of its original principles are maintained to do justice to the victims by bringing together survivors, witnesses and presumed perpetrators. All of them participate in a debate on what happened in order to establish the truth, draw up a list of victims, identify the guilty and decide on a sentence for those found guilty. Non-professional judges (inyangamugayo) who did receive training on the Gacaca system and how to intervene will chair the debates. Four categories have been established distinguishing the seriousness of the crimes committed and the sentences to be given.

After a long period of preparation, Gacaca has finally started in pilot villages (one per province). Nevertheless, there is still a lot of ignorance about its procedure and the effects it will have on communities. During a training on the principles of Gacaca in Gikongoro Rwanda), organised by Trocaire, a lot of questions rose from the participants.²³ It was for example not understood that somebody who was forced to kill will still be judged for murder. Another example of a question posed by a woman, “Is somebody who closed the door for Tutsi that were on the run for killing militias guilty?”. The response of the trainer, “According to Rwandese law a person in need or danger should be helped, not doing so makes you an accessory.” Even though justice needs to be done somehow and Gacaca is believed to be the most effective way given the total involvement of a country, it is also feared that old wounds will be opened up or people will fear to speak the truth.

c. Burundi

Burundi has received far less foreign attention than its neighbour Rwanda. Yet, Burundi is also suffering from serious political problems since the latest outbreak of (ethnic) violence in 1993 when a coup by the Tutsi army made an end to the life of president Melchior Ndadayé. He had been the first Hutu president in Burundi’s Tutsi dominated political, economic and social history (HRW, 2003: 3-4). The two major rebel forces Palipehutu Force National de Liberation (FNL) and the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) oppose the national Armed Forces of Burundi (FAB). The main issue in the fighting is the inequality of ethnic representation in politics and particularly the army, which is in practice the most influential power of the country and composed of a majority Tutsi. Since 1993 alone, over 300.000 people died in ethnical clashes. According to several respondents, the violence had recently taken on a more extremist orientation, in particular with the rise of sexual violence.

Burundi’s economy is mainly depending on agriculture and has good soils for food production. Since the violence has been concentrated around the capital Bujumbura, with the latest outbreak of fighting last July 2003, the fertile hinterlands can not transport their products to the main consumption centre. Because of the political murders and a relapse into conflict since 1993, the country has suffered for years from an international boycott crippling down economic activities to a minimum. After the sanctions were suspended in 1999, the economy slowly began to rehabilitate. However, until today especially the capital still suffers from a curfew that has been installed by the government almost ten years ago. As long as insecurity persists around Bujumbura, its citizens will not be able to move freely late at night.

On the 8th of October 2003 the government of Burundi and the largest Rebel group (FDD) have signed the latest peace accord in Pretoria (South Africa) in which they agreed to lay down arms and achieve a more equal division of political and military power between the

²² Source: <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503bck.pdf> Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, may 2003.

²³ Fieldnotes, 2nd August 2003.

two largest ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. Even though this political solution seems fruitful, there is still a large stumbling block. A respondent mentioned that efforts of the President to open up negotiations with the main Hutu opposition fail because they tell the President that there is nothing to discuss with the politicians, the real problem lies in the composition of the army. In more secure areas the UNHCR has made a start with the resettlement of refugees that were living in Tanzania for a long time. The people involved in this process can be divided into three groups, the returnees (from Tanzania), those who never left their village and internally displaced from elsewhere within Burundi. In the opinion of the local population too little attention is paid to follow-up activities in order for the returnees to rebuild their lives and reconcile with the past.

Thematic background to the conflict

Congo, Rwanda and Burundi each have their own histories with conflict yet it is also clear that these are related and partly result from common and intertwining factors and processes. Among these factors are the colonial administration, the nature of the state, the ethnicization of conflict, population displacement, land and development issues, the economies of war and the (non)engagement of the international community.

The Belgian colonial administration has had a large impact on the past and current atrocities throughout the region. Especially Congo became a “private company” of the Belgian King Leopold II, who used the country for brutal exploitation of labour and natural resources such as diamonds and rubber. In Rwanda and Burundi a different strategy was chosen in which local people became responsible for the day to day implementation of colonial policy (indirect rule). The Belgians had a preference for the Tutsi part of the population which was reflected in the division of important political positions. Since those two small countries were not strategically interesting given their lack of natural resources, they became not more than an appendix of Congo (Verlinden, 1996). The preoccupation with economic interests has led to a structural neglect of nation building and the development of a strong political class that would be capable of ruling a country after independence. Especially in Rwanda and Burundi, colonial policy has severely aggravated a distinction between Hutu and Tutsi and it is, also by many nationals, still seen as one of the main factors in the violent conflict.

With regard to the role of the state in the Great Lakes crisis, apparently contradictory political systems can be identified. On the one extreme the Rwandese state is characterized by a high level of institutionalization, especially compared to other African states. The distrust of the government towards civil society as healthy counter-power has resulted in very restrictive and repressive laws, as well as harassment, political murders and intimidation of opponents, media and NGOs. Given the fact that Rwanda has experienced several waves of genocide, the government that came to power by military means in a deeply divided society faces the challenge to overcome this fear of political competition along ethnical lines and herewith, a relapse into violence. On the other side a very weak state is found in Congo. The political system under the rule of Mobutu has contributed hardly anything to the development of a healthy state structure that is able to control the whole country. As a response, Congolese civil society has taken on tasks that normally belong to the state’s responsibility and became strong and well-organized. The Burundian state is positioned somewhat in the middle. Even though it is also characterised by a high control of military and political powers, a relatively free and liberal climate is created for and by civil society in the opposition.

What all three countries do have in common, despite their differences in state organisation, are problems they experience with sovereignty and institutional capacities to enforce compliance and to ward off internal and external threats (Douma, P, 2003:93). Despite the presence of apparently well-organised state institutions, such as in Rwanda, or due to the lack of them, as in Congo, have in both situations led to a situation in which the political system became characterised by exclusion and lacks fair and equal access to

decision-making and recourses at the political center. Under these circumstances ethnic and related cultural identities can easily become politicised (Douma, P, et al, 1999: 4).

On the sociocultural level several tendencies can be identified that partly explain the instability of the Great Lakes. The artificial state building during and after colonial times has resulted in a lack of nationalism in a region where people mainly use their community or ethnicity for identification. As mentioned by a respondent “using a country as reference for your identity is not part of our tradition and culture, it is a Western system of classification”. This tendency appears to be strengthened rather than weakened by post-colonial governments in the region. In Rwanda and Burundi states were organised on the basis of ethnic and regional differences and in Congo nation building has never been a priority of the government (Mamdani, 1998). Even though conflict can not be reduced to ethnical aspects, there is no doubt these play an important role in the Great Lakes crisis where conflicts are often ethnicised by rulers who create division to enhance their powers.

Another factor that results from conflict and at the same time contributes to new conflicts are the massive movements of refugees and internally displaced people. One example is that of the Banyamulenge, a group of Rwandan pastoralists that have entered Eastern Congo after they fled the ethnic violence of 1959 in Rwanda. The indigenous population integrated and accepted the Banyamulenge as part of normal life and as part of this settlement process they received land and the Congolese nationality. However, during the genocide of 1994 the Banyamulenge returned to Rwanda in order to defend their Tutsi brothers. After things calmed down they came back to Congo, followed by an influx of different types of militias. From this time onwards, the situation has escalated and the ethnic affiliation of the Banyamulenge with Rwandese Tutsi was used for stirring up problems. In Eastern Congo there has also been friction between the refugee population following the genocide and indigenous communities. These shared their limited resources but did not have access to aid brought in by international emergency NGOs. The Congolese people, who accepted the Rwandan and Burundian refugees just after the genocide find it especially hard to digest that it are also Rwandans who infiltrate their country and are, according to them, continue to be the main source of insecurity in the Eastern provinces.

Land problems, and more over the shortage of land in Rwanda and Burundi, are often seen as an important cause behind the conflict (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999; Melvern, 2000; Prunier, 1995). The region is blessed with fertile soils and reliable rainfalls. Especially the altitude of the hills in Eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi provides a suitable climate for agricultural production and cash crops such as coffee and tea. However, pressure on the land, unequal division of land, the lack of improved agricultural techniques, resulting in soil degradation, and insecurity creates a situation wherein few people can make a decent living in agriculture. This has a large indirect impact on conflict and often leads directly to conflict. For example, the 1973 declaration stated that all land belonged to the state created conflicts over land among the population and inflicted a clash between formal law and traditional law (*loi coutumiere*). Also present day conflict manifests itself locally often in competition and conflict over access to land. Land problems are aggravated by population movements where refugees compete for land and large refugee populations leave the otherwise richly vegetated slopes empty. The pressure on land can also said to be intensified by the high population growth.²⁴ Even though a lot is invested in lowering the birth-rate by family planning methods, the Catholic church is opposing to its modern variants and a lot of people do not support the idea of smaller families.

As mentioned above, natural resources in Congo feed an economy of war that is considered largely responsible for the major conflict in the region. On the other hand, poverty and the lack of employment outside of agriculture also contribute substantially to the vulnerability to conflict in the region. A critical aspect is in this respect the limited access to education, particular for women and girls. Structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and

²⁴ The birth rate in the region is respectively for Burundi 6 children per women, DR Congo 6.7 and Rwanda: 5.6. Source (2003): <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> Burundi.

continued conflict has severely deteriorated the education facilities in the region. The lack of education is demotivating people who find it difficult to see prospects to improve their lives. It is also acknowledged that education stimulates a critical attitude and the ability to reflect on what is said by others, making people more prone to taking warmongering seriously. This is furthered by the lack of quality media exemplified by the notorious role played by Radio Milles Collines during the genocide.

