REPORT

FINAL EVALUATION

OF

CORDAID SHELTER PROGRAMME

IN

HAITI 2010-2012

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Executive Summary

Cordaid commissioned this final evaluation of its Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties (SHO)\(^1\) funded shelter programme in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, in order to give account to those who donated funds and to learn lessons from the implementation. For a detailed description of the programme, please refer to section 4 of this report and the ToR in Annex 2.

Cordaid contracted a three-member team of external consultants, managed by the Cordaid emergency programme officer in HQ and the Head of Mission in the field and supported by a reference group. The team implemented seven methodologies to analyse the effectiveness, appropriateness, efficiency and impact of the programme and concludes that Cordaid successfully implemented a highly effective shelter programme, especially in the rural area of Leogane. Cordaid’s urban programme will probably achieve a shelter delivery effectiveness of over 90%.

Cordaid was not entirely able to adapt the programme to the social, political and legal complexities of the urban context in Port-au-Prince, as demonstrated by large numbers of people remaining in tent camps. Its owner driven housing programme component started late. Water and sanitation, livelihoods and communal needs such as drainage remain largely unaddressed, as the work associated with the integrated neighbourhood approach also started late and results will only be reached partially in two pilot projects. Activities specifically designed to improve the beneficiaries’ livelihoods activities were not implemented at all.

Beneficiaries deemed the programme highly appropriate. A representative sample of 327 beneficiaries scored 80 to 90% satisfaction rates on each of the five quality indicators: design, safety, size, assessment and construction. This was confirmed by 19 focus group discussions and 48 key informant interviews.

However, Cordaid did not reach the most vulnerable, especially in the urban areas. The need to build shelters within Haiti’s legal frameworks and policies, contributed to the exclusion of many vulnerable people already during the assessment stage. Large numbers of tenants, illegally settled people, and young adult family members remain today in tent camps in Cordaid’s operational areas. It is extremely difficult to overcome pre-existing factors, which contribute to the huge inequities and extreme poverty, with this type of shelter approach. Accepting SHO funding and the need to spend a large grant within a limited period of time, drove a service delivery approach.

Despite some of these design issues, the programme has begun to develop the social capital required to achieve longer-term impact. With the help of specially formed committees, Cordaid created the social infrastructure for a participatory assessment and construction approach that can be used to achieve Cordaid’s longer-term development objectives in Haiti. The extent, to which this infrastructure will be able to address inequities and injustice in Haiti in the future, is now up to Cordaid’s development strategy.

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\(^1\) SHO is a collaborative fundraising platform of Cordaid Mensen in Nood, ICCO, Kerk in Actie, Oxfam Novib, Save the Children, Stichting Vluchteling, Terre des Hommes, UNICEF Netherlands and World Vision Netherlands. The Haiti campaign raised a total of €111 million, €27 million of which went to Cordaid.
1. **Background**

An earthquake hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 and killed over 200,000 people, injured 300,000, left more than one million homeless, and destroyed infrastructure, services and homes.

The cost of reconstruction is estimated at US$11.5 billion. Haiti was already the poorest country in the western hemisphere, ranked 149 out of 182 countries on the 2009 Human Development Index, with about 78% of the population living on less than US$2 a day.

The earthquake had a relatively shallow focus (less than 10 kilometres below the earth’s surface) and the epicentre was close to Léogâne, approximately 25 km west of Port-au-Prince, meaning that urban areas (with many poorly-constructed buildings) where particularly hit. Léogâne suffered close to 80% structural damage.

The earthquake occurred at 16.53 local time, an hour at which mainly managers are still at work, as official office hours are from 8am to 4pm. It is also likely that there was a higher number of female casualties, as many women were at home when the earthquake struck, while men were on their way back from work.

The Government estimates that 250,000 homes and 30,000 commercial buildings were severely damaged, while the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment identified 105,000 completely destroyed homes and over 208,000 damaged.

According to Government figures, approximately 2.3 million people left their homes at the peak of the displacement. IDPs predominantly settled either as individual households or in small household groupings close to their former area of residence. Many settled in the street or parks, in spontaneous settlement sites varying in population from a handful to 50,000 people, or in collective accommodation. Initially, around 1.5 million displaced people settled in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, while around 600,000 left the affected area, many facilitated by the Government. Others using private means, sought shelter with host communities in non-affected areas. Up to 250,000 of the latter have since returned to Port-au-Prince or surrounding communes, either as households or individually.

IOM reports that as of April 2012, an estimated 421,000 individuals (or 105,000 IDP Households) continue to reside in 602 camps and camp-like settlements across the earthquake affected area. This reflects a decrease of 14% (of IDP individuals) living in IDP sites compared to its previous report of February 2012.
2. Introduction

This evaluation was implemented by a team of three consultants: an architect, a Creole speaking anthropologist and a social geographer, who was also the team leader. The team had only one week to prepare for the evaluation, as its original proposal to undertake this assignment had been rejected by Cordaid. The team’s proposal was reactivated after the preferred candidate proved not available, but this meant that two weeks of potential preparation time was lost.

During inception, the team identified contradictions and definition problems in the ToR, which contained a number of questions pertaining to the quality and role of assessments. These had already been addressed by mid-term review (scoped mainly around management, HR and assessment issues) and the team was instructed to avoid duplication of already existing analysis.

The ToR key questions were based on different definitions than the usual OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, in particular for terms such as ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’. Effectiveness is usually defined by the extent to which objectives are achieved², but the ToR suggests the use of decision-making and M&E questions to inform the effectiveness analysis. Similarly Cordaid poses ‘policy implementation’ questions to inform the efficiency analysis, whereas policy questions normally refer to ‘appropriateness’³.

Another problem with the evaluation of Cordaid decision making processes is that these are poorly documented, making an analysis largely dependent on anecdotal information and an ‘Information and explanation sheet’ written by the Shelter Manager, an external consultant deployed through the contract with Group 5. Other than that we were unable to validate this type of information with other official Cordaid sources (approved minutes, emails) or reference it to an agreed management framework. Due to a lack of preparation time these issues could not be resolved prior to the team’s departure to Haiti.

