Candid Voices from the Field:
Obstacles to a Transformative Women, Peace and Security Agenda and to Women’s Meaningful Participation in Building Peace and Security
**Cordaid**

Cordaid is based in the Netherlands and has country offices in 12 countries. It has been fighting poverty and exclusion in the world’s most fragile societies and conflict–stricken areas for a century. It delivers innovative solutions to complex problems by emphasizing sustainability and performance in projects that tackle security and justice, health and economic opportunities. Cordaid is deeply rooted in Dutch society with more than 300,000 private donors. Cordaid is a founding member of Caritas Internationalis and CIDSE. Women are crucial contributors to their societies; peace can only last when women are involved. Through its work on women’s leadership, Cordaid connects local women and provides them with national and international platforms to consolidate their positions. Together they define what security & peace means to them, monitor progress of their security situation through time, and provide this information as evidence base for engagement with policy makers.

**GPPAC**

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict is a member–led network of civil society organisations active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding from around the world. Founded in 2003, the network consists of fifteen regional networks of local organisations; each region having its own priorities, character and agenda. As part of its mission to work towards a shift from reaction to prevention of violent conflict, the network supports multi–actor collaboration and advocates for local ownership of conflict prevention strategies. Together, GPPAC members create greater synergy in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding by strengthening the role of local civil society groups in conflict regions and connecting them on the national, regional and global level. GPPAC commits to be inclusive of and promotes women’s efforts to prevent conflict. It has developed a Gender Policy to integrate gender–sensitive perspectives and approaches into the network’s fifteen regions, and works with a group of designated Gender Focal Points to highlight women’s crucial contributions to prevention in practice.

**Women Peacemakers Program**

Women Peacemakers Program (WPP) has been established in 1997, two years after the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action. WPP supports and empowers women peace activists all around the world to realise gender–sensitive peace in their communities and beyond. WPP works with women and men as partners for peace, and acts as a global activist community with member organizations in 25 countries. It advocates on local, national and global level for the recognition of women’s experiences of war and peacebuilding agency, as well as the integration of a holistic gender perspective in peacebuilding. WPP is unique in applying Gender–Sensitive Active Nonviolence within its work and analyses. WPP has pioneered work on integrating a masculinities perspective in gender–sensitive peacebuilding, and addresses the multi–layered linkages between gender and militarism in relation to the persistent obstacles for a transformative approach to UNSCR 1325 implementation. Recently, WPP engaged in groundbreaking research and advocacy to raise awareness on the effects of counterterrorism measures on the Women, Peace & Security Agenda.
Acknowledgments

This report is a product of the ideas and perspectives of many people and organizations who shared their experiences of the challenges they face in building a more transformative approach to women, peace and security policy and practice.

The author of this report would like to acknowledge all those who contributed to this report. Working with project partners and research informants as part of this action research project has been an enriching and fulfilling experience. Sincere thanks go to the research informants for their time and candor. Their ideas and participation in the one-to-one interviews and in the global consultation workshop ensured that the research reflected a diverse range of views and insights, grounded in the reality of women’s lives.

The author is also indebted to the project partners whose vision and commitment has guided this project from the outset. Particular thanks go to Gesa Bent (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict) for her invaluable skill in coordinating the research process and to Sophie Schellens (Women Peacemakers Program) for the smooth organization and management of the Global Consultation Workshop. The author would also like to express her gratitude to Marian Wiersinga and Dewi Suralaga at Cordaid; to Pascal Richard and Charlotte Divin at GPPAC; and to Isabelle Geuskens, Merle Gosewinkel, Tamara Kool and Thalia Malmberg at the Women Peacemakers Program for their ongoing guidance and critical contributions to ensuring the successful completion of this report.

The project partners, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Women Peacemakers Program, and Cordaid, would like to thank the author of this report, Karen McMinn, whose analysis, experience, and commitment to raising the voices of women in conflict situations and peacebuilding processes have been the foundation for the creation of this report. We thank her sincerely for her continuous and open engagement with the project partners and its many participants as part of the research process.

The project partners would also like to thank all their organizational and individual members and partners who have contributed to this project in different ways, both including and beyond interviews and through the global consultation workshop. GPPAC would like to give special thanks to Paula Banerjee for her engagement in the review of draft versions of this report.

The results of this research reflect the voices of our organizations and networks, and they will inform our continued work on a transformative women, peace and security agenda and on women’s participation and leadership in peace and security.
# Executive Summary

1. The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Research Purpose
   - Defining the Women, Peace and Security Agenda
   - The Current Context for the WPS Agenda—Where Are We Now?
   - Research Purpose and Objectives
   - Research Methodology
   - Structure of the Report

2. The Challenge of Transformative Change for UNSCR 1325
   - The Concept of Transformative Change
   - UNSCR 1325 as a Tool for Transformative Change
   - The Limitations of UNSCR 1325: The Need to Reclaim the Agenda

3. Findings: Obstacles to Transformative Change and Women's Participation
   - Obstacle 1: The Dynamics of Power: Patriarchal Attitudes and Norms in Peace and Security
   - Obstacle 2: The Lack of Political Commitment to Women's Participation in Peace and Security
   - Obstacle 3: A Security-First Approach to Peace and Conflict: Militarization
   - Obstacle 4: Global Capitalism and Macroeconomics
   - Obstacle 5: Ineffective Investment in and Funding of Women, Peace and Security
   - Obstacle 6: The Flawed Implementation of UNSCR 1325
   - Obstacle 7: Poor Policy Coherence between Peace, Security and Development Needs
   - Obstacle 8: The Weak Institutional Implementation of WPS at Global and National Levels
   - Obstacle 9: The Exclusion of Women in Transitioning and Post-Conflict Negotiations and Structures
   - Obstacle 10: The Challenges for Coalition-Building and Engagement

4. Conclusions and Recommendations
   - Conclusions
   - Recommendations

Appendices and References
   - Appendix 1: Research Purpose and Objectives
   - Appendix 2: One-to-One Interview Questions: Consultation with Research Informants
   - Appendix 3: Global Consultation Purpose and Objectives
   - References
“To enable the powerless, the invisible to be part of making change. That changes how they see themselves. And that changes everything”

Inez McCormack (1943 – 2013)  
Northern Irish Trade Unionist Activist and Human Rights Campaigner
Executive Summary

Delivering transformative change in peace and security is about bringing the lived experience of women at the grassroots into security policy and practice. It is about to supporting the needs of local communities in conflict and fragile settings. It involves giving women’s civil society a place at the tables of the patriarchal institutions of peace and security to dismantle the drivers of conflict and inequality. Women have a vital role to play in the prevention of conflict and in the creation of sustainable peace. However, women’s participation and influence in peace and security can only happen through their social, political and economic empowerment.

Despite the high expectations for UNSCR 1325 to build transformative change and strengthen women’s participation, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has failed to deliver on both counts. In the current context, confidence that the WPS agenda will enable women’s participation and leadership is diminishing at global, national and local levels. This is happening both within women’s civil society groups and grassroots organizations, and within the core community of peace and security actors. The broad view in many CSOs is that there has been a severe lack of political will and leadership from key implementing bodies to operationalize UNSCR 1325 effectively, and that state and non–state actors continue to undermine the status of women and delegitimize their work in conflict prevention, resolution and reconciliation.

The focus in WPS global policy has been on rhetoric and advocacy rather than action, and on a bureaucratic rather than transformative approach to gendering peace and security. In this static context, this research explores the impediments to women’s engagement in peace and security and interrogates the underlying paradigm that has excluded the development of transformative change.

The research has been valuable in a number of ways. It has deepened the debate on WPS by identifying deep–rooted obstacles to transformative change within and beyond the policy framework. Through a combination of one to one interviews and debates at a global consultation workshop, the research findings have captured the voices and concerns of activists at regional, national and local levels in conflict–affected areas – the candid voices from the field. This has provided a tool for movement–building and agenda–setting to help advance the WPS agenda.

The research has provided a dynamic space to build momentum to reclaim a more transformative approach to women, peace and security, back to an agenda more inclusive of conflict prevention, active nonviolence and a holistic gender approach. These are core issues that have increasingly been pushed to the margins of WPS policy. Engagement in the global consultation has helped to reignite a sense of purpose and solidarity within civil society on WPS and to define new perspectives within and beyond UNSCR 1325. It has strengthened the engagement of men as key allies in WPS work. The process has begun to reclaim a holistic WPS agenda where individuals and groups can find their place both inside and outside of the policy framework, to strategize and build advocacy for transformative change.

The research has identified ten deep rooted obstacles to the transformation of conflict and women’s participation in peace and security. Patriarchal attitudes and norms, militarization, macroeconomics and lack of political commitment to UNSCR 1325 implementation are some of the most disabling obstacles to both women’s participation in peace and security and to the realization of transformative change. Other obstacles such as poor policy coherence, weak institutional implementation and chronic underinvestment in WPS are symptoms of the lack of political value given to WPS by the key actors and institutions. It is still business as usual in the arenas of peace and security, where militarized interventions to conflict and peace operations are the bedrock of global and foreign policy approaches designed to protect vested economic and political interests and the proliferation of the global trade in arms.

This report documents the many ways that women have continued to make a significant contribution to building inclusive approaches to security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, despite their persistent exclusion from the loci of power and influence. This is based on their deep commitment to transformative change. Women and men are pioneering new pathways for a holistic WPS agenda, and the research provides many examples of dynamic and inspiring stories of change. In Iraq and Egypt women have been advancing the
development and implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1325. In the Philippines civil society has strengthened women’s participation in peace processes. Capacity building on WPS with local communities in Zimbabwe has strengthened the empowerment and skills of women. Activists in North East India have successfully used active nonviolence as a response to militarized security approaches, and work in India and Pakistan on alternative masculinities is increasing men’s understanding of and support for gender justice issues in relation to peacebuilding. These examples illustrate the diversity of approaches to WPS work, and the research has highlighted the importance of rebuilding the concepts of peace and security from women’s perspectives and from local realities. This is crucial to ensure responses to peace and security take account of different cultural contexts and political identities.

This research has identified the need to set a new agenda for WPS to address the obstacles, and it recommends a number of innovative strategies to support the dynamic roles of women and men committed to reclaiming the agenda. This report contains a number of recommendations which seek to build political commitment and sustained action on WPS from peace and security actors in global institutions, national governments, as well as donors and civil society organizations. Advocacy on the development of a new, multifaceted WPS agenda which is informed by an analysis of conflict prevention, inclusive security, active nonviolence and the dynamics of patriarchal power will be an important starting point. Significant political commitment, greater financial support and accountability will be needed at global and national levels to improve implementation of UNSCR 1325 in support of a new WPS agenda.

The recommendations also reflect the need to build movements and alliances that link and support civil society work in and outside of a new WPS agenda. One of the most innovative outcomes of the research process has been the development of an agenda for an outsider strategy which will help to set the priorities for longer – term activism on WPS. This outsider strategy seeks to construct new and alternative spaces for civil society to invest their energies and build more inclusive and participative process outside of the UNSCR 1325 policy agenda.

The imperative for the inclusion of women in conflict prevention and resolution has never been greater. The belief that the use or threat of military action alone can resolve conflict and create security is redundant: old conflicts continue to play out and ignite in different arenas; new conflicts emerge with increasing levels of violence and extremism from non-state actors, as civilian populations are dispossessed and communities and cultures are erased. There is an urgent need to change this paradigm, to dismantle militarized responses to conflict, address the root cause of conflict and the legitimate needs and concerns of civilian populations.

No global policy agenda in isolation can transform the lives of marginalized women and address the exclusion of women in peace and security. Work on WPS needs to start at the grassroots and in local communities. The conclusions from this research demonstrate the critical and essential contribution of women to the prevention of conflict and to promotion and development of sustainable peace in local, national and international arenas. They restate women’s essential participation to the politics and practice of peace, security and development. Women are a core constituency in building more effective and inclusive mechanisms for the transformation of the drivers of conflict. Addressing the deep rooted obstacles identified in this research will require significant political commitment, greater investment and accountability to WPS from global institutions and national governments. Changing patriarchal behavior, militarization and macroeconomics involves a fundamental rebalancing of power and influence, and a commitment to sharing resources and wealth in a more equitable and just way. This is a long process of systematic social, political and economic change, to which this report seeks to make a contribution.
The Bring Back Our Girls Abuja Family continue their campaign to call on the government to take more action during a town hall style meeting.
Candid Voices from the Field

Woman signs one of the Peace Walls in Belfast, Northern Ireland. There are approximately 40 “peace walls” in different areas of the city which continue to divide loyalist and republican communities.
1. The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Research Purpose

This report presents key findings from research undertaken to examine the underlying obstacles to delivering a transformative Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda to enable women’s meaningful participation in building peace and security in local, national and global settings. Participation can be understood as “organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control.”¹ Within the context of this research, a “transformative” WPS agenda broadly refers to an agenda that would prioritize the transformation of the political, institutional, economic and social drivers

---

¹ As quoted in Heintz et al (2015, 52) (citing Wolfe and Stiefel (1994)). Drawing on UNIFEM (now UN Women) (2008), Heintz et al continue: “Meaningful participation of women is about more than just numerical presence in decision-making forums, whether at the local or national level. Women in decision-making positions must be able to articulate and act on issues that concern different groups of women, especially those who are disadvantaged. Women’s rights advocates and autonomous feminist organizations have a critical role to play here in bringing women’s concerns into the policy-making process and holding decision makers and service providers to account.”
of conflict to enable women’s full and meaningful participation and leadership in building sustainable peace and inclusive security.²

The research was commissioned by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), the Women Peacemakers Program (WPP), and Cordaid.³ It seeks to build on the work of GPPAC, WPP, and Cordaid, as well as their member organizations, which highlights the prevention of armed conflict, the promotion of nonviolence, and the importance of a holistic gender approach as key elements in building a transformative WPS agenda. It is hoped that findings from this report will contribute to critical debates and analysis on transformative approaches to women, peace, and security, as well as strengthen action from global institutions, national governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) to enable meaningful participation and leadership of women in building inclusive models of peace and security based on their needs and those of their communities.

² The concept of transformative change, as it relates to the WPS agenda, is considered more fully in the following chapter.
³ Further information on the work of each of the partner organizations can be found on their respective websites: http://www.gppac.net/; https://www.womenpeacemakersprogram.org/; https://www.cordaid.org/.
1.1 Defining the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: From Beijing to the UN Security Council

In conflict-affected regions, countries and communities around the world, women are often at the center of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, working in informal and formal settings to build peace and foster dialogue and reconciliation in local, national and international arenas. From Colombia to the Philippines, to Zimbabwe and to Northern Ireland, the contributions of women to peacebuilding have helped to create a force for positive social and political change during periods of violent conflict and in the transition and rebuilding of communities towards sustainable peace and security.

In recent decades, issues of gender inequality and the disempowerment of women in conflict-affected regions have been increasingly recognized as part of a central concern about the gendered nature of armed conflict and the disproportionate impact of war and conflict on women and girls. As a result of global advocacy and mobilization by feminist activists, academics, peacemakers and women’s organizations, a range of international policy instruments has been developed to advance gender equality and to acknowledge the different and multiple impacts of armed conflict on women and girls. This has evolved into an international policy framework which is now recognized as the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS agenda).

The WPS agenda is commonly seen as referring to seven interrelated resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that set out the commitments and priorities of the Security Council, UN institutions, UN member states and other key actors in relation to women’s engagement in peace and security issues. In this context, UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, adopted in 2000, is regarded as the foundational resolution for the WPS agenda. UNSCR 1325 marked formal international recognition, at the highest institutional level, of the importance of the roles of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in peace negotiations, in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and in humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction. Since its inception, UNSCR 1325 has called on all actors to increase the participation of women in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, to incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts and to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence—particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse—in situations of armed conflict (S/RES/1325).

While UNSCR 1325 and its associated resolutions are recognized as forming a core element in the established international normative framework on gender equality and WPS, it is important to note that many feminist activists, policy makers and scholars also cite several other policy instruments as critical components of the WPS agenda. Two in particular are worth mentioning here. The first is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, adopted in 1979), which recognizes the importance of women’s inclusion in decision-making processes for sustainable peace. Member states are periodically evaluated on their compliance with this convention at the UN. The second is the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (BPfA, adopted in 1995). The BPfA is considered the most comprehensive affirmation of women’s rights and empowerment and continues to be recognized as a defining framework for transformative change, with comprehensive commitments under 12 critical areas of concern.

Defining gender equality and women’s participation as being inseparable from peace, security and development, the BPfA calls for a greater participation by women in conflict resolution and decision-making, the reduction of excessive military expenditure and disarmament, the promotion of nonviolent forms of conflict resolution, and protection and support for refugee and displaced women.

4. Subsequent to the first resolution (UNSCR 1325 from 2000), the UNSC introduced six more resolutions. Four of these—UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010) and UNSCR 2106 (2013)—focus exclusively or primarily on conflict-related sexual violence. UNSCR 1889 (2009) responded to the need to increase the participation of women in peace and security governance at all levels and approved the creation of global indicators to map the implementation of UNSCR 1325. UNSCR 2122, adopted by the Security Council in 2015, reflected the need to re-balance a focus on the participation agency of women and to strengthen civil society participation, both at the UN Headquarters and at the national levels. For the purposes of this research, references to UNSC 1325 also acknowledge the provisions within the subsequent associated resolutions that are of particular relevance to the research focus, such as those concerned with strengthening the participation, leadership and agency of women in the field of peace and security.

5. Ratified by 189 states, CEDAW is often considered to be the women’s human rights convention, as it recognizes the social, economic and political factors underlying women’s legal and political inequality. Many of CEDAW’s requirements for member states align with those of UNSCR 1325 and its associated resolutions, including: the demand for women’s participation in decision-making at all levels; the rejection of violence against women; the demand that security forces and systems protect women and girls from gender-based violence; the commitment to ensuring that women’s experiences, needs, and perspectives are incorporated into the political, legal, and social decisions that determine the achievement of just and lasting peace.

6. The 12 critical areas are listed on the BPfA website: http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/about#sthash.6v4xqqRG.dpuf.

7. The BPfA has now been adopted by 189 governments. The Beijing 20 website refers to the strategic priorities on women and armed conflict, which include the following commitments: to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation; to reduce excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments; to promote nonviolent forms of conflict resolution and reduce the incidence of human rights abuse in conflict situations; to promote women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace; to provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, other displaced women in need of international protection, and internally displaced women; to provide assistance to the women of the colonies and non-self-governing territories. http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/about#sthash.6v4xqqRG.dpuf.
For many WPS activists and advocates, the principles and goals of both the BPfA and CEDAW, when combined with the specific focus of UNSCR 1325 and associated resolutions, provide a much more holistic gender agenda to enable women’s engagement in peace and security. For this constituency, the WPS agenda did not originate in 2000, but rather in 1979 and in 1995, and it extends beyond UNSCR 1325 and its sister resolutions. It is within this expanded view of the WPS agenda that this research has been undertaken. The research is premised on the notion that the WPS agenda is a multifaceted holistic agenda that operates not only as an instrument driving global and national policy on women’s roles in peace and security, but also as a point of mobilization for some of its most critical allies: feminist civil society, academics and policy analysts, political activists, and women (and men) at the grassroots level in conflict-affected and fragile-state settings.

1.2 The Current Context of the WPS Agenda — Where are we now?

The prevailing context of the WPS agenda is a mixed one. Some actors feel a continued sense of optimism about the potential of the policy framework to deliver change and progress commitments to strengthen women’s participation and leadership. However, this is in contrast to the growing disillusionment and pessimism felt by other actors (including voices from women’s civil society), that current WPS mechanisms have not only failed to address the key needs women and girls in conflict-affected areas but have also "boxed in" women’s civil society into work on WPS in a manner that has been damaging for the evolution of women’s peace networks and women’s participation in activism and advocacy regarding peace and security. Both perspectives are reflected in the following sections.