Finally, the response of the international community in the prelude and during the crisis is also considered an important factor in how conflict evolves in the region. The joint evaluation of the Rwanda crisis has concluded that the United Nations and Western governments failed to prevent or halt the genocide. In the aftermath of the genocide a lot of criticism has risen to the support of foreign governments to refugee camps across the borders in Congo and Tanzania since they turned out to be a extremist stronghold in the planning and implementation of their genocidair activities. Likewise, the international community is strongly criticised for its relative neglect of the present war in the region and its victims. The humanitarian interventions of the international community seem to have mixed impacts. It could be said that its distribution is unequal with Rwanda receiving relatively much aid, and especially Congo receiving far too little to meet the humanitarian needs. Whereas many people are deprived of their basic necessities, some segments of the population have been held dependent on aid during their exile. The presence of aid can also be abused by militias and other groups to enhance their own interests.

Implications of the conflict on daily life

This paragraph will highlight some of the complex effects of the violence on the population. Even though these are described as effects, it should be mentioned that they also contribute to the changing causes that continue conflict.

Particularly sexual violence has become an enormous issue in the conflict. Women, girls and even very young children are victims to rape, often by multiple assailants. This is often accompanied by murder of the husband and physical mutilation of (private) parts of the body. It is not uncommon either that men are subjected to sexual assault or are forced to rape their fellow family members or have sex with their livestock.²⁵ In Congo, for example, girls and women are captured and sold to militias and soldiers at a price of US\$ 100-150 per person, to be used for sexual exploitation (CCAC/GLAN, 2003:11 and interviews). The individual and communal trauma caused by such practices is high, the transmission of HIV/Aids is on the increase and exclusion of rape victims and by rape born children deteriorates social fabric.

The extreme poverty and minimal basic living conditions have resulted in a humanitarian crisis in a large part of the region with most others living below the minimal standards. The majority of the population in the Great Lakes is composed of poor farmers that, with a Per Capita income of US\$ 40 Per Annum, can hardly meet the needed level of self-sustainability. An overall decrease in revenues gained from the land and the collapse of feasible market systems have deteriorated food security and insufficient and incomplete feeding patterns result in a very high rate of malnutrition, especially among infants.²⁶ Normally, wealth of a family is measured in terms of heads of cattle but given the fact that the staple of cows in the region has been reduced due to rebel activity and insufficient capital to treat animal illnesses, it is possible to state that poverty has increased.²⁷ Especially the

²⁵ Fieldnotes, 6th August 2003.

²⁶ The rate of malnutrition has been estimated on 27 percent for South Kivu province, making it the most affected area of Congo (UNICEF/USAID, reference derived from evaluation report BDOM Bukavu, August 2003)

²⁷ Before the war started, a large dairy project had been established around Bukavu in order to combat malnutrition. Unfortunately all 400 cows have been stolen and the people involved have become unemployed.

farming population does therefore not have the means to pay for basic needs such as education or health care. Despite a lot of support from NGOs and churches the health centres do not have the means to provide adequate care. Most common illnesses are malaria, tuberculosis and problems like diarrhoea and endemic cholera. Although the level of HIV/Aids infection is believed to be relatively low as opposed to other African countries, with the outrages amount of rape incidences this is surely on the increase.

As a result of the high insecurity in the region and the suffering already experienced, mistrust, hatred, internal displacement and murder have weakened social fabric. Not only have people been chased away from their homelands, also the traditional power of the chiefs and community bonds are no longer in tact. Particularly in terms of trust and peaceful mediation of social disputes by traditional jurisdiction, social disintegration is worsening the violence. People who do no longer feel part of a previous stable community are more likely to fall into the hands of people and groups that offer them protection and an income, as is the case with rebel groups who deploy particularly children as soldiers. As mentioned by several people, local administrative systems are also often disabled deliberately by the ruling militias in the area, either by replacing the chiefs by army commanders or by sowing division among the population.²⁸ In Congo this deterioration of social fabric has intensified beliefs and practices around witchcraft. Under influence of the establishment of small churches of awakening (*les églises de reveille*) certain parts of the population such as children and handicapped become stigmatized as the source of poverty and misery.²⁹ They form an easy scapegoat and are sometimes even expelled from their families.

The effects of conflict are differentiated by gender and age. Most vulnerable appear to be the children. Whether they are orphans, street children, child soldiers or “regular” children, in an impoverished area where quite often the family can not support a large number of children, they are an easy target for recruitment as a soldier or chased away on the streets. Many men are killed or recruited, leaving women to take care of livelihood and childcare.

Conclusions

Without pretending to be complete, this chapter has given an overview of some of the causes and consequences of conflict in the Great lakes region. The countries concerned each have their own history with conflict, yet these histories are also strongly intertwined. In different ways, conflicts concern disturbed state-society relations, combine multiple causes and inflict immense suffering on the populations, deeply affecting social fabric in the process. It is in this context that local NGOs have emerged and struggle to uphold their motivation, use their creativity to respond to the ever changing situations meet the always overwhelming needs of their clients and face (violent) threats of their organizations and persons.

²⁸ It is not uncommon that a village becomes divided due to partial loyalty to, for example, the RCD-Goma and the Mai-Mai.

²⁹ Fieldnotes Kinshasa, June-July 2003.

Chapter 5 Local capacities for peace

“If there is no aid, there will be no peace and reconciliation. How aid is used depends on the people; if it is misused it creates conflict, if it is managed well it can contribute to peace. However, not only the ones who give aid should decide upon a good structure, vision and organisation. The people who receive aid are equally responsible for its positive allocation”.
(FOR, Rwanda).

This chapter discusses NGOs and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region. The chapter starts with the Cordaid programme in the region, followed by local definitions of peacebuilding and the motivations that lie at the base of peace interventions. Then the practice of peacebuilding will be discussed, the choices of target groups and aspects of learning in the NGOs. Throughout the chapter a distinction will be made between the approaches that occur in the different countries and within different types of organisations, such as for example development NGOs and human rights NGOs.

Cordaid in the Great lakes region

The partner network of Cordaid in the Great Lakes dates back since before Cordaid came into existence as a result of the merger when, especially, *Mensen in Nood* was funding many health projects in the region. Currently, Cordaid is supporting four emergency organisations and 51 development organisations in DR Congo of which about ten focus specifically on peacebuilding and human rights issues. In both Rwanda and Burundi seven development organisations are funded besides the emergency aid programs that Cordaid implements itself in four provinces of Burundi.

The difference in numbers of partners can be explained because DR Congo is the only country designated “concentration country” of Cordaid in the region. This means that Cordaid commits itself to establish long-term relationships. Due to the interwovenness of the problems on a region level in the Great Lakes, Rwanda and Burundi have been added to the project portfolio and herewith the whole region has become a “concentration region” where peacebuilding activities are concerned. Apart from Peace and Conflict, Cordaid has adopted three other core themes for the region, i.e. urban livelihood, health and care, and HIV/Aids. The financial commitment by the year 2006 per theme is divided as follows (Cordaid 2003c):

Theme	Budget	% Budget
Urban livelihood	1.362.000	35
Access to markets	255.000	7
Health and care	1.152.034	30
Peace and conflict	703.000	18
HIV/Aids	350.000	10
Total	3.822.034	100
RWANDA		
Peace and conflict	430.838	81
HIV/Aids	100.000	19
Total	530.838	100
BURUNDI		
Peace and conflict	324.670	76
HIV/Aids	100.000	24
Other	0	0
Total	424.670	100

In Congo Cordaid channels emergency aid through its partners, in Burundi it has implemented emergency programmes and in Rwanda the structural department is now responsible for a program in the province of Cyangugu that pays particular attention to linkage since it was previously under the emergency aid department. In Burundi, Cordaid maintains a large office that provides access to health facilities in four of the provinces by operating mobile health clinics. This office with over 80 employees and a represents one of the largest international programmes in the Country. The programme avails of one expatriate manager, the other managers and all staff are Burundese. The programme in Burundi explicitly aims to suit the aim of linkage between relief and development and is designed to become sustainable in the long run. In the province of Cyangugu of Rwanda the structural department of Cordaid implements a health project which has been taken over from the emergency aid department. In cooperation with a large-scale decentralisation program of the Dutch Embassy in Rwanda, Cordaid has started to apply a strategy of performance based payment through a contractual approach. This means that local health clinics will receive an amount of financial support according to the number of activities they fulfil in a given period of time. The indicators that are used are defined by Cordaid itself after thorough consultation of the needs and wishes of health clinic personnel and beneficiaries of the program. Through the stimulation of local facilities and the support to health infrastructure, it is hoped that people will get more power over their own institutions. Because this program was previously an emergency aid program, specific attention is paid on how linkage between emergency aid and structural development can be put in practice. In the Cordaid office of Cyangugu the program is seen as very successful. According to the country manager this can also be attributed to creation of a strong and motivated team. The high level of social exchange build on trust rather than on hierarchical structures makes it a exemplary project in the region.

Besides its presence through these emergency programmes, Cordaid maintains small offices for its regular programmes in Kinshasa in Congo. Given the vastness of the country and the limited number of personnel, recently a second liaison office has been opened in Bukavu. This office will be responsible for the exploration of opportunities for Cordaid intervention in the Kivu provinces, including the heavily touched area of Ituri. The mandates of both liaison offices does not reach very far since the end responsibility for establishing new relationships lies at the Hague. However, there was a wish from many local NGOs to increase the Cordaid presence in the region so that cooperation can become more regular and the partners can herewith increase their understanding of Cordaid policies and intervention theories.

Civil society and conflict in the Great Lakes region

Looking at the different NGOs that count peacebuilding as part of their objectives, several types of organisation are represented in the portfolio of Cordaid. Most of these NGOs were included in the fieldwork and annex 2 provides a list of all the visited NGOs and their core activities³⁰. In general, a division can be made according to the main focus or pedigree of the organizations, i.e. on development, emergency aid, human rights or women.³¹. Yet, this division is at the same time difficult to make given the overlap of activities.

³⁰ Note that the portfolio of Cordaid is broader and includes a number of health programmes implementing emergency programmes without explicitly addressing peace.