The ToR proved even more problematic when the team arrived in the field, where staff seemed to have different expectations from the evaluation. The team suggested to test a number of hypotheses in an attempt to ensure that the evaluation answers questions pertinent to Cordaid’s management agenda. Although the reference group gave feedback on how to test the hypotheses, it did not provide feedback on how to formulate them in order to inform actual management information needs. This and the fact that it was too late to develop the tools in a way that would have allowed the hypotheses to be tested caused the team to abandon this approach.

The team lost more valuable time in the field, as it had to organise logistics for the beneficiary consultations, contrary to agreements made with those commissioning the evaluation in The Hague. Another limitation was that all but one of the (former) Cordaid’s Haiti development

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² OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, p. 20
³ see also: Evaluating humanitarian, action using the OECD-DAC criteria (ALNAP)
programme partners, declined to speak with the evaluation team, excluding their perspective on social capital building opportunities.

This led to the following approach to answering they key questions:

- Shelter, WASH and social capital building outputs informed the analysis of effectiveness.
- Quality as perceived by the beneficiaries as well as policy compliance informed the assessment of appropriateness.
- The potential outcomes of livelihoods, social capital and protection activities to assess the impact of the project.
- Existing evaluation reports and other documents and key staff interviews to assess the efficiency of approach and operations.

3. Methodology

In order to analyse effectiveness, appropriateness efficiency and impact, the team developed seven methodologies:

1. A survey among a statistically representative sample of 327 beneficiaries.
2. 19 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). 16 with Cordaid beneficiaries (male and female separately) in each of the 8 operational areas and three in areas with non-Cordaid beneficiaries (mixed male, female).
3. Meetings with almost all the committees.
4. Interviews with key stakeholders (KSIs), such as suppliers, bosses, local NGOs, international NGOs, authorities.
5. Interviews with Cordaid key-staff in The Hague, Port-au-Prince and Léogâne.
6. Direct field observations, transversal walks, ad-hoc meetings with beneficiaries.
7. Documents study.

For the efficiency questions, our sources were limited, but for each of the analyses of appropriateness, effectiveness and impact, we used at least three methodologies. Triangulation ensured that every conclusion is based on verified information. This gives us a large degree of confidence in the validity of our findings.

Effectiveness of Cordaid’s shelter programme focused on output, for which we took the objectives of the December 2010 proposals as our starting point. We analysed (monthly) reports to measure to what extent these objectives were achieved and then verified the quality of the outputs through the surveys, the FGDs, the KSIs and our own observations.

We designed the survey questionnaires in the Netherlands to measure beneficiary appreciation based on 5 quality indicators:

1. Shelter design,
2. Technical quality,
3. Security,
4. Assessment process, and 
5. Building process.

The Creole-speaking research specialist on the team recruited and trained ten students to conduct the surveys. The training was also used to test the questionnaires, as we did not have the time to do this with the beneficiaries. Survey data were entered into an excel-sheet and analysed by the technical specialist on the team. This allowed us to understand the quality and appropriateness of Cordaid’s output from the beneficiaries’ perspective, which we then triangulated with the results from the FGDs, KSIs and our own observations in the field.

The surveys gave us a solid basis of quantifiable data. We verified these with the qualitative information we obtained from focus group discussions, for which we recruited and trained FGD facilitators and note takers. We had to abandon our initial idea to work with control groups as we lacked sufficient logistics support in the field. Nevertheless we held three FGD with non-Cordaid beneficiaries, giving us some basis for comparison of the relative value of beneficiary appreciation of Cordaid’s programme.

We also interviewed a select number of key stakeholders, especially Cordaid shelter partners, sub-contractors, representatives of coordinating bodies and local authorities. To help us to triangulate the issue of legitimacy, we met with committees, beneficiaries’ (surveys), and authorities (KSIs).

Staff interviews focused mainly on programme approach, design and management issues. The results where then verified by interviews with key stakeholders and our own observations in the field.

This resulted in this report, which contains three main sections:

- Chapter 4: a descriptive section of the evolution of the project. The sources for this section were mainly staff interviews and project proposals verified by direct observations by the evaluators.

- Chapter 5: an analysis of project results based on the beneficiary survey, the focus group discussions, verified by key stakeholder interviews and direct observations.

- Chapter 6: a section which concludes the analysis in terms of the effectiveness, appropriateness, efficiency and the impact of the project and recommendations to strengthen operations along these lines.

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4 Complete set in annex 5.
5 In keeping with evaluation ethical codes and the principle of confidentiality, the names and positions of key stakeholders and staff are withheld.
4. **Programme Evolution**

This section of the report gives a general description of the programme and how it evolved over time in the rural and urban context.

4.1 **Emergency Response**

Immediately after the earthquake Cordaid sent a ‘reconnaissance’ team for its first response, which arrived on 14 January 2010. The team consisted of a coordinator, a logistics manager and a communication officer.

In the first month, this team supported a Cordaid development partner-driven emergency response programme. Partner-implemented rescue, non-food and food distributions were funded from a ‘solidarity fund’ of €250,000. The team also facilitated a Cordaid medical team and focused on preparing a logistics base in Port-au-Prince and later in Léogâne for a yet to be defined programme. Discussions to support Caritas Haiti (Cordaid’s natural emergency partner) did not lead to support due to ongoing financial and administrative challenges in this organisation.

Cordaid staff estimated that SHO fundraising would raise a minimum of €10 million. Based on field assessments of the capacity of development partners, the emergency department raised concerns over their ability to implement a programme of this size. Taking into account these factors, Cordaid emergency department decided to embark on an operational approach, supported by a trusted shelter implementation consultancy (Group 5), with which it had had good experiences in Iran, Aceh, Pakistan and Turkey. Other components of Cordaid’s emergency programme included a mental health programme, but this falls outside the scope of this evaluation.

4.2 **Emergency Shelter**

We were unable to establish a paper trail for decision-making, but anecdotal information suggests that the Sector Manager approved the request from the field coordinator for 1,250 tents. The idea apparently came in response to a Caritas International request from the communication officer, who had information that Cordaid had tents available in Pakistan.

A distribution report indicates that 1379 tents were donated to Cordaid’s development partners, who distributed 1133 (82%) of these. 18% remain unaccounted for (either missing, stolen or no data on file).