A Failed WPS Agenda?
The pessimistic view argues that despite the perpetual commitments to address the exclusion and marginalization of women in peace and security, the overriding culture in global and national WPS arenas is one of business as usual, where the serious and persisting challenges to women’s participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts remain undiminished. There is deep disappointment at the missed opportunities for a comprehensive implementation of the WPS agenda. This has created a legacy of frustration and anger among a generation of activists and commentators whose hopes and expectations for the transformation of conflict and the empowerment of women have remained unfulfilled.

Fifteen years after the introduction of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, the discourse about the depth of the political commitment of global institutions and state bodies to address WPS issues—and about the capacity of the WPS policy framework to deliver transformative results in peace and security and to women and girls affected by conflict—has reached a critical stage. An effective translation of UNSCR 1325 into transformative action at the global, regional and national levels has failed to materialize, and the WPS agenda remains a work in progress.
levels is recognized by many commentators to be the greatest challenge. The current expansive policy framework contains considerable rhetoric on the importance of women’s meaningful participation and transformative change, but the criteria rarely, if ever, form a key determinant of conflict-resolution processes, peace negotiations or post–conflict governance frameworks. As a result, the important contribution and engagement of women in peace and security remains undervalued and under-resourced and receives negligible political support.

The current context is one in which confidence that the WPS agenda will enable women’s participation and leadership is diminishing at global, national and local levels, not only within women’s civil society and grassroots women’s organizations but also within the core community of key UN actors such as UN Women (UN Women 2014). Despite the prominent focus on UNSCR 1325 within the wider political and global–policy context, key actors are struggling to maintain their commitment to the WPS agenda in its present form. Frustration within CSO communities is growing and finding articulation with the view that, for some, the WPS agenda has stalled—a view reflected in the ongoing debates within women’s advocacy organizations, feminist scholarship, and national and global peace and security organizations in recent years (WPP et al. 2013). Key questions about the capacity of the normative framework remain the preoccupation of actors at international, regional and national levels, with the broad view in many CSOs that there has been a significant lack of conviction and commitment by key implementing bodies to enabling women’s agency and leadership in conflict and post–conflict settings.

Concerns about the effectiveness of the instruments of UNSCR 1325 in terms of dismantling the significant obstacles to women’s participation in peace and security, about the narrowness of the implementation through National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325, and about the poor accountability and monitoring mechanisms have been key themes in the ongoing analysis and debate. Critical gaps in the coherency of UNSCR 1325 with other key policy instruments, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), reflect a siloed approach to implementation. The overall assessment is that UNSCR 1325 as a policy framework has been big on the rhetoric of transformative change but limited when it comes to delivering transformative results, and that it has not utilized opportunities to integrate the expanded vision of gender equality and women’s rights as enshrined in key human rights instruments such as CEDAW and the BPfA, or to effectively engage with women’s civil society. This is leading some women civil society organizations to advocate for the mobilization of an “outsider strategy” for WPS, which would focus energies on mechanisms to address the needs of women in peace and security beyond of the current policy framework of UNSCR 1325. The development of an “outsider strategy” as well as an “insider strategy” (which involves the continued support and engagement of women’s civil society with the UNSCR 1325 framework) should offer a broader basis for reframing the WPS agenda, but the two approaches are considered complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

**The WPS Agenda: A Catalyst for Women’s Empowerment and Social Change?**

The present research, in documenting the obstacles to transformative change and women’s participation is critical in nature, with a focus on the weaknesses of the WPS agenda. However, it is also important to highlight the optimism felt by women’s civil society and other actors for the sporadic moments of progress and impact, when the voices and contributions of women in peace and security have been heard as result of UNSCR 1325 and the broader WPS agenda. Despite the limitations of UNSCR 1325 and the concerns about the exclusion of women’s civil society from its mandate, what is interesting is the agency and inventiveness that women’s groups and organizations have shown in using UNSCR 1325 at strategic and grassroots levels in the last 15 years. They have been consistent in raising awareness and advocacy for women’s participation in peace processes, in demanding greater accountability of actors at national and UN levels, and in working to increase the political influence of women in building sustainable peace. Activists, policy analysts and academics at local, national and global levels have demonstrated an enduring belief in and commitment to the WPS agenda, and particularly to UNSCR 1325, despite its significant shortcomings as a policy instrument for strengthening women’s participation in peace and security and building sustainable peace.

It is important to acknowledge the benefits and results that the WPS agenda, and specifically UNSCR 1325, has delivered at local, national and international levels in terms of strengthening resources, and promoting action and awareness about the needs of women and girls in conflict–affected and post–conflict societies. UNSCR 1325 is regarded as being the first proactive policy to include women in peace and security policy making at the international policy level. The suite of WPS resolutions, along with the NAPs on UNSCR 1325, has delivered some very concrete results, particularly at the global and national levels. They have helped to focus attention on the needs of women and to increase the allocation of resources for women and girls in conflict and post–conflict settings at the national and international levels, and they have

8. There is a broad view that the MDGs (2005–2015) were binary in nature and failed to incorporate a holistic, gendered approach to peace and security to address issues of poverty, health and education as they affected women and girls in conflict and fragile settings, but also that a comprehensive gender equality dimension was lacking and that the reduction of targets on the specific goal of gender equality and women’s empowerment (MDG3) was limited to gender parity in education. This excluded a focus on more critical areas such as the need for women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) or the recognition of the gendered impact of economic policies in conflict and fragile settings (UN Women & ECLAC 2013).
brought the issues of women’s participation and leadership to the forefront politically. Key benefits that can be attributed to UNSCR 1325 and its sister resolutions include:

- an increase in opportunities to bring together key actors and increase coherence and visibility on WPS actions
- a strengthened focus on WPS issues by activists, feminists, policy analysts and academics
- recognition and support for the protection of women and girls in conflict settings
- improved reporting and sanction mechanisms regarding the use of sexual violence in conflict as a crime
- greater awareness and understanding of the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls
- the appointment of gender crimes investigators
- the appointment of a number of women to positions of influence in the policy and operational arenas.

Both NAPs and Regional Action Plans have provided an effective entry point for civil society and other peace and security actors in many countries and regions. They have also served as a catalyst for engagement to deliver actions to address core issues of WPS, particularly in relation to gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA).

The practical process of developing NAPs on UNSCR 1325 has energized women in civil society and local communities and helped to bridge social divisions along the lines of gender, ethnicity and religion. NAP development has also provided opportunities to establish more inclusive processes for women CSOs to engage with national governments as advocates, drafters and implementing agents for NAP actions (Miller et al. 2014, 18). More broadly, the WPS agenda has strengthened political mobilization on peace and security issues in civil society and within national governments and has pushed WPS issues higher up on the political agendas at the international and national levels. What is also significant is the extensive work that has been undertaken by women’s organizations and other civil society actors on peace and security at local levels to empower and mobilize women in conflict and fragile settings. This work, done in both informal and formal settings, often takes place outside of the scope of NAPs on 1325 and, in particular cases, where national governments have refused to develop a NAP on WPS.

Growing Coherence in WPS Policy: Some Joined-up Thinking — at Last

Although the actions taken to strengthen the intersection of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at global and national levels with parallel multiple international policy obligations to promote women’s roles in peace and security have been at best uneven, there are a few notable examples. The introduction of CEDAW Recommendation 30 (GR30) (2013) on women in conflict—prevention, conflict and post—conflict situations was a significant advance for the WPS agenda: GR30 clarifies the Convention as applying to situations of armed conflict and political crises, to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and to peacebuilding and post—conflict reconstruction processes. GR30 and the UNSCR 1325 resolutions all cross-reference each other and provide ways of reinforcing the implementation of each framework, particularly in relation to commitments regarding conflict prevention, GBV, participation and access to justice, as well as to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). Significantly, GR30 also outlines how the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 resolutions is constitutive of obligations of states to protect, respect and fulfill women’s human rights in conflict—prevention, conflict and post—conflict contexts under CEDAW (Swaine and O’Rourke 2015, 11). State compliance with CEDAW provides a much more robust monitoring mechanism and has the potential to strengthen the accountability of states as to their actions in relation to both GR30 and WPS resolutions. In addition to GR30, the adoption of UNSCR 2122 (2013) reiterates the importance of women’s participation in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

9. One example of this has been the role that UN Women has played in supporting the training of justice experts in investigating gender-based crimes under international law and seconding gender crimes investigators to international Commissions of Inquiry for Libya and for the Syrian Arab Republic, among others (established by the Human Rights Council in Geneva to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law), resulting in the documentation of conflict-related crimes against women (UN Women 2013, 2).

10. The first woman to be appointed by the UN as a Special Envoy was Mary Robinson, appointed in 2013 as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa.

11. Examples of this are: work undertaken in Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Columbia, where no NAPs have been developed on WPS. While the commitment and work of civil society is to be celebrated, the examples of Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland also reflect the refusal of many sovereign governments to acknowledge the needs of women in conflict, fragile and post—conflict settings. For example, the UK government has continually resisted calls to recognize and include Northern Ireland in its NAP on UNSCR 1325. The rationale given is that the conflict in Northern Ireland, which lasted for over 30 years, was a domestic, not an international conflict, yet Ireland’s NAP does include support and recognition for women in Northern Ireland. Other countries (for example some Arab Countries without NAPs such as Egypt) are progressing work on specific aspects of the WPS agenda such as masculinities but unable to address other deep—rooted barriers such as militarization and patriarchal norms.

12. The Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security provides guidance how both of these frameworks can be used to strengthen and reinforce each other, in particular through reporting. The primary purpose of GR30 is to provide authoritative guidance to States parties on the legislative, policy and other appropriate measures to be taken to ensure full compliance with their Convention obligations to protect, respect and fulfill women’s human rights in conflict prevention, conflict and post—conflict contexts. GR30 is broad in its scope, covering the following themes: gender—based violence and trafficking; participation; access to education, employment and health, and rural women; displacement, refugees and asylum-seekers; nationality and statelessness; marriage and family relations; security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; constitutional and electoral reform; and access to justice (Swaine and O’Rourke 2015, 16).
As both GR30 and UNSCR 2122 (2013) recognize the importance of the Arms Trade Treaty (2013) and its provisions on the gendered impacts of the proliferation of arms, they both reinforce the principles of the BPfA on disarmament. Considered as a whole, these provisions indicate a positive trend and a commitment to strengthen the overall capacity of the WPS agenda at the global policy level. They also indicate a recognition of the need to build a more holistic approach to WPS.

There is also cause for some cautious optimism, as this research is being undertaken during a significant phase of activity and measurement in the progress of the WPS agenda, a phase that may offer the promise of greater coherence for the WPS agenda. A number of important landmark events have been taking place in the last 12 months that place the WPS agenda under the global policy spotlight with assessments of a number of key intersecting policies reporting at the UN in the coming months. With the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 imminent, a UN High Level Review of UNSCR 1325 will take place in October 2015, informed by the findings of a Global Study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, which was recently completed. Initial findings from that study acknowledge the importance of the addressing the obstacles to women’s participation in peace and security, although it remains to be seen to what extent this will be prioritized into concrete support for women and civil society at local and national levels (UN Women 2015). This year also celebrates the 20th anniversary of the BPfA and findings from the Review of the BPfA+20 informed headline debates at the Commission for the Status of Women meeting at the UN earlier this year.

Another advancement of critical importance to the WPS Agenda has been the agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will determine the global priorities and resources for development over the coming 15 years (A/69/L.85). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development addresses issues such as climate change, gender equality, health, education, employment and urbanization and includes a specific goal on “peaceful and inclusive societies” and a target on “strengthening a culture of peace and nonviolence”. Nevertheless, there also have been concerns about the weakness of the linkages between the 2030 Agenda and the WPS agenda, with insufficient attention being given
to the role of women in peace and justice and an absence of specific targets that would ensure women’s full participation in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and reconstruction; the protection of women human rights defenders; and the protection of vulnerable populations affected by crisis and conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Women’s Major Group 2014, 1).

All of these processes will generate opportunities for scrutiny of the WPS Agenda, and indeed, part of the purpose of this research is to add value to these conversations and debates and to inform and influence the strategic and policy context for key actors at international, national and local levels in the hopes of strengthening the contribution of women to peace and security and development.

1.3 Research Purpose and Objectives

It is within this changing narrative on women’s engagement in peace and security that the rational for this research and the need for investigation, consultation and debate on the effectiveness of the WPS agenda have emerged. The purpose of the research is to investigate and address the underlying obstacles to women’s participation and leadership in the field of peace and security and the key barriers that have prevented the Women, Peace and Security agenda from delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership.

This research seeks to explore the impediments that hinder women’s engagement and influence in peace and security and interrogate the underlying paradigm that sustains women’s political, social and economic exclusion and marginalization. It considers the deep-rooted obstacles to transformative change for women’s participation, both within and beyond the UNSCR 1325 policy framework, while documenting the challenges for women and men who are working to address such obstacles.

The research further seeks to strengthen the dialogue and debate on barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security; and, to inform and influence policy makers and other key actors in the field of peace and security. A critical function of the project that has emerged from the research process has been to document the voices and concerns of activists at national and local levels in conflict-affected areas and to provide a tool for movement-building and agenda-setting to help move the WPS agenda forward. Full research objectives are detailed in Appendix 1. As well as being a stand-alone report, this document is part of an action research project that will inform the long-term collaboration between GPPAC, WPP and Cordaid in addressing the gendered nature of peace and security processes.

1.4 Research Methodology

The methodology for the research involved a number of separate phases: desk review and analysis of reports and research identified by the consultant and the three project partners; consultation with 16 informants through one-on-one interviews via Skype; presentation and discussion of initial research findings at a 2.5-day global consultation workshop; collation and analysis of data into research findings and production of draft and final reports. Questions guiding the one-to-one interviews with informants are detailed in Appendix 2. Draft reports were reviewed by an editorial board consisting of the partner organizations and selected resource persons.

Informants from the one-on-one interviews provided a rich and diverse range of views, with contributions from experts in the field of WPS including academics, policy analysts and advisers, gender consultants, activists from peace and security CSOs and from women’s civil-society and feminist networks, drawn from a wide geographical base. The global consultation event represented a significant element in the research process, providing dynamic opportunities for reflection, debate and mobilization for a transformative WPS agenda. It was attended by 27 activists representing key regions before full stop of global conflict with informants from Asia, Africa, EurAsia, Latin America, the Middle East and northern Africa, North America and the Pacific regions. Both consultation processes (the one-on-one interviews and the global consultation) included men as an essential component in the debates and discussion of the WPS and sought to build inclusive mechanisms to give space and value to the engagement and contribution of men as allies in building a transformative WPS agenda, particularly in their work in strengthening a critical masculinities approach within the agenda.

1.5 Structure of the Report

The following two chapters present the findings of the desk research, the one-on-one consultations and the feedback from discussions and recommendations from participants at the global consultation. Chapter Two considers the challenge of transformative change in the WPS agenda, while Chapter Three presents the findings on the obstacles to transformative change in the WPS agenda and the barriers to women’s engagement within and beyond the UNSCR 1325 framework, drawing on the voices and experiences of women and men working in a range of roles and arenas within the fields of peace and security. Chapter Four presents key conclusions and recommendations.
Hundreds of people including various civil societies and artists gather at the bank of Inya Lake in Yangon, Myanmar for a ceremony to mark the International Day of Peace.
Egyptian women gathered in Tahrir Square to call for the resignation of President Mubarak.
2. The Challenge of Transformative Change for UNSCR 1325

This chapter considers the challenges for UNSCR 1325 in terms of delivering transformative change as the key component within the WPS agenda. Drawing primarily on the findings from desk research, it provides an examination of the concept of transformative change using a model of conflict transformation to define and clarify different elements of transformative change, and it considers some of the political challenges to UNSCR 1325’s capacity to deliver transformative change as a mandated UNSC Resolution.
2.1 The Concept of Transformative Change

The concept of transformative change has been deeply embedded in much of the rhetoric generated to define and promote UNSCR 1325 as part of the WPS agenda, with a focus on the Resolution’s capacity as a transformative agenda with the potential to deliver transformative change. However, there is a lack of clarity about what is actually meant by transformative change within the context of the UNSCR 1325 as part of the WPS agenda and what is needed to build a transformative agenda. The Berghof Foundation’s definition of conflict transformation is helpful in providing a conceptual model for this research in considering the deep-rooted obstacles to transformative change:

“Conflict transformation [is a] comprehensive term for measures and processes that aim to transform conflict systems with a high degree of violence. Conflict transformation aims to change both the structural causes of conflicts and the attitudes and behavior of the conflict actors.”

(Wils et al. 2006, Annex 2)

This definition highlights not only the need to address the structural causes of conflict, but also the need to change the attitudes and behaviors of conflict actors—a critical element in addressing the issue of unequal power in gender relations and of the broader inequalities resulting from social, economic, political power dynamics.

Conflict transformation lies at the heart of the transformative change envisaged within the expanded model of the WPS agenda, but this has not been a key element informing the strategic priorities for UNSCR 1325. For many activists and practitioners, gendering peacebuilding and conflict resolution requires the realignment of the peace and security agenda with the structural drivers of violent conflict within a holistic gender lens. The Berghof model advocates a systemic approach for the transformation of conflict, which has resonance for the WPS agenda (Wils et al. 2006, 15). The model is based on seven normative elements including:

- facilitating a peaceful and constructive transformation of conflict systems
- supporting processes of comprehensive social change
- having local actors in the driver’s seat of social change
- pursuing an inclusive approach in peacebuilding
- having a holistic human rights approach
- considering and dealing with power asymmetries
- contributing to overcoming gender-specific power relations and violence.

This model validates the importance of inclusive and holistic processes and of the need to pay attention to gender power dynamics in order to build participation and leadership for women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and to find ways to share and exercise power in a more equitable manner. It provides us with a valuable framework with which to benchmark the potential for transformative change within UNSCR 1325 as part of the WPS agenda.

Additionally, critical analysis, inquiry and a commitment to building inclusive platforms to support the expression of multiple insights are tools that also support the evolution of transformative change within the WPS agenda, both conceptually and at a practical level. Adams and Luchsinger (2015a, 1) further highlight the importance of meaningful accountability by powerbrokers and decision-makers to the broader constituencies within WPS arenas to the practice of transformative change, posing a key question “what’s transformative if the powerful remain mainly accountable to themselves — or not to all?” They also cite the need for visionary leadership and risk taking to deliver a more transformative approach as well as the importance of inclusive and equal processes, arguing for a deep-seated political commitment to transformative change that “needs to be rooted in genuine fairness and cooperation, because transformation, in a real sense, will require people to work..."
2.2 UNSCR 1325 as a Tool for Transformative Change: An Inherent Contradiction?

Feminist scholarship offers an insightful analysis of the genesis, development and potential of UNSCR 1325 as a global policy instrument for transformative change as well as the critical role of women’s civil society in mobilizing and advocating for that resolution. Cohn (2008, 186) highlights the importance of the actions of the UN Security Council—“arguably the most powerful global governance institution in the area of international peace and security”—for a resolution on women, peace and security. She argues that it represented a significant political achievement for women’s global advocacy in 2000, as that was the first time that gender had been mainstreamed into the peace and security institutions of the UN. It is therefore unsurprising that the expectations of women’s civil society for UNSCR 1325 as a means to deliver transformative change to women’s engagement in peace and security were high then (and remain so today).