³¹ Note that human rights organisations also differ in their approach. In particular, a distinction can be made between legal-oriented NGOs whose staff mainly consists of lawyers and education-oriented NGOs whose staff may comprises in addition paralegals, social workers and others. The first type of NGO engages in the juridical assistance of people that are (arbitrary) kept in detention and monitor humanitarian conditions in prisons (facilities, torture etc). The second largest category, including Groupe Jérémie, ASOP, Heritiers de la

For peacebuilding activities, church-related partners are important for the Cordaid programme in the region. CDJP (Commission Diocesaine Justice et Paix), created in late 1980s, is one of the departments within the Catholic Church that engages in peacebuilding activities. CDJP was the first institutional structure that engaged in the field of human rights denunciations and training in the Great Lakes region. Its primary preoccupation is to engage people at the grassroots (*méthode de rapprochement*) and stimulate conflict resolution on a community level from a Christian perspective. Given their “antennas” in the field, they are often the first ones aware of violations in relative isolated places.

The ways in which peacebuilding is shaped by NGOs depends partly on the organization and strength of civil society. DR Congo has for a long time lacked a strong central state that took responsibility for the provision of basic services (article 15 of the Constitution explicitly called upon the citizens to take care of themselves: *Debrouillez-vous*). The relative absence of internal and cross-border problems in the time prior to 1990s, the relative high-level education system inherited from the Belgian Jesuits and the gap Congolese organization had to fill in the face of total state neglect, made civil society organisations a strong and powerful social force. Particularly in Eastern Congo a vast number of human rights NGOs has also evolved in response to the massive abuses of human rights that had evoked an internal counter force to violations.³⁵ Now that the Congolese state has officially entered a phase towards a new and democratic central government, many of the civil organisations face the challenge to transform their activities from “protest to proposal” and to redefine their relation with the authorities. One success in maximizing the new opportunities was reported by a woman representative who told they had succeeded to have 30 women represented in the transitional parliament.

Contrary to Congo, Rwanda hardly knows an independent civil society. Before as well as after the genocide the country has experienced a strong state system that operates through civil control structures. Although there is an active associational life and development NGOs or church decisions have always existed, these are rather state-controlled and have never developed an independent or oppositional attitude towards the government. As mentioned by Unsworth and Uvin, Rwandese have learned that it is better not to stick their neck out. Added on to the trauma and distrust experienced by individuals, state institutions and civil society organisations, Rwanda lacks the confidence, experience and open space for the emergence of civil society (Unsworth and Uvin, 2002). Even though Burundi seems to have a lot in common with Rwanda, for example when looking at the causes of conflict, civil society is structured differently. Burundi also has a strong state which depends largely on military control. In this context, civil organisations in Burundi could evolve better and NGOs in the country are very active and form a strong force, partly in opposition to and partly in conjunction with the government.

In each of the countries civil society is also strongly affected by the ongoing conflicts, both at the level of the organizations as for the staff. NGO staff is as affected by conflict as their clients either directly or by carrying the burden transmitted to them by their clients, which is especially the case for trauma councillors. NGOs are often targeted by armed groups. During an outbreak of violence it happens that NGOs shut down and the employees themselves need to flee or are murdered, as special targets or because they were simply at the wrong time in the wrong place. A question that rises is whether enough attention is being paid to the effects such traumatic experiences have on NGO actors and their organizations. A trauma councillor in Rwanda mentioned that they hardly have opportunities of debriefing with colleagues. She finds it difficult to forget about emotional impressive testimonies and

Justice PLD and others engage in addition in trauma counselling, denunciation of violations, training on human rights and lobby activities.

often takes her work home. Additionally a Congolese lawyer who is defending victims of human rights abuses revealed that it is not uncommon that his clients are waiting at his doorstep imposing their problems onto his private life.³² Another effect of conflict is that NGO actors are often overburdened by people depending on their income, including orphaned cousins and other destitute relatives for who they may represent the only salaried family member.

NGO work is also affected by the conflict in many ways. As is the case in the Great Lakes region, many areas that are far away or under the control of armed militias have become inaccessible. Undertaking a journey by car or lorry from, for example, Bukavu to Kamituga (Eastern Congo), only 180 kilometers away, can take up to one week due to the numerous roadblocks. Another importance aspect is the legitimacy and trust gained by the population at large. Even though NGOs can enhance their reliability by maintaining equal representation in their staff in terms of ethnic or regional origin, especially in a conflict situation NGOs are easily associated with only a part of the population and militias often believe that they conspire against them. Such stigmatization is difficult to avoid and it takes a lot of efforts to (re)gain trust and respect of the communities for which an NGO works.

A more ambiguous effect on civil society is related to the influx of foreign donors in the Great Lakes Region. This has the positive effect that established NGOs find it relatively easy to secure funding. On the other hand, the availability of funds has also elicited the emergence of many new NGOs that not only compete for funds but who may be too opportunistic or lack competence to deliver quality NGO work thereby damaging the reputation of the quality organizations.

NGO views on conflict and peacebuilding

Indigenous NGOs in the Great Lakes region are convinced that the interest in peacebuilding has been introduced by international NGOs. Some admit that they have initially taken on their commitment to peacebuilding to meet donor demands and to take the opportunity of available funding. The response of NGOs to the perceived foreign introduction of the theme is diverse. Some respondents view the theme as a fashion that will soon be replaced by a next issue and privately reject the attention for peacebuilding as an imposition from outside. Other respondents emphasize that although the label is new, they already consciously responded to conflict in their activities and that the theme complements and reinforces their former activities.

Even though NGOs already addressed conflict in their own ways that does not mean that they are proficient or familiar with theories and notions that have become common among international NGOs. Partner NGOs of Cordaid hardly use the notions that Cordaid has adopted in its criteria for peacebuilding, nine out of ten organizations has never heard of the do-no-harm principle. This does not mean of course that they do not apply the principle in practice any way, but that they have not translated theories into a clear vision or policy. This leads to a situation in which local NGOs find it difficult to engage in dialogue in the terms used by their international supporters.

The practical theories by which NGOs approach conflict and peacebuilding is strongly contextual and based on different (perceived) realities. In Rwanda, the genocide has left deep wounds in society and “Never again” has become almost a national slogan forging development and motivating people to look forward and seek reconciliation. Rwandan NGOs view peacebuilding mainly as recreating trust in their society and contributing to healing and reconciliation. Remarkably, none of the NGOs openly challenges the Rwanda government’s

³² Fieldnotes Rwanda and Bukavu, July-August 2003.

military ventures in the DRC and the atrocities committed in that country, which is telling of the repressive atmosphere in the country. In Congo, the conflict is viewed almost completely as a conflict waged by foreign aggressors, notably Rwanda and Uganda. Peacebuilding thus starts with condemning (external) violence. Education aims to make people resilient to oppose their oppressors rather than aiming to enhance a culture of tolerance within the country. In Burundi, peacebuilding activities aim to address ethno-regional differences. NGOs consider the need to build bridges between the Hutu and Tutsi, but also between the government and the military, and the economic elite and the poor masses. This notion of peacebuilding appears partly motivated to avoid similar patterns of violence such as happened in Rwanda.

For people at the grassroots, the clients of the NGOs, the term “peace” appears in the first place associated with physical and mental personal well being. As mentioned by a Rwandese woman, whose husband was in prison since the genocide, she could only find peace if her husband returned and her burden of running a household would be alleviated. Others mentioned that “peace” meant the time when they would be able to work again on their remote plots of land that were now insecure due to the presence of rebels. Peace of mind is thus very much related to peace in the stomach.

Cross-cutting concerns

a. Peace, justice and democratization.

Human rights organizations emphasize that peacebuilding must be reflected in the respect and embeddedness of justice in society. The enforcement of law institutions and increased capacities of the population to defend their rights are seen as part of the definition of peacebuilding. Even though the human rights activists present in the workshop in Bujumbura, found it important to combine human rights works with peacebuilding they found it difficult to do so in practice. As they explained, in order to be effective, human rights activists have to take an active and sometimes aggressive approach. Through denunciations of violence and by seeking the confrontation with authorities, they aim to change unacceptable practices. For peacebuilding activities, in their view, a more soft approach to negotiations, agreements and mediation is more effective. As became clear from the workshop held in Bujumbura (September 2003), local NGOs working in the Great Lakes region doubt the feasibility of integrating the two types of intervention and considered that seeking complementarity and co-ordination between the two might be better³³.

Development organizations, like their clients, emphasize that poverty reduction and the provision of services is a form of peacebuilding. They find it important to combine training and awareness raising on conflict prevention and conflict resolution with the provision of basic services such as schooling, food and healthcare.

Of course both types of NGOs are not mutually exclusive since overlap exists in their approaches and intervention strategies. An inventory of activities from the 17 partner NGOs represented during the Bujumbura workshop revealed that NGOs in the region usually develop a large number of activities in different domains simultaneously (see table below). However, the table does not reveal the degree to which and how integration is put in

³³ It is interesting to note that in a similar workshop in West Africa, NGOs have positive experiences with actually linking the two kinds of activity. Although this is still a rather recent development, it began with the organization of regional exchange forums. The West African Network of Peacebuilding (WANEP) has taken lead in this process and aims at identifying point of commonality and brings together organizations of a different pedigree in order to open up ways for cooperation.

practice, raising the question if an integrated vision should always be translated in an integrated approach as well or whether NGOs should better concentrate on a number of core activities and seek complementarities with other NGOs through co-ordination mechanisms.

	diplomatie officiel	gestion informel de paix	mesures militaires	mesures économique/ sociales	mesures politique et gouvernance	mesures judiciaires et légales	communication et éducation		
population générale	4	41	2	26	38	43	30	184	49%
groupes cibles: femmes	11	10	0	28	7	9	3	68	18%
groupes cibles: enfants	0	2	0	11	1	1	8	23	6%
groups cibles stratégique	19	4	12	6	37	19	6	103	27%
	34	57	14	71	83	72	47	378	100%

b. Cross-cutting themes

Apart from Cordaid a large number of other international NGOs are present in the region, mostly focusing their projects around main and rather safe urban centres. Even though accessing the hinterlands is difficult and dangerous, some do try to assist the heavily affected areas of for example Southern South Kiva (Fizi, Mwenga, Shabunda, Kama), the areas around the Ruzizi plain, Uvira, Kalehmi and Bunjakiri (DR Congo) and the rural areas around Bujumbura and Bubanza (Burundi). Even though the local NGOs are invited to co-ordination meetings organised by OCHA, they generally feel excluded and are of the opinion that the international structure is not working efficiently. Several respondents argued that most international NGOs structures do not co-operate with local counterparts and the majority has not been set up to build local capacities. The international emergency NGOs hardly pay attention to peacebuilding.