Our methodologies have not enabled us to locate the tents and former field staff, suggested that the tents have disintegrated and disappeared. We did not find any physical remains that could be inspected. As there were no records we were unable to identify any beneficiaries to talk about their appreciation of the tents.

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6 Perspectives on the Cordaid Emergency Intervention – Jaap Vermeulen and Jim Mason, 25 August 2010
Staff and external shelter experts interviewed indicate that tents are not a good emergency shelter solution (unless perhaps they are already in the country). They are expensive, logistically difficult to manage and the material is not appropriate for the humid and hot conditions of Haiti. Tarpaulins are easier to transport and store, more versatile, can be used in transitional shelter solutions and hence are preferred over tents. Two Cordaid staff members stated that a large number (14,000) of tarpaulins were also ordered. Cordaid intended to use tarpaulins for T-shelter walls. This was not implemented resulting in empty frames, in some cases for more than one year. According to the shelter manager, part of the stock was donated to other (emergency) agencies.

4.3 Transitional Shelter

This section covers the T-shelter programme and its evolution into the beginnings of a permanent housing programme. As the two components are operationally integrated they are presented in the same section of the report, with many sub-sections relevant to both.

Subsections 3 and 4 this section describe the rural and the urban programmes, of which the latter includes the evolution towards an 'owner-driven' and permanent housing approach. Cordaid decided to provide housing assistance (emergency, transitional shelter), in early February 2010.

4.3.1 Management

This section answers the following key questions:

- Did the major policy and implementation choices correspond to the changing needs of the target population?
- Analyze the quality, efficiency and transparency of the decision making process for the main choices and major shifts. Decisions made by whom and on which grounds? Specify roles and responsibilities de facto held by HQ and Field levels and compare to de jure design of the process.
- Analyze the effectiveness and timeliness of Cordaid’s efforts to access back donor funding.

Cordaid established a decision-making platform in The Hague, called the 'Haiti task force', which included the Sector Manager DRR/Emergencies, the Project Officer (PV) for Haiti, and the Emergency DRR Policy Officer.

Cordaid emergency department in The Hague contracted Group 5, a Rotterdam-based shelter consultancy firm, who deployed a Shelter Advisor (who later became Shelter Manager) to Cordaid Haiti. He reported directly to HQ (deputy sector manager emergencies) until mid June 2010 (strategy, implementation modes and alternatives etc) and developed proposals and budgets and sent them to the task force for approval.

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7 Cordaid March and June proposals
8 "The transitional shelter design developed by the Cordaid team is in fact the first phase of the construction for a permanent house" (document called: 'TRANSITIONAL SHELTERS OR PERMANENT HOUSES')
9 Annex 2 provides an implementation overview. The information mainly comes from Cordaid Haiti staff because monthly progress reports did not provide this kind of overview.
10 Information and explanation sheet
11 For a description of Group 5 see Annex 3.
The Head of Mission (HoM) and Shelter Manager shared responsibilities for procurement, tendering, monitoring system development, logistics and human resource management (except for Netherlands based recruitment).

Cordaid also hired a number of 'barefoot' architects, young and committed architects, recently graduated from university, who assessed shelter needs in rural Léogâne and engaged with beneficiaries to develop a range of possible shelter solutions.

Results from staff interviews indicate that this set-up worked well, because it maximised implementation related decision-making driven from the field, with the task force and later the emergency department playing the role of verifying proposals, design and implementation against Cordaid’s policies and budget.

### 4.3.2 Location Selection, Assessments and Proposals

This section of the report answers the following key questions:

- *Make an inventory of the assessment process and mention strengths and weaknesses.*
- *How were beneficiaries selected and what are eventual side effects from beneficiary selection for communities.*

According to key field staff, the shelter programme started in Léogâne for three reasons:

1. Cordaid has a number of development partners based there and given the fact that Cordaid from the beginning intended to have a participatory and social capital building approach, the idea was to involve the partners in this.

2. The area was relatively neglected by the international humanitarian community in the early stages, as many incoming INGOs and other agencies focused on the needs close to the logistically more accessible areas of Port-au-Prince, and to the area of Petit Goave, further east from Léogâne, where UN presence guaranteed more security.

3. The Léogâne area sustained very heavy structural damage as a result of it being the epicentre.

The field suggestion to prioritise T-shelter was approved by the task force in early February 2010. Senior field staff report a focus on technical aspects in the rural areas, as land tenure and other types of social protection are less of an issue there. This allowed Cordaid to a trial a number of technical shelter solutions by developing temporary shelter prototypes. A review of the first proposals reveals that other proposed, and later approved, activities included drinking water, latrines, infrastructure improvements, disaster risk reduction, livelihoods and social protection.

The same staff report that the urban neighbourhood of Sainte Marie (290 families) was chosen because there were no land-issue problems (due to church ownership), and hence was ‘a good and low risk experimental ground’. According to the Shelter manager, Cordaid declared its intention to work in neighbouring Villa Rosa as early as February 2010, as its development partner GRET already worked here prior to the earthquake.
In July 2010, Cordaid indicated its intention to work in two western suburbs (Tisous and Nan Cocteau) in the area of Carrefour, as according to the Shelter Manager, ‘no other shelter organisations were active, while damage was severe’. However, Cordaid was not able to commence construction activities in Port-au-Prince until December 2010, even though field staff obtained approval late February or early March 2010 for ‘a three month start up proposal’ which included water and sanitation activities. After approval a consultant was hired who ‘strongly advised permanent solutions, and to start with a hygiene promotion campaign’. The fact that the need for a longer-term approach could not be resolved within the approved short-term strategy is given as the reason for not starting activities until 2011.

Staff report that a revised rural programme proposal in October 2010 and a new urban proposal including additional shelters, community development, social protection, DRR, WASH and livelihood components were rejected due to lack of funds and detail. This resulted in new proposals in December 2010, which HQ approved. For unknown reasons the budget did not match the narrative and funds were only available for shelter. The operational area was expanded, leaving no resources available for social capital building, WASH or livelihood activities. Field staff mentioned that HQ did not capitalise on external funding opportunities for T-shelter from international donors, which could have been used to free up SHO funds for the other components. A decline in the relative value of the Euro during implementation also limited the funding base as budgets are in USD. For the urban programme allocations for other components besides shelter were approved.