Along with many other commentators (e.g. Klot 2011; Olonisakin et al. 2011), Cohn has also pointed to a number of inherent weaknesses in the capacity of the Security Council to transform the gendered drivers of conflict. Cohn (2008, 186) cites firstly the inherently gendered and politically conservative nature of the Security Council itself—an overwhelmingly male and masculine domain, devoted to the ‘hardcore’ issue of military threats to international peace and security”. Secondly, Cohn (2015) says that UNSCR 1325 is a product of an internally negotiated political process, providing “an institutional artefact […] for the specific bureaucratic mandate of the Security Council”. As a third weakness, Cohn (2015) points out that UNSCR 1325 “was never designed as a tool for women’s movements; instead, it was shaped as an intervention for the functioning of a global governance institution” for actors within the UN institutional body such as the Secretary General, Peacekeeping Operations and individual member states.

While acknowledging the importance of Security Council actions to implement UNSCR 1325, Klot (2011, 265) questions “their range, scope, and transformative potential.” She argues that UNSCR 1325 has been mischaracterized “as a comprehensive policy framework for increasing women’s security and supporting the role of women in peacebuilding” by some feminist scholars and activists whom she considers “unfamiliar with the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, institutional, and bureaucratic processes” and who place “far too much expectation on a single resolution’s potential for transformative change.”

2.3 The Limitations of UNSCR 1325: The Need to Reclaim the Agenda

The failures in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 as a tool for transformative change have been a key focus of the debate on WPS in recent years. The tenth anniversary of the introduction of UNSCR 1325 in 2010 provided a focal point for reflection on and an assessment of the effectiveness of the agenda for civil society and UN actors. From 2010 onwards, evidence of the significant gap between UNSCR 1325’s rhetoric on transformative change to enhance women’s roles in peace and security and its capacity to deliver a meaningful and impactful implementation of its commitments has mounted in literature and debates within policy, academic and civil society arenas.

In the last five years, a reservoir of knowledge and data has been building against which we can more accurately measure progress on UNSCR 1325.15 Findings from research at global and national levels, from evaluations of both first-generation National Action Plans (NAPs) and of the evolution of second-generation NAPs at country levels have helped to focus on the need to build a more informed assessment of the extent of the progress on women’s participation in peace and security (Pasquinelli & Potter Prentice 2013; McMinn 2013, 2015; Miller et al. 2014).

Particular weaknesses of the resolution identified include its ambiguous language, its lack of accountability mechanisms and the fact that “advocacy outweighs substance” (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011, 3). Barnes further argues that the failure of the policy to challenge “entrenched notions of masculinity, militarised use of power and gender inequalities […] can appear to reinforce the notion of women as peacemakers, with the implicit opposite of men as aggressors” (Barnes 2011a, 20), and that the resolution fails to address the deep-seated issues at the root of gender inequality (Barnes 2011b, 225). She is somewhat critical of the approach of UNSCR 1325, arguing that “it tends to advocate for measurable, visible and quick impact results such as requiring that 30% of all parliamentary positions go to women” (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011, 10).

15. Even prior to 2010, women’s civil society had been consistently building knowledge on the operation and implementation of UNSCR 1325. The analyses by groups such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have played a consistent role in monitoring and advocating for the full implementation of WPS UNSC resolutions and provide a useful barometer of the continuing challenges to the implementation of UNSCR 1325.
Cohn also argues for a more comprehensive analysis of drivers of conflict beyond the framework of UNSCR 1325 as well as for the need to reclaim the agenda by focusing on the broader causes of war and conflict. She argues further for the need to strengthen women’s participation not only in peace processes but also in the broader economic and political relations that impact the capacity of women to exercise their rights for political and economic empowerment in post-conflict settings. Citing the issues of women’s access to land rights and the practice of land acquisition (in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guatemala), Cohn (2015) advocates “taking on the issues that we have not addressed before that are not clearly associated with 1325” and cites the need to build feminist platforms for the building of sustainable peace.

Key actors at the highest global level have recognized key deficits within the operation of UNSCR 1325. Among those actors, UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka has highlighted “the need to advance political and operational responses that would deliver greater impact in strengthening the participation and empowerment of women and girls in conflict-affected regions” (as cited in UN Women 2014). Much of the literature generated in recent years reflects concerns about the strength of UNSCR 1325 as an effective global policy mechanism, notably the low level of implementation of UNSCR 1325 by member states (according to the PeaceWomen’s website on implementation, currently only 25% (48) of UN member states have adopted a NAP), and the underutilization of the potential of NAPs as policy instruments (Swaine 2009, 410). It could be argued that the low level of implementation at national levels and the underutilization of the policy is related to the extent to which UNSCR 1325 is legally binding on member states. Indeed, that is a contested issue in the literature and debates, with some commenters arguing that it concerns “soft law” rather than “hard” law (Swaine 2009, 409). Whatever the legal interpretations of the enforceability of accountability between member states and the UNSC on WPS may be, what is evident is that the UNSC has not acted effectively in fully following up on its mandate regarding the implementation of UNSCR resolutions on women, peace and security, or has not properly mandated other parts of the UN family to do so.

Taylor (2013, 3) argues that the more concrete the work of women, peace and security has become, the more it has the potential to be “held hostage to national and regional interests”, highlighting the risks of the dilution of UNSCR 1325 as a policy mechanism through NAPs. This point is echoed by other commentators who have been critical of the capacity for localization of UNSCR 1325 in building engagement and targeting resources to women and girls in local communities affected by conflict. The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), for example, has taken on, as one of its signature projects, the support of “localizing” or promoting the internal decentralized support of UNSCR 1325 in response to this key weakness.

A core debate generated in much of the ongoing discourse on WPS revolves around the extent to which UNSCR 1325, as part of the WPS agenda, represents a shift toward “a more inclusive, gender-sensitive global governance” that supports transformative change to enable women’s participation and their visions of peace and security, or whether it “undermines women’s grassroots struggles for justice and security” or is “mere rhetoric that changes little in practice” (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011, 499). Part of this analysis suggests that the WPS policy framework itself has become a barrier to transformative change and that there is a need to examine the more deep-rooted obstacles to women’s empowerment and participation in peace and security, linking those to the drivers of conflict, structural gender inequalities and the gendered dynamics of power operating within conflict and post-conflict settings—themes which are explored in the following chapter.
Malian women stand in line to vote.
Woman blows a whistle during a protest in Nepal

© ANP
3. Findings: Obstacles to Transformative Change and Women’s Participation

This chapter presents the substantive findings from research consultations. Drawing on the global perspectives of research participants in one-on-one interviews and the consultation workshop, and augmented by the results of desk research, it documents the deep-rooted obstacles to transformative change that act as impediments to women’s participation and influence in the field of peace and security. The findings are structured to reflect obstacles both within and beyond the WPS policy framework. They include political, economic and policy obstacles as well as institutional obstacles or barriers to women’s participation and movement-building.
The whole security paradigm is based on elitist masculinities and we see this playing out across different sectors and spaces where women continue to be excluded”

(Research Informant)

3.1 Obstacle 1: The Dynamics of Power: Patriarchal Attitudes and Norms in Peace and Security

Many of the informants stated that one of the most significant underlying obstacles to transformative change within the WPS agenda was its failure to challenge and change the patriarchal attitudes, behaviors and norms of key actors—a view that echoed the analysis of many feminist scholars and activists. Participants in the global consultation and in the one-on-one interviews felt that patriarchal attitudes were pervasive not only among peacekeeping and security actors, but also within UN institutions and bodies, representatives of member states, decision-making bodies at national and local levels of governance as well as civil society and religious institutions.

As a power system, patriarchy—“the social organization of men’s control of power”17—operates on a hierarchical “power over” model of power, privileging those who have control over resources and authority in decision-making over those who do not.18 The exercise of patriarchal power has multiple devastating consequences for women and girls in conflict, fragile and non-conflict settings. Violence against women is recognized as one of the most widespread kinds of human rights abuse: an estimated 120 million girls and women under the age of 20 (about 1 out of 10) have been subjected to forced sexual intercourse or other forced sexual acts.19 Women are underrepresented at all levels of political decision-making: worldwide, only about 1 out of 5 parliamentary seats is held by a woman; globally, three quarters of working-age men are in the labor force, compared to only half of working-age women; and women earn less than men across all sectors and occupations, with women’s earnings being 24% less than men’s.20

In the context of armed conflict, when the exercise of patriarchal power is intensified by the use of weapons by state and non-state actors, the impact on women and girls has been particularly damaging and disempowering, as evident in the levels of sexual abuse or gender-based acts of violence in conflict including rape, sexual mutilation, forced abortion, trafficking, forced prostitution, domestic violence and marital rape.21 The abuse of defenders of women’s human rights (which can also include attacks on men) often takes place with impunity for the perpetrators and a systemic failure to provide protection against threats, harassment and attacks from state and non-state actors.

Patriarchal norms are also damaging to men, demanding not only that men should dominate women, thus effectively preventing women’s empowerment, but also that male elites should also dominate other men: this creates hierarchical structures where people are ranked not only according to gender, ethnicity, age, education, and sexual orientation, but also according to their conformity to patriarchal norms (Ekvall 2015, 29). The process of militarization incorporates specific gender dynamics that also disadvantage men, pushing them to engage in armed and violent action to solve conflict. This has been acknowledged in a recent UN review of Peace Operations, which states that “sexual violence remains a pervasive tactic of modern war. […] Women and girls are subject to mass abduction, trafficking as well as forced

17. This is the definition proposed by Joshua Goldstein, as cited in Jenkins and Reardon (2007, 210), who go on to define patriarchy further as “the social organization of men’s control of power; a social and cultural construct that has not only privileged men over women, but can be seen as a paradigm for other forms of authoritarianism, hierarchy and inequality.”
18. Power-over can be defined as the “ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to another actor or set of actors in a nontrivial way” (Allen 1998, 33). It is a way of exercising influence and domination over people, often negatively associated with force (violence), repression, coercion, discrimination, abuse, or corruption.
19. The Statistics Division of the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs estimated that more than one-third (35%) of women worldwide have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual violence by a non-partner at some point in their lives. (UNSD) http://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/docs/WW2015%20at%20a%20Glance.pdf
20. Ibid.
21. The WomenWarPeace.org website provides statistical data on the numbers of women raped both during the genocide in Rwanda (at least 250,000 and perhaps as many as 500,000) and during the war in Bosnia, where Muslim women were targeted for rape as part of the “ethnic cleansing” and over 20,000 women are thought to have been raped in that period. (WomenWarPeace) http://www.womenwarpeace.org/facts-figures
conversion, marriage and sexual slavery. Men and boys are more often forcibly recruited to fight or face extrajudicial execution” (UN 2015, 2). Participants in the research highlighted the ways that men are directly disadvantaged by the gendered nature of armed conflict; as combatants they sometimes face extreme levels of physical violence that can result in devastating physical and emotional trauma. Men also face significant social and cultural pressure in both public and private arenas to adopt the values and norms of a patriarchal model of masculinity in which the use of power, control and violence is socially accepted and encouraged.22

As a result of patriarchal norms, men have continued to dominate the political and economic structures of power and women’s leadership in and influence on the formal and high levels of peace and security architecture have remained very limited and static.23 Within the UN, patriarchal norms are evident in the institutional setup of departments and bodies that exclude women from influence and key decision-making roles, in the limited space and low status given in connection with the discussion of WPS issues, and in the limited scale and allocation of financial resources for a holistic WPS agenda. The cultures of military institutions—of state and non-state armed actors—are rigid, often difficult to change, and based on gendered hierarchies. They rarely see gender concerns and women’s role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution panels for security debates and in the limited extent to which women’s agency as a serious priority.

In broader circles, patriarchy is also clearly evident in all-male panels for security debates and in the limited extent to which women’s role in conflict prevention and conflict resolution is included as a focus in research and policy dialogues at national and global levels; in underfunding for women, peace and security generally; and, in the ways women’s roles and contributions to increasing security are not taken seriously by state and non-state combatants, security actors, analysts and political representatives.

The impact of patriarchal norms is also reflected in the low levels of women’s engagement in formal peace negotiations (Diaz and Tordjman 2012, 2).24 The decision about who participates in peace negotiations is driven by power, often the patriarchal power of the parties to the conflict. Efforts to establish inclusive processes that seek to strengthen women’s engagement and contribution tend to challenge the established power structures—which represent the narrow interests of an elite constituency of state and non-state conflict parties—that characterize most end-of-conflict negotiations. A recent briefing on women and gender analyzing the broader participation of women in political negotiations argues that although the practice of building more inclusive talks is growing, resistance from mediators and policymakers to the greater inclusion of women is still evident (Paffenholz 2015a, 2). A more detailed discussion of the factors relating to the exclusion of women from peace processes is presented in 3.9.1.

Research informants gave many examples of ways in which they had both experienced and observed behavior towards women that was discriminatory, hostile and at times threatening, or otherwise dismissive of their rights and capacities to engage in formal and informal peacebuilding, conflict resolution and security processes. Such practices weaken opportunities for women as local actors to be in the driver’s seat of social change and undermine the potential for the transformation of conflict. Many research informants also expressed deep concern that the overall environment for women human rights defenders has become more difficult and dangerous, highlighting increasing levels of abuse and intimidation against women activists and women political representatives, as evidenced in recent research (Amnesty International 2015).25

The influence of patriarchal attitudes is also evident in the increasing conservatism in religious movements, and in traditional and religious interpretations of cultural and social practices that undermine and curtail the engagement of women in public life, social spaces and consequently limit the capacity of women to contribute to conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution processes. Informants shared many examples of the deepening discrimination experienced by women and girls in the community and at the family level. In this context, women and girls face significant social and cultural pressure in both public and private arenas to adopt the gender norms of a patriarchal model of masculinity in which the use of power, control and violence is socially accepted and encouraged.26

22. “Patriarchy and Masculinities: Defining patriarchy as a power system based on sex–gender relations, within the patriarchal system, masculinities can be defined as the experience, or rather entitlement, of power. The link between masculinity and power is something that is tied into systems of hierarchy. Masculinities are a policing system for hierarchy. In connecting masculinities with violence and war, and as such militarism, they become tools to maintain the patriarchal system.” (These definitions are from Rahul Roy, an Indian filmmaker and a member of SANAM (South Asian Network to Address Masculinities), given during a panel discussion that was part of the WPP Global Consultation on Gender and Militarism held July 2–4, 2014 in Cape Town, South Africa).

23. “Where are the EU’s Women Leaders in Foreign Affairs?” This paper, published by EPLD, indicates just 18% female representation at European External Action Senior management levels (only one woman out of eight positions at the Managing Director level), no women among the 18 appointed positions for head of Common Security and Defence Policy Missions, and no women serving as European Union Special Representatives.

24. Concerns over the historically low levels of participation in peace processes informed part of the discourses in the literature reviewed, and was evident in work of a range of commentators: Bell & O’Rourke 2010; Diaz and Tordjman 2012. According to the latter report, which provides an overview of 51 major peace processes since 1992, participation in negotiating delegations averaged 9% in the 17 cases for which such information was available. Just 4% of the signatories in the peace processes included in this sample were women, and women were absent from chief mediating roles in UN–brokered talks. (Diaz and Tordjman 2012, 2)

25. Amnesty International (2015) interviewed more than 50 women human rights defenders from 13 provinces across Afghanistan between August and November 2014, documenting evidence of a wide range of threats, harassment and intimidation as well as physical attacks on their family members and property and the killing of women activists who had been deliberately targeted.
women across a range of religious traditions, ranging from Buddhism in Thailand, to Catholicism in the Philippines and Colombia and to Islam in Indonesia. In the case of Indonesia, CSOs and women activists cited examples of how a particular interpretation of religious beliefs has been used to justify restrictions on women’s role in society. In concrete terms, that has prevented women from speaking in public, from taking up positions of leadership, and from engaging in public life.

Patriarchal Attitudes: Barriers to Women’s Participation

The post-conflict administration in Aceh, in the northern part of Indonesia, has introduced Sharia law as part of the legal system, and this has been the basis for a number of regulations that restrict the personal liberties, behaviors and dress of women in public. The requirement that women who are applying to enter the military or planning to marry military officers must undergo a so-called virginity test is a mandatory part of the recruitment process currently being carried out by Indonesian military.26

In Colombia, despite the existence of a highly active feminist movement and women’s networks, the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church, which support women’s traditional roles within the family, have also acted as a barrier to women’s participation in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution activism.

Recent elections in Sri Lanka (January 2015) reflect the challenges for women’s political participation in post-conflict countries, where the struggles for power can create political cultures that are hostile towards or even exclude women. Here, women candidates represented only 9.4% of the nominations for the general election. They faced a lack of access to funds for their campaigns and had to operate within a culture where there seemed to be a lack of faith in the political capacities of women within the electorate and society generally.

Safety and Security of Women

In socially conservative, political and religious conflict settings, women and girls are also increasingly being targeted as a backlash against the women’s rights movement.

Since the invasion of northern Iraq in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or simply Islamic State (IS)—has made women a direct target of its agenda. Where ISIS now rules, women have been forbidden to work, walk in public without a male “guardian,” or go to school. Women who attempt to exercise basic rights have been executed. In the absence of international and government-sponsored services and legal remedies, local Iraqi women’s NGOs are at the forefront of providing necessary services.27

In Afghanistan, entrenched social and cultural barriers have resulted in the dilution of women’s civil and political rights. One example of this is the case of Rohgul Kaikhwah, a woman elected as senator for the Nimroz province in southern Afghanistan, who was attacked by the Taliban in 2013. With her in the car were her husband and their three children, her brother and his three children. The senator’s seven-year-old daughter and brother were killed in the attack. Her other daughter, who was 11 at the time, was paralyzed as a result of her injuries. The senator was shot nine times, sustaining wounds to her liver, lung and leg. She later returned to continue her work as a political representative. In addition to the direct attack on her and her family, she estimates that she has received more than 100 threats since 2010 via phone calls and texts (Amnesty International 2015,4).

In Sri Lanka, where women have been excluded from peace negotiations, there have been records of gross human rights violations, with civil society organizations and human rights defenders being particularly vulnerable (Spectrums of Perspectives 2015). Informants from the global consultation described a very hostile and challenging environment for women seeking political office during recent elections there. Key threats to women’s safety were the level of violence in the run-up to elections, which posed risks to the security and safety of women who were out late at night campaigning; the high level of personal / political verbal abuse experienced by women; and the risks relating to the legacy of the generally violent culture in the country post-conflict.28
“The real problem is that despite all the research and all the toolkits, guidelines, funding and advocacy, if you don’t have the buy-in from the key institutions and actors, along with their political commitment to the inclusion of women and women’s rights, nothing will change.”

(Research Informant)

3.2 Obstacle 2: The Lack of Political Commitment to Women’s Participation in Peace and Security

For many informants, the lack of political commitment as well as the low priority given to women’s participation in peace and security and to an effective policy implementation of UNSCR 1325 by UN institutions and member states have formed a significant obstacle to conflict transformation and are seen as a further consequence of patriarchal norms. Many of the informants saw this lack of political commitment as indicative of a broader failure at the global and national levels to support actions that would enable greater comprehensive social change and gender equality as part of the WPS agenda. There was a common concern among the research participants about the lack of political will within the UN Security Council itself to commit to the WPS agenda, with some informants arguing that this was linked to the protection of the broader strategic interests of the five permanent members of the UNSC. One participant in the global consultation expressed concerns about the capacity of the UNSC to be representative, with implications for the credibility of the Security Council as a legitimate actor for WPS.
“In Africa, there is a lot of mistrust of the Security Council as it is viewed as an aggressor, composed of global superpowers, with a propensity to sanction use of military might. **African countries don’t feel represented there**, and this leads to difficulties in [UNSCR] 1325 implementation.”