A lot of the Cordaid partners in the Great Lakes region engage in lobby activities in order to reach a large public, particularly in relation to the denunciation of human rights violations. Lobbying is important to raise awareness and create international sympathy for the conflicts taking place in the Great Lakes region. The crisis in the Great Lakes is a forgotten crisis and does not receive as much attention as for example Iraq. The Congolese interviewees complain that the international community is biased towards Rwanda out of a guilt complex after the genocide. In order to establish a better coordination of training and lobby activities with regard to the denunciation of human rights violations, many networks

have been established such as RADHOSKI (DR Congo) and LDGL (Rwanda/Great Lakes). Although the NGOs find lobby important and devote time to it, the impact on the international organizations is not clear which may be related to that the lobbying seems not clearly targeted and directed.

Peacebuilding in practice

A major activity of NGOs is to support the creation of local non-formal intervention strategies for peace. Throughout the Great Lakes region, indigenous NGOs have very much stimulated the local population to set up informal or voluntary local peace committees that are responsible for identifying sources of community conflict and finding solutions to settle the problem and improve community cohesion through peaceful conflict resolution. Also in the Great Lakes region quite many local groupings that have no status as NGO or organisation have come into existence and try to improve the living conditions in their own area or village. In general they aim to tighten community bonds and also prove quite effective in resolving community conflicts about land, cattle or other social tensions like adultery or polygamy.

A good example of such a local peace initiative is the peace commission of Kalehe (Eastern Congo). Since the presence of rebels increased, many people got engaged in pig raising because those animals are less vulnerable to looting by rebels. A side effect of these animals is that they destroy crops on the fields of other villagers. Given the scarcity of food, this creates social conflict that sometimes even results in murder. The peace committee has been attributed the task to hear both parties and then tries to mediate by suggesting a compensation for the affected families. In Kalehe they agreed upon a restitution of the damaged crops and particular hours of the day when the pigs can be herded outside. For the rest of the day they are expected to be kept near the house in a stable. It is interesting to mention that these informal peace committees are seen as very successful in this particular village. Not only have they reduced community conflicts, also it has resulted in a dropping number of cases that are eventually reported to official juridical systems such as the police, provincial tribunals or district commissioners.³⁴

Although these local initiatives tend to be voluntary, in general they do avail of support of NGOs that created a network among these initiatives. By this means the NGO secure a large representation of the grassroots and a somehow transparent structure for the implementation of activities. For example RECIC (Kinshasa) has bonds with numerous member NGOs that work in the different urban areas and marginalised neighbourhoods of the capital. These groupings collect information and are responsible of a large part of the civic education activities. RECIC, in this respect, is not an implementing organisation itself but offers financial, material and/or human support to their members.

A point of criticism is that the availability of funding leads to a mushrooming of such member organisations. As was mentioned in rural Bukavu, some community members participate in more than three different network organisations, casting doubt on their real motivation and the effectiveness of their participation.

Reconciliation is a very important term in the Great Lakes region and refers to renewed social organisation based upon trust, respect and love. Forgiveness of what has happened, especially in Rwanda, plays an important role. When looking at intervention for peace by local NGOs, it is remarkable that necessary aspects of reconciliation processes is the attention for awareness raising and civil education throughout the region. Development

³⁴ Respondents have also mentioned a contradictory aspect of the success of conflict resolution by local peace committees. The decrease of official jurisdiction has led to a situation in which the administration is not very happy with the establishment of local peace committees. Normally they were the ones mediating in civil cases and they used to get paid for it. Nowadays they have lost this additional source of income.

NGOs and human rights activists argue that the severe lack of information on human rights and non-violent conflict resolution makes people more vulnerable to conflict because they do not have the skills to counter insurgencies and do not know where to go to if their rights are violated or conflict occurs. Before people can reconcile, they need to understand the context in which it should take place. Many NGOs therefore engage in training sessions and workshops of which four domains are distinguished:³⁵

- Education on human rights (basic knowledge and the identification and follow-up of violations);
- Education on active non-violence by improving skills of denunciation and the organisation of demonstration and written material on violations;
- Education on conflict resolution by providing skills of mediation;
- Education in the field of peace and development by accompanying a development activity with a “message of peace”.

Another aspect that is seen as important, particularly by the human rights NGOs, is the direct juridical assistance in cases where human rights have been violated. In addition, these programs target authorities who are responsible for handling cases in a fair and transparent way. Complemented by training, lobbying and denouncing violations on paper or radio transmissions, it is hoped that the number of violations decrease and the attitude of officials and conditions in prisons change.

A focus on human rights issues alone falls short in the opinion of NGOs in the Great Lakes. As mentioned by several respondents, *sans pain il n'y a pas de paix*. They believe it is useful to combine attempts to improve the living conditions of the population with a peacebuilding and reconciliation component. NGOs have therefore put in place projects that aim at improving livelihoods by generating a sustainable income, intervening in the following fields:

- Micro finance in nature that rotates among the community;
- Agricultural support such as improved farming techniques, pastoral activities, fishery, agro-forestry, apiculture;
- Construction of houses for displaced people;
- Construction of water wells and boreholes
- Reconstruction of basic infrastructure like schools, other educational institutions and hospitals.

For example AFCECF (*Association des Femmes Cadre pour l'Epanouissement Integrale de la Femme*), in cooperation with UNDP (United Nations Development Program), has initiated a rotative micro credit system in the village of Njantende (Eastern Congo). All the members (about 270 women and several men) of the local associations were called for a meeting in which the project was explained. PNUD will support half of the members by donating a goat, a hoe, tree kilos of maize seeds and five kilos of beans. Based on a rotary credit system, the beneficiaries have to give the inputs to the other half of the members after one agricultural season (including the mother goat after it has given birth). According to the responsible of AFCECF these types of micro credit increase community awareness. Since the goods need to be paid back, people will feel responsibility and since the other half of the community will benefit afterwards, social control secures the conditions in which the goods are kept and stimulate cooperation. If rebels would steal a goat, the whole community would be

³⁵ This particular division has been created by the Episcopal Church of Congo. A specific pillar of their intervention, the RIO-program, focuses on the development of a coherent peacebuilding policy. Also activities are defined and ways in which evaluation and monitoring can be established.

responsible to replace the missing goat. The need to cooperate results in more understanding of each other and such communities serve as example for surrounding villages.

Despite the risks involved in material support, all NGOs argued that they can not stop their activities following attacks or looting considering the high needs of their clients. What have such projects to do with peacebuilding? For example, micro credit programs in the Great Lakes works mainly with rotative credit because the sustainability is more certain. On the one hand, credit in the form of animals or seeds might form a source of conflict with regard to the risk of looting and to a lesser extent, conflicts between communities who do and do not profit. On the other hand, if conflict sensitive mechanisms are put in place misuse of material goods can be avoided. To begin with, the social context is identified and the likeliness of looting is taken into account beforehand and if necessary a choice is made to donate sheep or pigs instead of goats³⁶, or to stress the need to keep animals in *stabilisation libre* rather than being left to roam around freely. Also, pilot projects are tested in relative stable areas. If successful, such activities will be implemented as well in the more inaccessible areas as well. By estimating the needs and wishes of the target groups and exploring the opportunities of a project and its setting, failure is minimised. Rather they seek for solutions among the communities, for example by making them responsible for the sustainability of goods (replacing of losses). Rotative credit is seen as increasing social control and enhances local management of the project because all beneficiaries involved benefit in turns. Furthermore this system offers the opportunity to gather people around a specific interest and by cooperation they will more easily accept “the other”. Community education on rights, plights and acceptable behaviour can be given at the same time, which together is seen as an indirect mechanism to peacebuilding.

Reconciliation is seen as important on the individual level. Many NGOs have therefore started programs that focus on the trauma that came along with the killings and rapes. The trauma healing project of Mbwira Ndumva Initiative that focuses on both Hutu and Tutsi women, is a good example. Through individual sessions with psychologists, people can tell their story. Group sessions show the people that they are not alone and relieves the burden of shame and humiliation. Exchanging experiences between individuals of the Hutu and Tutsi side creates the understanding that everybody has suffered, removing the prejudices that it were only “them” who killed “us”. According to Mbwira Ndumva Initiative, focussing on psychological trauma alone is not enough. In a poor country where the victims of the genocide have little to spend, it is very important to create an income and to provide basic needs such as housing. For example some widows who were afraid to go back to their hometowns have got a small house in one of the suburbs of Kigali. Besides that they obtained a small starting capital that needs to be paid back with which they began small shops, increasing their self-esteem.

In the opinion of local NGOs, reconciliation and peacebuilding needs to be started at a level in which conflicts are prevented. An NGO in Bukavu, Group Jérémie, has taken this up by organising so-called “camps of peace”. Given family hardships, children are already on a young age exposed to death, hatred and violence and develop a mistrust towards “the other”. By familiarising students with their rights and plights in society a culture of peace will be established among the youth. Every Friday afternoon about 100 students from different schools in Bukavu (Eastern Congo) gather and discuss a central theme like tolerance, by making use of stories and role-plays, (often based on the bible). Discussions are held about, for example, tolerance for prostitution and street children. Both groups have increased as

³⁶ A practical example, as mentioned in a report about the models of intervention for Kivu, goats are more likely to be stolen because they are able to run much faster than sheep (CREDAP, 2000).

result of the conflict and at the same time are very stigmatised by the population. The children were taught that judging at a first instance is short sighted. Stimulated to search for causes, the reasons why somebody becomes a prostitute and possible solutions were discussed. The moral of such gatherings is to stimulate neutrality in a conflict. Listening to both parties involved in order to understand the cause of the disagreement and searching for solutions is much better than taking sides immediately.