Cordaid architects assessed the damage in the rural areas and Cordaid established neighbourhood committees to select the most vulnerable beneficiaries, who would be given priority. In urban areas Cordaid selected beneficiaries based on the government department of MTPTC (Ministere des Travaux Publiques, Transports et Communications) assessments.

Cordaid staff visited each household in order to assess the technical damage in the rural areas. MTPTC assessed the damage in the urban areas, requiring all houses to be tagged:

- Unsafe for habitation and having to be destroyed or retrofitted (red),
- Needing repairs (yellow) or
- Safe and needed no work (green).

Cordaid staff verified MTPTC data in urban neighbourhoods with a community member and conducted its own assessments in the rural areas. This was labour intensive work, especially in the vast area of 7ième Gerar. The MTPTC assessments in the urban areas had to be conducted without the benefit of a register or other kind of land or home ownership registration in the spontaneous settlements.

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12 Information and explanation sheet
In addition to individual beneficiary participation in the construction of their own shelters, local community members participated in community forums and elaborated community action plans (CAPs). These served two purposes\textsuperscript{13}:

1. Establish committees
2. Needs identification

The committees became the community communication and representation platform for Cordaid’s shelter programme and the main focus of its social capital building strategy. Committees identified the most vulnerable beneficiaries based on such criteria as:

- Loss of breadwinner
- Female headed household
- Elderly
- Pregnancy
- Disability

Based on these criteria committees prioritised the most vulnerable among the eligible beneficiaries. Cordaid staff verified the lists. During the CAP process in both rural and urban areas committees also identified other needs such as WASH, infrastructure and livelihoods. According to key staff, Cordaid initially sought to partner with other organisations (Terre des Hommes) to address these needs, leading to some WASH activities and rubbish removal as part of pilots in Tisous and Villa Rosa, preparing the basis for a strategy for fulfilling the objective of creating “safe and friendly neighbourhoods.”

Building high quality T-shelters is a relatively expensive approach and several Cordaid staff mentioned that spending pressure reinforced the arguments to continue an elaborate approach with more features (walls) and implementation in (sub) urban areas of Port-au-Prince. The additional resources were not available for other activities. Only at the end of the programme did Cordaid start to implement a broader (integrated neighbourhood) approach, by including the restoration and construction of retaining walls, drainage and other sanitation solutions. However, we verified directly during field visits to the urban areas that such needs remain largely unaddressed in other Cordaid operational areas at the end of the project\textsuperscript{14}.

Livelihood activities were limited to the temporary employment opportunities offered to tradesmen (‘bosses’) and vocational training for young school drop-outs, recruited in collaboration with the NGO IDEJEN in the rural areas. Staff mentions also local procurement of construction materials, as part of a livelihoods strategy.

### 4.3.3 Rural Programme

The original objective of the rural programme was to build 2,300 T-shelters, 3,300 latrines and 16 wells and the physical rehabilitation of the environment. Additional objectives focused on

\textsuperscript{13} Community Action Planning, Practical Guide (draft) – Haiti, December 2010

\textsuperscript{14} our visual inspections in Sainte Marie and Tisous took place 6 weeks prior to the end of Cordaid activities
livelihoods, disaster preparedness and social protection\textsuperscript{15}. As we have already seen, these were not covered by the first budget.

After Cordaid architects assessed the technical damage and established neighbourhood committees, the agency engaged a number of implementation partners and suppliers in order to develop shelter prototypes. Beneficiary contributions were initially limited to preparing the plot and assisting with the erection of timber frames.

Cordaid designed a timber frame shelter because this material was available from sustainable producers in the US at a reasonable cost. However, Haiti has a shortage of skilled carpenters due to the fact that people more recently started to prefer the use of other materials such as concrete and masonry. Timber frames were prefabricated and designed in such a way that two persons could carry them. The frames were anchored in concrete feet, contained trusses covered by CGI roofing sheets and had walls cladded with high quality tarpaulins. The dimensions of the shelters were 20 m\textsuperscript{2} (Sphere standards using an average family size of five persons would require a minimum of 17.5 m\textsuperscript{2}), and we estimate life span to be approximately 10 years. The cost for one shelter in the rural area was originally budgeted at 1,500 USD.

Cordaid developed the first prototypes in cooperation with suppliers of the timber frames and as early as February 2010 and invited beneficiaries to comment on two demonstration shelters in 7ième Gerard and in Lompré, leading to modifications. These prototypes were the basis for the first two contracts for 75 shelters each, a total of 150, produced by two suppliers (Maxima and Promobois) completed in May 2010. Cordaid continued to consult with the population in July and August 2010, leading to further improvements to the structural integrity such (certified hurricane connectors and straps) and modifications to the design (the possibility to add a veranda, an accessible ceiling for storage, a second front door, back door, and a flexible square lay out based on 1 metre wide panels, flexible doors and window locations). An important additional modification was the replacement of the temporary tarpaulins with more sustainable walls, which due to a management disagreement was not implemented, resulting in empty timber frames for a long period of time. These modifications were included in the design for the next batch of 1850 shelters at a new cost of 3,500 USD per shelter. HQ approved required modifications to the budget in June 2010.

Cordaid contracted IPA to launch an open international tender for 1850 shelters in four batches (starting end February 2010). Reportedly the response was ‘insufficient’ and the emergency manager approved a ‘3 quote’ system, allowing direct approach of suppliers. The tender opened in March 2010 and 3 quotes were obtained in April 2010 (Maxima – production, Acierie d’Haiti – timber supply, Alliance Distribution–2 lots for roofing sheets and hardware). Construction in the field started end of October and Cordaid delivered 600 shelters to CARE.

The next tender for 940 shelters opened in October 2010 and was awarded end of December 2010 to Steel Elements International (SEI)– USA for 800 shelters. 140 shelters cancelled for unknown reasons. Steel Elements experienced import delays and Cordaid awarded 250 shelters to Maxima, which proved a cheaper and more reliable contractor than SEI\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{15} Cordaid project proposal December 2010
\textsuperscript{16} Information and Explanation sheet
Cordaid defined objectives and approach in the rural areas and informed and validated this with the local authorities, whose implementation role was limited as they lacked capacities, which was part of the reason Cordaid established committees with which to work.