The lack of political commitment to WPS is evident both in the selective, bureaucratic and instrumentalized implementation of NAPs and in the absence of effective accountability measures with which the broader constituencies of women’s civil society and local communities affected by conflict can hold the UNSC and member states to UNSCR 1325 accountable. This creates a context in which national governments remain mainly accountable to themselves, with the balance of their political will being invested in militarized responses to conflict and security to maintain vested political and economic interests, rather than enabling women’s equality and engagement. As a result, key tenets of the broader WPS agenda—such as women’s political, economic and social empowerment, the promotion of gender-sensitive nonviolent forms of conflict resolution, punishment for violations of human and women’s rights, and the reduction of excessive military expenditures and control of armaments—are excluded from the agenda. This is not an approach that promotes transformative political and social change.

In the absence of clear political will and commitment to addressing core issues of gender inequality and the disempowerment of women in conflict settings, it was felt that UNSCR 1325’s role in the WPS agenda had become piecemeal and partial, and that at the UN level, it had reverted into a technical and staffing agenda, giving priority to the training of peacekeepers and mediators and the appointment of a small number of women to some senior positions and the resourcing of programs. Some informants argued that while these efforts may help to get some women into existing structures, they have failed to change the underlying exclusionary processes of how the business of peace and security is conducted and/or to challenge the narrow interests served. Informants expressed a very high level of frustration and anger with regard to this institutional failure, as the assessment of one informant reflects:

“The bottom line is that this is a political failure. We are not seeing the UN and other key actors making women’s participation an automatic and necessary part of peace and security processes... Some political capital needs to be expended to make that happen—and soon.”

(Research informant)

---

**A Lack of Political Will to Commit to Women, Peace and Security in Northern Ireland**

In Northern Ireland: In the run-up to the referendum on the Peace Agreement, a massive civil society campaign initiated by the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition successfully pushed for a positive outcome of the referendum and for inclusive approaches to power-sharing. However, political support for the Women’s Coalition quickly evaporated, and 17 years after the peace agreement, with the refusal of the UK government to include Northern Ireland in its NAP on UNSCR 1325, the political environment for women’s empowerment and participation in Northern Ireland’s post-conflict governance remains extremely challenging (McMinn 2011; 2015, 26). There is also little evidence of a peace dividend, with politically/ethnically segregated structures in social, educational and economic domains (Noland 2014).
A Lack of Political Will to Commit to a Holistic WPS Agenda in the MENA Region

In the MENA region, women activists are very often shunned and excluded from hard security decisions (including DDR and SSR processes). Some challenges specific to the MENA region include: ongoing war and conflict, political turmoil, deep-rooted corruption, and a lack of democracy, accountability, transparency, and good governance. Other challenges that affect the WPS agenda within the MENA region are climate change and access to information and communication technology (Rodriguez 2014).

Political commitment to the development of a holistic WPS agenda in MENA countries is low, with a selective focus on particular issues to the exclusion of others. In Egypt, addressing issues such as masculinities has been possible, but addressing militarism and SSR is very sensitive. State and military representatives imply that gender issues are not relevant to their context, or that the participation of women in the security sector is not socio-culturally acceptable (Donais 2008, 123). With rise of violence associated with ISIS, the political response of the Egyptian government has been to focus more on traditional national security rather than other aspects that address the needs of women. One example of the lack of political will to commit to WPS is the government’s response to violence against women. During celebrations for Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s victory in the presidential race in June 2014, mobs of men violently sexually assaulted at least nine women on Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Within days of the president’s statement calling to “vigorously enforce the law and take all necessary measures to combat sexual harassment”, the Ministry of Interior announced plans to expand the Violence against Women (VAW) Unit nationally. Yet, the VAW unit still lacks commitment from the government for matters such as ensuring that all police officers are trained to deal appropriately with VAW cases, increasing the representation of women in the police force, or adopting a wider set of reforms to ensure accountability and democratic governance in the security sector. This is all within a broader political context in which no NAP on UNSCR 1325 exists in Egypt, although the recent efforts of women’s civil society to develop one are encouraging.

3.3 Obstacle 3: A Security–First Approach to Peace and Conflict: Militarization

3.3.1 A Security–First Approach

Militarization, like patriarchy, eliminates the possibility for a peaceful and constructive transformation of conflict systems, which is a key element within transformative change. Research informants identified the militarization of security and peace operations in conflict and non-conflict regions as a multiplier of violence that often served to undermine the safety and security of women and girls and exclude models of security based on the engagement of women in their local communities. Many informants regarded the use of patriarchal norms, the lack of political will to commit to WPS, and militarization as interlinking obstacles to transformative change and to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security.

Subsequent to 9/11, militarized responses to security and conflict concerns have increasingly become the default model for interventions in conflict, humanitarian and fragile settings. Significant resources have been invested in military interventions in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in inter- and intra-state conflicts in the African continent, as well as in counterterrorism measures in response to the more recent rise of conflict as a result of violent extremism. The impact of military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the militarized response to unrest in Libya are broadly perceived to have resulted in negative transformations that have created political insecurity and destroyed social and economic infrastructure, destabilizing the region further. The consequences of this are evident today in the massive displacement of populations in the region due to violence and in the deepening of ethnic and religious conflicts.

The impact of militarism and militarization is also increasingly evident in “non–conflict” settings and communities: from deaths and injuries as a result of legalized gun ownership by individuals and the proliferation of legal and non-legal ownership of small arms in post-conflict settings to the militarized responses to crime and social unrest (for example in role of the police and army to the violence of organized crime and drug cartels in Mexico) and the glorification of the use of militarist norms of violence in popular culture and the media.

29. “US Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq to Cost $6 trillion”. Global Research News (2013) has reported that the cost to the US government for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be $6 trillion.
30. Over 12,000 people, adults and children died from gun violence in the US in 2013, i.e. about 30 a day. (Cox 2014)
Militarization, Masculinity and Conflict

The patriarchal norms of masculinity and the patriarchal societal structures in most countries in the world also inform the ways in which gender identities support a culture of militarized intervention. In both conflict and non-conflict regions, such norms teach young men to use violence or the threat of violence to get respect and to avenge perceived wrongs. Research also suggests that patriarchal norms of masculinity encourage dominance, competition, risk-taking and power over women, the disdain of homosexuals, and the control of emotions (Ekvall 2015, 29–30). Patriarchal norms can also be hegemonic, stipulating that not only should men dominate women, thus effectively preventing women’s empowerment, but also that some men should also dominate other men. Evidence from several countries including South Sudan, Somalia, Kosovo, Colombia, Afghanistan and Uganda show that militarized norms of masculinity which valorize domination and violence have motivated men to join armies and militia groups (Wright 2014, i). These norms are the dominant ethos of state and non-state combatants in conflict settings and drive a culture of violence and patriarchal power.

Several informants stressed the importance of including in the WPS agenda a deeper understanding of the complexity of factors that motivate both young men and young women to become engaged in armed conflict, either as non-state combatants or as mobilizers or supporters. They cited the need to examine the response of young people—including young women—who have joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq as either supporters or opponents of ISIS within a broader analysis of security.

Pioneering Work with Men: Alternative Masculinities

Pioneering work undertaken by WPP partners CYAAD (College of Youth Activism and Development) in Pakistan and SAMYAK in India has been providing valuable spaces for young men and women to promote ways of integrating a masculinities perspective in conflict analysis and peacebuilding, which contributes to increasing men’s understanding of, support for, and involvement in addressing gender-justice issues in relation to peacebuilding, as well as to exposing the deeply gendered nature of armed conflict. Work of this nature illustrates the importance of working with men within an alternative masculinities approach as part of conflict prevention and the value of gender-sensitive active nonviolence as alternative to militarized approaches to conflict resolution and prevention.

In Pakistan, CYAAD works with youth in Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Balochistan, Karachi, and South Punjab, the areas extensively affected by extremism and a range of violent conflicts. Focusing on conflict prevention and conflict resolution, this project sets up groups of young leaders/mentors to address the gender dimensions of conflict and post-conflict situations through greater engagement of young people and communities.

In India, where much of work is focused on working with men on GBV, SAMYAK works on sensitizing young men to understand concepts of masculinities and expanding their worldview to consider the issues of conflict, macroeconomics, nationalism and militarism.

31. From a speech given by Youssef Mahmoud, a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Peace Operations and of the High-Level Advisory Group of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, at an event hosted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy for researchers international policy-makers and practitioners in the field of peace and security, for a series of seminars and panel debates June 2015.
The Militarization of Peace Operations
Policy analysts and activists alike have noted with concern the increasing militarization of peace operations, particularly peacekeeping interventions, and the danger of these actions being seen as the “legitimization of force in the pursuit of peace.” Within the context of this “Security First” (militarized) approach, security concerns are siloed and privileged over political and development strategies in conflict resolution. Not only is security prioritized over political and developmental needs, but the political and development agendas are used to reinforce or “buttress a Security First approach.”

Many of the informants consulted felt that within the militarized security-first approach to conflict and peace operations, it has been extremely difficult to build for advocacy on what most informants felt to be the core priorities of the WPS agenda: women’s engagement in conflict prevention, demilitarization, disarmament, inclusive security, and alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms—all fundamental elements that helped to inform the genesis of UNSCR 1325. As a result, the voices of women remain marginalized in the mega narratives of conflict analysis and peacebuilding, further marginalizing the contribution of women to building sustainable peace. The difficulties faced by women are illustrative of the difficulties that broader civil society faces in seeking to have an impact on these areas. There was also criticism from some informants about the ways in which the participation pillar in UNSCR 1325 was increasingly being used as a tool to support women’s recruitment into militarized institutions and environments, rather than focus on strengthening women’s political and economic power and influence to increase participation and leadership in broader arenas and redefine peace and security.

Other informants felt that working to increase the participation of women in police and peacekeeping forces and strengthen gender perspectives within these intuitions was a valuable and legitimate part of security sector reform (SSR) and of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Informants in the one-on-one interviews and the global consultation also argued for the importance of considering the prominence and impact of armed non-state actors as part of concerns about a militarized approach, particularly in the context of the significant expanding conflicts in the MENA region and, to a lesser extent, in certain parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

Highly militarized responses to conflicts in Kashmir and Manipur
In India, the highly militarized responses to conflicts in Kashmir and Manipur and the historical conflicts over territory regarding the border with Pakistan illustrate the challenges for women’s participation. Here, a security-first approach has made women’s political participation difficult and forms an impediment to raising women’s concerns regarding peace and security. Women are active in both regions as peacebuilders and in conflict resolution, but they remain excluded from mainstream decision-making and political processes. There are many informal civil society alliances, but the government’s strategy is to prioritize border and internal regional security threats to maintain a hard security response, diverting concerns away from economic development, caste-related and intercommunal violence, and the exclusion of women from political participation.

“Just as war has become ‘inclusive’—with civilians deaths more common than soldiers’—so too must our approach toward ending conflict”

(Hunt and Posa 2001, 38)
3.3.2 Inclusive Security: A Pathway for Women’s Participation for Sustainable Peace and Security

Many of the research informants regarded the need for a more inclusive approach to the concept and practice of security as critical to transforming conflict and an essential element in dismantling existing militarized models of security. Informants argued for the need to reframe the women, peace and security discourse as one of inclusive security to strengthen the role and contributions of women. There is a wide body of evidence that supports this view, notably the material gathered by Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, whose definition of inclusive security—“a diverse, citizen-driven approach to global stability”—asserts women’s agency, not their vulnerability (Hunt and Posa 2001, 38). In common with many commentators and activists, Hunt and Posa advocate that women are crucial to inclusive security since they are “often at the center of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), popular protests, electoral referendums, and other citizen-empowering movements.” As they put it: “While most men come to the negotiating table directly from the war room and battlefield, women usually arrive straight out of civil activism and [...] family care” (ibid.). They cite the benefits of involving women at every level of the security sector, arguing that women negotiators often have a more collaborative style, which makes it easier for them to work through differences; on the ground, women may be more in touch with their community, knowing which teenagers are disaffected or most likely to fall in with radical groups; and that in many parts of the world, women’s status as second class citizens allows them to go places without being noticed (ibid., 41).

The concept of human security has provided a useful basis for building more inclusive models of security. Moreover, with its focus on the broader social and economic causes of conflict, it is widely acknowledged as a valuable alternative to militarized approaches to security. Human security is people-centered and with its seven dimensions of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, it stands in opposition to national-state concerns about the security of territory, the protection of national interests in foreign policy and global security (Krause 2013). Informants in the one-on-one interviews and the global consultation further highlighted the value of a human security approach in addressing the specific security threats faced by women in conflict, post-conflict and fragile contexts and as a way of increasing the perspectives of women in the politics, policy and practice of security. Many also argued for the need for a more gendered approach to the practice of human security more generally, a point that has been echoed in broader discourses on the weaknesses of the concept of human security.33

33. Hudson (2005, 164) argues for the need to “link women’s everyday experiences with broader regional and global political processes and structures” and to deal with power asymmetries in all aspects of peace and security. Krause (2013, 77) identifies a number of broader weaknesses with the concept of human security as being state centered and donor driven; that much of human security advocates the strengthening of the role and resources of the state in security sector reform in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. He also argues that post-2001, the international climate and the war on terror have reinforced a more traditional and restricted approach to security in many foreign-policy bureaucracies, a key driver in determining national policy priorities to state security.

Strengthening Gender-sensitive Approaches to Human Security

Recent research from research partner GPPAC asserts that not only should women’s security be an indicator of human security, but that gender-sensitive approaches can inform a more appropriate methodology for measuring human security and devising human-security strategies. In an extensive analysis of the everyday experiences of security by individuals and communities, the report advocates the need to address threats to women’s security as a core dimension of human security and documents the impact of the failures to address the needs of women’s security. These include the increasing phenomenon of femicide (the deliberate murder of women) in Mexico and the economic vulnerability of women in Zimbabwe’s Matebeland in their struggle to access pension and inheritance rights. The report also argues that traditional security providers such as police forces often minimize and jeopardize women’s security rather than strengthen it (Wall et al. 2014, 109).
Gender-Sensitive Active Nonviolence in Northeast India
Informants to the research described many ways in which women’s civil society had used nonviolent protest as a response to militarized security approaches.

The work of the Maira Paibis and Naga Mothers movements, as shared at the global consultation, provides a potent example of the use of nonviolence by women’s civil society to challenge the power and autonomy of a highly militarized region, in this case: northeast India. The passing of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in the region in 1958 legitimized the use of violence on people that it considers errant/deviant. The AFSPA is meant to suppress civil society, curb dissent, and legitimize state violence. Women have suffered under this Act and in the hands of the two patriarchies: the rebels and state armed forces. In addition, the Act militarized the entire region of northeast India, which caused an inflow of men working with or in support of government security structures. Furthermore, the region faces endemic poverty, (forced) migration, social imbalance and political violence and human rights abuses (e.g. rape, torture, human trafficking), particularly against vulnerable groups, of which women form a large part.

The Naga Mothers movement mobilized a campaign of nonviolent action, creating a space for women to protest against the specific legislation but also against the actions of the military. Their work has included protesting the atrocities committed by the security forces, preventing raids through nightlong watches, engaging in dialogue with security forces and conducting mediation. In addition, the movement has used culturally specific and ethnically relevant political protest and movement-building forms (e.g. naked protests, fasting). It has created a common inclusive platform for all civil society groups, strengthening the political participation of women within their traditional roles, and it has provided an inclusive approach to security and peace from a political, economic, developmental and social angle (e.g. by focusing on health, de-addiction and the rights of women). Its involvement in developmental activities has increased women’s effectiveness and their acceptance in their own society.

Barometer of Local Women’s Security: Strengthening the Voices of Local Women
Women are powerful agents of change in rebuilding and reshaping communities affected by conflict. Yet the situation for women in conflict-affected countries shows insufficient improvement, largely because many WPS policies and initiatives are based on incomplete data and analysis, and they fail to reflect the perspectives and experiences of local women in conflict-affected communities. Macro indicators focusing on state security, for example, do not measure the daily situation and quality of life at the community level, let alone for women.

Cordaid has developed a community-based participatory approach to identifying the key issues of concern for women in local communities called the “barometer of local women’s security” (Cordaid 2014 b). The barometer captures and monitors the daily reality of peace and security of local women and turns this into a credible evidence base. The evidence base informs decision-makers and can help to leverage their accountability. Cordaid works with local partners to implement the barometer in a range of conflict-affected countries/territories including the DRC, Afghanistan, Colombia, Israel, the Palestinian territories and South Sudan.

3.4 Obstacle 4: Global Capitalism and Macroeconomics
Research informants highlighted the growth of global capitalism, driven by a macroeconomic policy approach,34 as a key obstacle, not only as a significant driver of conflict but also as a driver of the other deep-rooted obstacles to transformative change discussed in this report, notably: patriarchy, militarization and the embedded security-first response, and the proliferation of arms. The role of global capitalism as a driver of conflict is evident in the significant political and financial investment in militarized defense–and–security responses globally and in the international trade in arms and weapons. This is further reflected in the imbalance of investment and spending priorities of national governments on militarization and defense over critical drivers of equality such as health,

34. The Economist defines macroeconomic policy as follows: “Top–down policy by government and central banks, usually intended to maximise growth while keeping down inflation and unemployment. The main instruments of macroeconomic policy are changes in the rate of interest and money supply, known as monetary policy, and changes in taxation and public spending, known as fiscal policy” (http://www.economist.com/economics–a-to–z/m#node=21529450).
35. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, six countries exported over 75% of the world’s weapons in 2014. The USA’s share of world military expenditure remains highest at 34% ($610 bn). China, Russia and Saudi Arabia were the second (12%), third (4.8%) and fourth (4.5%) highest military spenders, respectively, while France and the United Kingdom were in fifth (3.5%) and sixth (3.4%) place, respectively. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014” (SPIRI 2015). (http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf).
education, and poverty reduction, which have been further eroded by the ongoing global economic crisis. This investment in a security-first approach is also based on protecting the political and economic interests of particular countries (most notably the five permanent members of the UNSC) and illustrates the paradoxical role that countries play in financing and fueling war and conflict to the exclusion of investments that would support a peace and security agenda including demilitarization, conflict prevention and nonviolence, and—critically—the empowerment and engagement of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The economic crisis and the resulting austerity have had a particularly negative impact on the social and economic status of women, yet military spending is one of the few areas that have not been eroded by the austerity measures of national governments. In an economic context in which “austerity policies in both developed and developing countries are shifting the burden of coping and caring back to families and onto the shoulders of women and girls” (Heintz et al. 2015, 12), macroeconomic policy seems to offer a particularly disabling environment for the realization of economic and social rights. As a gender-neutral policy, macroeconomics is incompatible with achieving substantive equality for women and counterproductive to strengthening the meaningful participation of women in economic decision-making and policy development. Macroeconomic policy further requires the normal functioning of economic and political institutional infrastructure and hence its capacity to deliver effective economic growth can be particularly constrained in post-conflict countries (Heintz et al 2015, 224).

Without an alternative model of economics, driven by different aims, the transformation of economic systems at global, national and local levels—aimed at creating sustainable economic output, employment and growth, dismantling the drivers of conflict, and creating greater social and economic equality for women and girls—has stalled. The contribution of feminist political economy—an integrated feminist analysis of issues including finance, livelihoods, displacement, healthcare, housing, urban planning, infrastructure, environment and disaster rebuilding—offers one such alternative. Unfortunately, such a model has largely been absent within the UNSCR 1325 implementation policies, which generally fail to address the economic barriers to building sustainable peace and security. The impact of global and national economic policies driven by global capitalism on communities in developing, fragile and post-conflict settings has been particularly damaging and represents the antithesis of processes that would encourage the type of comprehensive social change essential for transformative change and women’s participation.

