DRAWING LESSONS FROM EXTRACTIVES LOBBYING & ADVOCACY

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP LOBBY & ADVOCACY

2015 - 2020

DECEMBER 2020
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMA Assistance Mission for Africa
BEST Bureau d’Études Scientifiques et Techniques
CERHD Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development
CERN/CENCO Commission Episcopale pour Ressources Naturelles
CISLAC Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre
CTCPM Technical Coordination and Mining Planning Unit
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EPRM European Partnership on Responsible Minerals
EU European Union
EurAc European Network for Central Africa
HRRAC Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium
HYPREP Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project
MoMP Ministry of Mines and Petroleum
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency
NOSDRA National Oil Spill Detection Response Agency
OFRD Organization of Fast Relief and Development (OFRD)
POM Plateforme des Organisations de la Société Civile intervenant dans le secteur Minier
PWYP Publish What You Pay
RGI Resource Governance Index
RNE Royal Netherlands Embassies
SP L&A Strategic Partnership on Lobby & Advocacy
ToC Theory of Change
UNYDA Upper Nile Youth Development Association
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cordaid and its partners within Afghanistan, DRC, South Sudan and Nigeria, partnered with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) under the Strategic Partnership Lobby & Advocacy from January 2016 to December 2020, to carry out advocacy, campaigning and lobbying activities around extractive industries governance, under their extractives trajectory. The work marked the conclusion of Cordaid’s activity in the extractives sector and as such this document draws out key achievements, lessons learned and priorities for partners to take forward at a country level.

The extractives trajectory achieved a wide range of results at the international, national and sub-national level. In Afghanistan, for example, partners worked to form active mining watch committees in targeted provinces, despite initial disinterest at the central government level. In the DRC, partners were instrumental in getting civil society amendments incorporated into the revised Code Minier and are now following up application of the Code. In Nigeria, partners focused much of their efforts on oversight of the Ogoniland clean-up issues and supported a better functioning of the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project through advocating for its independent mandate and improving relations with affected communities. In South Sudan, sustained advocacy and involvement of multiple levels of government, the partners were able to secure the first transfer of community allocated oil revenues from central government to state governments and communities, in accordance with the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.

These achievements were not without their challenges however, and across the trajectory there is clear evidence of learning from partners and areas where they would approach issues differently in future. Some key lessons emerging from the extractives trajectory are that:

1. Linking international and national advocacy is effective but it does require resourcing at both levels for technical expertise and staff time to link national issues into international processes
2. Working in a coalition or network structure continues to be an effective approach and supports sustainability as partners develop longer term connections and learn to adopt ways of working they may not otherwise have had the opportunity to try
3. Engaging bilateral donors as stakeholders in advocacy is important, but requires alignment with country level priorities as staff turnover and competing bilateral priorities limit time that donor agencies have to engage with advocacy activities
4. Joint reflection and theory of change approach valuable for planning and adjustment at country level and is an approach partners can continue to use
5. Carrying out L&A activities without ability to support related service delivery is a challenge to effective L&A as it begins to constrain continued community interest in advocacy activities in the context of more severe or pressing needs.

Moving forward, ensuring Cordaid’s partners at the country level are equipped, through sufficient resources; and linked into relevant funding and partnership networks, is essential to ensuring this work can continue. Within Afghanistan, continuing to support a civil society movement focused on extractives issues and also linking this to the women’s rights movement will be a priority, along with expanding community-based monitoring approaches. In the DRC, civil society continue to have a vital role in ensuring government compliance with local development requirements of the revised Code Minier, particularly around funds for community development. Similarly, maintaining space for civil society to have a role and oversight in traceability initiatives at the national, regional and international level is important. Civil society in Nigeria have had an important role in ensuring HYPREP fulfills its mandate and their continued oversight role is therefore important to work with communities in Ogoniland. There is also a need to work with communities and NGOs on livelihoods options for communities in Ogoniland, to move away from artisanal refining and bunkering. Finally, partners in South Sudan have achieved important success in pushing for transfer of funds to the sub-national level, but continued work to regularize the process of disbursing money to oil producing states and communities is needed, along with an improved environmental governance framework. Specific recommendations for project partners and stakeholders are as follows:
**Cordaid**

1. Facilitate funding linkages and introductions for country level partners into international networks
2. Produce a concept note on extractives & conflict related L&A to be shared with partners to support them orientating their work to new donors/donor priorities
3. Hold an internal lessons sharing session on extractives to ensure other Cordaid programme teams working on other issues in countries with resource extraction understand these issues and how they may interlink with their programming

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Royal Netherlands Embassies**

4. Country level close out meetings with partners, consider where there might be scope for RNE to facilitate introductions to other partners and donors
5. Donor & partner roundtable to allow partners a forum to share experiences and lessons and network
6. Consider targeted support at the national level to civil society initiatives on priority extractives issues,

**Partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>1. Develop a concept note for targeted expansion of mine watch committees to new provinces (criteria might include safety, food security, MoMP strategy on locations for resource development), including covering issues of land rights and environmental governance.</td>
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<td>2. Engage directly with major media outlets and valued provincial outlets on responsible mineral sector coverage; support training on how to report on extractive industries issues.</td>
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<td>3. Engage directly with women’s rights movements on extractives sector gender justice position paper; work with women’s networks to compile broader evidence on gendered dimensions of the extractives sector in Afghanistan.</td>
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<td><strong>DRC</strong></td>
<td>1. Produce a concept note on local-national monitoring mechanism on implementation of local development provisions in revised mining code</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Support local government on design of local development plans and participatory budgeting resulting from mineral revenue, formation of community spending</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Continue to advocate to international mechanisms around traceability and due diligence to ensure continued civil society involvement in agenda setting</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nigeria</strong></td>
<td>1. Produce a concept note on an integrated advocacy and alternative livelihoods initiative working at national and subnational level, focused on Ogoniland.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Form a legislative monitoring unit between partners, tracking status of legislation related to Ogoniland, HYPREP and extractives governance more broadly, covering national and sub-national levels. Divide advocacy targets between partners and continue mapping spheres of influence and leveraging existing networks to push advocacy asks forward.</td>
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<td>3. Ensure linkages are made between women’s groups in Ogoni with extractives governance groups at the national level and build linkages with broader women’s movements in Nigeria so that women can access support on both dimensions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Sudan</strong></td>
<td>1. Develop a concept note on a 5% advocacy and monitoring project, combining advocacy around publication of revenues, necessary amendments of the law and regular transfer, with monitoring compliance of state government and formation of necessary councils and committees with the law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Work with communities on their local development priorities and facilitate dialogues linking community members with CDCs and other mandated bodies, supporting regular meetings so community members may hold local bodies to account</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Continue to advocate for improved environmental governance in South Sudan, possibly including set-up of an environmental concern/complaint line to collect environmental data and support response</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Cordaid is an international NGO, headquartered in the Netherlands, working on restoring trust and social cohesion in fragile contexts through advocacy and programme delivery. For the past four years, Cordaid has partnered with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) under the Strategic Partnership Lobby & Advocacy, which ran from January 2016 until December 2020. Now, Cordaid’s extractives advocacy work under the Strategic Partnership for Lobby & Advocacy (SP L&A) is drawing to a close, marking the conclusion of Cordaid’s extractives programming and offering a natural juncture for reflection on learning. With that mind, this report is designed to:

- Map the results of the extractives trajectory at a country and international level
- Develop a narrative of achievements spanning across the extractives trajectory as a whole
- Identify and extract key lessons learned across the trajectory and for the future
- Develop recommendations for future programming for Cordaid and partners

This report is divided into four main sections. It begins with an overview of the context ad project positioning per extractives country, then it looks at results and outcomes across the trajectory, including case studies of achievements from each country. Following this, learning and reflections from the past four years are presented; and finally, a forward look and recommendations for future work. The remainder of this section presents an overview of the extractives trajectory and the methodology used for this report.

Introducing the extractives trajectory

The Strategic Partnership (SP) ran from 2016–2020 in six countries in Africa and Asia, with advocacy also carried out at the international level in various global fora, drawing from country level priorities to link together local, national and international dialogues. The SP L&A included trajectories on inclusive peace, security and access to justice, accountable health services and civic space – work that will be carried forward by Cordaid in future partnerships. In addition to this, the SP L&A included a trajectory on extractives governance that will not be continued through future SP L&A work, underscoring a need to reflect on lessons learned and results achieved through this work, as it draws to a close.

Cordaid managed the extractives trajectory in four countries: Afghanistan, DRC, Nigeria and South Sudan, looking at mining issues in Afghanistan and DRC and petroleum issues in Nigeria and South Sudan. Cordaid country offices worked with a range of local partner organisations in each country, with varying approaches toward and knowledge of the extractives sector. Methods and strategies ranged from community dialogue to media engagement to government lobbying, underscored by partnership led research and evidence. In parallel, at a global level Cordaid focused on extractives industry regulation on conflict minerals via their membership of EurAc, to complement national work in the DRC.

Cordaid has historically had a broader portfolio of extractives work, however this work had come to an end and the SP represents Cordaid’s final extractives project. As a result of the wind down in extractives work, the extractives trajectory has been carried out independently of linked community level programming or service delivery; and with reduced internal staffing and expertise on extractives within Cordaid the global advocacy efforts have been less pronounced than in other areas of the SP. The closing of Cordaid’s extractives work is the driver of this learning report, to ensure the work is rounded out sustainably and that partners are left with a clear track record of achievements and basis for future projects.