The role of beneficiaries consisted of:
- digging the foundation holes and levelling the plot
- safeguarding and transport (sometimes over considerable distances) of materials from point of delivery to construction site
- assisting with erecting timber frames and roof
- selecting the boss, often Cordaid proposed qualified bosses

Cordaid engaged IDEJEN students to erect the prefabricated timber frames and to cover the shelter with a roof, assisted by the beneficiary. Working with IDEJEN gave school drop outs, often coming from marginalised groups, a chance to learn new skills.

The authorities in the rural areas only had a limited role in the design, planning and implementation of the rural programme. Cordaid liaised with the Lompre Case, the Magistrate of Grand Goave and the mayor and deputy of Léogâne. However, operationally, Cordaid opted to work through the committees, which it regarded as more legitimate and effective representative bodies.

By the end of 2010, Cordaid reorganised the Léogâne office and confirmed its implementing approach:
1. The beneficiary prepares the land or plot.
2. The supplier delivers the pre-fabricated timber frames, roof sheets and hardware; the beneficiary signs off.
3. Cordaid staff signs off on quality and quantity of products. A copy of the waybill is kept in Léogâne office. The supplier invoices with the signed original of the waybill. These are verified with the Léogâne copies before payments are made\(^\text{17}\).
4. IDEJEN erects the structure and roof, assisted by the beneficiary. Cordaid verifies the quality of construction and signs off for completion.
5. Cordaid purchases the sand, gravel, cement, chain link; the beneficiary signs off for receipt.
6. The beneficiary selects a builder to construct the floor and walls.

Later in 2011, following the example of the urban programme (Sainte Marie and Nan Cocteau), Cordaid funded the repairs of 204 houses in Grand Goave, implemented by FAU. House repairs took place in parallel to shelter provision, with an objective of ‘build-back-better’, requiring investments in earthquake resistant reinforced columns and beams. Other repair works included roofing, doors, windows and plastering. Toilets were sometimes restored as well. The scope of work was limited by the budget available per house. In order to assist the beneficiaries with repairs, local tradesmen (‘bosses’) were contracted depending on technical skills, specifically for the shelter floor and walls program. They received three days training from

\(^{17}\) Cordaid reduces risks and liability by avoiding ownership of shelter kits in this way.
Cordaid, to improve their basic skills and to coach them in the use of new techniques. FAU trained a separate workforce for other types of repairs.

4.3.4 Urban Programme

The original plan was to build 3,000 T-shelters, 5,000 latrines, repair 1,000 houses, improve drinking water supply and drainage\(^\text{18}\).

Cordaid was committed to work within the government’s policy and legal frameworks and therefore dependent on the outcome of the assessments of MTPTC. Delays in the delivery of building standards and specifications frustrated the process of adapting the rural design to urban conditions. Shortage of land, land tenure issues, delays in the clearance of rubble and complex discussions about whether or not and how to address drainage, roads and water supply problems, further compounded the delays.

Cordaid started its urban programme in Sainte Marie in January 2011 with a community action planning exercise (CAP). In May 2011, shelter construction activities started in Tisous, Nan Cocteau and Villa Rosa. The approach was based on the rural programme, with technical assessment, design and the establishment of a committee. However, the rural design did not allow for the possibility of a second story, a common design aspect in Haiti’s dense urban settlements and often rented out as part of an owner’s livelihood strategy. Small plot sizes limited opportunities for other types of extensions and improvements.

Sainte Marie is a private settlement where the Catholic Church owns all land, which is managed by the Foyer, its administration office. Beneficiaries pay a type of tax for the privilege of living there and for the supply of drinking water (which is the main infrastructural problem in the area) and other services. Cordaid was able to complete 98 shelters by August 2011. Staff attributes this relatively rapid implementation to the absence of land tenure issues in Sainte Marie.

Almost simultaneously Cordaid delivered 150 shelters to CHF in Ravine Pintade. According to the shelter manager, the ‘MoU with CHF was only signed in mid 2011 and implementation delayed since CHF could not prepare plots sufficiently for shelter erection to take place’. CHF staff told us that the residential area on the slopes of a steep ravine was largely destroyed. This enabled them to plan an intervention, which included new roads, paths and public spaces. CHF also renovated drainage and sanitation facilities in the area. CHF built steel frame, tarp-clad, two story T-shelters. Cordaid provided an adapted version of its rural design to beneficiaries whose houses were heavily damaged or completely destroyed.

In November 2011, the president declared the end of the emergency phase and banned the provision of T-shelters. Cordaid stopped T-shelter construction in December 2011 and gave more priority to beneficiary involvement and to repairs. It adopted an owner driven housing (ODH) approach in which the beneficiary decides how to use a Cordaid grant: complete the ground floor, enlarge the building, repairs, new roof, etc.. Cordaid also provides technical advice

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\(^{18}\) Cordaid Project Proposal, December 2010
from an architect and an engineer. Cordaid rolled out this strategy in Villa Rosa, Nan Cocteau and Tisous from May 2012. ODH is an important evolution, as it no longer sees the beneficiary as a recipient, but also as an active partner and participant, not only in planning and design, but also in the construction process itself. It also signalled the transition to permanent housing solutions.

Cordaid Haiti had already signed a partner agreement with FAU in May 2011, covering the repair of 855 households in Sainte Marie, Grand Goave and Nan Cocteau. This was later adjusted to 955 households. FAU assessed and designed repair works and 'built back better' 53 houses in Sainte Marie. FAU was also contracted to repair houses in the rural areas, and in Nan Cocteau in 2012. The role of FAU was to undertake a detailed assessment, make a repair plan and budget and contract local tradesmen ('bosses') to implement the repairs, sign a contract with the beneficiary and hand over the house after completion. FAU purchased construction materials funded by Cordaid and also monitored construction work. Cordaid’s involvement was limited to funding and co-signing the contracts. Physical presence was limited to that of the area manager during security incidents.

Although on paper owner-driven housing started September 2011, it took until December 2011 before Cordaid started to involve beneficiaries directly in construction activities of its urban shelter programme in the field. The Villa Rosa Casec and the mayor of Carrefour became more actively involved, as they asserted their role as elected officials and duty bearers in the process of developing ways to secure land rights for former occupants without documents. Cordaid partnered with US based NGO Build Change for the implementation of this programme in a similar way to FAU.