“The realization of women’s rights cannot be separated from broader questions of economic and social justice. Militarism and violent conflicts, the global financial and economic crises, volatile food and energy prices, food insecurity and climate change have intensified inequalities and vulnerability, with specific impacts on women and girls” (Heintz et al. 26)

36. Findings from The Price of Austerity: The Impact on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Europe indicate the scale of the impact of austerity measures in the region on women: cuts in the public sector, in which women form the majority of workers; a sharp decline in the availability and affordability of care services for children and other dependents; cutbacks in public services mean that services are transferred back to individual households where economically vulnerable groups such as lone mothers, pensioners and migrant women will lose the most; loss of services and benefits for women; deterioration of working conditions and employment and rising levels of unemployment; increase in the levels of domestic violence; reduction in support for women’s organizations. (Elomäki 2012, 2).

37. Marilyn Waring is a key proponent of feminist political economy advocating for the incorporation of caring and unpaid labor as fundamental economic activities. Her book If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics (1988) highlighted the lack of recognition of the economic value of women’s household production services, and the ways in which the value of nonmarket (unpaid) household labor is excluded from both sides of national income and product accounts.
“Food, water and land on which to build sustainable economies and build self-sufficiency: these are most important resources central to people’s security, but security is based on terrorism and counterterrorism—and we and [UNSCR] 1325 have not made a dent in this.”

(Research informant)

Many research informants identified the acquisition of land and resources by multinational companies (a common element of the development strategies of many private corporations) as a particular concern, as this practice often owes its success to the use of military force for the displacement of local communities and the protection of globalized economic interests. Informants advocated a more strategic focus for the implementation of the WPS agenda to the Global South, where massive development projects driven by global capital are displacing rural communities and indigenous cultures. Many informants advocated the need for UNSCR 1325 implementation to move beyond its current focus so as to address the broader concerns of grassroots communities in relation to the ownership of natural resources, climate change and ecological concerns. This is reflected in a comment by one of the participants:

The absence of post-conflict economic recovery from a gender perspective was also recognized by informants as a key barrier to women’s empowerment in the transition of communities from conflict to post-conflict. One policy analyst described it “the most neglected area” in the field of women, peace and security. Research on the gender sensitivity of financing for post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) indicates that proposals for economic recovery are developed with little attention to the needs of women: in an analysis of six PCNAs, less than 5% of activities and only

38. Resource exploitation is also pursued by corporations in the Global North, for example in Canada, where the resistance to extractivism has resulted in one of the strongest social movements in Canada. It has been led by Indigenous movements and young people, with women playing a key role. (Women’s Peacemakers Program 2015a).
2.9% of budget lines were found to mention women’s needs and issues (Cueva–Beteta et al, 2012, 12). The words of one informant crystallized the gendered impact of this thus: “In a post–conflict context where an average of 30% of households are headed by women, you are looking at a vector of extreme poverty.”

Impact of Macroeconomic Policy and Globalization: Poverty, Austerity and Land Grabbing

In Colombia, poverty was identified as a key obstacle to women’s participation, linked to the impact of the current armed conflict on women. CIASE (La Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica Colombia) works with women in Colombia to support their social, economic and human rights. CIASE estimates that 80% of the 5.5 million victims of the conflict are women, many of whom represent women–headed households and are bringing up families on their own. In the absence of any clear government economic and political policies to provide the opportunities that women need to create employment opportunities for women and girls, women—particularly in rural areas—are experiencing high levels of economic and social deprivation. The situation is intensified by the lack of adequate social welfare and protection for the population in general and in particular for the growing need for social care to older women. Land rights for women is another key issue in a context where women are bringing up families on their own, with the proof of their right to land and formal marriage forming key barriers. With a high level of economic interest in the rights to land, women have suffered high levels of intimidation, threats and violence in their efforts to claim their right to land ownership. This situation has not been helped by the inadequate response from the Victims Unit in Colombia, which has been very slow and bureaucratic in their efforts to support victims and deal with corruption.

In the European Union, the withdrawal of the Maternity Leave Directive is another example of the erosion of women’s rights and the dilution of women’s equality. Data from the Second Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE 2013) indicates that in the past ten years, progress in achieving equality between women and men has stagnated across Europe, and in some countries it has even regressed. Overall, women are still only halfway to equality and continue to earn on average 16% less than men.39 Cuts in public–sector jobs as a result of austerity measures have had a drastic effect on women’s employment, as 69.2% of EU public-sector workers are women. Women’s share is highest in health and social work (78.4%) and in education (71.5%). 38% of all employed women in the EU work in the public sector, ranging from 22.5% in Romania to 49.1% in Sweden (Elomäki 2012, 4).

In tribal areas in the eastern states of India, the development of land grabbing for their forests and mineral wealth has resulted in the displacement of thousands of tribal people as well as in ethnic conflict and violence. The appropriation of land for infrastructure development weakens people’s access to the basic resources of food and water, while also undermining the position and autonomy of women in their communities.

“If you are serious about peace, you have to be serious about women. Investing in women is the soundest instrument in peace processes.”

(UN Women Deputy Director Ms. Lakshmi Puri)

3.5 OBSTACLE 5: Ineffective Investment in and Funding of Women, Peace and Security

State Funding for WPS: Indicators of Inequality

Chronic and persistent underinvestment in addressing gender equality and the absence of support for the participation of women’s civil society in nonviolent conflict resolution and conflict prevention has defined the funding landscape of the WPS agenda since its inception. The lack of adequate, targeted funding for WPS is indicative of the lack of political will to commit to gender equality and to women’s agency as drivers of transformative change in peace and security more generally. Programming at international, regional, national and grassroots levels has targeted some resources through NAPS on UNSCR 1325, but much of this has been focused on the protection of women as victims rather than on strengthening women’s participation and leadership in peace and security. As noted earlier, relative to the financial investments for militarized and securitized responses to peacebuilding and peacekeeping internationally and the resources spent by member states on investment in armaments and armed interventions in the territories of other member states, the funds targeted to support the building of a transformative approach to supporting peace and security are insignificant.

Global military expenditure in 2014 was an estimated $1776bn, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) was $135bn, representing just 7.6% of military expenditure or a ratio of 14:1. 41

In 2010, the UN Secretary General issued his first report on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding, which resulted in a 7–Point Action Plan that has been adopted throughout the UN system to guide work on gender–responsive peacebuilding and track its progress. The Secretary General’s 2010 report also pledged a financial commitment of 15% of all peacebuilding–related funds to directly target women’s needs, advance equality and empower women. Despite this target (which has not yet been fulfilled), funding to strengthen women’s participation in peace and security remains piecemeal and inadequate at global, national and local levels. Without political support, funding levels for WPS have remained stagnant. The Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD) recently reported that only 3% of peace and security funding targets gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal objective (Cordaid 2014 a). This is a stark indicator of the inequality of resource allocation for WPS and of the magnitude of the challenges faced by those committed to building women’s empowerment in peace and security processes.

Informants raised a number of specific weaknesses regarding state funding for WPS, including the fact that most governments do not allocate specific funds for the implementation of the WPS agenda and the absence of gender–sensitive budgeting to ensure that resources will be effectively support gender equality outputs and outcomes. Informants also regarded the narrow funding of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 by national governments as a particular barrier, and the absence of NAP funding for work on conflict prevention and nonviolence as a specific concern.

Recent research has revealed the scale of the obstacles facing civil society organizations that are competing for funding for WPS (Cordaid and GNWP 2014, 8). Some common challenges include: the great extent to which the sources and the sustainability of financing for UNSCR 1325 implementation vary, with the corresponding implications for tracking, monitoring, and accountability; the trend whereby many governments are financing the implementation of their NAPs based on shifting national priorities without funding all pillars equally or adequately; and the frequent inadequacy of tracking–and–monitoring mechanisms for NAP financing. Though rhetorically supported, civil society is not being adequately resourced in NAP development and implementation. That holds especially for women’s human rights organizations, networks, and movements. Several informants were concerned that women’s civil society organizations are further being undermined by restrictions on accessing funding as a result of impact of counterterrorism measures (CTM), which they described as having “the potential to become a serious disabler to women’s human rights and peace activism and hence UNSCR 1325 implementation.” 42

The impact of inadequate and narrow funding within the broader context of the global economic crisis and the constraints on national economies to support civil society has resulted in a significant shrinking of resources, adding to pressures on women’s civil society which is facing greater competition in securing funds, particularly for aspects of work that are not perceived to be central to the implementation of the policy and operational priorities of national and local governments.

Donor Funding: A Lack of Shared Vision for WPS?

Informants described much of the donor funding on WPS as being problematic for CSOs, with its focus on short–term results, rather than on investments in addressing the root causes of violence. One particular concern was the extent to

41. Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014”. (SPIRI 2015). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=496. Member states of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) spent more than $135bn ($90bn on official development assistance (ODA) last year, a 0.5% decrease from 2013, when a record amount of development aid was sent, according to the OECD. “Foreign aid close to record peak after donors spend $135bn in 2014” (The Guardian 2015b) http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/08/foreign-aid–spending–2014–least–developed–countries

42. There is a growing body of evidence that shows that the risk–averse behavior of banks has resulted in the withdrawal of bank services to civil society active in conflict areas—in particular Syria, Iraq, and Somalia. (Women’s Peacemakers Program. 2015b, 2–5).
which donor–led funding is acting as a barrier to civil society in pursuing its own strategic priorities to advance activity on WPS. This was reflected in the experience of one women’s CSO in Libya, as described by a research informant: “When generating funds for raising awareness on UNSCR 1325, one embassy liked the idea, but since they did not have funds on WPS, but only funds for sexual violence, they tried to convince us to change the proposal accordingly.”

Other challenges include funding that supports militarized notions of security rather than a more inclusive model of human security and the trend by donors to prioritize funding for women as victims of GBV over support for women’s economic and political participation and influence. Low priority is given to work to support conflict prevention, alternative masculinities, nonviolent conflict resolution and gender–sensitive conflict resolution. Many informants cited the current economic environment as being very challenging for CSOs: with the dramatic decrease in any long–term funding for work at the grassroots level, larger amounts of funding are being centralized to bigger CSOs, putting smaller organizations, which are not always in a position to meet the specific priorities and criteria of funders, at a disadvantage.43 The shift to short–term funding, while accommodating the need of some funders to demonstrate immediate results, was seen as being incompatible with supporting the complexity of the structural changes required for the transformation of conflict drivers and women’s roles in that.

### 3.6 Obstacle 6: The Flawed Implementation of UNSCR 1325

**The Derailment of UNSCR 1325: Narrow and Bureaucratic Implementation**

Informants were candid about the weakness of the UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions to enable transformative change for women’s participation and leadership in peace and security. There was a high level of agreement among the research informants that the inadequacy of UNSCR 1325 as a policy instrument had itself become a barrier to the delivery of transformative change for women’s participation and leadership in peace and security and that the current implementation of UNSCR 1325 had “depoliticized the broader WPS agenda. [...] There is a disconnect between the women’s civil society and the institutions in political dialogue on WPS.” (Research informant)

Studies on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NAPS, assessments and briefings from project partners and findings from the evaluations of NAPs provided further evidence of a range of core weaknesses of implementation globally, nationally and locally (Pasquinelli and Potter Prentice 2013), (Miller et al. 2014), (McMinn & Hinds 2013), (McMinn 2011; 2015), (Cordaid and GNWP 2014).44 These weaknesses act as barriers to women’s participation in and efforts to build peace and security, and they reveal the extent to which UNSCR 1325 has failed to deliver even modest progress towards transformative change. Key deficits include:

- The weakness of implementation mechanisms and the lack of accountability mechanisms through NAPS. These have served to narrow the focus of WPS to exclude key priorities such as conflict prevention and nonviolence, and they have prioritized actions on GBV over those to strengthen women’s participation.
- Chronic financial under–investment in WPS issues. Some of the key concerns are that the majority of governments do not earmark funding of NAPS: that the sources and sustainability of financing for NAP implementation vary greatly; and that women’s CSOs, particularly networks of women’s rights organizations at the grassroots level are not adequately resourced.
- A bureaucratic and instrumentalized approach to implementation. This results in NAP–assigned actions simply replicating existing government commitments and policies and failing to add value or strategically advance core priorities within the WPS agenda. It also means that NAPS have become not a means to the end but the end. Such an approach does not enable or validate the contribution and expertise of women’s civil society as key actors in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.
- Inadequately sustained commitment to WPS by political leadership at the national and global levels.
- The lack of political recognition and enablement from governments departments nationally and form peace and security institutions globally of the contribution of CSOs, particularly women’s civil society and women in local communities, as significant stakeholders in the development and implementation of work on WPS and NAPs.

The extent to which UNSCR 1325 has become separated from both the broader struggles for women’s substantive empowerment and equality instruments such as the BPfA

43. Part of this debate also argues that funding frameworks for “gender work”—being strictly tied to women’s organizations—can be counterproductive both to the aim of mainstreaming this area of work and to greater presence of gender issues and the leadership of women’s organizations in civil society movements. “War and peace: still a man’s world”. (The Guardian 2013). http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/oct/21/peace-building-gender-bias-funding.

44. Much of this evidence draws on the perspectives of NAP assessments in the Global North and may not be wholly representative of the assessments and experiences of implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Global South or in non–conflict–affected or fragile settings. However, although there are significant differences in the political, economic and cultural contexts between the Global South and the Global North, the two spheres also share many of the same concerns about the weakness of NAP implementation.
and CEDAW was also a cause of concern for many informants, with one stating that “the peace has been lost in the WPS agenda and it needs to be reclaimed.” There was a high degree of consensus among the informants that the practical implementation of UNSCR 1325 as a policy has been a major challenge, with so far only a cosmetic implementation on a very instrumental and narrow level, based on quantitative targets and the counting of numbers rather than qualitative ones as discussed in Chapter One.

Limited Implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 as a Barrier to Transformative Change

A NAP on UNSCR 1325 in Iraq
The war and ongoing conflicts in Iraq have affected the social, economic, cultural, health and political status of women, and recent violence as a result of the presence of ISIS in the territories has created a very fragile security environment in the country. Though women play a crucial role in the maintenance of society, they have been marginalized in public and private life, excluded from decision-making at all levels, and deprived of the chance to influence decisions that shape their lives. Discrimination and violence against women still persists in the legislation and in the social and political life. This has contributed to women’s feeling of insecurity. The Iraqi women groups spearheaded by Women’s Empowerment Organization (WEO)—with the cooperation of international partners and the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—were able to develop a NAP on UNSCR 1325 and to get it endorsed by the governments. The WEO is a non-governmental, voluntary and independent organization. Its main goal is to consolidate women’s roles and capabilities in the Iraqi community through enhancing their social, political, economic and cultural participation.

Women’s organizations in Iraq recognize the NAP on UNSCR 1325 as an important tool with which to apply pressure and demand implementation, especially within the current situation and considering the gross violations against Iraqi women in the current conflict. But women there still face many challenges, including competition within a divided women’s movement, with donors sometimes reinforcing the divisions within the movement, and the fragile political will to commit to the WPS agenda, reflected in the lack of financial support from the State to keep up the momentum.

NAP Development in Egypt
The situation in Egypt regarding NAP development reflects the pioneering role that women’s civil society plays in WPS. In May 2015, PeaceWomen Across the Globe organized a National Dialogue Forum on Women’s Participation together with Egyptian and international organizations: “Empowering Egyptian Women: From Recommendations to Strategic Implementation”. One hundred participants from different sections of the population and segments of society worked on a national strategy for the implementation of political equality in Egypt. It is hoped that within the next few months a clear strategy can be formulated for the creation of a NAP on UNSCR 1325.

The Implementation of NAPs in Canada, Fiji and Israel
The implementation of NAPs in Canada, Fiji and Israel reflects a common trend in which the national governments narrowed the scope of the WPS agenda instead of using the opportunity for legitimate engagement with women’s civil society to develop a more holistic agenda. In Canada, critics have argued that despite the consistent commitment of civil society to the NAP on UNSCR 1325, little has been achieved for women’s participation aside from cosmetic changes and that there is a need to focus beyond UNSCR 1325 if any type of substantive change is to come. The status and influence of civil society is also a matter of concern for many civil society organizations and women’s advocacy groups that are frustrated with the way that national governments have failed to use NAPs to enable and support the contributions and address the concerns of civil society with regard to peace and security. In Fiji there has been limited implementation of the regional action plan as a result of the lack of political will, on both the regional and the national level, to implement the NAP. In Israel, there was concern that the NAP drafted by civil society is being implemented in a militarized framework to fit with government’s security-first approach.
UNSCR 1325 is premised on a flawed and narrow analysis of Women, Peace and Security. Progress on women’s participation has been driven by a focus on quantitative results—quotas—and usually restricted to political institutions at national levels... The quality of the participation and influence is another story.”

(Research informant)
15 years, UNSCR 1325 and its sister resolutions have become “renowned for being the most advocated and least implemented set of resolutions”, as one of the informants put it. This is hardly a resounding endorsement of the capacity of a global policy instrument to change the lives of some of most marginalized and critical actors that have a significant contribution to make to building sustainable, peaceful and secure communities.

Despite this, many informants expressed an optimistic belief in the capacity of UNSCR 1325 and NAPs as tools for political mobilization for positive social change, as illustrated by women’s engagement in NAP development in Iraq and Egypt and by the consistent commitment of women’s civil society to implement NAPs in many countries around the world. This commitment includes a diverse range of roles for civil society in various NAPs: as co-signatories to the Dutch NAP, for example, as a monitoring mechanism for Ireland’s NAP, or as contributors to consultations for the drafting of new and revised NAPs. However, despite such contribution’s, many women’s organizations’ experience of engagement with NAP development and implementation has not been an empowering one, with the balance of power, influence and decision-making lying very much with the powerbrokers, thus excluding any meaningful participation by women’s civil society or ways to coherently address the needs and concerns of women and girls in conflict-affected communities.

Uganda: Addressing Poor Localization

In Uganda the dominance of party politics has curtailed women in pursuing a stronger gender agenda: the political parties encourage and select those women candidates whom they feel they can influence with regard to party-political priorities rather than having processes to identify candidates with a strong commitment to gender. The Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO) has been addressing the poor localization of the WPS with a focus on building awareness and engagement on the NAP on UNSCR 1325 at the district and local levels, providing training for the District Local Action Plan Taskforce on WPS. Key outcomes have included: the engagement of men in the WPS agenda; the Dokolo district budget allocation to address gender issues increased from 0.03% in 2012–13 to 8% in 2013–14; CSOs working in the district have committed to fighting GBV and supporting women’s participation in governance and decision-making; the district has increased its focus on critical issues affecting women, mobilizing community-driven action, and informing the district development plan and budget; Dokolo remains a role model district in terms of its spearheading of the WPS agenda. The initiative has since been replicated in the Lira, Bushenyi, and Kasese districts.
3.7 Obstacle 7: Poor Policy Coherence between Peace, Security and Development Needs

Poor policy coherence between peace, security, and development was regarded as a key obstacle to transformative change and women’s empowerment. This reiterates the need to reframe the WPS agenda in line with the principles of the BPfA, which recognizes gender equality and women’s participation as inseparable from peace, security, and development. Despite the recent progress made in strengthening WPS policy coherence as discussed in Chapter One, there are still a number of significant weaknesses in how peace, security, and development policy priorities operate at the national and international levels in the context of WPS. These include: the predominance of a security–first approach in foreign–policy development at the national level, the poor intersection of the WPS agenda with the Post–2015 agenda–development policy framework, and a fragmented approach to gender mainstreaming in humanitarian / development policy implementation which can result in a poor targeting of resources and interventions for women and girls in conflict, post–conflict and fragile settings. The incoherence of policy development across matters of peace, security, and development reflects a broader separation of global and national policy structures that not only acts as a barrier to collaboration between institutions and governments, but also makes them unable to move beyond their own interests to build a more holistic gender approach to peace and security.