Methodology and approach

This report identified learning and results through three main methods: document review, interviews and workshop process. Documents were reviewed throughout late September and October to identify achievements and extent of learning and adaptation to challenges. Workshops were held with each participating country to explore one specific project achievement in depth to produce outcome case studies using a story of change approach; and to collectively discuss future advocacy priorities. Country workshops were held over Zoom during October and November with each
participating country team and partner organisations.\(^1\) In parallel, interviews were held with Cordaid representatives of each country and with representatives at the global level to better understand programme challenges, corroborate workshop or document review findings and identify possibly future programme entry points. The results from the workshops, interview and document review were all organised against a learning framework examining context, results; direct learning; adaptation; and programme insights.\(^2\) The forward look and recommendations were drawn from an analysis of outcomes and learning and the direct priorities articulated by workshop participants.

### Limitations

This report is produced predominantly from self-reported evidence from Cordaid and partner staff through workshops and interviews, or via Cordaid and partner reporting and research as the focus was on learning within the trajectory. Therefore, the results and outcomes described in the report have not been independently verified, nor have lessons been triangulated with other sector stakeholders. However, an independent end-line evaluation is being conducted in parallel to this learning exercise for the SP as a whole, which will assess outcomes and include broader primary data collection. Given that the SP was approaching its end as this learning exercise was being conducted, Cordaid country staff and partners had a number of competing claims on their time and therefore the decision was made just to hold workshops with partners rather than additionally interviewing all partners individually, as had originally been planned.

### CONTEXT OF THE EXTRACTIVES TRAJECTORY

This section sets out the context in which the extractives trajectory took place, at the global level and within each of the four SP extractives trajectory countries, drawing on a brief analysis of the context in each country and the positioning of the work of the SP.

### Extractives at the global level

International partners and donors have paid increasing attention to the extractive industries over the past two decades, both for its potential as a driver of economic development, but also for its role in conflict and environmental risks and the evidence of corruption and revenue mismanagement associated with mineral wealth. Initiatives such as the EITI have sought to improve transparency, reduce scope for mismanagement and enable citizens to follow the revenue flows linked to their natural resources. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas is designed to support responsible sourcing practices and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights set out principles for states and companies to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses. At a regulatory level, the EU has been an important advocacy target and has passed directives relating to conflict minerals and on transparency and accounting. Organisations like Publish What You Pay, Global Witness and the Natural Resource Governance Institute are active at the international level in advocating for better regulation, civil society involvement and monitoring application of these standards.

Within this context, Cordaid has been an active stakeholder in the extractives advocacy space. Cordaid worked closely with PWYP at the global and national level. However, with Cordaid’s broader extractives work having ended in recent years, the end of the SP represents the conclusion of most of Cordaid’s international advocacy work on extractives. Under the SP, at a global level, Cordaid aimed to link work in extractives trajectory countries to international level advocacy asks and processes. Cordaid for example, pushed for the EU Conflict Minerals Directive and accompanying measures aimed at ensuring certain minerals imported into the EU are mined responsibly. Cordaid also became a member of the European Partnership on Responsible Minerals (EPRM) to link ground experiences to policy processes and ensure civil society were properly included in the process. They were able to provide input into the NGO pillar of EPRM including on funding selection\(^3\) and link experiences from Afghanistan and the DRC into campaigns around the conflict minerals

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\(^1\) Assistance of Hervé Magaribi in providing translation for the DRC workshop is noted and appreciated; in Afghanistan, partner organisation HRRAC did not join for the workshop.

\(^2\) Learning Framework is detailed in the Inception Brief for this project, submitted to Cordaid September 2020.

\(^3\) Mid-Term Evaluation
The extractives trajectory however, had some differences when compared to other trajectories funded under the SP. Unlike other thematic advocacy focus areas, like health, the extractives trajectory existed independently and was not linked to broader programmes providing services or working with communities, as the work took place during a phase out of Cordaid’s extractives work. Relatedly, whilst other trajectories had support from technical experts at the global level, the extractives trajectory did not have a specific dedicated technical expert, limiting scope for global work.

**Country programme contexts**

Whilst there are commonalities across the four extractives trajectory countries and the challenges civil society are seeking to overcome there, each country presents a host of unique sector considerations and political challenges. The sections below set out the key context trends for the sector in each country and the positioning of the SP within this.

**Afghanistan**

| Main commodities: copper, iron, lithium, gemstones, coal, hydrocarbons |
| RGI Rank: 71/89 |
| Sector Value: USD 48m in revenue (2017) |
| EITI: Meaningful progress (temporary suspension in 2019) |
| Partners: HRRAC, OFRD |

Afghanistan is estimated to have a vast hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, however exploiting these resources fairly and responsibly remains challenging. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) and its provincial Departments of Mines and Petroleum (DoMP) is the lead agency tasked with managing extraction in Afghanistan, however large scale production is limited for a number of reasons, including the security situation. Whilst there is potential for a variety of projects, current EITI reporting shows that the largest source of revenue for the extractives sector stem from the Aynak Copper project (not yet in production) and the two state owned enterprises – collectively accounting for around two-thirds of government extractives revenues. Transfer of revenues to the subnational level, although legally provided for, have not been disclosed or audited. Furthermore for large scale projects, it is unclear whether Environmental and Social Impact Assessments have been carried out. Outside of these formal, large scale projects, research from organisations like Global Witness have noted the role of the minerals sector in financing armed opposition groups. Beyond this risk, there is a large informal ASM sector in Afghanistan, bringing with it environmental risks and missed opportunities for revenue collection from the state – the security context hampers the ability of central government to enforce revenue collection.

Extractives work, whilst not new for Cordaid, was a new topic for the Afghanistan country office and the trajectory had to be built up. At the outset of the project there was a great momentum around the potential of Afghanistan’s extractives sector for revenue development, and related to this, the risks associated with developing the sector further. In this context, including extractives within the SP had seemed a priority, particularly given that there were not many international organisations working on extractives governance issues in Afghanistan at the time. The SP commenced work on extractives in Afghanistan by commissioning a scoping study of potential issues and entry points. Through this, the SP identified a local partner organisation, however after issues emerged, the SP ended the partnership and began work with another partner selected through a public announcement. Finding partners with both technical extractives expertise and lobbying expertise proved challenging. Work focused principally at a community level on developing mine watch committees in selected provinces, with Cordaid’s scoping study noting that despite 340 small scale mining projects having been awarded in Afghanistan, they received comparatively less attention than the large scale projects did.

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1. Planning Report 2017
2. EITI and Resource Governance Index data was used to populate the following tables, sourced directly from country pages from EITI and RGI sites
3. Afghanistan, EITI. Available at: [https://eiti.org/afghanistan](https://eiti.org/afghanistan)
5. Ibid
6. See: War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, lapis lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth
7. Afghanistan, EITI. Available at: [https://eiti.org/afghanistan](https://eiti.org/afghanistan)
Additionally, the SP engaged at the national level with MoMP and coordinated with other CSOs on extractives issues and worked with Afghanistan-EITI.

**Democratic Republic of Congo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main commodities:</th>
<th>copper, coltan, gold, cobalt, diamonds, oil</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RGI Rank:</td>
<td>75/89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Value:</td>
<td>26% government revenues (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITI:</td>
<td>Meaningful progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners:</td>
<td>BEST; CERN/CENCO; POM</td>
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DRC has a vast resource wealth and is home to many of the minerals required for production of in-demand goods like mobile phones, cars, jewellery. Industrial production takes place predominantly in Katanga, South-Kivu, Maniema and Oriental Province and these areas are home to some of the world’s largest copper and cobalt mines – DRC is fifth amongst copper producing countries. However, competition over mineral resources have also been a feature of conflict in eastern DRC and has contributed to displacement. In fact, recent reporting from International Crisis Group has highlighted tension between industrial and small-scale miners and states that 10,000 artisanal miners were expelled by state security forces in 2019 for encroaching on industrial mining sites. Artisanal and small scale mining is widespread in the DRC, but according to survey data, less than 1% of artisanal mining activity was taking place in areas designated for this purpose. Artisanal mining, whilst a source of income for many, also brings with it a range of risks, including work site safety, environmental degradation, child labour and in the DRC, there has also been a noted risk of SGBV in and around mining areas.

The RGI notes that the weakest area of extractives governance in the DRC relates to local impact and subnational revenue sharing – issues the SP has specifically researched. The DRC’s mining code (from 2002) was replaced in March 2018 with a revised mining code, which includes a mechanism for transferring payments to local governments under article 242. For communities around mining operations, frustrations around the limited contributions mining has made to social development are high and are a potential conflict risk, emphasising the importance of addressing revenue transfer. Accordingly, much of the SP’s work in the DRC has looked specifically at the revisions to the mining code, in the early years of the partnership, proposing amendments from civil society; and in the later years, looking at how the new code is being rolled out, in particular with regard to revenue sharing for mining affected communities.

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51Democratic Republic of Congo, EITI. Available at: https://eiti.org/democratic-republic-of-congo
52Democratic Republic of Congo, Country Profile. Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/COD/mining
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Democratic Republic of Congo, Mining, Gas, Country Profile, Resource Governance Index. Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/NGA/oil-gas
58Ibid.
Nigeria

Main commodities: oil, gas, iron ore, bitumen, coal, limestone
RGI Rank: 55/89
Sector Value: 65% government revenue
EITI: Satisfactory progress
Partners: Kebektache Women Development & Resource Centre; African Centre for Leadership, Strategy and Development; MOSOP; PWYP-Nigeria; CERHD; CISLAC; FACE Initiative; MacJim Foundation

Nigeria is Africa’s largest producer of oil and holds 29% of Africa’s proven oil reserves. The country is highly resource dependent, with oil and gas contributing the majority of the government’s revenues and constituting 90% of exports (as of 2015). Most of the oil and gas activity in Nigeria is found in the Niger Delta, where extensive extraction, including by Shell, has left a legacy of pollution, community grievances and pipeline vandalism. As such, the Niger Delta, specifically Ogoniland, was the primary focus of the SP.