After the assessment and the selection of the beneficiaries, the following steps are taken:

1. Build Change makes the design, together with the beneficiary;
2. Build Change prepares the budget for the work (if the work needed or desired exceeds the budget the beneficiary is asked to contribute financially or adjust the design to available funds.
3. The Neighbourhood Committee receives a small fee from the beneficiary for checking documents.
4. Cordaid verifies data (name, eligibility etc.) and approves.
5. The beneficiary receives a half-day training from Build Change, learning how to select a boss, how to build with quality materials and how to supervise the execution of the works;
6. The beneficiary selects a boss for the construction works;
7. If the boss is new, he receives a 4 day training, focusing on concrete works and earthquake resistant building;
8. The beneficiary receives 3 or 4 tranches (retrofits and new build) of which the last tranche is 5% of the contract amount to be paid after final delivery;
9. The beneficiary purchases the materials and contracts the boss;
10. Implementation, supervised by the beneficiary, assisted by Build Change engineers whenever necessary;
11. Final delivery in presence of the beneficiary, boss, Build Change and Cordaid.
A final development is the so-called ‘integrated neighbourhood approach’ (INA). Cordaid already participated in a CHF implemented project INA in Ravine Pintade. The main idea is to include shelter solutions as an integrated aspect of urban planning, addressing a wider inter-related set of needs, such as WASH, land rights, public space, social protection, livelihoods, drainage, education and health. Reportedly, INA was always foreseen in all programme areas, however for a variety of reasons already mentioned, it was initiated late, never fully implemented and remains limited to two pilot projects in Villa Rosa and Tisous.

4.3.5 Implementation Partners

This section of the report answers the following key questions:

• Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources – taking into consideration the context in which the intervention had to be implemented, e.g. costs to be incurred to reach the beneficiaries, and application of benchmarks for the costing of support items? Take note that in some cases Cordaid opted for outsourcing, extending the chain of partners (international as well as local), contractors, subcontractors and implementers. Compare efficiency of more direct implementation with outsourcing. Contracting out

• In later stages, more emphasis was placed on partnering with other international NGOs (Build Change, Fondation Architectes d’Urgence, Architecture for Humanity, Care, etc.). What are consequences in terms of policy coherence and cost efficiency. How and by whom were these partners identified, what were criteria for selection? Was the contracting procedure cfm standing instructions.

The implementation of the shelter programme requires international and national staff capacities, which Cordaid does not possess on a permanent basis. Senior staff acknowledges that Cordaid lacks the capacity to recruit and support professionals (urban planners, engineers, architects, project managers and controllers) for this type of operation.

Cordaid implemented a strategy to boost its implementation capacity:

1. It contracted Group 5 for technical advice, coordination and implementation and recruited teams of international ‘barefoot architects’ in Léogâne and in Port-au-Prince, supported by a management team and national staff.

2. It contracted two INGOs (Fondation Architectes d’Urgence and Architecture for Humanity) to implement urban planning exercises and a third (Build Change) to implement the owner driven housing strategy. Fondation Architectes d’Urgence also obtained the contract to repair houses in Léogâne and Port-au-Prince. Their roles were:
   ■ general mapping of the project area.
   ■ community planning and designs.
   ■ micro-planning of implementation.
   ■ coordinating the community execution of some infrastructure works

3. Cordaid also partnered with CARE to provide 600 shelters in Léogâne. Cordaid had the materials available, but had not yet established its implementation capacity (field staff, beneficiary selection, training of builders), whereas CARE did not have materials, due logistical constraints but did have implementation capacity. Other activities reportedly included the development of community infrastructure and a WASH study.
4. Cordaid signed an agreement with IDEJEN to implement certain aspects of shelter construction in both rural and urban areas.

5. Cordaid signed MoU’s with IDHI, PNAOS and GTIH for rubble clearance and with CHF for shelter construction in Ravine Pintade. IOM designed and implemented the latrine construction in the pilots.

6. It also tendered or contracted a number of other business partners for the delivery of materials, construction, training and other services.

During the selection process Cordaid had to overcome the difficulty of severe shortages of local and international technical expertise, due to the extremely high demand on these services in the aftermath of the earthquake. Cordaid used the cluster meetings to identify potential partners working in the same areas. The shelter manager, who himself was contracted, compared organizational, financial, administrative and staff capacities, based on expertise, track record, presence and reputation. We were unable to find any Cordaid policies to support these types of processes, even if the HoM designed some tools to support the shelter manager in this process.

Most partners charged their back office costs to Cordaid, which means that Cordaid contracted implementation but also quality assurance, risk management, policy development and other overheads.

5. Results

This section of the report answers the following key questions:

• What are beneficiaries/communities perspectives about needs identified outside the scope of repairs and construction (f.e. WASH, DRR, Livelihood interventions)?
• How successful were Cordaid’s efforts to engender its approach and interact with the beneficiaries?
• Was the intervention appropriate with regard to the specific characteristics of the disaster: (semi) urban setting, scale, weak governance, damage to institutional structures (government as well as NGOs)?
• Were the shelter program strategies and implementation choices coherent with the cluster system, national reconstruction plans and strategies?
• How do the achieved results and the manner in which they are achieved, compare against international quality standards Cordaid strives to adhere to as defined in the Sphere standards and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and NGOs in disaster response programmes.
• Was there an adequate system for monitoring and evaluation in place in Cordaid Haiti?
• Identify major effects (negative and positive) at beneficiaries, communities or other stakeholders (local government), fostered by the programme
• Were there any unintended side-effects (negative or positive)?

Results were initially slow to emerge. According to key international field based technical staff the planning of implementation seems to have been rather ad-hoc and dependent on the availability and presence of the HoM and Shelter Manager during 2010. The discontinuity of a shelter manager in Léogâne was mentioned by Cordaid staff as the main reason for the lack of planning for the rural programme, which contributed to a lack of results during the first year.

Former field staff mentioned that the initial pilot of 150 shelters was not immediately followed by the completion of 2,000 shelters as planned, because of poor logistics, changing
implementation strategies and a lack of direction which ended by the end of 2010, when the shelter team more clearly defined the approach, leading to an increase of output in early 2011.