The poor policy coherence between NAPs and the foreign policy commitments of national governments is another indicator of the lack of political will to commit to WPS issues. Politics, defense, and trade reflect the key domains of national foreign policy concerns, along development (for countries in the Global North). These are usually siloed domains, with national security being the key driver, prioritized over politics and development (which finishes in a poor third place). A holistic gender approach (which recognizes the links between security and development, violence and insecurity, underdevelopment and poverty) does not easily fit within the prevailing model of foreign policy globally, which lacks any synergy between national security on one hand and diplomacy, trade and development on the other. The challenges for the development of “feminist foreign policy” in Sweden were highlighted by one informant as an indicator of the low level of support for this type of approach. Other commentators have also noted an acceleration in the global trend in foreign policy toward using humanitarian aid and development funding for security-related purposes (Cortright et al. 2012, ix), which has an especially negative impact on women and girls in fragile and post–conflict settings and on the allocation of resources for gender–sensitive approaches to conflict prevention.

Ensuring a more gendered human–security approach to international development policy and priorities within foreign–policy commitments could help address some of these challenges. It could catalyze women’s participation in peace and security, providing resources at the country and local–community levels through Official Development Assistance (ODA) from member states. Evaluations of the overseas development priorities of states in the Global North within NAPs on UNSCR 1325 have indicated a disproportionate focus on GBV over women’s empowerment projects and gender–sensitive humanitarian programming. Women’s participation is further weakened by the insufficient integration of a gender perspective into aid and development programming and humanitarian interventions in fragile and conflict–affected states (Cordaid 2012). There is a need to strengthen women’s collective voice and capacity for peace and development, based on their own perspectives and priorities (Cordaid 2013).

International development organizations can play a critical role in strengthening gender–sensitive programming at the country level to focus on providing resources to organizations that will apply a holistic gender analysis and strengthen linkages between peace, security and development at the grassroots level.

46. As Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström has championed a feminist approach to foreign policy, advocating that foreign policy should strengthen women’s rights, increase women’s participation in decision–making, and include a gender perspective on how resources are allocated. After Sweden’s Social Democrats won the general elections in 2014 and announced that they would become the first EU member state to recognize Palestine, she was invited as a guest of honor to the meeting of Arab ministers in Cairo. However, after she criticized Saudi Arabia’s record on human and women’s rights, the offer was withdrawn. The Swedish government responded by failing to renew a controversial memorandum of understanding for the provision of arms to Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, there has been little public support from other foreign ministries for this approach to foreign policy, which supports human and women’s rights, indicating the prioritizing of economic self–interest and the protection of arms agreements over the protection of women and human rights. ("The Guardian View on Sweden’s Foreign Policy: Admirable, But Maybe Not Entirely High–Minded". (The Guardian 2015a).

47. In the United States, a quarter of USAID funds are channeled through the Pentagon. In the United Kingdom and other donor states, a growing portion of development assistance is being directed toward conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is another example of a security–first approach, whereby the diversion of aid to conflict zones is determined by the need to protect the security interests of the Global North rather than by the humanitarian or development needs of people in the Global South (Cortright et al. 2012).

48. The benefits of ODA to countries in the Global South is a contested issue, with critics arguing that it operates on the basis of a paternalistic donor–recipient relationship, which makes recipient countries unhealthy dependent, restricting their economic growth and independence. Critics also claim that reducing the burden of historical debt on the world’s weakest economies would be a much more effective way to support economic growth in the Global South. The counter argument to this is that developed / Global North countries have a target to allocate 0.7% of their GDP annually to development cooperation (although this is rarely reached) and that a more effective targeting of that funding could better address the needs of women in fragile and conflict settings.

49. See the Mid–Term and Final Reviews of Ireland’s NAP on UNSCR 1325 as a specific example of this. (McMinn 2016). (McMinn and Hinds 2013).
3.8 Obstacle 8: The Weak Institutional Implementation of WPS at Global and National Levels

3.8.1 UN Institutions: Poor Leadership and Vision for WPS?
Informants highlighted the need for effective leadership of the WPS agenda at the global institutional levels and were concerned about the response from a number of key UN institutions and agencies, including the UNSC, UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UN Women. Poor implementation at the institutional level was felt to be aligned to the lack of political will to commit to WPS generally.

Other criticisms expressed by the informants were that the UN leadership has failed to properly champion UNSCR 1325 or support its implementation. Moreover, within the UN family, the bulk of the responsibility and commitment for the WPS agenda had been assigned to UN Women, which is recognized as being under resourced itself, rather than building effective engagement across a range of institutions tasked with peace and security such as the UNDP and the DPKO (Spectrum of Perspectives 2015, 11).

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
Several of the informants consulted expressed concerns about the capacity of the DPA to provide an effective entry point for women’s participation in peace and security. They feel that, despite its having key political roles in the brokering of peace processes in which the UN is involved, in providing early-warning analyses on peace and security issues, and advising the Secretary General, the DPA has shown little commitment to engaging women as political actors, either as peacebuilders or as combatants, in the resolution of conflict.

One research informant identified the DPA’s lack of gender expertise at the strategic level as a significant weakness: “It has locked away its gender capacity in country desk offices and regional offices. There no gender expertise that conducts political analysis and does early warning to inform the SG of looming conflicts and identifies who the key actors are in any situation. This a critical gap.”

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
The broader peacebuilding culture and architecture within the UN itself was also seen as an obstacle to transformative change, where military responses to peacebuilding have been prioritized to the exclusion of the development of gender-sensitive, nonviolent approaches to peacebuilding. Generally it was felt that there was little commitment to enabling women’s perspectives on gender-sensitive peacebuilding, with some informants arguing that advocating women’s participation and leadership in essentially militarized and patriarchal structures is a flawed strategy that does not transform or even question the underlying gendered norms and cultures of these mechanisms.
UN Review of Peace Operations: A Lost Opportunity for WPS?
A recent report by a High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations documents a number of key weaknesses that limit the implementation of the WPS agenda within UN peacekeeping operations (UN 2015). These include:

- the frequent exclusion in preliminary analyses of the specific experience, rights, needs and roles of women and girls in conflict situations
- a lack of mission funding to support gender-related activities that limits the capacity for engagement
- an uneven commitment to WPS agenda at UN Headquarters, senior levels and within mission personnel
- an inconsistent application of the WPS agenda
- a lack of attention for WPS issues in briefings and reports to the Security Council by the Secretariat and senior mission leaders.

The report also recommends a range of actions to enhance the accountability for violations of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by UN peacekeeping personnel, which has been a matter of concern for many years, and to deal with the need for greater policy coherence on WPS between key UN institutions such as the DPKO, the Security Council and UN Women.

Interestingly, several key findings from the report also suggest the need for a greater emphasis on political rather than military solutions to drive peacekeeping operations and a greater emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation. Some also suggested that the UN should not undertake peacekeeping missions involving counterterrorism.

However, this review along with a 10 year review of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/674 – S/2014/911) have been met with criticism that they fall short of diagnosing the shortcomings of current approaches to WPS implementation; fail to advocate for actions to address the deep rooted structural issues that undermine women’s participation in peace and security processes globally and domestically; and that “neither report succeeds in overcoming the ‘add women and stir’ curse familiar to advocates of gender mainstreaming in peace and security institutions” (Jenkins and Goetz 2015, 1).

UN Women
A number of concerns were also identified regarding the role of UN Women in the implementation of the WPS agenda and UNSCR 1325. For some informants this was linked to insufficient resourcing for UN Women, which they saw as disabling the capacity of individuals and organizations to deliver effectively on the WPS agenda. In some cases this was even felt to be creating direct competition between UN women and local CSOs on the field. For others, three strategic implementation at country levels by UN Women, resulting in poor localization (as discussed in previous sections), did not support engagement with women at the grassroots or enable groups to address the chronic lack of access to funding (for NAPs) for broader work in WPS.

3.8.2 Institutions at National Levels: A Hostile Environment for Women’s Empowerment?
Political institutions and ministries relating to security and defense within national governments were identified as difficult arenas for women to navigate in, with cultures that were often hostile and aggressive to women, and sometimes also corrupt. Making these institutions a more gender-sensitive environment for women is not a key political priority for governments, resulting in a lack of investment in resources and a lack of commitment to create sustainable change for women’s participation. As a result, any progress booked is siloed, rather than systematic, and often only a tactical response from an isolated gender resource. One example of the failure of this approach is the situation in Yemen, where there was a 30% commitment to women’s representation in parliament but with the majority of women voting along party lines, little changed in terms of the power dynamics or diminishing the broader threats to peace and security. Indeed, in recent months, the country has faced civil war with protracted fighting between militia groups.

50. Members of a UN peacekeeping mission engaged in “transactional sex” with more than 225 Haitian women, according to a report in The Guardian (2015c), which suggests that sexual exploitation remains significantly under-reported in such missions; UN peacekeepers have been accused of sexually abusing street children in the Central African Republic capital of Bangui. One-third of the alleged sexual abuse involves children under 18, the assistance given to victims is “severely deficient”, and the average investigation by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which says it prioritizes cases involving minors or rape, takes more than a year.
Strengthening Regional Networks and Standards on WPS: Southeast Asia

A key challenge identified in Asia as a region was the increasing regionalism in response to resistance against the model of a multilateral approach that produced the WPS agenda. This approach limits the UN’s WPS agenda in favor of regional and national initiatives such as those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has drawn up its own declarations on rights of women that nevertheless often position the gender norms below the international standards as enshrined in CEDAW. The impact of this is a downgrading of national policy to the lower standards of the regional level. The work of women’s networks in the region has been instrumental in championing an alternative regionalism from a feminist perspective, building women’s participation and advocacy on core peace and security concerns. The work of these networks represents a dynamic and pioneering model of good practice in seeking to maintain the norms and practices needed to deliver transformative change for women in conflict-affected and post-conflict regions.

The coordinating group of the ASEAN Women’s Caucus is sustaining feminist movements and diversifying civil society spaces, working to increase the participation of young women within the network. The Asia-Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development works to ensure the involvement of the most marginalized women from Asia-Pacific (rural, indigenous and migrant women) to amplify their voices at global decision-making processes, and to build new alliances and networks to build pressure for structural change, including a focus on the need for a greater intersection of women, peace and development issues. The Asia-Pacific Women’s Alliance for Peace and Security (APWAPS) is also seeking to put forward an alternative discourse on women, peace and security in the region, with a focus on amplifying the voices of local women from conflict areas.

Civil society organizations focusing on peace and security issues were also criticized by some of the research informants for their lack of capacity and lack of commitment to supporting women’s leadership and empowerment. Several informants referred to the “old boys’ networks” that acted to exclude women’s contributions at senior levels of decision-making and influence in peace and security arenas. One informant felt there was a growing schism in the culture of civil society organizations working on peace and security, commenting that while men dominate a lot of the space in civil society, that was often in the more “powerful/technical” arenas associated with funding, building political capital, and developing high-level policy, whereas women tended to be drawn to activism, mobilizing, networking, and dialogue-building, which was often less valued within the peacebuilding of civil society as a whole.

Concerns were also expressed about the increasing role of the private and corporate sector as an actor in the field of peace and security, whose remit includes the provision of private security to groups and individuals as well as consultancy services for training, evaluation, organizational and staff development and legal guidance. The extent to which gender is a priority for these companies, which are driven by profit rather than social responsibility or a commitment to social change and political justice, remains unclear. As the private and corporate sectors are being given a growing role in fragile countries, civil society and other actors face challenges on whether it is possible to find methods to work with them in achieving transformative change.

There were a variety of perspectives on the engagement of women who had broken through the glass ceiling to operate in the elite spaces of power. A small number of informants were critical of the way these women had failed to challenge the norms and felt they were pursuing an individual path to empowerment based on educational privilege; others felt that those women continued to be a part of a broader alliance and were needed to build a dynamic feminist constituency.

A more general conclusion was that the WPS agenda had failed to build inclusive participation across key levels, which, particularly at the grassroots level, has restricted the ownership of the agenda.
Capacity Building: The Value of Regional Networks and Active Nonviolence Training in Zimbabwe

Enhancing the capacity of women is essential for progressing women’s participation and leadership in peace and security. The development of women’s regional networks in West Africa, the western Balkans, Central America and the Pacific Islands were cited as providing a critical resource in terms of the prevention and resolution of conflict, but it is a resource that has yet to be used by international institutions (for example in the resolution of the conflict in Mali in 2012). This is an indicator of the continued lack of value ascribed to the contribution of women in peace and conflict by powerbrokers more generally. Although progress on increasing women’s participation in peace processes / political participation has been slow to build, exceptions to this trend were identified in the recent examples of successes in achieving women’s inclusion in the political negotiations in the Philippines and in Colombia—both of which were linked to the UNSCR 1325 policy framework.

Women’s self-confidence about and self-belief in their own abilities for leadership and advocacy was regarded as a key attribute in terms of the capacity of women to engage in conflict and post-conflict settings, which are often politically and socially hostile environments. Moreover, mechanisms to provide coaching and peer support were felt to be of value. One example of capacity building on nonviolence and leadership in conflict resolution and peacebuilding was work in Zimbabwe (which does not have a NAP on UNSCR 1325) delivered through the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe (WCoZ), which ran a three-year Gender and Peacebuilding project that engaged over 5,000 women in three provinces of Zimbabwe that had experienced high levels of politically motivated violence in the 2008 presidential run-off election and that still experience significantly high levels of GBV. The key strengths of the project were that it adopted a holistic approach to the WPS agenda including socio-economic issues, that it was grassroots-oriented and reached local ordinary women to make changes by raising WPS issues at the family and community levels, and that it created networks of women seeking change.

“In a peace process no one has the absolute truth. Therefore all views need to be considered and valued.”
(Herbolzheimer 2011, 2)

51. The capacity of the West African Regional Networks was assessed as particularly effective by many research informants.
52. It should be noted that the UN was not officially involved in the peace process in the Philippines.
3.9 Obstacle 9: The Exclusion of Women in Transitioning and Post-conflict Negotiations and Structures

Informants identified a number of ways in which women were excluded from critical post-conflict negotiations and structures including: formal mediation and peace processes, processes for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) structures. This is linked to the earlier discussions on the lack of political will to commit to gender equality, the lack of an inclusive security approach and the lack of investment for women’s economic empowerment in post-conflict settings.

3.9.1 A Restricted Space: Women’s Participation in Peace Processes

The participation of women in political negotiations and electoral and transitional justice processes is a key dimension of engendering transitions from conflict to post-conflict societies and conflict resolution. There is a shared view among actors that this trend has been slow to progress, despite the existence of the WPS agenda and UNSCR 1325, which have had a specific focus on strengthening the participation of women in peace processes. The evolution of women’s participation in peace processes has been recognized as progressing in more recent years, with women being appointed to senior positions as mediators and envoys at the UN and as envoys at the African Union (AU), with the systematic guidance and training for mediators at the UN, and with an increased profile and a greater role for women’s civil society in some high-level mediation and peace processes. Nevertheless, many see these as cosmetic approaches to increasing women’s participation in the context of women’s significantly restricted access to political power and influence in peace processes and the challenge of opening up and maintaining entry points for women’s participation. Activists from the Asia-Pacific Region assessed the current context for women’s participation as having stalled: “We seem to be at a plateau where the aphorisms that we use are stuck especially about numeric representation of women at the peace table” (Spectrum of Perspectives 2015, 15).

Breaking through the traditional notions of peace and security that prevail from the inception of most formal peace processes is very difficult for women, who are rarely there from the beginning, despite the fact that they are engaged in mobilizing for peace. Ironically, negotiators are not selected on the basis of their negotiating skills and/or training; they are selected on a range of other criteria, none of which is gendered. More often than not, political considerations are what determine participation.

One example of this is how the “standard operational procedures” of peace processes broadly exclude women and women’s security needs in post-conflict negotiations. Unlike state and non-state combatants, women in conflict countries do not represent a powerful constituency in formal conflict-resolution structures; hence, they are not regarded as a credible political force for inclusion. Within these patriarchal mechanisms, supporting women in civil society to become a significant constituency in peace processes is a challenge. War and conflict tend to undermine women’s capacity for engagement. Post-conflict settings, and where increased levels of violence against women are often the norm, do not normally encourage or enable women to develop their skills and capacity for political participation and leadership.

A broad critique of the failure of UNSCR 1325 and NAPs to increase the participation of women in peace processes is that the mechanisms developed and supported have not focused on creating inclusive processes as a result of patriarchal norms and that the separation of Track 2 and Track 1 mechanisms in peace negotiations is disadvantageous to women’s participation. Paffenholz (2015b) argues that peace negotiations that involve women are more apt to lead to a lasting peace: “When women’s groups have the opportunity and capacity to exercise effective influence on the peace process the likelihood of peace agreement being reached and implemented is much higher.” However, she also notes that the quality of women’s influence is more important than the number of women included and that “exclusionary barriers for women were overcome following a massive push by the women themselves and/or by international supporters and mediators” (ibid.). This supports the importance of the role of women’s civil society in advancing women’s participation, as well as highlighting the current failure of the international community to skillfully manage the resistance to women’s inclusion in peace processes as a key obstacle to women’s participation.

Despite these challenges to building women’s inclusion, the research informants identified a range of processes that provide a snapshot of varying levels of success and challenges for the participation of women in peace processes.

53 In the same text, Paffenholz (2015b) goes on to identify a number of process and context factors that support or hinder the ability of women’s groups to influence peace and transition processes.
Peace Processes: Gaining and Losing Ground in Colombia, Nepal and South Sudan

Specific examples of the challenges for the engagement of women’s civil society include:

In Colombia: with support from the UNDP, a victims’ forum set up as part of the Havana Peace Talks included 60% women participants, offering recognition and a precedent that women directly affected by conflict should be participants in transitional peace negotiations. However, as the forum has limited power and will have little influence on the larger process, this can also been seen as a tick-box exercise since it makes the international community and civil society happy, which reduces the pressure on external parties to demand and see to a reduction of the pressure on the conflict parties to accede to women’s participation in the larger process. There are concerns that negotiations have not been inclusive enough to address the exclusion of women in political life (currently 20% in the Congress but much lower in levels of local governance) and that there is a need to document the experiences of women in the conflict as part of the public record including the impact of the conflict on women as victims of sexual violence. Women’s civil society voiced ongoing concerns about the authenticity of the inclusion in the processes, stating:

*The Havana negotiations are primarily a process to end the fighting between the government and FARC. But is this a peace process? How do we to transform the output of the negotiating table in Havana to the broader peace process that Colombia needs? Today Colombia wants more than an elite negotiation.*

In Nepal: there was an opportunity for women to build alliances to challenge proposed legislation on restricting the definition of citizenship, which would have a disproportionally negative effect on women. The efforts to build a political coalition failed when women were pressured by their respective parties to vote along party lines. This raises the issue of the cultural and political identities and alliances of women that go beyond gender and that play a role when women participate in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution processes—an issue that is considered further in section 3.10.