Target groups and beneficiaries

An important aspect of the reality of peacebuilding are the choices NGOs in the Great Lakes region make around their beneficiaries. A main target group of differently mandated NGOs is formed by women and children who are considered most vulnerable. Children are seen as vulnerable given their lack of education, the poor living conditions and their susceptibility to psychological manipulation. In principle this means that children are prone to end up on the streets or to be mobilised for the rebel forces that promise them a better life, food, an income and a powerful weapon. Women are seen as the main victims of a conflict, since they suffer from forced sexual violence and are often left with the responsibility of childcare and the generation of livelihood. Women are also considered strategic target groups for organizations who aim to improve the situation of children and NGOs that want to enhance peacebuilding, since women are considered to be important agents in the transmission of values.

This categorisation of women and children tends to depict them as passive individuals that are inactive in any process of change. This is especially problematic in relation to women who are in fact brought under the same category as children. This overlooks the powerful role many women play in their societies. Another point of discussion is that men are rarely targeted for their vulnerability even though many men are subject to traumatizing events, forced to commit sexual acts or mutilated. The number of male casualties as a direct result of the war is also much higher. It might be worthwhile to explore this issue to recognize male suffering and also as a strategy to address the social problems that may be caused by men suffering from trauma and displaying aggressive behaviour.

Notable is the NGO engagement with so-called *strategic target groups* such as administrative organs, the army, rebels, police, judges and prison personnel. Investing in this category of people is seen as necessary in order to address some causes of the conflict. A number of NGOs has developed training programme to sensitize judicial officials to treat people more humanely. The targeting of strategic groups is also a kind of scaling up of NGO activities who reason that educating people about their rights is hardly useful when they can not count on authorities when they are victimised.

Apart from the special target groups, NGOs focus on the poor farming population as well as urban poor, particularly for income generating projects. It is argued that in order to achieve a more peaceful society, the direct needs of people need to be satisfied and small micro-credits can help them to gain a small income in order to secure family survival. In order to disseminate activities to the lowest levels, NGOs use community leaders as primary focal point. It is argued that people who form a spill in communities are able to set an example and diffuse information easily. When it comes to "general" training issues, for example on human rights, men form the majority of the participants. When the subject is more gender-specific, for example training on how to start a micro-credit program in a village, women are identified as leader since they are the ones mainly engaged in agricultural production and micro enterprises.

Particularly in Burundi and Rwanda, a lot of attention is paid to the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced. These beneficiaries are often difficult to

identify since people never remain idle in one place. It is remarkable that these tasks are mainly implemented by the large international agencies, whereas local NGOs are left out and deal marginally with psycho-social care and income generation after repatriation has taken place.

There are very few NGOs that engage in projects from a narrow ethnical perspective. In Congo this can on the one hand probably be attributed to the relative peaceful cohabitation of the more than 350 tribes present in the country. On the other hand there are some organizations in Congo that tackle local conflicts over natural resources in which different ethnic groups are playing a part (e.g. in the Kivus and in Fizi territory) which does imply some ethnical NGO involvement. For the neighbouring countries Rwanda and Burundi it was observed that NGOs in general try their best not to invoke ethnic based division and therefore it is tried to organise an organisation in such a way that all groups are represented in the composition of staff and beneficiaries. There was a Burundian example in which a justice and human rights NGO split up because they faced problems because the Hutu members felt subsumed. Two NGOs are now working on the same topic. Even though it might seem that both organisations work solely for their own (ethnic) interest groups, the representative of the recent established counterpart denied this and it was difficult to reveal their actual engagement.

In a conflict situation it is very important to adapt projects to the needs and wishes of beneficiaries. The comment was often raised that initiatives and activities of organisations in the Great Lakes region are little supported by the people for whom they are meant. Either they are too ambitious or they do not comply with the living conditions. One could for example wonder whether it is useful to train a community on formal state law (which article says what) whereas they have never used this law nor do they have enough food to meet basic living conditions. As mentioned by several respondents “you can not eat knowledge in the short run”.³⁷

Learning organizations

In the workshop in Bujumbura, it was concluded that most NGO participants are well aware of the professional requirements in handling projects and many of them were familiar with tools to analyse conflict and other knowledge. Yet, the situation in which they work seldom permits to implement their activities ‘according to the book’ and they have to be very creative and flexible to respond to the challenges posed by these situations.

The challenge thus becomes to develop approaches that allow NGOs to work in unpredictable or even chaotic conditions without losing direction. Anchors to hold on to in practice are the specialization of the NGOs, their mandates, their working methods and the confidence and motivation they derive from their values. Nonetheless it was realized that the flexibility required from them in practice requires that the NGOs improve their learning capacity and continue to invest in their human resources.

Currently, learning seems to be lacking in the NGOs. Although most staff members attend a multiplicity of workshops and meetings in which mutual exchange facilitates the development of new ideas, it is not always clear how learning relates to their own experience and how this helps them to make the decisions required in everyday- practice. Another obstacle to individual and organizational learning that plays particularly a role in large institutions, such as for example the Catholic Church, is its hierarchical structure in which reference needs to be made to a higher ranked authority (Dijkhorst and Hilhorst, 2003).

³⁷ Fieldnotes.

Discussion of peacebuilding intervention

This paragraph sheds some light on several issues that are disputed within local NGOs in DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi about the concept “peacebuilding”.

a. *Timeliness and ownership of interventions*

When looking at the history of violence in the Great Lakes region, one of questions raised concerns the timing of true reconciliation and peacebuilding. The question is whether it is feasible to try to accelerate these processes by outside interventions. In Rwanda it was often mentioned that the time that has passed since 1994 is too little, wounds will only heal over generations, as was the case after the Second World War in Europe. This relates to the question whether peacebuilding is the responsibility of international NGOs and if so, what approach should be taken. Inspired by the Gacaca procedure in Rwanda, the question how NGOs can reinforce traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution has gained importance. However, the usefulness of a pure focus on traditional conflict settlement doubted by the population because the local chiefs are no longer a neutral party in their community. Bribed by armed groups, they have lost the confidence of the people and reinforcing their power could deteriorate the situation.³⁸ A plea exists for the creation and support of other local structures (peace committees) that can resolve local conflicts through a mix between traditional and modern ways of jurisprudence. These structure would build on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution but do not depend on traditional hierarchy of power.

b. *Peacebuilding as a meaningful add-on to development work*

Many NGOs that deal with micro-credit programs have moulded these projects into a peacebuilding perspective. Whereas they are primarily designed to generate income, it is believed that the improvement of the living conditions and the necessity to cooperate in the project will increase the level of community responsibility and awareness about peaceful cohabitation. Nevertheless, it seems that many organisations believe that adding on some messages to their clients alongside regular development projects is already doing peacebuilding. In line with this, the fieldwork reinforced the observation that it is difficult to make peacebuilding visible and concrete once the idea is abandoned that peacebuilding is a separate approach and mainstreaming is considered. When doing the fieldwork almost everything was presented as relevant for peacebuilding and reconciliation, making efforts on peacebuilding little transparent.

c. *Designing organizations for peace.*

It turns out that peacebuilding is not simply what an organization does, but the impact depends on how the NGO is organized. The effectiveness and credibility of peacebuilding relate to and can be enhanced through many different dimensions of the organizations, including :

- The composition and role of the Board of Directors
- The composition of the management and staff (origin, ethnicity, gender)
- The space for peacebuilding in the organogram of the organization.
- Decision making structures
- Application of values of democracy and justice within the organization
- Financial organization
- Evaluation et learning

³⁸ Fieldnotes, discussion with representants of several parts of Kivu province during a workshop organized by Heretiers de la Justice, 14th August 2003.

- Human Resource development
- Personnel security

Even though it is very important for Cordaid's legitimacy and credibility to 'know' their partners, in the practice of Cordaid partners, these kind of considerations are not easily be made explicit. Partners are apparently not used to reflect on the implications of the adoption of values or policy choices for their own organization and if they do all kinds of interest related to the conflict hamper putting it in practice. Or, as Mahatma Gandhi would say: "Be the change you want to see in the world". In the case of peacebuilding these kind of issues can have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the organization. The issue given attention in the Great Lakes Region is the representativeness of staff, although not all partners agree that they should develop a deliberate policy on this matter.

d. Risks that NGO work contributes to conflict

When talking to the partners it appears that a certain loss of assets to people antagonistic to peace, through looting or by being forced to pay bribes to gain access to target groups, is inevitable. As elaborated above, NGOs in the Great Lakes are very creative in finding ways to minimize these risks, but nonetheless they also related of incidents where they felt they had failed to properly assess the situation at hand. An NGO actor in Bukavu related how they had once chosen local representatives who were not trusted by the community and thus induced local conflict. In Burundi a NGO that employed Hutu and Tutsi has now split up in two organizations. The question remains whether such NGOs still work for the people at large or whether they have become oriented more towards particular segments of society.³⁹ It is important that NGOs create an atmosphere in which they can discuss these issues and develop guidelines on what risks to take and what losses to incur without jeopardizing their internal value or outside credibility.

e. Identification and measurement of results

NGOs in the Great Lakes region are very modest about changes they achieve. Not only is positive change rarely attributed to their own work, also they doubt the possibilities to identify hardcore indicators to peace. When the partners talk about their achievements they use a mixture of basic indicators and qualitative observations, including:

- the number of families that bring food to imprisoned family member and/or friends;
- community work (for example exchange work in planting, weeding and harvesting);
- the creation of associations in which both ethnies are represented;
- the number of people that ask for forgiveness and the number of people who do forgive;
- reintegration of ex-prisoners in the communities;
- marriages between the Hutu and Tutsi and mutual presence on wedding parties;
- increasing sense of safety and unity;
- the growing openness of people to talk about the war;

These issues reflect obvious changes in society for insiders, but are hard to make solid in the eyes of outsiders. On the one hand, this implies that Cordaid and other donors will have to find ways to accommodate and evaluate soft claims of their partners. On the other hand, partners also expressed that they find it a priority to develop indicators and methods to measure the effect of peacebuilding to enhance their motivation and learning capacity.