From this point in time, planning of rural and urban programmes improved. Time and activity schedules were included in project proposals, indicating activity implementation targets for all project areas. However these schedules were not systematically updated, making them a poor basis for progress monitoring.

Comparison of Cordaid shelter programmes to the original and to the most recent updated objectives documented (March and May 2012 respectively), shows that shelter outputs and repairs have been largely realised, especially in the rural areas, where design originated and implementation began earlier. Cordaid largely achieved its social capital development objectives through the establishment of the beneficiary committees. There are even early signs that these community platforms are already becoming sustainable. Original integrated neighbourhood approach and WASH objectives were de-prioritised in the rural areas and remained at the pilot phase in the urban component of the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original objectives</th>
<th>Updated objectives (March 2012)</th>
<th>Results (May 2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural programme</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,300 shelters</td>
<td>3,320 shelters provided</td>
<td>3,003 number of shelters provided and an unknown number of families returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200 houses repaired</td>
<td>340 families living in repaired houses</td>
<td>204 number of houses repaired and 308 number of families returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe and friendly neighbourhood infrastructure and community facilities created</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation facilities provided to ensure 3,300 families having and using latrines and 5,000 families having access to water.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A reduced vulnerability of communities to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, landslides and earthquakes.</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>Training of bosses Risk mapping exercises in all project areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased social protection by ensuring landless beneficiaries (an estimated 80% of target families) land tenure protection</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>The rural programme includes unknown numbers of renters (figures not yet available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital developed through strengthened organisation of, and cooperation between, local government, community committees, and non-governmental organisations.</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>- Bonding: setting up of committees, involving local NGOs (e.g. IDEJEN), capacity building to committees starting to take place - Bridging: the committees themselves consist of members from various local CBO’s, PANOS has provided training to different committees and a meeting with all rural committees has taken place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved livelihood and income generating opportunities within the communities</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>Labour (bosses, IDEJEN). Purchase of local materials (sand, gravel etc and in the Urban ODH programme all materials are purchased in or near the neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban programme</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 shelters</td>
<td>856 shelters provided 800 houses provided = 1,656 shelters/houses</td>
<td>848 shelters finished 84 houses finished = 934 shelters/houses constructed and x number of families returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 houses repaired</td>
<td>1,059 houses</td>
<td>146 repairs finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe and friendly neighbourhood infrastructure and community facilities created</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>123 houses retrofitted (ODH yellow) = 269 number of houses repaired and x number of families returned</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 latrines and water supply provisions in 4 communities covering approximately 75,000 people</td>
<td>340 latrines and water supply provisions in 2 communities (Tisous and Villa Rosa)</td>
<td>Within the two initial zones (T and VR) Cordaid provides infrastructure improvements including drainage, directly benefiting approximately 1,200 persons. Retrofitting the urban houses often includes the repairs of toilets (304 completed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A reduced vulnerability of communities to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, landslides and earthquakes</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>One urban committee being transformed into Platform Communautaire to ensure formal participation in government led urban development (16/6) 3 number of Houses of Knowledge provided Training to bosses and beneficiaries Risk mapping exercises in all project areas Awareness campaigns on building standards and risks in urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased social protection by ensuring landless beneficiaries (an estimated 80% of target families) land tenure protection</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>The urban programme includes unknown numbers of renters (figures not yet available) The urban programme includes an unknown number or landowners that received their ownership through testimonials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital developed through strengthened organisation of, and cooperation between, local government, community committees, and non-governmental organisations.</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>- Bonding: setting up of committees, involving local NGOs (f.e. IDEJEN), capacity building to committees starting to take place - Bridging: the committees themselves consist of members from various local CBO’s, PANOS has provided training with different committees, the VR committee is being transformed into a Platform Communautaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved livelihood and income generating opportunities in communities</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
<td>Labour (bosses, IDEJEN, Owner Driven Works)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1 Technical Results

This section answers the following questions from the terms of reference:
- How were the technical designs appreciated by Cordaid, others and beneficiaries?
- What were other needs and what was done with those?
- What level of participation was achieved?
- Were approach and results within international standards (Sphere, others)?
- How was social capital developed?
- Were there unintended side-effects?
- Compare the response time of Cordaid’s shelter interventions with similar shelter interventions of other NGOs in Haiti.

Survey results show very high degrees of beneficiary satisfaction with four quality indicators: design, size, materials, and construction.
• Design
  ○ 27% highly satisfied
  ○ 61% satisfied
• Size
  ○ 23% highly satisfied
  ○ 63% satisfied
• Quality of materials
  ○ 27% highly satisfied
  ○ 66% satisfied
• Execution of the construction works
  ○ 26% highly satisfied
  ○ 65% satisfied

A relatively large proportion (32%) of beneficiaries did not know whether their shelter is safe (earthquake or Hurricane resistant), an indication that beneficiaries are not well informed about technical quality issues.

• 72% of beneficiaries do not know the lifespan of their shelter
• 65% believe that they will be able to maintain their shelters by themselves
• 48% of members of beneficiary households received training during the project
• 24% involved in construction
• 12% learned additional skills

Beneficiaries appreciated the shelters provided by Cordaid not only in terms of design but also in terms of the participatory approach that Cordaid adopted. They reported that Cordaid and its staff sought their input in terms of design and cultural appropriateness of the shelters, contributing to high levels of satisfaction about the design of the shelters.
Among rural residents,
- 32% of our survey respondents were highly satisfied with the design of the shelters
- 62% were satisfied.

We recorded a lower level of satisfaction among urban residents where
- 16% of survey responders were highly satisfied and
- 59% were satisfied.

Urban residents expressed relatively more often dissatisfaction with the design of the shelter (17%), than rural beneficiaries (5%). One likely reason for this is that the design originated from the rural setting and, despite modifications took essential urban design requirements insufficiently into account. The rural T-shelter approach became the dominant feature of the programme, not so much as a result of a Cordaid policy, but according to key staff, by default from its rural design origins and the strong involvement of architects. Other factors mentioned by staff were cluster agreements and Government requests.

Nevertheless, the appreciation of the shelter design goes beyond its cultural appropriateness. Focus group participants and survey responders believe the shelters will provide a higher level of safety in case of future earthquakes or hurricanes. Urban residents expressed the highest level of confidence in the structural integrity of the shelters:
- 18% highly satisfied and
- 53% satisfied.