Recent research has documented how oil companies and the Nigerian government have failed to clean up oil spills in Ogoniland, leading to high levels of pollution, causing contamination of agricultural land, fisheries and water and the attendant health risks for communities living and farming there. UNEP produced an environmental assessment of Ogoniland in 2011 and warned of serious health consequences from contaminated water if left unaddressed. Now, in 2020, research following up UNEP’s recommendations, has found that despite these warning, communities still lack access to clean drinking water. UNEP estimates have previously put the timespan of the clean-up at up to 30 years.

Given the legacy of issues in the Niger Delta related to oil and gas, the work of the SP has focused heavily on this region; and in fact, the Dutch MoFA even asked Cordaid to consider including Nigeria in SP given the importance of these issues and the need for a strong civil society voice. The SP brought together eight different partners with varying approaches and levels of familiarity with the oil and gas sector, enabling partners to learn from each other and leverage comparative advantages. The partnership has together employed a variety of approaches, including direct lobbying, protest, research and legislative options, use of media, and community dialogue. The partnership has worked at a variety different levels and with different departments, including the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP), the National Oil Spill Detection Response Agency (NOSDRA); as well as the state and national legislatures and over the course of the project, partners have developed productive relationships with these agencies, with government departments at times turning to them for advice.

South Sudan

Main commodities: petroleum, gold, limestone, iron ore, copper
RGI Rank: 76/89
Sector Value: 80+% (2016)
EITI: N/A
Partners: AMA; UNYA

South Sudan has been experiencing conflict and political instability; and whilst independence brought with it support and efforts to develop a strong legal framework, including a petroleum governance regime, implementation and enforcement has been challenging. In fact, the Resource Governance Index (RGI) notes a ‘vast’ gap between the quality of the country’s legal framework and the implementation of said framework – the largest gap of all countries on the index.

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22 Nigeria, EITI. Available at: https://eiti.org/nigeria
23 Nigeria Oil & Gas, Country Profile, Resource Governance Index. Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/NGA/oil-gas
24 Nigeria, EITI. Available at: https://eiti.org/nigeria
26 Ibid
28 https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SSD/oil-gas
Whilst South Sudan has disclosed its national budget, there is a lack of transparency in reporting on the oil dividends and the SP have noted a lack of adherence to the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2013. South Sudan’s main state-owned oil company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) received a failing score on the RGI, driven by failure to report finances, dividends, joint ventures and subsidiaries in accordance with the Petroleum Act 2012. Nilepet has actually been implicated in funneling of oil revenues directly to the state security services and to some militias, who stand accused of abuses, in South Sudan’s ongoing conflict. The sector is marked by distinct lack of transparency in reporting on the oil dividends and a lack of funding of social programmes as a result of the sector.

In parallel to these governance issues, South Sudan is enduring a humanitarian crisis, marked by displacement. Since the eruption of conflict in December 2013, a peace agreement signed in 2015 collapsed but was again revitalized in 2018, however there continues to be violence across the country, outside of the capital of Juba. This is a challenging environment for advocacy, when much attention is on humanitarian issues. However, the oil industry is clearly wrapped up in the conflict and consequently, the humanitarian situation. Analyses have demonstrated the oil industry is in fact a “major driver” for the armed conflict and associated human rights violations and abuses. Global Witness, for example notes that the Greater Upper Nile region has been a strategic target for fighting by opposition groups in order to disrupt the government’s finances and at points, food levels in oil producing areas have been designated in crisis, given the widespread fighting. Furthermore, issues of oil payments not being transferred to official government accounts has become a practice so widespread it was included in the regionally negotiated peace agreement. In this context, the SP has focused on understanding concerns at the community level and linking these into subnational and national dialogues, particularly around the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, which stipulates that 3% of net oil revenues should be allocated to the communities and 2% to the government of the oil-producing State.

HIGHLIGHTING RESULTS AND OUTCOMES

Across its four-year span, the extractives trajectory had undertaken a variety of activities and strategies with government actors at every level, linking local, national and at times international decision makers with issues emanating from communities. This section takes a look at some of the key achievements from the extractives trajectory, by first reflecting on the SP’s overall theory of change; the role of generating evidence in the extractives sector; and a look at the trajectory’s key achievements through the compilation of a project timeline and country level case studies centring on specific results.

Reflecting on the theory of change

The SP L&A as a whole, set out to strengthen the social contract in fragile contexts, working toward the long term outcome ‘Legitimate and effective policies, systems and practices in security and justice, service delivery and economy that reflect and are responsive to the needs of all people are in place’. The programme defined the social contract as ‘an implicit agreement among the members of a society, or between a community and decision-makers, to cooperate for social benefits’ and the SP was designed to strengthen CSO capacity to legitimately influence powerholders and contribute to an enabling environment so that CSOs could effectively engage in L&A on behalf of communities to influence systems, policies and practices. Each year, within each country the SP partners would review their theories of change as part of their planning, refining their approach and mapping spheres of influence. In South Sudan for example, a review of the ToC after the first year of the project, resulted in a renewed focus on the environmental impacts of oil extraction, in response to community and local authority calls for companies and government to do more to minimise health risks from oil waste.

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30 South Sudan, Country Profile. Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SSD/oil-gas
31 Global Witness, 2018, Capture on the Nile: South Sudan’s state-owned oil company, Nilepet, has been captured by the country’s predatory elite and security services. Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/south-sudan/capture-on-the-nile/
33 Programme Document, p.2
34 Ibid
35 Analytical Report, 2016
Evidence from across the SP L&A demonstrated that social contract interventions are more likely to be successful at the local level than the national level, noting community confidence to engage local government and local government receptiveness to immediate community concerns.36 In South Sudan, work with state level government, resulted in state government actors putting pressure on national actors. Similarly, in other contexts like Afghanistan, partners found the local Departments of Mines and Petroleum (DoMP) at the provincial level to be more engaged than the overall Ministry of Mines and Petroleum at the national level. As such the SP found work in Afghanistan on consultation with mining affected communities to be more active at the provincial level, whilst at the national level, significantly more effort was required to produce engagement.37

Over time, SP partners were able to achieve more collaborative relationships with government, where appropriate. In Nigeria, for example, SP partners were invited to participate in joint monitoring visits, investigative visits, public hearings on legal amendments and organising roundtables on the establishment of local environmental desks.38 In fact, some government agencies became more receptive to the SP’s oversight, with a HYPREP representative noting at a town hall event with civil society, “We have learnt from the criticism of our mistakes in the past”.39 In South Sudan meanwhile, MPs were able to use SP findings to summon Ministers to parliament to react to the revelations on the oil disbursements and review budget provisions. One study commissioned by Cordaid on social contract initiatives noted in South Sudan, the ‘facilitation of ground-breaking dialogue among parties that do not often communicate’ as a highly effective strategy. In the DRC, government agencies actively requested SP partner participation in awareness raising around the new mining code. However, working more closely with government was not undertaken without consideration, with one interviewee noting the need to balance maintaining good working relationships with government agencies, with maintaining the independence and objectivity to provide effective oversight and critique.

Overall, whilst challenging, the work of the extractives trajectory appears to have supported the project’s guiding theory of change, with partners capacitated to engage with decision makers and evidence of effective influencing of policy and practice at varying levels.

Supporting evidence-based advocacy

The work of the SP has drawn heavily from evidence and analysis. Understanding and amplifying community concerns was a key principle and starting point for much of the SP’s work. The SP has produced several key research reports to generate evidence for advocacy; for example in South Sudan the analysis of allocations and transfers of the 5% share of revenues from petroleum to be allocated to producing states and communities (2 and 3% each respectively) and in the DRC, an assessment of the implementation of the revised mining code for community benefits. Underscoring this, Cordaid’s research into the social contract noted the importance of research and evidence as something that can also affords a type of protection against shrinking civic space.40

Ensuring that research stems from community needs and issues is important and of equal importance is ensuring that findings are shared back with community members. In South Sudan for example, findings from research on environmental pollution were shared in a forum with key stakeholders in Juba, and the partners facilitated involvement of youth from the state in question, who were able to attend the forum and validate the findings. This was noted to prompt parliament to carry out a fact-finding mission in the region and summon responsible ministers to parliament together with the governor of oil-producing Unity state for clarification.41 The partnership also found that using locally built evidence is also important in strengthening the legitimacy of international stakeholders’ influence on national stakeholders.42

The research appears to have played an important role in opening up space to access decision makers. For example in South Sudan, research into the community’s 3% share of oil revenues led to formation of a Community Development Committee (CDC) in the oil-producing region.43 Similarly at a decision-maker level, SP research on allocation of 2% to

36 Analytical Report, 2019
37 Ibid.
38 Nigeria Outcome Harvesting Document
39 Ibid.
40 Garred, Michelle; Jannaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 1: Operationalization of the Social Contract in the Capacitating Change Program
41 Analytical Report, 2018
42 Analytical Report, 2018
43 Analytical Report, 2017
States and 3% to communities led to a state MP raising a motion in the Council of States, resulting in the summoning of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning to appear before the Council to explain petroleum revenues allocation.\textsuperscript{44} In Nigeria, engaging the Federal Ministry of Environment in the drafting of the Environmental, Social and Human Rights Impact Assessment policy brief seemed to lead to the Ministry requesting SP input on developing their position on the EIA Amendment process.\textsuperscript{45} It is worth noting however, that the impact of research on project outcomes was not evidenced in the MTR,\textsuperscript{46} which may in part be due to the timing of research and related outcomes being after the MTR was conducted or it may overlook the greater ease with which partners can undertake lobbying activities when armed with evidence, as one partner noted during a workshop.