³⁹ Fieldnotes Bukavu and Burundi, August-September 2003.

Conclusions

Cordaid has recently selected peacebuilding as one of the core themes of its humanitarian and development work. How to give meaning to this policy choice in practice is a long process that involves the staff of Cordaid as well as representatives of its partners in the field. In October 2002, Cordaid commissioned an interactive research project to study how this process is shaped by staff working with the theme and to identify local practices of peacebuilding. The study is conducted by Disaster Studies of Wageningen University.

Cordaid also aims to be a learning organization, which implies that the choice for peacebuilding as a policy focus is not imposed on the organization but is allowed to evolve from a process in which different initiatives articulate. Hence, while this research project was undertaken in close dialogue with a support group from within the organization, a peace and conflict policy group was active writing a policy paper and consultation rounds were held with partners in different conflict areas. Two important policy documents came out in the course of the research and provided further input: the Cordaid-broad policy documents on Africa (Africa Policy Document 2003-2006) and the Peace and Conflict policy paper (2003-2006). Some policy choices that have evolved out of this process are the identification of peacebuilding as a mainstreaming theme, the introduction of a value-based ecumenical approach, a regional approach to conflict and peace building, the development of partner criteria and the recognition of churches as important partners in peacebuilding. With regard to the latter, Cordaid is aware of possible adverse roles that churches can play in conflict and the repercussions that the hierarchical structures of many churches may have on the participatory nature of peacebuilding processes.

This research did not start with *a priori* assumptions about what conflict prevention and peacebuilding is or how Cordaid should address conflict. Instead the research started with analysing the “practical theories” of conflict Cordaid actors work with, their reading of particular conflicts and the translation to intervention practice. What is actors’ interests in peacebuilding and how give actors within and around the organisation, influenced by bureaucratic procedures, identity, vision and mission, personal experience, affinity, social network and the like, meaning to peacebuilding *in practice*? It soon became clear from this open-ended elaboration, that Cordaid actors strongly favour an approach that mainstreams peacebuilding in other activities. This led to new questions to probe into, concerning partnership, learning and the interface of peacebuilding with other development themes. These questions are explored from a perspective on the everyday politics of Cordaid and its local counterparts working in the Great Lakes region.

Cordaid actors tend to view peacebuilding as a mainstreaming activity that needs to be grounded in specific conflict analyses and should be adapted to local conditions. This means that the main question is not what peacebuilding *is*, but *how* it is done. Closely related is the question of *who* implements peacebuilding activities. This realisation that came forward from a first step of this research has further set the agenda of subsequent steps. In these steps we have mainly focused on how different actors define peacebuilding and what practical theories they maintain, and on the question of the partners and target groups of peacebuilding activities.

The Beyond Conflict research is organised on a step-by-step basis and is interactive in nature. This means that the research project is partly planned and partly open-ended, thus building in flexibility and the possibility to change perspectives on the way. The research has been composed by a sequence of steps. Each step contained ethnographic data gathering (accessing the lifeworlds of actors through qualitative interviews and observations) and was concluded by discussing findings with people in Cordaid and the identification of the next step. The first two steps concentrated on file research in Cordaid and interviews with managers, policy makers and in particular project officers. The third step consisted of fieldwork in Rwanda, Burundi, Kinshasa and East Congo and focused mainly on Cordaid partners and – to some extent - their clients.

The project officers that were interviewed in the course of the research are generally highly committed to the importance of peacebuilding, but raise some practical considerations on how to make the theme workable. Some of these are transitional and will resolve themselves once policy issues are further evolved. Other concerns point to the problem that the mainstreaming of peacebuilding makes the theme intangible and difficult to measure for its results and impacts. This is especially problematic in light of what we have called the divide between process and manageability, where peacebuilding is both a grounded process as a product that has to fit into the bureaucratic realities of targets, time frames and figures. Even though project officers may have more affinity with the first approach they realise they have to mould their activities into the bureaucratic realities as well.

Finally, the project officers raise concerns about the need to base the focus on peacebuilding on local realities, perceptions and needs. With the recent merger, Cordaid has engaged in a very intense process of redefining its objectives and working methods. In the eyes of some staff, this has led to a temporary inward-oriented attitude that, if not overcome in time, risks to become detached from the realities on the ground. Given the different realities in which the peacebuilding theme is shaped, it will indeed remain very important to safeguard the organization from putting its own needs over the expressed needs and proposals from partners. One challenge in this respect is to further evolve the role of field offices in bridging Cordaid in the Hague with the partners in the field.

The causes and consequences of conflict in the Great lakes region are multiple, complex and changing. The countries concerned each have their own history with conflict, yet these histories are also strongly intertwined. In different ways, conflicts concern disturbed state-society relations, the heritage of the Belgian colonial administration, the ethnicization of conflict, population displacement, land and development issues, the economies of war and the (non)engagement of the international community. The conflicts in the region inflict immense suffering on the populations, deeply affecting social fabric in the process. It is in this context that local NGOs have emerged and struggle to uphold their motivation, use their creativity to respond to the ever changing situations meet the always overwhelming needs of their clients and face (violent) threats of their organizations and persons.

The practices of Cordaid partners in the Great Lakes Region with peacebuilding show that the theme, although it was introduced from outside - by Cordaid and other donors – generally corresponds close enough to their own interests and work to be taken on with commitment. The Cordaid partners generally develop a large range of activities which they try to tailor on do-no-harm and peacebuilding objectives, even though they may not use these exact terms to describe their work.

Combining the findings of the research in Cordaid and with Cordaid partners in the Great lakes Regions the following conclusions can be drawn:

- Cordaid's choice to mainstream peacebuilding is in line with international developments, is consistent with Cordaid's overall policies and corresponds with the practical approach to peacebuilding adopted by its partners. The triangulation of peacebuilding with justice and democracy on the one hand and with poverty reduction on the other likewise suits the overall tradition and practices of Cordaid and its partners. What needs to be elaborated is how this triangulation can be achieved in practice. This operationalization exercise must take into account how to translate this vision to the diverse realities on the ground that are hardly ever favourable to bring about the ideal approach. Most importantly, policy development must more systematically be based on dialogue with local partners.
- Cordaid actors tend to perceive of peacebuilding as a process concerning integrated qualitative change. Yet, they also have to accommodate bureaucratic realities that stipulate a translation of this process into targets and figures. The further development of

the theme has to address this tension in such a way that it become workable for the project officers.

- A major challenge is to make peacebuilding tangible in order to enhance that peacebuilding is taken seriously by the different actors involved, to make results explicit and especially to be able to learn from the experiences gathered in this field. Partners of Cordaid point out that in the fluid conflict situations where a multitude of actors operate, it is impossible to find evidence of direct relations between their efforts and the qualitative changes that occur. This means that while Cordaid continues to operationalise peacebuilding together with its partners, it must at the same time accept the reality that beyond indicators about the implementation of activities hard statements about results and impact can not be given and ways have to be found to accommodate and weigh soft statements instead. This requires among others a thorough knowledge base on the situation and actors involved and attention for qualitative forms of monitoring and evaluation.
- Peacebuilding is done by and with people, making partners and target groups a major concern. Cordaid has undertaken significant initiatives to develop its partner policies and criteria and it is important to continue this endeavour and make these policies and criteria more workable in practice. The nature and strength of civil society in conflict situations is diverse and some situation may require Cordaid to step away from its formats for partnerrelations and seek other ways of supporting processes towards peacebuilding.
- The effectiveness and credibility of peacebuilding relate to and can be enhanced through many different dimensions of the organizations, including the composition and role of the Board of Directors, management and staff, decision making structures, evaluation et learning, human resource development, personnel security. In the practice of Cordaid partners, these kind of considerations are not easily be made explicit, and Cordaid could play a positive role by encouraging discussion on these issues.
- There is a need for reflection and dialogue on what constitutes the target groups of peacebuilding. The almost mechanical association of women and children as vulnerable groups is problematic because it overlooks the capacity of women and gives no recognition to the vulnerability of some groups of men either. Cordaid partners often focus their activities on strategic target groups, such as political leaders, militias, prosecutors and police, and it is worthwhile for Cordaid to integrate this attention in their policies and learning efforts. A point of concern of Cordaid partners in the Great lakes Region is how they can access and service the most destitute people. Cordaid should continue to pay attention to this problem of how to identify and reach the people that are most in need.
- Cordaid partners turn out be very apt to minimize risks that assets get lost to people antagonistic to peace, through looting or by being forced to pay bribes to gain access to target groups. It is inevitable that these kind of losses nonetheless occur and it important that a free space is created in the dialogue among partners and between partners and Cordaid to discuss these issues and develop guidelines on what risks to take and what losses to incur without jeopardizing partners' internal value or outside credibility.
- The Cordaid policy of linkage of relief and development is starting to get realised in new programmes in the field and old programmes are brought into the policy as much as possible. Linkage programmes seem particularly well suited to pay attention to peacebuilding processes, but in practice this does not happen by itself. Cordaid must

thus make a more conscious effort to enhance the feasibility of integrating peacebuilding into linkage.

- A lot can be gained in improving lobby activities of Cordaid. In relation to the Great Lakes Region Cordaid is well positioned to influence the Dutch policies which could make a real difference on the ground considering the large role the Netherlands plays in the region. Apart from the plundering of resources that Cordaid plans to address, the human rights record in the region should also be taken up in lobby activities. It is important to start involving local partners better in the agenda setting and implementation of lobby campaigns.
- The successful transformation of Cordaid into a learning organization will be particularly important for the development of the peacebuilding theme. Coping with the high demands and sudden changes in conflict situations requires a flexible and creative approach at the different levels of Cordaid and its partners. It appears that intuition and improvisation, based on tacit knowledge and experience, is highly important in this respect. To make this more effective learning should be geared to grounding experiences in value-based policies and to make practical learning transparent.