In South Sudan, the eruption of violence in December 2013 caused hostilities and deaths, displacing an estimated 850,000 people internally. In the subsequent negotiations on a cessation-of-hostilities agreement, women were notably absent. In response, South Sudanese women from different parts of the society came together and developed a common message, calling for peace, the protection of women and children, and the participation of women in the peace process. This resulted in the certification of seven South Sudanese women delegates from civil society to attend the peace negotiations, and the inclusion of women delegates in the negotiation teams. This has been supported by a coordinated approach by women in South Sudan and by building capacity for lobbying and advocacy for women’s participation in future peace negotiations and processes.

3.9.2 Post–Conflict Reconstruction: The Failure of Processes for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The end of war does not herald the end of violence and insecurity for women, and often the presence of military and paramilitary groups continues to affect women’s security and mobility in most conflict societies. The lack of progress on processes and practice for effective DDR and gender-sensitive DDR forms a key barrier for women’s participation and empowerment at the grassroots level in post–conflict societies. The post–conflict period has the potential to be a transformative and dynamic stage in the peacebuilding process, with the process of demilitarization being a key indicator of the transition of societies from conflict to post–conflict. Although DDR is considered to be a prime peace dividend, most current models of DDR have focused on the needs and status of male combatants, to the exclusion of the needs of female combatants and the security needs of the broader communities. As one informant commented: “There are no good examples of DDR truly ending conflict.”

Similar assessments were made in relation to SSR. Part of the function of SSR is to investigate human rights abuses against women and to administer sanctions against perpetrators of human rights violations, including those relating to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), where such violations

---

54. Even in relatively stable post–conflict regions such as Northern Ireland, the legacy of the conflict there for women remains a matter of concern, particularly in relation to the influence of paramilitaries in local communities, the levels of GBV, and the absence of a human security approach to women, peace and security (Ward 2013). The refusal of the UK government to implement UNSCR 1325 with regard to Northern Ireland remains a challenge within this context, although the mobilization of women’s civil society is strong and support for women in Northern Ireland as part of Ireland’s NAP is a valuable acknowledgment of the continuing challenges faced by women in the process of transitioning from conflict to peace (McMinn 2011, 2015).
have involved state and security forces. When women fear for their personal security or that of their family, their potential for political participation is restricted. The unreformed nature of security forces (state and non-state actors) in transitional/post-conflict settings, combined with high levels of access to weapons by combatants, can create an atmosphere of fear, leading to raised levels of violence against women and social insecurity. Surveillance by the military further restricts the activities of civil society and makes human rights work extremely difficult.

The lack of accountability for SGBV violations and the impunity for human rights violations perpetrated by state and non-state actors in conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings was also identified as a key barrier to women’s participation. The failure of international laws and policies to enforce accountability by state and non-state actors and the scale of impunity for perpetrators in many countries represents a damming indictment of the indifference of peace and security actors to women’s security, protection and need for justice. Many informants expressed concerns about the extent to which both DDR and SSR are often driven by interests at international and national levels, without taking the needs of local communities into account. The levels of fear and insecurity experienced by women and the levels of threat, violence and intimidation that women in local communities suffer, including women activists and women human rights defenders (WHRDs), were a cause of deep concern for many informants.

3.9.3 Demographic Shifts in Post-Conflict Settings

The need to pay more attention to demographic shifts between genders as part of gendering post-conflict recovery is an important point that one informant brought up. She highlighted recent demographic shifts in regions where there has been a massive increase in a predominately male youth population. Cautioning about the potential risks of social and political insecurity that such imbalances could create, she commented that “imbalances in populations where there is an unnaturally higher proportion of men and where the population is disproportionately young, there is the risk for potential instability in the context of social and political upheavals. When violent masculinity combines with severe social economic inequality, the outcome will not be good.” The informant considered the current policy perspective that focuses resources on “mitigating the incipient violence of young men through employment programs” rather than on addressing the unequal position of young women and women in general to be an inadequate response. She suggested that a more effective investment would be to support the social and economic empowerment of young women and to support the empowerment of young men through work on alternative masculinities.

55. Half of the MENA region’s population is under 25 years old and 2.8 million young people are entering the labor market every year. The demographic “youth bulge” represents one of the greatest challenges faced by MENA economies (World Economic Forum 2014).
“How come we had a vibrant movement 20 years ago, but that it is now slowly fading out? We are letting [UNSCR] 1325 currently dictate our priorities as civil society, and we are working completely in that framework. The women’s movement existed before [UNSCR] 1325 and we need to look beyond the traditional nation–state mechanisms of implementation.”

(Research informant)

3.10 Obstacle 10: The Challenges for Coalition-Building and Engagement

The informants identified a number of impediments to coalition-building for WPS, most notably the shrinking and diluted space for WPS, the cultural barriers to women roles and contributions to peace and security, and the contested agendas for WPS.

The Shrinking and Diluted Space for Women’s Networks and Agenda Setting for WPS

Many informants expressed concerns that the space for analysis and debate and critical reflection on the WPS agenda is shrinking and has become more diluted and fragmented. This has weakened the women’s peace movement, and women’s networks generally, with diminishing co-ordination between the grassroots and national levels on peace and security. Several informants argued that the changing security paradigm since 9/11 have narrowed civil society’s space and redefined the relationship between governments and civil society (particularly in the Global North). As a result, the input and influence of civil society has become less evident in government consultations and policies, and the contributions from civil society are less highly valued and accorded less credibility by governments. The restrictions on CSOs have been growing, with more and more countries passing restrictive laws and curtailing the activities of civil society. Over the past three years, more than 60 countries have passed or drafted laws that curtail the activity of non-governmental and civil society organizations. As of August 2015, 96 countries had taken steps to inhibit NGOs from operating at full capacity.56

The Democratic Deficits of Conflict in Burundi: Shrinking Space for Women and Civil Society

Research informants shared concerns about the democratic deficits in the absence of an inclusive approach to building security, where tensions and conflict often emerge in the pre and post periods around elections. One example of this is the resurgence of conflict in Burundi in response to the announcement of the intention of President Pierre Nkurunziza, of the ruling party, to run for a third term in April 2015. This action was denounced by most international observers including the African Union, the United Nations and the European Union. So far, over 180,000 people have fled the country, fearing political violence. From April to August 2015, (when President Nkurunziza was sworn in for his third term), at least 100 people were killed and hundreds were injured during peaceful protests by civil society activists calling for greater democratic governance and accountability. Despite the heavy threat of violence by the security forces, the movement has remained active, with women activists doing a key part of the nonviolent activism. However, with space for civil society shrinking due to the conflict, many human rights defenders, civil society representatives, media actors, as well as political leaders from the opposing parties fear for their physical security and are now residing outside Burundi (Women’s Peacemakers Program 2015b).

Parallel to this has been the changing contractual relationship that has developed between civil society and governments, whereby civil society is now increasingly regarded as a contractor of services to deliver government policy priorities “in partnership” with state bodies. Many of the research participants felt this had further eroded the critical space and activism of women’s civil society within the WPS agenda and weakened its capacity for feminist advocacy, as critical voices become excluded. Actions to build transformative change need to be rooted in fairness, collaboration and inclusion. Some participants in the global consultation were especially concerned about the process in which women’s civil society had become co-opted by national governments and peace and security actors through the UNSCR 1325 framework.

With a lack of political space to develop and deepen a shared feminist / power analysis and with funding pressures on civil society, the opportunities for dialogue have become more restricted, especially in a political culture where deepening conservative values are increasingly becoming the dominant influence. While the growing conservatism in political and religious arenas may differ between the Global South and Global North, with very diverse challenges for women within those cultures, this reflects a growing trend globally.

Cultural Barriers to Women’s Engagement in Peace and Security: A Movement of Equals?

It is important to note that, while promoting women’s strengths and capacities in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, many commentators have also cautioned against the risk of essentializing women’s socially constructed roles as peacemakers, nurturers and caregivers, and thus reinforcing gender stereotypes about the nature and extent of women’s participation and leadership in peace and security. The problem of essentializing women visions and contributions to peace and security has been a consistent theme in the feminist scholarship about WPS and was a concern highlighted by informants at the global consultation and in the one-on-one interviews. One of the key concerns was how UNSCR 1325 has been implemented within NAPs to prioritize and resource the needs of women and girls as victims over the need for the political, social and economic empowerment of women and girls—an approach that can actually reinforce gender inequality and act as a barrier to transformative change.

Linked to this are concerns about the fact that UNSCR 1325 had been developed as a liberal feminist agenda, excluding the different cultural experiences and perspectives of women globally, yet the WPS agenda also needs to be made culturally relevant for people in their own settings. With the focus of WPS often being in New York and the EU, there is a danger that this agenda can become an exclusionary agenda. An examination of how gender identities are socially constructed and politicized in relation to war and violence is required in order to embed a more transformational analysis of UNSCR 1325 since, as Pratt and Richter–Devroe (2013, 1) put it, peacebuilding “interventions [...] should not only be informed by a liberal feminist agenda, but also by intersectional and post-colonial feminist analysis [and] should also include those women who do not necessarily support liberal agendas”. This analysis argues for a new and much more inclusive narrative that reflects and understands the complexity of the multiple roles that women play in peace and conflict—a complexity that allows for other interpretations and analysis of conflict by women not only as peacebuilders but also as perpetrators, mobilisers and supporters of conflict, as discussed earlier.

Inward and Outward Agendas: Addressing Inequalities in the Global South and North

Allied to the debate on the predominance of the Western liberal agenda within UNSCR 1325 was the challenge for civil society in terms of building ownership of the priorities of WPS agenda as a holistic global agenda. There was a shared frustration among women’s civil society representatives from both the Global North and the Global South about the role of Western governments in setting the WPS agenda and the fact that aspects of implementation of NAPs were being delivered as part of a development / aid agenda by member states, thus restricting the capacity for transformative change. This was considered to be undermining of women’s participation and engagement, especially for women in the Global South, whose voices were often marginalized within the more privileged context of women in the Global North.

“Stereotypes of women as inherently peaceful can also be damaging and reductive. A truly gendered approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution must have a comprehensive analysis of the variety of roles that women play in society”

(Speake 2013)
Many participants from the Global South felt that it was critical that resources should be prioritized in the Global South, where the levels of conflict and social and economic needs are the highest, and that “women at the grassroots level should be more central to the process than the existing actors or than actors in the Global North.” Other informants from the Global North, while supporting the needs for the prioritization of resources to the Global South, further argued that the absence of an inward (domestic) dimension within NAPs in the Global North had fragmented and weakened the capacity of UNSCR 1325 as a global and holistic WPS instrument in general.57 There was also a tension between the models of the Global North, which broadly support building women’s representation in national parliaments, and those of the Global South, which favor supporting women’s representation in local governance as a starting point. Several advocates from the Global South consider the assumption that things will change as a result of women in parliaments as flawed and think, as one informant put it, “that the architecture for peace comes from the community level up and that investment to support women at the grassroots should be prioritized.”58

“There is no one feminism [...] The security needs of Western women and women in the developing world are different to the extent that no global sisterhood can be assumed”
(Hudson 2005, 157)

57. Ireland’s NAP on UNSCR 1325 is one of few NAPs that combines an inward and outward agenda.
58. The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) has taken on, as one of its signature projects, the support of “localizing” or promoting the internal decentralized support of UNSCR 1325.
Building an Inclusive Peace Process in the Philippines: We Act 1325

We Act 1325 is a project working to build an inclusive peace process in the Philippines that would include the voices of Bangsamoro women from the Mindanao community. Women from local communities in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao are generally not in leadership and/or decision-making positions because of cultural beliefs that leadership, and political leadership in particular, is a man’s business. Some women have accepted this as fact. Some political leaders have also cited religion as the basis for those beliefs, although some religious leaders have denied this.

Women who believe that they have the right to participate are prevented from doing so, not only by cultural beliefs and traditions, but also by things like a lack of education, poverty, multiple burdens in the home, discrimination, a lack of confidence, fear and insecurity. Key results of the organization’s programs included: over 3,000 women from various backgrounds were consulted on what was envisioned about the Bangsamoro Transition Government; the process provided a space for women in the community to articulate their thoughts and voice their perspectives in relation to the peace process and the autonomous new political entity that will be established in Mindanao. Lobbying points were generated, not from gender experts, but rather rooted in the experiences and lived realities of women in communities. It enabled women from the ground level to work together with local and national women’s organizations towards a common purpose (to engender the peace agreement and related documents and mechanisms) and a shared vision (women’s meaningful participation in the building of peace and security in the future Bangsamoro government). Finally, it provided an awareness-raising opportunity for men who hold on tightly to their cultural beliefs and traditions.

Creating Cultural Space for Indigenous Women in Mexico

In Chiapas, Mexico safe and culturally accepted spaces where women can start participating in public life and practically tackle patriarchal norms and the machismo culture were gradually established by a local organization. Established by indigenous and peasant women, this organization first allowed women to come together among themselves, undertaking a contextual analysis of their situations and preparing themselves to assume a public role. At the same time, the spaces in Chiapas provide a feminist reading of the bible “through the minds and hearts of women”. This religious basis of their activities forms a more accepted way for women to then effectively participate in public life. Once allowed to participate in public life, these women use dialogue, plays and group work to get both men and women to talk about their feelings and their situation and safety at home or in their communities and to start acting upon them.

This approach has been used to tackle some of the key challenges for women, which include: high poverty rates, discrimination against indigenous women in particular, machismo, patriarchy and monolingualism. These and other barriers have sidelined women from participating in public life and decision-making positions in their community.
Compilation photo of global consultation participants
4. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents key conclusions drawn from the analysis of the research findings and proposes a number of recommendations for actions to be taken towards a transformative WSP agenda and women’s meaningful participation in building peace and security in local, national and global settings.
4.1 Conclusions

**Momentum in civil society is building to reclaim a different WPS agenda**

The voices and perspectives captured in this research add value to the discourse on transformative change and women’s marginalization in the development of peace and security in conflict and fragile settings. The research has provided a space to build momentum to reclaim a more transformative approach to women, peace and security, to return to an agenda that is more inclusive of conflict prevention, nonviolence and a holistic gender approach—core issues that have increasingly been pushed to the margins of WPS policy. Engagement in the research has helped to reignite a sense of purpose and solidarity within civil society on WPS and to define new perspectives within and beyond UNSCR 1325. For many informants, this research represents the start of a journey towards the rebuilding of a more authentic WPS agenda that can become of a tool for the transformation of conflict—a tool that is accessible to women at the grassroots level, to feminist activists, and to other peace and security actors at the national and global levels.

**Civil society’s expertise and innovation in WPS**

Despite the persistent exclusion of women from the loci of power and influence, women have continued to make a significant contribution to building inclusive approaches to security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The skills and expertise of women’s civil society on WPS offer a formidable resource for member states, UN peace and security actors, broader civil society and donors struggling with piecemeal and ineffective strategies for addressing conflict and building peace and security in a very challenging global landscape. However, they remain a resource that has not been effectively utilized or enabled. Findings from this research offer a reminder of the many ways in which women at the grassroots level and women’s civil society have acted as catalysts for transformative change, from their critical analysis on WPS to the development of resources and advocacy on the ground.

In northeast India, the dedicated actions of the Maira Paibis and Naga Mothers movements have provided a powerful example of nonviolence that has successfully challenged security laws; women’s organizations in Mexico have changed the cultural acceptance of women’s agency in public life; in Zimbabwe and Uganda, women and civil society have built vibrant spaces for capacity building with women in local communities; women’s organizations in Colombia and the Philippines have been successful in breaking down the exclusive nature of formal peace negotiations and have secured the participation and voices of women in peace processes; women in Southeast Asia have built effective regional networks on WPS to include the most marginalized women in Asia-Pacific; in Iraq and Egypt, women have been progressing the development and implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1325. These are inspiring examples of actions that testify to the determination and commitment of women’s civil society. What is also significant is the growing and vital contribution of men to work on women, peace and security. The work being undertaken in India and Pakistan on integrating alternative masculinities within the analysis of conflict and sensitizing young men to look at the gender dimensions of conflict is creating new pathways for the WPS agenda.

Despite the often increasingly hostile and dangerous contexts in which women and men are working and the limited financial resources that are available for WPS-related work, these innovative and creative approaches are helping to build a strong collective voice for civil society across communities and regions.

**A focus on obstacles beyond the policy framework to add depth to the debate on WPS**

The research has aimed to deepen the debate on WPS by including a focus on the deep-rooted obstacles to transformative change beyond the policy framework. This has highlighted the nature and scale of the impediments blocking women’s participation. Informants to the research have provided many examples of the exclusionary nature of peace and security structures for women seeking to address the gendered impact of conflict on communities. They also revealed the high and shocking levels of patriarchal and discriminatory attitudes encountered by women seeking to engage in formal and informal work on conflict resolution and reconciliation.

The research has identified 10 key obstacles preventing the development of a transformative WPS agenda and women’s meaningful participation in building peace and security. Some of the most significant obstacles—patriarchal attitudes, militarized security and macroeconomics—operate not only as obstacles to women’s participation and transformative change, but also as fundamental drivers of conflict. Other obstacles relate more specifically to the operation of the WPS agenda as an instrument of global policy: the lack of investment and chronic underfunding in WPS, a bureaucratic and narrow approach to implementation.

**The key obstacles to transformative change and women’s participation are political obstacles**

Patriarchy, militarization, macroeconomics and the lack of political commitment to implementing UNSCR 1325 were identified as some of the most disabling obstacles to women’s participation in peace and security and to the realization of transformative change. As political obstacles, they operate together to feed the structural causes and drivers of conflict, determining the exercise of power and allocation of resources at the local, national and global levels in both conflict and
in non-conflict settings. In terms of the WPS agenda, they provide the mechanisms for the political, economic and social marginalization and exclusion of women as participants in building peace and inclusive security.

Gender and sexual stereotypes continue to be used on a widespread basis by global and national peace and security actors and by social, political and religious institutions to undermine the status of women and delegitimize their work in conflict prevention and reconciliation. Women (and men within the WPS networks) are sidelined in the mega structures of peace and security policy and practice. Their voices and concerns are excluded from WPS policy and decision-making arenas, from formal peace and reconciliation negotiations, and from critical decisions involving DDR and security sector reform in post-conflict settings at the local, national and international levels. There is little evidence of the political will to change the patriarchal norms that sustain this exclusion, with no real buy-in from the key institutions and peace and security actors who remain mostly accountable to themselves.

Militarized interventions in conflict situations—despite evidence that they act as a multiplier of sexual and gender-based violence—continue to be prioritized by the power brokers of peace and security. Many countries in the Global North, while championing the WPS for women in the Global South, continue to ignore the devastating consequences of their own economic and foreign policy priorities on the security and prosperity of women, girls and the marginalized communities in the South.

Work to address these deep-rooted obstacles and drivers of conflict is currently absent from the WPS agenda and needs to become central to future priorities. This will take a significant act of political will, as it involves a fundamental rebalancing of power and influence and a commitment at the global and national levels to sharing resources and wealth in a more equitable and just way—in essence, it will take a process of comprehensive social, political and economic change.

The current spotlight on WPS globally provides a unique opportunity to address weaknesses in the implementation of UNSCR 1325

The research has also included a focus on the WPS policy framework—documenting the weaknesses of the current policy approaches and of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The lack of political will within key institutions to effectively operationalize UNSCR 1325 and to provide adequate investment and funding within the WPS agenda has resulted in a flawed implementation, poor localization and the dilution of the agenda. While there is some evidence of greater coherency and a more holistic approach to policy development at the global level, many opportunities to strengthen implementation at the global and national levels have not been progressed.
The current spotlight on WPS globally provides a unique opportunity to address weaknesses in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Despite the significant obstacles to the operation of WPS, expectations of the potential for the WPS agenda remain high, and many actors hold an optimistic belief that UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda can be a tool for political mobilization and social change towards women’s empowerment. Although findings from this research illustrate the many ways in which current political and policy approaches to women, peace and security have not enabled a transformative approach, they also have documented the benefits of UNSCR 1325 implementation within the WPS agenda such as building political commitment, promoting awareness, setting minimum standards of accountability and providing some degree of financial resources for WPS.