**Key achievements from the extractives trajectory**

The extractives trajectory has employed a variety of methods to achieve an array of results at the local, national and international level. Whilst different countries have taken different approaches tailored to their respective context, there are some common themes. Linking local concerns into national processes, for instance, has been an important feature. In South Sudan, grievance redress committees were formed in Melut and Palouch areas and these committees were able to engage county commissioners, governors and MPs at the state level, who in turn presented the grievances to national MPs for deliberation in parliament.\textsuperscript{47} Ensuring the trajectory kept a focus on involving young people in their activities has also been key. In Nigeria, for example, youth were trained as Impact Monitors and can now monitor impacts during clean-up and are reporting such activities to local civil society.\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile in South Sudan, youth from Melut area directly petitioned the president regarding oil pollution, resulting in a commitment to send an assessment team.\textsuperscript{49} During the partner workshop in South Sudan, one SP partner noted that these youth (and women’s) groups also supported sustainability as the groups were active even when the partners were not available.

The partnership has also involved a diverse array of partners, including media outlets. In Afghanistan, the media played an important role in stimulating public debate and acted as a mechanism for residents and CSOs to share their experiences and directly share policy recommendations to the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{50} Meanwhile in Nigeria, a group of journalists trained by the SP formed the Journalists Against the Delay of the Clean-Up group, to ensure implementation of clean-up commitments as per the UNEP Report on Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.

In order to explore these achievements in more detail, the remainder of this section sets out an overview of what has been achieved through the SP across the four countries and globally through a four year timeline, followed by specific case studies. The timeline highlights SP key achievements made across the project and although this should not be taken as exhaustive of project achievements, it is designed to give a sense of the breadth of what has been achieved since 2016 across four countries and at the international level. The subsequent case studies are designed to complement this by looking in depth at specific achievements per country, demonstrating specific approaches and adaptation to challenges and learning.

\textsuperscript{44} Analytical Report, 2019  
\textsuperscript{45} Nigeria Outcome Harvest Document  
\textsuperscript{46} Fabrri, Paola; Alpenidze, Irma; Owusu Afriyie, Kwaku; Selemani, Zephirin (2018) MTR of the Cordaid Programme - “Restoring the Social Contract, Empowering People in Fragile Context” MDF Training & Consultancy  
\textsuperscript{47} Analytical Report, 2019  
\textsuperscript{48} Nigeria Outcome Harvesting Document  
\textsuperscript{49} Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 1: Operationalization of the Social Contract in the Capacitating Change Program  
\textsuperscript{50} Analytical Report, 2019
DRAWING LESSONS FROM EXTRACTIVES LOBBYING AND ADVOCACY

2016

- Adoption of EU Regulation on conflict minerals
- EC Policy Makers hear SP lobby on due diligence costs falling on artisanal miners
- SP invited to public hearing about NOSDRA and EIA
- Government commitments on alternative livelihoods and spill monitoring
- SP in launch of EPRM
- EPRM incorporates SP selection criteria advice
- Some companies agree to fence oil waste to minimise health risks after community and local authority advocacy

2017

- Statement from government on new policy on ASM formalisation
- New mining code adopted, includes proposals from civil society
- Communities South Kivu and Maniema write to Banro CEO asking for fair compensation & support

2018

- SP Partners join working group on domestication of the UNGPs for Business & Human Rights
- Government discloses information on 3% share of net petroleum revenues
- Community & CSO representatives form Paswan Mine Watch Committee - complaints shared at Mining for Development Forum in Kabul

Global
Afghanistan
DRC
Nigeria
South Sudan
DRAWING LESSONS FROM EXTRACTIVES LOBBYING AND ADVOCACY

- Global Afghanistan
- DRC
- Nigeria
- South Sudan

NOSDRA sets up joint committee with SP partner on oil leaks

HYPREP asks SP for support on KPIs for Ogoni clean-up progress

Increased federal budget for Ogoni clean-up made

Side events with OECD, EC on implementation of EU minerals directive

Global

Volunteers and SP partner form alliance on bunkering and artisanal refining

Government & SP partner conduct assessment on alternative livelihoods

Ogoni Councillors develop position paper, submit to HYPREP, develop monitoring for community feedback

SP partner invited to join clean-up site visit with government

Senate committee requests SP to help prepare draft bill on legislation of HYPREP

2019

Research on pollution presented in Juba, parliament carries out fact finding mission, summons Ministers, state governors

SP report prompts government committee to verify community claims of pollution

Partners contribute to draft law on traceability & certification initiatives

Government requests SP raise awareness of new mining code

MP raises motion in Council of States on revenue allocation

Grievance Redress Committee active in Melut and Palouch oil producing areas

Civil society collaboration framework with CTCFM established

2020

MSG established for local government involvement in community dialogue in 3 provinces

MoMP begins consultation with mining community CSOs on change in policy & procedures

Government & SP partner conduct assessment on alternative livelihoods

Ogoni Councillors develop position paper, submit to HYPREP, develop monitoring for community feedback
STORIES OF CHANGE FROM THE EXTRACTIVES TRAJECTORY

As the timeline above highlights, the extractives trajectory has achieved a variety of successes over the past four years. Whilst it is not possible to investigate each change in detail, this section allows us to look at one change per country in greater depth, to better understand how the partnerships have worked in each country. The visual and narrative case studies that follow are based predominantly from workshops conducted with each country team and supported by project research and reporting. The workshops examined the SP’s contribution to change (blue boxes); the external factors influencing the change (green boxes) and the SP’s future priorities to sustain or amplify the change (yellow boxes).

Afghanistan

Whilst the expectations placed on Afghanistan’s extractives sector are high, much of the dialogue around the sector is concentrated at a central level, in Kabul, perhaps given the limited large-scale production in the country. There has been less attention given to communities in areas of extraction. However, the SP has developed a functioning model for government-community engagement around the mining sector in three provinces, through establishing multi-stakeholder, representative mine watch committees.

In forming these committees, the SP understood the need to bring together stakeholders from within the communities themselves, from local civil society and from government. Initially, the SP held meetings with central and local government departments and met with community representatives to discuss the initiative and begin the process for identifying representative committee members. The SP met with representatives of Community Development Committees in mining affected areas to get to know who was active on extractive issues. They consulted with provincial government departments, including the DoMP, but also the Department of Economy and the Department of Women’s

51 Specific reports or interviews are referenced in footnotes in this section, remaining findings were generated through discussion during workshops.
Affairs, to ensure inclusion of a broader range of stakeholders. Each committee was finally formed, comprised of 15 members, meeting at the provincial level but including community representatives from the districts where mining is taking place. Initial meetings oriented participants to the topics to be discussed and agreed a schedule of meetings and focused on forging connections between the members. Committee participants were trained on the mine cycle, rights of the communities under the law, advocacy techniques and most recently, social and environmental impacts of mining. Crucially, each of the 15 members agreed to share the discussion points from the meetings with their broader constituencies.

Forming a sustainable committee has not been without challenges. Afghanistan is beset by insecurity, and mining areas are no exception to this - particularly given role of minerals in funding conflict and local strong men. Thus, simply reaching the provinces for SP partners required coordinating movements with security agencies. More pragmatically, lack of materials and venues locally, lack of travel budget for district representatives all needed to be overcome to support the committees.

Beyond the practicalities, the SP encountered challenges of bridging the gap between government and CSO views and expectations over the sector; and at times this gap could be substantial. Despite an initial unwillingness from either party to compromise, the SP had to bring them together around a middle ground. The SP quickly learnt that it was important to involve CSO and community representatives and government representatives at each stage of the project, without cutting corners, as feelings of exclusion could potentially create problems down the line, given the extent of differing views.

Outside of the SP’s work, whilst the capacity of DoMP at the provincial level was seen to be low, with limited human and financial resources, the commitment to the project that existed from provincial government stakeholders to bring about change, was noted to be a crucial factor. It was this that enabled relatively quick mobilisation of the committees. As the project comes to a close, the Mine Watch Committees have committed to continuing their work without the support of the partnership. The approach of these committees brought government representatives from provinces in front of CSOs and community members, often for the first time. There was no mechanism or platform in these provinces prior to this to enable people to ask questions directly to government representatives. This highlights a key achievement of the project and its approach.

**DRC**

Following years of deadlock and opposition from mining companies, DRC’s *Code Miniere* was revised in 2018, including amendments proposed by civil society, who are now monitoring its implementation. Whilst proposals to revise the mining code were launched in 2012 prior to the start of the SP L&A, limited progress had been made; and civil society, including SP partners, were instrumental in breaking the impasse.
The approach of the SP in progressing the revised code involved a combination of grassroots evidence, consensus building among civil society and broad, but also targeted, stakeholder mobilisation within government. The amendments the SP proposed for the mining code included those from broader civil society so that there were unified demands on what the revised code should cover. The SP produced a memo on strengths and weaknesses of the 2002 code and presented proposed amendments to a range of people within government, including MPs and senators on specific parliamentary committees. Crucially, all of this was underpinned by evidence from mining affected communities, ensuring their voices featured prominently in the debate. The SP was able to use the advocacy expertise they had built to leverage the shifting interests of the key government and company stakeholders to achieve their demands, noting that at one time or another, governments or companies could be allied with CSOs on advocacy demands and that the partners had to be adaptive to this.

Outside of the work undertaken by the SP, the partners were supported by several external developments, including analysis submitted by the IMF on benefits from revision of the code and expert contributions from NRGI. The broad support of the media over the revision of the code also helped as it enabled the SP to inform and mobilise demand within communities and keep them up to date on challenges and blockages in the revision process. Evidence from EITI and other sources helped to highlight the limited benefits communities had been able to derive from mining, sitting in stark contrast to levels of poverty around mining sites. This helped form public opinion in support of civil society demands and put pressure on parliamentarians to adopt them.

However, the roll out and implementation of the revised code remains a challenge and the SP produced an analysis of the gaps in transferring local benefits, two years on from the revision of the code. Partner research has noted insufficient enforcement measures in the code for sharing royalty funds. Partners highlighted the lack of interest from the government’s side in the measures relating community development, even at a decentralised level. Despite this though, there are some positive developments with some provincial and local authorities requesting SP partners to support efforts raising awareness of the code and support the implementation of local development provisions. Moving forward, monitoring of the code’s implementation remains a priority, alongside supporting communities to set spending priorities and mechanisms.