Recommendations:

Will be formulated upon the discussions in the workshop of 6 January.

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(C115-10065) International Alert: Vredesopbouw in Oost-Congo

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(C115-2170a)	CRS Justice et Paix: Opbouw rechtvaardige en vreedzame samenleving
(C115-8086/a/b)	BICE Hulp aan kinderen in gevangenissen/herintegratie kindsoldaten
(C115-9519B)	BDOM/Codilusi: Aids preventie project
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(C145-10001)	Barakabaho Foundation (Mbwira Ndumva Initiative)
(C145-10016)	FOR (Forum des Organisations Rurales)
(C145-10017)	Cordaid Rwanda: Cyangugu gezondheidsproject
(C145-10018)	Trocaire: Economic empowerment for women for peacebuilding in Rwanda

Annexes

1. Policy Tools for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation⁴⁰

Official Diplomacy		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Negotiations • Conciliation • Good offices • Informal consultations • Peace conferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unilateral good will gestures • Conflict prevention or management centres • Special envoys • Diplomatic sanctions • International appeal/condemnation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis and war diplomacy • Coercive diplomacy • Diplomatic recognition • Withdrawal of recognition • Certification/decertification • Hot lines
Non-Official Conflict Management Methods		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions • Conflict resolution or prevention centers • Peace commissions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian peace monitors • Visits by eminent organizations/individuals/ "embarrassing witnesses" • "Friends" groups • Non-violent campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops • Cultural exchanges • Civilian fact-finding missions • Humanitarian diplomacy
Military Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventive peacekeeping forces • Restructuring/integration of military forces • Professionalization/reform of armed forces • Demobilization and reintegration of armed forces • Military aid • Military-to-military programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative defence strategies • Confidence-building and security measures • Non-aggression agreements • Collective security or co-operation arrangements • Deterrence • Demilitarized zones 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arms embargoes or blockades • Threat or projection of force • Disarmament • Arms control agreements • Arms proliferation control • Crisis management procedures • Limited military intervention • Peace enforcement
Economic and Social Measures		

⁴⁰ Derived from "A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace", Developed by Creative Associates International, Inc. for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, administered by the US Agency for International Development. See: www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox.htm

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development assistance • Economic reforms • Economic and resource co-operation • Inter-communal trade • Infrastructural measurements • Support grassroots initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint projects • Private economic investment • Health assistance • Agricultural programs • Aid conditionality • Institution building • Land reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic sanctions • Humanitarian assistance • Repatriation or resettlement of refugees and displaced people • Trust/confidence building • Capacity building • Strengthening civil society • Psychological support
Political Development and Governance Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political party-building • Political institution-building • Election reform, support and monitoring • National conferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic society development • Training of public officials • Human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building • Power-sharing arrangements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decentralization of power • Trusteeship • Protectorates • Constitutional commissions and reform
Judicial and Legal Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commissions of inquiry/war crimes tribunals • Judicial/legal reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional commissions • Police reform • Arbitration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjudication • Support to indigenous legal institutions
Communications and Education Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace radio/TV • Media professionalization • Journalist training • International broadcasts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote alternative information and communication sources • Civic education • Formal education projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace education • Exchange visits • Training in conflict mgmt., resolution and prevention • Primary education

When trying to subdivide intervention strategies of Cordaid and its partners, we can argue that those are found in all categories except military measures (see bold/italic). According to literature, these categories of intervention can be related to the particular sources of conflict that are addressed (once again, urging the need for a comprehensive conflict analysis).

Addressing systemic (structural) causes
To increase the aggregate, conserve and/or redistribute natural, economic and human resources like land, water, food, infrastructure, technical skills, in order to improve material and social conditions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Economic and Social measures</i> • <i>Communications and education measures</i> • <i>Political development and governance measures</i>
Addressing proximate (enabling) causes

To create or strengthen general political, social and economic institutions, rules, procedures, and other decision processes through which societies define their public problem agenda, set goals, form policies, allocate authority, implement public discussions, and settle grievance.

To reduce and put prior restrictions on specific means of armed force or coercion that could be used to carry out violent conflicts.

- *(Non)official diplomacy and conflict management measures*
- *Political development and governance measures*
- *Judicial and legal measures*
- *Military measures*

Addressing immediate (triggering causes)

To regulate parties' manifest conflict behaviour directly by actions, speech and interactions.

- *(Non)official diplomacy and conflict management measures*
- *Communications and education measures*
- *Military measures*

2. List of partner NGOs and their main activities

Name (underlined are supported by Cordaid)	Area of operation	Main activities
DR CONGO		
<u>Panos</u>	DR Congo / Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop sustainable press institutions and reinforce the rights of journalists; - Promote the use of media for peacebuilding among press houses, civil society and (local) governments; - Installation of a "centre d'alert" in Bujumbura, Rwanda and Kinshasa that is analysing news and media programs contents, if necessary sanctions are the result; - Coordination of media initiatives throughout the region by organising meetings and exchange forums.
<u>CONAFED</u> Comité National Femme et Développement	DR Congo / Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International lobby activities (since the launching of a new program in 2002); - Demobilization; - Psychological support to people in need; - Monitoring of the upcoming elections in the DRC of 2005; - Special focus on the position and role of women in conflict.
CEPROSOC Centre pour la Promotion Sociale et Communautaire	Kinshasa (suburbs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to women, girls and street children; - Alphabetization and education program in which street children are placed in a boarding school during nine months to learn a handicraft.
CODIAF Collectif de diffusion de l'information et d'appui aux femmes	Kinshasa (suburbs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - civic education on democracy, the lives of women and the inter Congolese dialogue; - Lobby activities for imprisoned women in order to facilitate liberation; - Support of micro credit programs; - Stimulation of good hygienic care in suburbs.
<u>Justice Plus</u>	Ituri (Bunia) and liasion in Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defense of human rights and denunciation of violations of these rights; - Publication of articles about issues related to violence (for example small arms, the exploitation of natural resources); - International lobby activities and recommendations for the international community.
<u>RODHECIC</u>	DR Congo / Kinshasa and liasion in Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civic education on human rights issues; - Assistance to HIV/Aids orphelins; - Computer courses for young people and reinforcement of personnel of internet cafés; - Publication of human rights violations and lobby activities; - Reconciliation gatherings between different ethnical groups; - Creation of networks between local NGOs and other civic groupings.
<u>CENADEP</u> Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire	Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace education; - Organization of reunions of human rights activists around specific subjects; - Monitoring and denunciation of human rights violations; - Creation of a network in order to protect NGOs and reinforce activities.
<u>INADES-Formation</u>	DR Congo / Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to the auto sufficance of every individual through the increase and improvement of

Institut Africain pour le Développement Economique et Social		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> agricultural production - Identification of income generation crops and support of income generating activities for women (soap, local wine, etc.) - Establishment of an information system about market prices; - Stimulation of cooperation among farmers from a peace objective.
CENJP Commission Episcopale Nationale Justice et Paix	DR Congo / Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exchange and coordination of activities of all the CDJPs in Congo; - Facilitate in mediation processes of the local CDJPs around community conflicts; - Networking and lobbying on a national and international level; - Publication of reports about the human rights situation; - Training and education of diocese employees on specific subjects; - Special attention for the position of women.
CDJP Commission Diocésain Justice et Paix	Kisantu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensibilisation on juridical information and knowledge through sessions, conferences, workshops (with the use of animators and facilitators); - Attention for the relation between the environment and conflict.
Renâitre	DR Congo / Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Publication of a journal that focuses on peace and democratization (journal belongs to Church); - Promotion of human rights and the value of human life; - Denunciation of human rights violations and analysis of root causes conflict; - Stimulate the liberty of expression.
OFAC Organisation des Femmes pour les Activités de Communauté à la base	Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education of women and children on human rights and peace issues; - Malnutrition program for children ; - Stimulation of small income projects such as house farming and the commercialization of soap, biscuits, orange juice and confiture
FCDD Femmes Chrétiennes pour la Développement et le Démocratie	Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education and training on human rights ; - Publication of small booklets with information and tips about community life ; - Installation of centres that help with juridical assistance in the suburbs of Kinshasa.
BICE Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance	Kinshasa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reintegration program for street children and ex prisoners (children); - Establishment of schooling and creative/economic activities in prisons; - Psychological support to prisoners; - Creation of housing and schooling facilities for children.
Other visits and interviews:		
Displaced camp Sicotra ; Ministry of Reinsertion, Kinshasa ; Prison, Kinshasa ; Centre de Sauvetage de Kinshasa Aggl. Kinshasa		
RWANDA		
Cordaid	Kigali/Cyangugu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening of local health structures based on a contractual approach; - Research and development of new strategies for linkage and sustainable support.
Dutch Embassy	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institutional support to decentralisation program (good governance); - Keeping contacts with and supply of information to Dutch government - Establishment of international lobby network; - Strong partnership with LDGL (human rights network), denunciation, and Cordaid; - Reinforcement of local capacities