**New Space and Momentum to Reclaim the WPS Agenda: the Insider—Outsider Strategy**

The research has provided a valuable global space where feminist civil society, activists, policy analyst, academics and women and men working on peace and security at the grassroots and at the national and regional levels can come together. Findings from the research reflect the contrasting and candid views of a diverse range of actors, as well as the political and practical challenges and dilemmas they face in addressing the obstacles to transformative change and women’s empowerment in peace and security.

This research has not only been about identifying obstacles to transformative change: one of the most important outcomes of the process has been the creation of a transformative space for key actors from civil society who have identified ways to expand the existing WPS agenda to improve pathways both inside and outside the WPS policy framework. The discussion among global consultation participants on ways to reclaim the agenda and the discourse on WPS provided a dynamic platform in research. For some participants, this means finding alternatives to working within the system (the UNSCR 1325 framework) based on a belief that UNSCR 1325, as a key element in the agenda, cannot be a tool for transformative change. This outsider strategy is one that seeks to construct new and alternative spaces where civil society can invest their energies and build more inclusive and participative processes outside of the policy agenda. Other participants remain committed to an insider strategy. For them, it is important to continue to invest and engage in the UNSCR 1325 framework and in NAP development, and to look for more creative ways to strengthen policy implementation and the accountability of peace and security actors and institutions, particularly within the UN and at the national level. Besides the development of this two-tiered strategy, what was also significant about the global consultation was how all participants respected each other’s choice to pursue either the insider strategy, the outsider strategy or, indeed, both approaches.

This research has raised some interesting fundamental questions on the expectations and investment in UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda: Were the expectations for a UNSC-mandated resolution to deliver transformative change on WPS unrealistic? Has women’s civil society over-invested in UNSCR 1325 in the last 15 years? Key messages coming from this research would suggest that the answer is yes to both questions, but this hardly represents the complexity of views and issues involved. Pessimistic voices were the minority in this process. What has been impressive is the enduring belief in the WPS agenda by women’s civil society and their commitment to deliver social and political change for women; the resilience that many have shown in the face of such perpetual levels of exclusion and marginalization in formal and informal mechanisms from peace processes to engagement in post-conflict governance; and the creative strategizing and deep commitment of civil society to reach and honor the fundamental goal of a truly transformative WPS agenda.

4.2 Recommendations

This research has drawn on a diverse range of perspectives: on the analysis of leading academics in the field from extensive desk research; and on the experience of an expert group of thirty-three informants who shared examples of innovative practice and suggestions for ways to enable a more transformative approach to women, peace and security.

The following section presents a number of concrete recommendations and actions to address the obstacles to transformative change and women’s meaningful participation in peace and security. The recommendations underline the need to prioritize actions which will transform the drivers of conflict, realign gender power asymmetries, and deliver political, economic and social change for women and girls. They also reflect the diversity of the WPS strategies that women’s civil society groups are engaged in and are illustrative of the need for a range of approaches at local, national, regional and international levels.

Significant political commitment from key peace and security actors at global and national levels to WPS will be a critical factor in the implementation of many of these recommendations. The proposed actions also include continued engagement from women’s civil society groups to an insider strategy which ensures civil society’s ongoing commitment to improving WPS within the existing UNSCR 1325 framework. Recommendations for an outsider strategy recognizes the significant work that is being achieved outside of the UNSCR 1325 system. This approach seeks a more fundamental change of the WPS agenda and advocates for civil society to focus its energies on mechanisms to address the needs of women in peace and security beyond the current policy framework of UNSCR 1325.
1. Broaden the analytical framework for Women, Peace and Security to enable transformative change

The analytical framework for Women, Peace and Security needs to be broadened to redefine the WPS agenda so that it can deliver transformative change and fully enable women’s participation. The new WPS agenda and its priorities should be determined by three key analytical models which are outlined below.

1.1 The WPS framework should be based on a thorough conflict analysis which includes commitments to: peaceful and constructive ways of transforming conflict systems; processes which support comprehensive social, economic and political change for women in conflict and fragile settings; inclusive processes which support the engagement of women at the grassroots level and other local actors; and the realignment of power symmetries to give value to the contribution of women to peace and security. These are all elements of a systemic approach to conflict transformation which is based on the need to address the structural causes of conflicts; the behavior of conflict actors; and that of other key actors in peace and security. The Berghof Foundation’s definition and conceptual model of conflict transformation (Wils et al. 2006, 15) can provide a useful framework to strengthen a transformative approach for redefining the WPS framework.

1.2 The new WPS framework should be based on regendering peace and security from a holistic gender perspective which identifies patriarchal power and patriarchal norms as key drivers of conflict and inequality. Based on a holistic gender perspective, a redefined WPS agenda should include actions to promote work on gender sensitive conflict prevention, active nonviolence and alternative masculinities, demilitarization and disarmament. Existing policy frameworks which reflect a holistic gender analysis of WPS, such as the Beijing Platform for Action, provide a useful model to draw on.

1.3 The new WPS framework should be based on re-defining peace and security from a combined analysis of inclusive security and human security to dismantle the drivers of conflict such as militarization and economic globalization. Both concepts can be used to strengthen alternatives to existing militarized models of security and address the broader social and economic causes of conflict. An inclusive security approach can be used to provide pathways for women’s participation in sustainable peace, security and development. A human security approach for WPS should be used to strengthen sustainable economic output, employment and growth and create greater social and economic empowerment for women and girls in conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings.

2. Create a holistic WPS action agenda which includes commitments to work on conflict prevention, inclusive security, active nonviolence and dynamics of power. This agenda should also support the roles of women’s civil society as critical actors in the implementation of WPS. Global and regional peace and security institutions and national governments should consider ways to strengthen action on the following issues as an integral part of the WPS agenda and commit to ensuring they become central to future policy priorities.

2.1 Conflict prevention strategies: include conflict prevention by addressing root causes of inequality such as poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of resources; access to health, security, justice, and education; and reformation of unjust political structures. Gender sensitive nonviolent conflict prevention should be part of the focus of conflict prevention work.

2.2 Alternative masculinities: include work on alternative masculinities with men to challenge the gendered roots of armed conflict and the role of patriarchy in maintaining the power and privilege of male power elites and the marginalization of women in peace and security; address hegemonic masculinities norms and their relation to armed conflict and peace.

2.3 Invest in alternative conflict resolution methods including active nonviolence training to build knowledge, skills, personal and collective empowerment for women and men in local communities.

2.4 UN institutions, national governments, military actors and other key peace and security organizations should take actions including training on gender sensitivity to address and change the high level of patriarchal and discriminatory attitudes and norms within traditional arenas of power and security at global, national and local levels. These actions should be linked to strengthening women’s engagement in peace processes; peace and security policy and decision making arenas; and political institutions.

2.5 Strengthen accountability: Hold leaders in the UN, national governments in the Global North and South and military organizations accountable for promoting and implementing a transformative WPS agenda and ensure these bodies hold each other accountable.
3. Mobilization and Movement Building
There is a need to look beyond the traditional arenas of power and security and to strengthen engagement and collaboration with feminist platforms and other social justice movements to build an inclusive WPS agenda. This work should be based on an inclusive approach that values the diversity of perspectives and cultures of women globally, particularly women at the grassroots and in the Global South, and that includes working with men as part of the WPS agenda.

3.1 Women’s Civil Society groups should invest in alliance building on a new framework for WPS, working in a tiered approach, linking grassroots with national networks in conflict and non-conflict affected areas. A global alliance of activists, service providers, advocates, feminist academics, researchers, policy and political analysts should be established. Joint analysis and strategizing on women, peace and security which enables and promotes a range of strategies both inside and outside the WPS – 1325 system should be developed.

3.2 Invest in the development of Insider / Outsider Strategies on WPS. An insider strategy involves women’s civil society continued support and engagement to improve WPS within the existing framework of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions; an outsider strategy advocates for civil society to focus energies on mechanisms to address the needs of women in peace and security, beyond the current policy framework of UNSCR 1325. Develop mobilization of an outsider strategy to include multiple voices for transformative change, to reflect and respect the differences and similarities between the needs of communities in the Global South and Global North.

3.3 Civil Society should create a WPS research–activist network to map issues of security in different communities, and to research and document women’s perceptions and experiences of security, safety and insecurity.

3.4 Raise awareness and build capacity on WPS among women civil society actors: develop community definitions of WPS and inclusive security at local levels; invest in education and training for women on WPS including the development of women’s skills in political negotiations, active nonviolence and inclusive security; develop peacebuilding agendas locally; deepen understanding of WPS and UNSCR 1325 with women’s groups; encourage public officials to build public opinion and political will on WPS at local levels.

3.5 Share models of good practice and examples of transformative change on peace and security from women’s civil society and women at the grassroots, recognizing that women on the ground have pioneered many effective WPS initiatives on capacity building, network building, lobbying and advocacy, gender-sensitive nonviolence training, and initiatives that have created awareness of WPS and UNSCR 1325.

4. Strengthen political will to WPS and more effective UNSCR 1325 implementation at operational levels, particularly in relation to women’s security and participation.
There has been a lack of political will to effectively operationalize UNSCR 1325 at national and global levels to strengthen women’s participation and empowerment.

4.1 National governments should commit to improved NAP implementation by broadening the focus of WPS to support the development of transformative change and enable women’s participation in peace and security. Accountability and funding mechanisms, particularly in relation to actions on women’s participation and empowerment in peace and security, should also be improved.

4.2 Member states should broaden their commitments to WPS across a range of national policies, including strengthening commitments in foreign policy instruments to contribute to the meaningful participation of women in the field of peace and security, both within the home country and in other countries.

4.3 Action to address the specific security threats faced by women in conflict, post–conflict and fragile contexts should be prioritized by global institutions and by member states in their policy and NAP implementation. Gendering processes should be strengthened for demobilization and reintegration; arms control; economic reconstruction and development; and humanitarian interventions.

4.4 Commitments to WPS should be strengthened within existing global policy frameworks. This should include actions to build policy coherence on the peace and stability goal with the Sustainable Development Goals to enhance action on the WPS agenda. The forthcoming implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda and the recommendations from the High Level review of UNSCR 1325 should be used to address the inadequacy of the existing WPS agenda and to address the structural factors that perpetuate inequality, insecurity and the exclusion of women’s meaningful participation and leadership in peace, security and development.
4.5 Actions by national governments and global institutions should be undertaken to strengthen structures to increase women’s meaningful participation in peace and security decision making arenas at local, national and global levels, including peace operations, peace processes, peacebuilding movements and decision-making. Enabling women’s engagement in formal and informal peace negotiations, mediations and post conflict governance structures should be mandatory.

4.6 Actions to enable women’s participation should address ways to strengthen women’s economic and political rights. This should include a focus on supporting women’s economic empowerment and access to land rights and natural resources in conflict and fragile settings.

5. Key actors on peace and security, national and local government bodies should take action to support local actors, particularly women at the grassroots, to be in the driving seat of social change, to strengthen local capacities and local ownership of peace and security strategies. This should form of a broader commitment (by key actors) to shift the focus, power and resources on WPS from global and national institutions to the grassroots and local communities.

5.1 Leverage Political Power to embed women’s rights and participation into peace processes: Develop a model that would make women’s rights and participation in peace processes non-negotiable criteria for actors engaging in conflict resolution / peace processes, including parties to armed conflict; peacekeepers; actors providing political support; representatives of civil society; and mediators.

5.2 Strengthen political structures at national and local governance levels: Use quotas as a short term mechanism to build women’s participation, backed up with mentoring and caucuses to build and strengthen gender focus in governmental institutions; work with local candidates to include WPS and the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in their agendas.

5.3 Strengthen consultation with women: key actors on peace and security such as mediators and SRSOs (Special Representatives, Envoys, and Advisers), heads of UN missions, Security Council members, regional bodies and member states should establish regular and meaningful consultation with women’s civil society and women at the grassroots, so that women’s experience of security (and insecurity) informs WPS policy and peace and security operations.

5.4 Increase women’s meaningful participation and representation in peace operations, peace processes, peacebuilding movements and decision-making processes by appointing more women in decision-making positions and by building women’s capacity.

6. Adequate investment and funding for the implementation of WPS work at global and national levels is required as a matter of urgency

6.1 Dedicated funding for WPS work at international and national levels needs to be increased. This should include: NAP / WPS assigned funding at national and local levels; more funding initiatives at the grassroots to support local actors as leaders of social change; and organizational support to increase women’s participation at the grassroots. This should include non-programmatic funding.

6.2 Donors need to gender-sensitize their grant-making policies so that a diversity of civil society organizations can access funds for WPS programs and activities. Donors should set up funding programs to invest in new and groundbreaking approaches to peace and security including ways to support work on conflict prevention, alternative masculinities, inclusive security and active nonviolence.
Appendix 1: Research Purpose and Objectives

Research Purpose
To investigate and address the key barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security and the underlying obstacles to delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership through a Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Research Objectives
1. To investigate, document and critically reflect on:
   i) The key barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security;
   ii) The underlying obstacles to delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership through a Women, Peace and Security agenda.

2. To inform and strengthen dialogue and debate on the key barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security through the presentation of desk research findings to project partners and members at a Global Consultation.

3. To identify ways in which women and men have addressed barriers and obstacles at different levels.

4. To identify a number of actions oriented recommendations to address the barriers and obstacles and further enable women’s participation and leadership in peace and security.

5. To inform and influence policy makers, decision-makers and other powerbrokers in the field of Peace and Security through the dissemination and presentation of the final research findings and recommendations.

Desk Research and Consultations with Informants: Scope and Criteria
This desk review focused on the materials produced by a selected range of commentators, critically examining progress on women’s participation and leadership in peace and security and obstacles to transformative change and was informed by a number of criteria including:

• Literature from Feminist scholarship;
• A balance of practitioner and policy perspectives;
• Given the significant roles that women, peace and security CSOs and peace activists play in supporting women’s participation in peace and security, they represent a significant constituent in the body of the literature reviewed. This includes materials generated by the three project partners and their network members and other peace and security partner organizations; and,
• Materials reflecting current rather than historical debates and analysis

The key focus of the desk research materials and themes on which informants were consulted on included:

• The progress and capacity of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda to deliver transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership in peace and security;
• Underlying obstacles that have prevented the WPS Agenda from delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership;
• The substantive barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security beyond the policy framework; and,
• Key Actions to address barriers to women’s participation / transformative change and examples of good practice.

The research consultations (one–on–one interviews and the global consultation) also prioritized the perspectives of civil society practice, particularly the roles and contributions of women as agents of change in the transformation of conflict within the context of building sustainable peace.
Appendix 2: One-to-one Interview Questions: Consultation with Research Informants

Research Purpose: To investigate and address the key barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security and the underlying obstacles to delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership through a Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Obstacles to Delivering Transformative Change within the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Building upon the Beijing Platform for Action, globally the Women, Peace and Security agenda has been driven by policy creation and implementation of a suite of UNSC Resolutions originating from 2000 with UNSCR 1325. The effective implementation of this normative framework into transformative action at global, regional and national levels continues to be a significant challenge, with some commentators arguing that the framework itself has “boxed in” women’s agency in peace and security.

1. How would you assess the current capacity of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS) to deliver transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership in peace and security?

2. What you see as the underlying obstacles that have prevented the WPS Agenda from delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership?

3. In brief, how would you summarize current progress on enabling women’s full and equal participation and leadership in peace and security?

4. In your view what have been the substantive barriers to women’s participation and leadership in peace and security (beyond policy creation)—3 key barriers?

5. IMPACT: Based on your expertise, what has been the impact of these obstacles and barriers, thinking about different levels—at the grassroots, national, regional and international levels?

Moving the Agenda On: Actions, Examples of Good Practice to address barriers to Women’s Participation / Transformative Change

6. What are the transformative shifts that need to happen to build more inclusive and transformative approaches to enable greater women’s participation and leadership?

7. Are you aware of any examples of innovative practice that have been effective in addressing the underlying barriers and obstacles to transformative change, and that have enabled women’s participation and leadership in peace and security?
Appendix 3: Global Consultation Purpose and Objectives

Candid Voices from the Field: Global Workshop: Consultation on Research Findings
30th June – 2nd July, 2015 Den Hague
Outline Agenda

Workshop Purpose: To review and validate the findings of the desk research and consultations with informants; to share case studies to challenge, strengthen and illustrate the research findings; and, to build collaboration on lobbying and advocacy for a transformative Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Workshop Objectives:

1. To present the initial findings from the research to workshop participants.

2. To provide an opportunity for participants to review, debate and validate the findings from the desk research and consultations with informants.

3. To provide an opportunity for participants to critically reflect on and share input on testimonies relevant to the research project, including ways to strengthen or illustrate the findings through case studies and examples of good practice.

4. To provide an opportunity for participants to start a dialogue on strategizing, lobby & advocacy for a transformative Women, Peace and Security agenda, based on the research findings.

5. To build and provide a space for collaboration on a transformative Women, Peace and Security agenda.

59. This is based on the understanding that a transformative Woman, Peace and Security agenda requires a focus beyond the UNSCR 1325 agenda, which is consistent with the research approach / framework. The key focus of the research has been to explore the underlying obstacles that have prevented the WPS Agenda delivering transformative change to enable women’s participation and leadership in peace and security.
References


Cordaid. 2012. Integrating Gender into the New Deal 2013: From Fragile to Flourishing. (Author Karen Barnes Robinson)

Cordaid. 2013. Gender Inequality and Fragility In The Post–MDG Framework. (Author Karen Barnes Robinson)


Cohn, Carol. 2015. Part of a presentation at the workshop: “A Feminist Playbook for Peace: Re–Ownership 1325,” Women’s Power to Stop War Conference, delivered at the WILPF 2015 Conference, on 27 April 2015.


EIGE. 2013. Second Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality.


“Foreign aid close to record peak after donors spend $135bn in 2014”. The Guardian. 2015b.


Wright, Hanna. 2014. “Masculinities, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Men through a Gender Lens”. London: Saferworld

# List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSPA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Special Powers Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APWAPS</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Women’s Alliance for Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPfA</td>
<td>Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWIGO</td>
<td>Centre for Women in Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIASE</td>
<td>Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYAAD</td>
<td>College of Youth Activism and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGE</td>
<td>European Institute for Gender Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLO</td>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNWP</td>
<td>Global Network of Women Peacebuilders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR30</td>
<td>CEDAW General Recommendation 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and Northern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANAM</td>
<td>South Asian Network to Address Masculinities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual abuse and exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCoZ</td>
<td>Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEO</td>
<td>Women’s Empowerment Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHDR</td>
<td>Women Human Rights Defender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP</td>
<td>Women Peacemakers Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WPP contact information:
Women Peacemakers Program (WPP)
Laan van Meerdervoort 70
2517 AN The Hague, The Netherlands
Website: www.womenpeacemakersprogram.org
Phone: 0031 (0) 70 345 2671
Email: info@womenpeacemakersprogram.org

Cordaid contact information:
Lutherse Burgwal 10 2512 CB Den Haag
The Netherlands
Website: www.cordaid.org
Phone: +31-70-3136300
Email: info@cordaid.nl

GPPAC contact information:
Laan van Meerdervoort 70
2517 AN The Hague
The Netherlands
Website: www.gppac.net / www.peaceportal.org
Phone: +31 (0)70 311 0970
Email: info@gppac.net

www.candidvoices.net