**Nigeria**

In Nigeria, the project’s biggest success has been the improved functioning of HYPREP. At the outset of the SP, HYPREP was a largely non-performing entity, existing in name only and inaccessible to those most affected by the spills. Now, as the project draws to a close, HYPREP is a functioning entity showing improved effectiveness, resourced with government budgeted. The SP can claim significant contributions to this change.

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52 Mayani, Fabien (2020) Presentation des conclusions du rapport d’évaluation de la mise en œuvre des dispositions relatives au développement Communautaire
53 Analytical Report, 2019
HYPREP now has clearer governance structures in place, including councils and boards and structures to liaise with the community and mechanisms for monitoring the clean-up. Whilst there are still gaps in how HYPREP operates on a number of issues, some clean-up sites have now been handed over to contractors and communities have been able to interact directly with HYPREP.

This was not the case at the outset of the project, when HYPREP was largely just a governing council, removed from the affected communities, who were not aware of its role. SP partners gathered evidence around this communication gap, particularly for women and young people and following direct lobbying, HYPREP launched engagement with communities and conducted joint visits to clean-up sites with CSOs. This has engendered greater communication with HYPREP. For example, the Forum of Ogoni Councillors – a representative group, trained by the SP – have initiated their own quarterly meetings with HYPREP, whilst a number of women’s groups came together to form the Coalition of Ogoni Women Development Initiative, increasing their capacity for advocacy, including via radio outlets. CEHRD, one of the SP partners, has direct connection with HYPREP’s communication team over awareness raising with communities on clean-up activities and HYPREP has agreed to partner with CEHRD on these activities where necessary. The SP was able to play to the various strengths of the partnership members – some partners were directly involved in local monitoring, whilst others mobilised stakeholders outside of Ogoni as part of the broader environmental policy initiative.

The SP importantly played an instrumental role ensuring HYPREP was allocated funding to mobilise the clean-up. The SP used a range of methods, as the diagram above highlights, including advocacy visits and direct engagement of oversight agencies like the House Committee on Environment. The SP used their quarterly planning meetings to conduct stakeholder mapping and categorise potential advocacy targets by spheres of influence in order to identify strategic stakeholders and share the work between the partners. Capacity building initiatives conducted through the SP supported a strong improvement of the policy environment and legal processes surrounding the oil sector, with supported contact with legislative bodies. Similarly, the research the SP undertook on community awareness (underpinned by annual learning agendas) provided the evidence base needed to persuade HYPREP to change to a more engaging communications strategy. Involving communities in endorsing research findings helped to strengthen this.

External to the SP, the broader movement around environmental governance and the Ogoni clean-up contributed to this improved functioning. The SP was able to capitalise on work of initiatives like FOSTER who were already focused on the Niger Delta. In addition, with the passage of the EIA Act in Nigeria, broader coalitions of civil society and international partners, including the Heinrich Boll Foundation) who were interested in environmental issues, came together as a block, creating opportunities to leverage the partnership for advocacy. Outside the SP’s direct strategies. Local women groups influenced strongly and appealed to policy makers on the clean-up as well as champions from within the policy space - who came to value the SP further noting how the partnership had promoted the independence and resourcing of HYPREP. Sustained media coverage of the issue also helped.

Moving forward, the SP has emphasised a need for continued independent monitoring of HYPREP as it fulfils its mandate. Much of the success achieved has involved sustained engagement from civil society on the clean-up and this continues to be needed to ensure HYPREP’s work and engagement with communities is sustained. Linked to this, pending legislation on HYPREP’s independence, currently in the House, needs to be passed into law, to solidify HYPREP’s role and functioning. Additionally, continued engagement with Ogoni councillors for adequate grievance mechanisms on early warning and conflict resolution are needed. These achievements are all underscored by an awareness that if the issue of pollution through pipeline vandalism and other practices are not resolved, this will impact the clean-up process. The initial engagements that the SP has had with the government on alternative livelihoods for youth in Ogoniland, to reduce bunkering and artisanal refining are an important step in this.

**South Sudan**

Despite a clear legislative provision under the Transitional Constitution (2011) and the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (2013), mandating that 3% of oil revenues should be transferred to the surrounding communities and 2% to oil

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54 Analytical Report, 2019
56 Ibid
59 Ibid
74 FOSTER a UK Government funded Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform in Nigeria
producing states, these revenues have not been correctly allocated since the passing of the act in 2013. Now, as the project draws to a close, the first disbursement of revenues has been made to communities.

At the outset of the project in 2016, communities were not aware of the provisions in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act related to revenue sharing back to oil producing communities. With communities unaware of these provisions there had been little demand side pressure around compliance with the 3% requirements. The SP invested heavily in awareness raising with communities over their rights under the law and additionally over issues around water pollution as a result of oil extraction. The SP undertook many meetings with communities and local authorities in oil producing counties to achieve this and it slowly helped to see a change in practices around polluted water and engender demand for transfer of revenues and better environmental regulation. This increased awareness was a big success of the project.

In parallel, researchers and advocates under the SP began to look at evidence under the petroleum acts and budget documents and analysed this in comparison with other petroleum producing countries, to better understand citizens’ resource rights. The research was able to identify that the state owed producing communities a total of $350 million between the 2011 and 2017 budget years. Additionally the necessary oversight institutions mandated within the act for the transfer and management of petroleum revenue had not been established, including the Community Development Committee. Research was also carried out with affected communities – made more challenging by strict NGO regulation in South Sudan and the potential for key permissions to be blocked. However, the project saw community access improvements over time.

The SP was able to use the findings from their research with state level governments and the Council of State, who in turn put pressure on Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Petroleum for compliance with the Act. The partners were able to convene consultative workshops on the challenges facing the transfer of the 3% of oil revenues and their lobbying efforts resulted in MPs from oil producing areas summoning the Ministers of Finance and of Petroleum. In parallel lobby groups from youth, payam chiefs, women leaders were formed in oil producing areas to push for the formation of the CDCs. This result of government authorities questioning ministers, combined with greater community awareness of and demand for their entitlements, created pressure from all sides for government compliance with the Act.

Outside of the SP, the media was instrumental in raising this issue, which the SP saw as a good contributing factor. The ability to disseminate information from research and public meetings through the media increased discussion and
engendered demand for these provisions to be adhered to. In addition, the role of the Council of States and MPs from oil producing regions, combined with the appointment of a new Minister of Petroleum, under the terms of the 2018 Peace agreement, helped to create a more enabling environment on the regulatory side and the project was able to link state level policy makers with those at the national level.

Moving forward beyond the SP, the immediate priority for the SP partners, is transparency over what this initial transfer represents. The first transfer amounted to $7 million in 2020, but this is only equivalent to one month of budget execution. In addition, the partners aim to regularise the process. The transfers should be made routinely and consistently, which has not yet been achieved – in Upper Nile State for example whilst money has been received, the CDC there is not clear which months and years this money is supposed to cover. In addition, although oil producing areas such as Ruweng and Melut have established Community Development Committees, these committees are not yet formed fully compliant with the 2013 Act; and communities in oil producing Unity State have yet to form CDCs. Furthermore, once formed, these CDCs and other structures require training on transparent and accountable management of the oil revenues. The partners also propose amendments to the Act to address gaps and include provisions for credible environmental and social auditing.
LEARNING FROM THE EXTRACTIVES TRAJECTORY

This section looks at some of the key learning themes that have emerged from this review, looking first at evidence of and approaches to learning from within the SP and then at some of the overall lessons from the SP that could inform future extractives advocacy initiatives.

Key learning themes across trajectory

The trajectory used a variety of approach and with the Mid-Term Review noting most results were achieved with lobbying authorities, awareness-raising campaigns, training, research, organisational development, and direct service provision.58 Given the diversity of issues and contexts, there was no overall ‘most effective’ strategy. However, one consistent theme of learning was around the importance of engaging at different levels of government. Consistently across all countries, engaging at the sub-national level was noted to be important. At points this had a catalytic affect in engaging national government – for example in South Sudan with the national assembly summoning national government ministers, whilst in Nigeria NOSDRA came to see increased value of the SP for supporting their independent mandate.

Another theme that evolved over the project cycle was the positioning work around the concept of extractives as a driver of conflict.59 For example, lack of community consultation before award of contracts and licences might cause feelings of marginalisation, land disputes in areas of resource wealth are common and may trigger conflict and so to may disputes between local communities and personnel working on a mining project, particularly if they are not from the area.60 Minerals can also have a role in financing conflict and in Afghanistan it was noted that even where mines are not directly controlled by armed groups, the revenue from them was often ‘taxed’ by local strongmen and armed groups.61 This issue emerged as the common advocacy agenda at the end of 2019 following the Abuja workshop and in interviews and workshops participants noted the interlinkage of extractives and conflict, but also that there may be more donor interest in funding around conflict related issues than pure extractives advocacy work. In conflict contexts, there may be less funding for traditional advocacy programming or environmental programming, particularly if the needs are viewed as humanitarian. However, there may be scope to frame extractive work through the lens of stabilisation work and conflict sensitivity, given the clear linkages between extractives and conflict, as a means of accessing alternative funding.

In addition, most partners have (and should continue to) noted the importance of involving women in the extractives sector. This has involved working with women’s groups and providing training among other areas; and in the case of Afghanistan adjusting the community complaints component of the project to be accessible for women. However, given that most of the extractives countries also had a trajectory on women, peace and security, this might have been a missed area for collaboration. Furthermore, whilst extractives work should of course involve specific women focused work or work with women’s groups, it is important to ensure women are supported to be involved in other aspects of extractive industries oversight. Women are citizens with views and concerns around how resources are extracted and how revenues are spent and should therefore be engaged throughout extractives governance advocacy and not just in women-specific initiatives.