SNV Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Research on human rights situation Rwanda (GLR) done by consultants; - Networking and lobbying; - Capacity building of partner NGOs; - Putting pressure on resolving prisoners problem.
Mbwira Ndumva Initiative	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trauma counseling and medical support for genocide and rape victims (mainly women); - Provision of shelter, cloths food and micro-finance to widows; - Provision of schooling for genocide victims and orphelins; - Creation of talking groups and individual psycho therapy.
CAURWA Communauté des Autochtones Ruandais	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to the Batwas pygmees of the GLR; - Mircor-finance, support of economic activities; - Lobby on political level for integration Batwa throughout society; - Defence of the Batwa rights.
LDGL Ligue des Droits de l'homme dans la région des Grands Lacs	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional approach to the conflict; - Exchange and joint publication of region violations with other networks; - Programs for elections, schooling, refugee care, empowerment; - Creation of code of conduct for human rights practitioners; - Organising and participation in (international) seminars, etc.
LIPRODOR Ligue Ruandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droites de l'Homme	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Theatre group acting about peace and tolerance issues (civic education); - Training on peace and human rights issues.
CDJP Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix	Cyangugu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of small groups in society; - Stimulating reconciliation through speaking out the truth and forgiving; - Choosing and training of natural leaders per community.
Réseau des Femmes	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identity women leaders and train them on rights issues (community representatives); - Carry out enquetes about subjects that are important in society (Gacaca); - Stimulate talking and forgiveness; - Creation of a documentation centre/library; - Support to cultural activities (dansing, theatre, etc.).
Trocaire	Kigali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training and educating of animators according to the DELTA method; - Support to income generating projects - Influencing of authorities, mobilization; - Maintain network relations with partner organisations.
FOR Forum des Organisations Rurales	Ruhengeri	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reinforcement of the farming population; - Support of human rights and liberty (also for women); - Sport activities (cultural) to bring youth together; - Training on HIV/Aids, human rights and other social issues; - Institutional support to the Gacaca process on local levels.
<p>Other visits and interviews: AJD (Association Jeunes pour le Développement), Cyangugu ; ACPF, Ruhengeri, ABADACOGORA, Ruhengeri ; CARE, Kigali ; DETERIMBERE, Gikongoro ; ADTS, Gikongoro ; Protestant Church, Cyangugu, Eglise Episcopale, Cyangugu, Trauma councillor hospital, Cyangugu; farming family, Cyangugu ; Vice maire, Cyangugu ; Woman who's men is in prison, Cyangugu ; Rehabilitation project for widows, Kigali ; Victims of the genocide, Kigali ; Traditional chief, Ruhengeri ; Participation in training on Gacaca (Trocaire), Gikongoro.</p>		

BUKAVU		
Radio Maendeleo	Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emission of radio programs with a focus on development and peacebuilding; - Denunciation of human rights issues through the radio; - Support to and creation of radio clubs; - Cooperation with other radio stations and organizations of women.
MONUC-DDRRR	DR Congo / Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Observation of implementation peace accord; - Military support in demobilization programs; - International lobby activities; - Protection of human rights and denunciation of violations; - Pro-active military protection of population.
BAD Bureau d'Assistance aux Détenues	Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lobby for human rights through media; - Legal support to prisoners and people in arbitrary detention; - Participation in seminars on human rights, peace education.
<u>Héritiers de la Justice</u>	Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of three working modules on general human rights, juridical knowledge and conflict issues; - Organization of regional workshops; - Training of local trainers and public agents; - Childrens programs in schools and non-educated children; - Several publications on human rights issues.
<u>Groupe Jérémie</u>	Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training on human rights at the grassroots level; - Support to local conflict resolution; - Alphabetization program; - Publications on human rights issues.
APED Action pour la Paix, Education pour la Développement	Kalehe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resolution of community conflicts; - Analpabetization program for adults; - Stimulation of cooperation in agricultural work; - Support to micro-credit programs for income generation.
<u>RADHOSKI</u> Network organization with 37 members		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exchange and stimulation of cooperation in the defence of human rights; - Joint lobbying towards the international community; - Joint publication of human rights violations.
EMAC-CACOFI Ensemble pour la Mobilisation et les Actions Collectives- Carrefour des Correspondants de Fizi		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organization of training sessions on peace and the problems existing in Fizi territory; - Creation of peace clubs among the youth that carry out socio-cultural activities; - Special focus on women and children.
<u>Centre Olame</u>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Psycho-social support to women that are victim of the war; - Medical assistance in HIV test, pregnancies, etc.; - Support to women groups that gather around economic projects for income generation; - Lobby towards administration, the Catholic Church and the international community.
Bureau Société Civile		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mediation between different groups in civil society; - Constitution of a committee that diagnoses and resolves conflicts; - Linking of traditional jurisdiction and modern law;

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organization of regular exchange meetings between all groups that compose civil society (NGOs, Churches, administration, etc.).
RFDP Réseau Femmes pour le Développement et la Paix		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training on national and international human rights; - Renforcer the role of women in conflict transformation processes; - Stimulate exchange and dialogue between women of different groups and communities; - Carry out research on violence against women, follow up; - Monitoring and denunciation of human rights violations.
ASOP Actions Sociales d'Organisation Payants		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to income generating projects; - Mediation in community conflicts through legal and traditional mechanisms; - Monitor arbitrary detentions; - Training on human rights, peace and conflict prevention; - Installation of village committees that seek solutions for community conflicts.
APRODEPED		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to prisoners and observations in prisons; - Peace and human rights education, training on democracy; - Creation of local representation and human rights observers.
PLD Pain pour la Désertés		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Informer and educate on human rights and peace; - Dissemination of radio programs and journals that address human rights issues; - Support to raped women - Organization of the "open day for jurisprudence" - Supply of micro credit to the vulnerable
CDJP Commission Diocésain Justice et Paix	DR Congo / Bukavu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of para-jurist who can engage in juridical issues in the churches; - Publication and radio emissions; - Paying visits to prisons and tribunals; - Juridical assistance to prisoners; - Exchange and cooperation with other institutions on human rights issues (lobby and denunciation).
ECC-RIO Eglise de Christ au Congo-		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Scientific research about peace and peace intervention in Eastern Congo; - Creation of a platform of exchange between the different Churches; - Development of a curriculum for schools that will teach about peace and reconciliation; - Creation of peace clubs in schools around socio-cultural activities; - Training of trainers and teachers on peace issues.
Other visits and interviews:		
Participation in "camp de la paix" of Groupe Jérémie, Bukavu; Participation in training of CDJP, Nyangezi; Participation in meeting of Civil Society Bureau; participation in general assembly of AFECEF, Njantende; interview with villagers, Bukavu; participation in workshop of Heritiers de la Justice, Bukavu; interview villagers, Kalehe; OCHA, Bukavu; AFECEF, Bukavu.		
BURUNDI		
Eben Ezer Ministry	Uvira (Eastern Congo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stimulate exchange and critical reflection within the Protestant Churches; - Visits to displacement camps in order to monitor the humanitarian conditions; - Visits to most affected places in order to broaden the support and interest for such areas; - Creation of nutrition centres for women and their children; - Creation of centres for socio-economic activities for children and women.

<u>Cordaid Burundi</u>	Bujumbura and other provinces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Medical emergency assistance through mobile health clinics in war affected areas; - Lobby and exchange with other international NGOs; - Developing of a linkage approach for structural development on the long term.
CAFOB Collectif des Associations et ONGs Féminines du Burundi	Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training related to peace and development; - Stimulate the political and associative life; - Identify the special role of women in conflict resolution and support.
<u>RPA</u> Radio Publique Africaine	Bujumbura (studio)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of diverse radio programs on peace and tolerance; - Addressing of taboo issues; - Stimulating dialogue between the warring groups; - Creation of radio clubs in the field.
CDJP Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix	Bubanza	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education about the Arusha peace accord and the peace process through local representation; - Spread the “Code de la Famille” on civic rights (marriage, succession, divorce, children); - Spread information about the penal code and legal procedures.
<u>Studio Tubane</u>	Bujumbura (studio)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reporting programs about reconciliation for refugees in exile; - Focus on human rights, gender issues and HIV/Aids; - Dissemination of theatre about land problems, abuses, community conflicts, etc.; - Organization of workshops; - Support of income generating activities between the Hutu and Tutsi.
CCAP	Uvira (Eastern Congo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensibilization about peace through theatre, dance and sketches; - Exchange with civil organizations in Rwanda and beneficiaries; - Lobby among the armed groups in order to stimulate dialogue between rebel groups; - Support of local NGOs that work with income generating and trauma counselling projects.
SOFIBEF Solidarité des Femmes de Fizi pour le bien-être Familial	Fizi, Southern Kivu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Create solidarity among the women of Fizi territory (different ethnic groups) - Support displaced people with micro credit programs; - Education about peace through days of reflection and exchange; - Psychological and social support to war victims.
<u>SWAA-Burundi</u>	Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education and training about HIV/Aids, especially focusing on youth; - Medical support to Aids victims and the provision of basic needs (food); - Psycho-social support to, amongst others, victims that have been stigmatized; - Creation of an SOS telephone line for anonymous questions about HIV/Aids; - Research about the prevalence of HIV/Aids in Burundi.
<u>Centre Ubuntu</u>	Bujumbura	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Scientific analysis of conflicts and development issues in Burundi and the GLR; - Denunciation of human rights issues; - Research on civil society activities in Burundi; - Establishment of database NGOs in Burundi.
CDJP Commission Diocésain Justice et Paix	Muyinga	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of farmers about improved agricultural techniques; - Spreading of the Christian values; - Training and education about human rights, peace, HIV/Aids; - Support of camps, seminars, sports and other social gatherings; - Exchange between the different CDJP and other parts of the Catholic church; - Monitoring of the human rights situation and exchange with other CDJP.

Lige Izere	Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education of demobilized children; - Focus on women to educate them on their peaceful role within the family; - Monitoring and denunciation of human rights violations committed by both ethnic groups.
SWAA-Muyinga	Muyinga	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of community leaders that disseminate information about HIV/Aids; - Provision of HIV tests and material and psycho-social support to the victims; - Training in the villages through cultural activities; - Creation of clubs "stop Aids" in schools.
Studio Ijambo	Bujumbura	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Making of creative and balanced radio programs, soap operas, etc. - Support to the "peace theatre" that is addressing taboo issues throughout the country; - Networking of women groups for capacity building, exchange, leadership, etc.; - Lobby activities and stimulation of dialogue with other international and local stakeholders; - Establishment of a (theoretical) toolbox for peace intervention and mediation.
<p><i>Other visits and interviews:</i> Woman group of flourmill, Muyinga; interview women victims of rape; interview women infected with HIV, Muyinga. Muyinga</p>		