Direct learning

Training and capacity building played an important role in the approach to learning across the SP. During the first year of the programme, most of the work focused on developing L&A capacity with partners.62 By 2017-18, SP analysis of

58 Fabri, Paola; Alpenidze, Irma; Owusu Afriyie, Kwaku; Selemani, Zephirin (2018) MTR of the Cordaid Programme - “Restoring the Social Contract, Empowering People in Fragile Context” MDF Training & Consultancy
59 Planning Report 2019
60 Planning Report 2020
61 De Zeeuw, Jeroen; Noorani, Javed; De Brouckere, Lien (2016) Scoping Study for a New Cordaid Mining Advocacy Program in Afghanistan. Timu
62 Planning Report 2018
planning documents showed shift from capacity strengthening more toward policy and decision maker influencing.\textsuperscript{63} This shows how capacity building was clearly embedded into the project’s theory of change and the resulting knowledge applied in later years. In Nigeria, for example, advanced training resulted in partners diversifying strategies to include participating in public hearings, awareness campaigns, protest, policy dialogue and social media campaigns.\textsuperscript{64} In the final year of the project, the approach shifted entirely away from training to coaching and mentoring to solidify knowledge and experiences gained so far.\textsuperscript{65}

Some training was carried out through a combination of online and face to face training – for example training of coordinators on EU lobbying – knowledge coordinators were able to use during lobby meetings in Brussels.\textsuperscript{66} At a country level, training appeared to be useful and partners were able to directly apply it through activities. However, staff turnover in partner organisations did prove to be a constraint in the overall capacity development as trained staff would move on.\textsuperscript{67} In addition, the learning gaps greater in different contexts – e.g. Afghanistan where extractives was a new topic both for Cordaid country office and the partners. Another noted issue identified through the social contract research, was a low level of awareness of unintended negative effects or an unwillingness to report them and a low level of attention to advocacy risk management, itself a source of learning.\textsuperscript{68} This is an issue where those in management and coordination need to create and communicate an environment where it is safe and acceptable to report risks and indeed failures to ensure partners are open about them.

### Adjusting and adapting

Using learning to adjust and adapt project priorities is a key feature of a theory of change approach and the SP’s yearly planning and quarterly meetings provided a forum for this. As projects continued, there was evidence of partners learning and adapting to the context, with mixed levels of success. In Nigeria for example, there was open reflection that they did not initially engage with the State Assembly, which could have been a useful advocacy channel. Once partners came to appreciate this, they did include the State Assembly in their work, but making this change later in the project limited scope to pursue this further. However, this knowledge and linkage is now there for the partners to take forward in future. In South Sudan and DRC partners were very sustained in their follow up of issues. No sooner had they achieved successes with revisions to the code or disbursement of 3% oil revenues than they began to follow up implementation of the code and streamlining revenue disbursement. This shows the continuous nature of this kind of advocacy and how the partners evolved their tactics.

It is important to also reflect on the adjustment each country had to make at the outset of the programme. The scale-down of Cordaid’s extractives work to just the SP L&A, meant that for most country offices, they were operating with reduced scope. In the case of Nigeria, this transition appeared to be the smoothest, with the Coordinator hosted by another organisation. In DRC and South Sudan, country teams had to adapt to a smaller project compared to what they had previously had to work with. In Afghanistan however, the country team had to take on an entirely new work area, having not carried out extractives work before and led to a comparably slower start up than in the other countries. The project had to adjust again, later in the cycle after issues with the first partner emerged and brought in another partner, focusing on new provinces.

### Learning and sharing between countries

The extent of lesson learning and sharing between extractives trajectory countries appears to be somewhat ad-hoc. Whilst the global office was consistently involved in supporting countries with planning and at points with capacity building, the opportunities for sharing between countries appeared to be less routinised. Given the differences in context between the four countries, this might partly explain the limits to experience sharing. However, opportunities like the 2019 Abuja workshop for country coordinators to come together did prove useful – for example, Nigeria’s experiences with environmental audit were useful for those in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{69} Participants in interviews did remark that where there were cross-country learning opportunities these were helpful in understanding how other contexts faced similar issues.

\textsuperscript{63} Analytical Report 2019  
\textsuperscript{64} Analytical Report 2018  
\textsuperscript{65} Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 3: The Role of Capacity Development in the Capacitating Change Program  
\textsuperscript{66} Planning Report 2018  
\textsuperscript{67} Planning Report 2017  
\textsuperscript{68} Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 2: The Role and Influence of Civil Society in the Capacitating Change Program  
\textsuperscript{69} Report of Abuja Extractives Strategy Meeting
what legal issues were emerging, what community impacts had been observed in other contexts, what ‘not to do’. The onset of covid-19 in early 2020 constrained the project’s ability to carry out additional planned learning exchange visits between South Sudan and Nigeria, which was unforeseeable. This being said, given the narrow scope of the SP as compared to Cordaid’s previous extractives programming, country teams needed to be strategic in how they used their time, with one person noting that although learning visits were important, they were not a higher priority than the day to day work.

Efforts to form a common advocacy agenda took place from 2019 onward, with support from the global office. The Abuja workshop was an opportunity to review the international lobby agenda and look for opportunities to coordinate national advocacy. This does appear to have helped drive learning around the linkage of extractives and conflict and had it taken place earlier in the project cycle, or had the pandemic not constrained travel, it might have stimulated greater learning and sharing between countries as well as between specific countries and the global office. One interviewee reflected that forming this common agenda late in the project did limit some of the effectiveness of it.

**Reflections on approaches to extractives advocacy work**

**Lesson 1: Linking international and national advocacy is effective but it does require resourcing at both levels**

The extractives trajectory was able to undertake some important areas of international-national collaboration for the DRC, specifically around conflict minerals. However, there was comparatively less international level advocacy under this trajectory as compared to other trajectories as a result of limited available expertise at HQ level. For some countries, this may in part have reflected a lack of international focus in the broader international debate around extractives – for example, for Nigeria there was a perception that the issues in the Niger Delta were not as ‘big’ on the agenda at an Europe level as they once had been and were seen more as a ‘Dutch problem’; whilst in Afghanistan, the momentum that had characterized the international community’s engagement with the sector a few years ago appears to have decreased in recent years. However, these shifts in international priorities do not necessarily equate to a lack of need from the countries themselves, and therefore the SP required resourcing either at country of global level on the extractives trajectory to raise issues to the international level. An honest reflection from participants in this review, was simply that there were some missed opportunities at this level and that more work could have been linking into international agendas.

Leveraging local insights to the international level is therefore challenging without sufficient staffing and resources and has made capacity development challenging as well – particularly in a new context like Afghanistan where extractives work was new. In addition to this, research commissioned by Cordaid on the social contract for this project also noted a perspective that Cordaid country office and partners were not always abreast of international developments or open to linking up to them as they do not feel they are within their mandate. Whilst this feedback was not specifically directed at the extractive trajectory, it might highlight a potential gap in understanding or perceptions around international advocacy processes. It might also highlight some of the gaps between international advocacy priorities and country/community level priorities, if local partners do not feel these developments are really within their mandate to engage with. This finding might also serve to confirm some of the points that Cordaid and the DRC partners had raised around the need for civil society inclusion in standard setting.

**Lesson 2: Working in a coalition or network structure continues to be an effective approach and supports sustainability**

This review has confirmed that coalition building or network approaches to advocacy continues to be an effective strategy. In Nigeria in particular, the value of working together across a diverse range of organisations on complex issues was pronounced. It allowed partners to leverage each other’s networks, to open doors they would not ordinarily have been able to and to amplify the effect of their respective actions. This was not without its challenges, with debates and occasionally disagreement about the best way to tackle an issue, but overall it enabled partners to be part of approaches that they may not ordinarily have been able to participate in and sometimes it meant that successes came about in unexpected ways – for example a protest at the Ministry of Environment that partners had not initially been in

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70 Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 2: The Role and Influence of Civil Society in the Capacitating Change Program
agreement over led to the engagement of the Minister. These networks and linkages and new experiences are what can be sustained of the project after its close.

Each trajectory country was involved to some degree in forming or participating in a network or coalition around extractives. In South Sudan for example, partners formed a national forum of CSOs, including media, interested in extractives, in parallel to the process of forming a national PWYP coalition, as that process was a longer term objective and the forum met immediate coordination needs and gave partners a larger voice and platform. This further confirms the importance of working as part of a broader network, which may also support some of the obstacles posed by limited funds and shrinking civic space, its smaller organisations are able to work together.

**Lesson 3: Engaging bilateral donors as stakeholders in advocacy is important, but requires alignment with country level priorities**

The original programme document for the SP L&A saw the Dutch MoFA and the RNEs within in each trajectory country an important stakeholder in the project and there was certainly bilateral engagement throughout. However, the engagement of the RNEs as an advocacy partner was varied. The levels of interest from each RNE is likely to be linked to broader priorities in the country - for example in Nigeria, the Niger Delta is a priority area for MoFA, whilst there may be less obvious areas for strategic engagement on extractives in other areas. Additionally, staffing and priorities of RNE staff can be a challenge to forging strategic relationships for advocacy work and competing priorities were noted as a limiting factor on strategic engagement with RNE.

Notwithstanding this, exposure to bilateral donors is important for national partner organisations who may have access to a smaller range of funding sources than organisations operating internationally. Ensuring there are opportunities for national civil society to access funding directly and develop connections for potential future proposals through showcasing their work is important to sustaining such efforts in the long-run and amplifying the impact of the capacity built through the SP L&A. This has already been helpful for some partners in Nigeria who have been able to source their own direct funding.

**Lesson 4: Joint reflection and theory of change approach valuable for planning and adjustment at country level**

The SP L&A used a theory of change approach for planning and results management. Reflection on this during the interviews and workshops. The overall programme ToC guides the work but is underpinned by country level ToCs for each trajectory, which are refreshed each year and outcomes are harvested and compared to the initial planning. This was a new approach for a lot of partners and was appreciated for how it routinised planning and reflection and supported the ability to orient the project to the context. Importantly this approach conveyed a greater sense of ownership over the SP from national partners. Effectiveness and appreciation of this approach was validated through the MTR, which noted the ToC approach being appreciated for flexibility (as opposed to logical frameworks), but also for linking planning into outcomes and providing a basis for adaptation drawing form context analysis. Feedback from the MTR was noted in reporting as having encouraged the SP management to enhance reflection and learning through quarterly strategic discussions. However one potential constraint to this may have been the one year contract cycles most partners were given, which one report noted could contribute to short term thinking in the context of what was actually a five year project.

**Lesson 5: Carrying out L&A activities without ability to support related service delivery is a challenge to effective L&A**

Unlike other trajectories, that were implemented alongside service delivery or more practical programming, the extractives trajectory existed as a standalone trajectory, which did present a challenge. The SP L&A’s mid-term review

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76 Planning Report 2018  
77 Planning Report 2018  
78 Planning Report 2017  
79 Planning Report 2019  
80 Fabri, Paola; Alpendizde, Irma; Owusu Afrivje, Kwaku; Selemani, Zephirin (2018) MTR of the Cordaid Programme - “Restoring the Social Contract, Empowering People in Fragile Context” MDF Training & Consultancy  
81 Planning Report 2019  
82 Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 3: The Role of Capacity Development in the Capacitating Change Program
found that ‘SP partners achieve the highest contribution to change when they support direct service delivery and behavioural change at the community level whereas a medium contribution – when they involve winning commitments from authorities to act in line with advocacy, and when building communities so that they demand their rights, self-organise for action, and dialogue with the authorities’. Given that the extractives trajectory did not have the ability to support service delivery, this was always going to be a challenge.

Across the four countries, partners were working with communities that had unmet, sometimes quite fundamental, needs, but that they could not offer services to meet. Engaging at a grassroots level to inform national and international priorities was central to the SP L&A’s approach, however in the context of severe needs, this engenders a risk of lack of community participation or research fatigue, even if communities themselves are anticipated to be the long run beneficiaries of successful advocacy. Given that advocacy successes can take a long time to materialise as community benefits, without expectation management this can also lead to perceptions from communities that they have been lied to. It is also important to consider, morally, how much of a community member’s time can be taken on an unremunerated basis.

This is not to imply that advocacy work must always have linked service delivery, but where strategies require sustained engagement of specific communities, methods to meet some needs or find linkages with other programmes need to be considered. There can also be additional benefits to linking advocacy and programmatic support in supporting feedback loops between effective programming and reform needs at the government/policy level.

Fabrri, Paola; Alpenidze, Irma; Owusu Afriyie, Kwaku; Selemani, Zephirin (2018) MTR of the Cordaid Programme - “Restoring the Social Contract, Empowering People in Fragile Context” MDF Training & Consultancy
FORWARD LOOK

The extractives trajectory and Cordaid’s extractives work as a whole is now coming to a close. This section supports the closing out of extractives work, by setting out future priorities per countries and recommendations for the main stakeholders to the SP. Partners to the SP L&A have achieved many noteworthy successes but research conducted in the final year of the SP noted partners concerns about continuation of funding after the SP L&A ends, as for many the SP constituted a high proportion of their funding. Ensuring they are equipped – in resources and networks - and able to continue this work must be a priority of Cordaid and the Royal Netherlands Embassies of the trajectory countries.

**Priorities at Country Level**

**Afghanistan**

Whilst some of the interest from the international community around Afghanistan’s extractive sector may have reduced in recent years, the value of the sector remains high and still represents one of the only sectors in Afghanistan capable of delivering revenue at scale. As such, efforts to exploit Afghanistan’s natural resources will continue and with current peace negotiations, may become more contentious given the sector’s legacy of funding opposition groups. Therefore, continuing to **build a stronger civil society movement focused on extractives issues**, including through the media remains a priority. Supporting civil society networks to link province and district level initiatives to those oversight mechanisms and discussions taking place in Kabul is necessary, and vice versa, supporting province level initiatives with the information and resources to sensitise community members on their rights and the risks in relation to the sector are important. Similarly, enabling a diverse range of organisations to input and feed into international agendas surrounding extractives and surrounding Afghanistan’s future, as peace negotiations continue, is needed to tell a more representative story about the needs in Afghanistan. This will require support in developing technical expertise around mining sector issues and ability for civil society to access specific technical expertise where needed to support advocacy. One proposal of this nature from Cordaid’s scoping study remains ever more relevant with Cordaid’s extractives work coming to an end, of developing a CSO capacity-building proposal in coordination with Environment and Natural Resources Monitoring Network in Kabul, linked with a global institution – potentially – for example Heinrich Boll Foundation. This could also help to ensure a more diverse range of organisations benefit from support.

Strengthening community level oversight of mines remains important, particularly to avoid some of the pitfalls other countries have experienced, where community concerns have not been prioritised. Experiences through the project show that greater community awareness and oversight can be achieved and there is potential to **expand community monitoring** as a means of identifying issues early and improving data from hard to reach areas that can contribute to improved policy.

Whilst the mine watch committees included some women, the lack of women involved in extractives at a province level was a challenge. There is a strong emphasis on programming around women’s rights in Afghanistan and currently, women’s involvement in peace process is a big emphasis, however linking this dialogue into other sectors and future development needs to be expanded. The extractives sector is known to have gendered impacts and exclusion of women is a risk, that at this early stage in the sector’s development, Afghanistan does not necessarily have to follow. Therefore, **investing in capabilities of women around extractives governance and linking extractives governance movements to women’s rights movements**, with sufficient funding, would be important. This in turn can help to strengthen the evidence base on the gendered dimensions of the extractives sector in Afghanistan specifically.

**DRC**

The long-awaited revision of the Code Minier was an important achievement for the SP, however there is a need to **ensure government compliance with local development requirements of the revised Code Minier**. The

79 Garred, Michelle; Janmaat, Linda (2020). Deliverable 3: The Role of Capacity Development in the Capacitating Change Program
80 De Zeeuw, Jeroen; Noorani, Javed; De Brouckere, Lien (2016) Scoping Study for a New Cordaid Mining Advocacy Program in

Afghanistan. Timu
SP’s work on noted that of the three levers put in place in the code to support community development, only one is functioning and the funds are not reaching community interest projects. Continued work is needed on adoption and reinforcement on subnational revenue transfer mechanisms and ensuring there are effective transparency measures for management of these funds. This work might involve supporting local authorities in designing local development plans and participatory budgets and ensuring participatory and gender inclusive community involvement. It is important to keep in mind the extent of grievances and tensions from communities who have yet to benefit from their mineral wealth and that non-compliance with local development requirements could become a conflict driver.

In parallel, civil society in the DRC needs to be support to continue their oversight of traceability work covered through the revised mining code and engage at the regional (ICGLR) and international (OECD, UN, EU) level on this. Whilst traceability initiatives are important evidence from the SP has shown a need to push to ensure inclusion of civil society and community voices and relatedly ensure there is funding for this. Continued (and funded) involvement of civil society representing affected communities in development or revision of standards and due diligence guidelines is important to ensure such guidance is responsive and is not used for signal value by companies. As part of this proper outreach to and involvement of women’s groups and child protection groups should be made, as the prevalence of SGBV around mine sites in the DRC is a noted issue.

**Nigeria**

In Nigeria, a diverse range of partners have come together to achieve movement both at the policy level and on the ground in Ogoni. Communities have been linked to decision makers and HYPREP, a once inactive agency has taken steps to fulfill its mandate. Moving forward, a safe oil sector in Ogoniland requires the continued functioning of an independent HYPREP. Whilst important progress has been made, sustaining this will require the passing of legislation that will safeguard HYPREP’s independence, including provisions on transparency and accountability around selection of contractors, progress on clean-up and inclusive communication with affected communities. In parallel, continued civil society engagement in the monitoring of HYPREP and the role of contractors is essential to keep HYPREP working properly and safeguard the achievements the SP have made to date in its functioning.

Furthermore, in order to ensure the sustainability of the clean-up there is a need to reduce risks of re-pollution, through practical support to alternative livelihoods. Whilst steps have been taken to raise awareness of these risks, partners noted that awareness and disapproval of these activities is already there and without alternative livelihood options, bunkering and artisanal refining will continue – a practice that creates risks to the communities in Ogoniland. Without alternative options, awareness raising will only go so far to curtail these issues. Concrete livelihoods programming, potentially including credit facilities and grants, and targeting women and youth as well, are needed. SP research on environmental governance noted that consistently environmental issues in Ogoniland are related to the oil economy. There is a need for a more cohesive, overarching approach to environmental governance is needed, including through continued advocacy from SP partners on these issues, leveraging existing knowledge and evidence collected through the partnership. This includes advocacy for a law that clearly defines the roles of central and regional governance, with a clear policy framework at the subnational level.

Women have been specifically, negatively affected by pollution in Ogoniland and there is a global evidence base that articulates the risks of exclusion of women from extractive sector decision making. There is a need to promote the work done by women’s groups and networks on the clean-up so far and ensure HYPREP directly engages with women representatives as a matter of course.

**South Sudan**

Work in South Sudan has achieved incredible collaboration between community, civil society and state governments in the push for subnational oil revenue sharing. Moving forward, South Sudan needs to solidify and regularise the process of disbursing money to oil producing states and communities. Despite the successes in getting the first transfer disbursed, this needs to be routinised, clearly included on separate lines in the national budget and clarity is required through an amendment to the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act on who can be a signatory to revenue

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81 Mayani, Fabien (2020) Presentation des conclusions du rapport d'évaluation de la mise en œuvre des dispositions relatives au développement Communautaire

82 Oke, Akinwumi; Odio, Inatimi; Olatiwon, Tolase; Adeyera, Oluwapelumi (2020). Oily Livelihoods: dynamics of artisanal refining on sustainable livelihoods in the Niger Delta
transfer accounts, notification when money is withdrawn, allocations to neighbouring counties in different states who may be affected by spills and institutions to manage the 2% state share. In keeping with this, advocacy for the arrears owed by the government for transfers not yet made remains important. Community Development Committee Coordination Forum (CDCCFs) need to be established in Upper Nile State, Unity State and Ruweng Administrative Area. Civil society oversight, to ensure that disbursements are not halted or diverted is needed. Work at the community level is required to understand their priorities for the spending of the money so that when money is received it is clear what it is intended to be used for and that revenues do genuinely meet community needs. The risks of money being diverted at a state level or not meeting community expectations after prolonged dialogue should not be minimised and should be considered a conflict sensitivity risk. Beyond the issues of revenue transfer, workshop participants noted the need for local content requirements for South Sudanese people in the oil sector is another consideration. workshop participants also noted the need to consider the oil sector operations and the communities driven out because of it as an issue of transitional justice.

In addition, environmental issues in relation to oil production have been evidenced by the partners. The SP partners in South Sudan benefited from learning from the Nigeria partners and saw the risks of pollution evidenced. Support is needed for improved environmental governance in South Sudan and a comprehensive environmental and social audit for oil producing areas. Civil society needs to be supported to call for the needed reforms, gather grassroots evidence and communicate back to communities.

Recommendations

The priorities outlined above represent medium term areas of focus for the extractives sector in the trajectory countries. Achieving such priorities requires a resourced and networked civil society at the national and subnational level. Despite the actions taken by Cordaid and partners to ensure sustainability, the conclusion of the extractives trajectory leaves a gap in funding and support for SP partners to continue their vital accountability work. With that in mind, below are some short-term recommendations designed to support the close out of the partnership, for Cordaid, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for the SP partners.

**Cordaid**

1. **Facilitate funding linkages**: hear from partners on funding gaps and concerns and review international and national networks and consider facilitating introductions for SP partners with other organisations or donors to open up potential future funding streams with sources partners may not be connected to. For Afghanistan consider linking the network with international partners mentioned in the scoping study if not already linked.
2. **Produce a concept note on extractives & conflict related L&A**: develop a note on avenues to integrate extractives advocacy and oversight work into stabilisation work and peacebuilding work, its role in conflict sensitivity, to be shared with partners to support them orientating their work to new donors/donor priorities
3. **Internal lessons sharing on extractives**: leverage Cordaid’s history on extractives to help ‘mainstream’ an understanding of extractives into related work areas – for instance environmental work, governance, land rights – to ensure programme teams working on other issues in countries with resource extraction understand these issues and how they may interlink with their programming

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Royal Netherlands Embassies**

4. **Country level close out meetings with partners**: hear from partners on achievements and priorities; consider where there might be scope for RNE to facilitate introductions to other partners/donors; ensure partners are aware of portals or sources of information for future RNE funding calls
5. **Donor & partner roundtable**: host a roundtable at a country level to allow partners a forum to share experiences and lessons; interested stakeholders can discuss advocacy priorities; partners can forge connections with other potential sources of funding or partnership
6. **Future funding**: consider targeted support at the national level to civil society initiatives on priority extractives issues, either directly targeting the extractives sector or as part of broader good governance or stabilisation work; consider opportunities for co-funding with other interested donors.

**Partners**

SP Partners are continuing to work on extractives issues following the close of the SP L&A project and whilst the partners themselves have proven through this project that they are best placed to know the needs of the communities they work...
with, some future project recommendations emerge through this review that partners could pursue funding for, supported where possible by Cordaid (in developing concept notes) and the RNE in the relevant countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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</table>
| **Afghanistan** | 4. Develop a concept note for targeted expansion of mine watch committees to new provinces (criteria might include safety, food security, MoMP strategy on locations for resource development), including covering issues of land rights and environmental governance.  

5. Engage directly with major media outlets and valued provincial outlets on responsible mineral sector coverage; support training on how to report on extractive industries issues.  

6. Engage directly with women’s rights movements on extractives sector gender justice position paper; work with women’s networks to compile broader evidence on gendered dimensions of the extractives sector in Afghanistan. |
| **DRC**       | 4. Produce a concept note on local-national monitoring mechanism on implementation of local development provisions in revised mining code.  

5. Support local government on design of local development plans and participatory budgeting resulting from mineral revenue, formation of community spending.  

6. Continue to advocate to international mechanisms around traceability and due diligence to ensure continued civil society involvement in agenda setting. |
| **Nigeria**   | 4. Produce a concept note on an integrated advocacy and alternative livelihoods initiative working at national and subnational level, focused on Ogoniland.  

5. Form a legislative monitoring unit between partners, tracking status of legislation related to Ogoniland, HYPREP and extractives governance more broadly, covering national and sub-national levels. Divide advocacy targets between partners and continue mapping spheres of influence and leveraging existing networks to push advocacy asks forward.  

6. Ensure linkages are made between women’s groups in Ogoni with extractives governance groups at the national level and build linkages with broader women’s movements in Nigeria so that women can access support on both dimensions. |
| **South Sudan** | 4. Develop a concept note on a 5% advocacy and monitoring project, combining advocacy around publication of revenues, necessary amendments of the law and regular transfer, with monitoring compliance of state government and formation of necessary councils and committees with the law.  

5. Work with communities on their local development priorities and facilitate dialogues linking community members with CDCs and other mandated bodies, supporting regular meetings so community members may hold local bodies to account.  

6. Continue to advocate for improved environmental governance in South Sudan, possibly including set-up of an environmental concern/complaint line to collect environmental data and support response. |
ANNEX 1: EXTRACTIVES DONOR MAPPING

This table outlines some prospective donors and partners that SP partners may want to consider looking at for funding. The first half of the table includes potential funding organisations — some will accept unsolicited concept notes, however others advertise specific grants or invite organisations to apply directly. Partners should review the organisation’s websites for country priorities and ascertain the best way of approaching the organisation and whether it would be appropriate to first contact them at a country level to get more details or whether Cordaid or other contacts may be able to facilitate introductions. The second half of the table gives some potential partner organisations that SP partners may want to contact at the country or international level with project collaboration concepts. The information in this table is based on current information available online and therefore does not include funding discussions these organisations may be having for specific countries, nor is it exhaustive of all organisations working on extractives.

Partners may also consider engaging with research institutions as sources of co-funding. Partners may want to approach World Bank country offices to understand if civil society funding is available and partners in Afghanistan and Nigeria may consider engaging directly with UK FCDO for whom extractives have previously been priorities in those countries. Partners should also refer to GOXI to track potential opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Donors/Funders</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>Natural Resources and Climate Change focus area. Ford Foundation may solicit grant proposals, but also possible to make an Idea Submission via website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Extractives &amp; Development Project until 2021, governance and livelihoods project within focus countries. See GIZ website for contact details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewlett Foundation</td>
<td>Climate and environment; global development programme – civic participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oak Foundation</td>
<td>Environmental issues – grants by invitation only, but unsolicited letter of enquiry can be submitted if organisation has idea that closely aligns with Foundation’s areas of work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Foundation</td>
<td>Civil society leadership, climate activism – active grants available on OSF website and further details OSIEA website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarthur Foundation</td>
<td>Climate programme area and Nigeria specific area. Foundation sometimes launches specific calls for proposals and also accept unsolicited proposals, but partners should read grant guidelines on website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigrid Rausing Trust</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability programme area. Grants by invitation to apply only.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Project Partners</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability Lab</td>
<td>Accountability Incubator in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civicus</td>
<td>Civil society network, civic space focus. Partners can join as a member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Witness</td>
<td>Country campaigns and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Alert</td>
<td>Peacebuilding, conflict focused organisation, worked on conflict aspects of extractives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Budget Partnerships</td>
<td>Budget advocacy and budget surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internews</td>
<td>Potential partner for media and data journalism support or training related to extractives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resource Governance Institute</td>
<td>Training, advice and research available on NRGI website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Government Partnership</td>
<td>Governments in Nigeria and Afghanistan members of OGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Oxfam America and Oxfam Australia work on extractives issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish What You Pay</td>
<td>Global extractives network, some partners already members, others may choose to join via PWYP website.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 2: BIBLIOGRAPHY – SP L&A DOCUMENTATION

Research & Advocacy Outputs


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Planning Report 2018 Strategic Partnership - Capacitating Change: Restoring the Social Contract in Fragile Contexts
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- Annex 4: Democratic Republic of Congo
- Annex 5: Nigeria
- Annex 6: South Sudan
- Annex 10: International lobby Economic Opportunities (extractives)

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- Annex 5: Nigeria
- Annex 6: South Sudan
- Annex 10: International lobby Economic Opportunities (extractives)

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- Annex 1: Afghanistan
- Annex 4: Democratic Republic of Congo
- Annex 5: Nigeria
- Annex 6: South Sudan
- Annex 10: International lobby Economic Opportunities (extractives)

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Cordaid works to end poverty and exclusion. We do this in the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected areas as well as in the Netherlands. We engage communities to rebuild trust and resilience and increase people’s self-reliance.

Our professionals provide humanitarian assistance and create opportunities to improve security, health care and education and stimulate inclusive economic growth. We are supported by nearly 300,000 private donors in the Netherlands and by a worldwide partner network. Cordaid is a founding member of Caritas Internationalis and CIDSE.