The level of satisfaction with the level of safety among rural residents was distributed more evenly:
- 29% highly satisfied
- 34% satisfied and
- 36% did not know.
Although a relatively high proportion (32% compared to 26% of highly satisfied and 39% satisfied) of beneficiaries did not know whether their house is safe, there is also some anecdotal evidence that at least some of them feel confident with the safety standards. For instance, one focus group respondent reported that during a recent tremor, he stood at his window and watched his neighbours run from their cement bloc houses because he was confident that the construction and design of his shelter was solid enough to withstand the quake.

Committee members participated in the project even when they knew that they would not personally benefit from the project and continued to do so even when aspects of the process became problematic. This illustrates confidence in Cordaid and the project.

Committee members told us that beneficiaries expressed disappointment in the fact that other needs such as livelihood and WASH identified in the Cordaid facilitated CAPs were not included in the programme. Both the CAPs and the proposals called for a strategy addressing a broad spectrum of needs. In several zones the population and the committees criticised the fact that Cordaid promised other interventions but did not follow up. This unfortunately created tension among the population and towards Cordaid. Some committee members reported that they agreed to participate in the project because of their understanding that the project would go beyond shelter so that people who were not eligible for shelters would eventually benefit in some other way. Committee members report that they were held accountable by their constituency, to commitments to deliver for which in retrospect they found they had no mandate.

Cordaid partner CHF implemented an integrated neighbourhood approach in the urban slum of Ravine Pintade. CHF upgraded the neighbourhood’s lay out and reserved public spaces for attractive seating areas where people can meet, read and study. They paved roads and paths and covered and cemented the areas drainage canals. CHF provided two storey steel frames, clad with tarpaulins and Cordaid provided 150 of their temporary shelters.
Beneficiaries in Ravine Pintade expressed in the FGD high levels of satisfaction about the results. They reported that they are happy with life in their community. According to one participant: “Now the neighbourhood looks better. Most of the damaged houses have been repaired. They have taken down the houses that could not be repaired. We are now safe from earthquakes.” Unlike most other neighbourhoods where FGD participants complain about safety and sanitation issues, Ravine Pintade residents report that they feel safe because they help each other and also do not mention sanitation problems as often as FGDs in Cordaid neighbourhoods, probably due to the fact that CHF provided modern toilets and repaired drainage. Residents in Ravine Pintade also express high levels of satisfaction with the way the different parts of the programme were communicated to them especially during the meeting where they presented the neighbourhood plans and discussed the placement of the local park.

### 5.2 Social Results

This section of the report answers the following key question:

**Social Capital**

- In its shelter program Cordaid Haiti aims to apply a support driven, people-centered reconstruction approach. Through community based interventions, involving national partner organization and community groups, Cordaid aims to strengthen social capital. The strategy also fosters an increase over time in the responsibility of local communities and partner organizations. It also aims to maximize the use of local materials, local labor and local skills/techniques. These objectives do not necessarily contribute to timeliness and efficiency of the operation. How were these objectives defined and by whom? How did strategic choices deal with possible conflicting objectives.

From the perspective of the beneficiaries, one of the most important social results is housing security. FGD participants consistently report that, because of their confidence in the design and construction of the new shelters, they feel protected from future disasters and able to focus on rebuilding other aspects (economic, cultural, health) of their lives.

FGDs with people who benefited from tarp-clad shelters provided by other agencies, reported that they feel uncomfortable leaving their houses for fear of losing their possessions. Because the Cordaid shelters are made with durable and “theft resistant” material, residents feel comparatively safer and report engaging in activities that will enable them to continue to rebuild their lives.

Families who rented, shared family plots, or lived illegally on hazardous land (ravines, steep slopes, flood prone areas), although included in the MTPTC assessment and possibly tagged ‘red’ or ‘yellow,’ were excluded by Cordaid as ownership provided the legal basis. We were able to verify directly in Tisous and Villa Rosa that many who were excluded from the initial assessments, still live in tents today.

Another group not reached by Cordaid were those who had “rien” next to their name, indicating that they had not received an MTPTC tag. Staff report that it had insufficient funds to reach this group, which included:

- Renters or those renting a room in the occupier’s home.
- Houses owned by families that were not present at the time of the assessments.
● Houses owned by families who were unwilling to provide information as a result of assessment fatigue or rumours that participation might jeopardise US visa applications
● Plots already cleared by the owners could not be tagged.
● Tagged walls removed by owners in order to clear the plot were excluded because the tag was not visible anymore. Some owners successfully asked MTPTC to be included again.
● Some of the red-tagged houses did not need repairs, but were tagged as such because of neighbouring hazards.
● Couples who could not be accommodated because the size of the new shelter did not provide adequate privacy for extended families or multiple family units.
● Some yellow tagged houses repairs costs beyond the budgeted amounts.
● For the urban programme a major condition for selection was the possibility to build an actual shelter or a house on the plot owned by the family. If the plot was on a hazardous location, too close to a riverbed or if the plot was too small for a shelter, Cordaid excluded the household.

Despite these problems Cordaid communicated that it would cover 100% of the damaged houses in its operational areas. This caused problems later, as Cordaid was unable to deliver fully on this commitment, creating tensions with the communities and even security incidents in urban areas.

The “rien” category included residents whose houses were not tagged by the MTPTC or cases where Cordaid surveyors could not verify the tagging done by the MTPTC. In some cases the wall on which the MTPTC tag was placed, was not visible to the Cordaid surveyors. According to committee members, this group contained people who would otherwise have been eligible to receive help from Cordaid.

FGD reports indicated that young couples were often excluded from the project. The decision on the size of the shelter did not take into consideration multi family households. Young couples that used live with their parents prior to the earthquake found that the Cordaid shelters did not provide them with adequate privacy.

According to one committee member, Cordaid’s survey focused on houses and not people and as a result the size of shelter provided could not accommodate the number of residents that the pre-earthquake houses held. Cordaid built houses according to Sphere standards. However, the fact that many extended households were not able to continue living together, due to the size of the T-shelter, and many young adults ended up having to live in nearby tent camps, clearly illustrates the shortcoming of standards driven approach.

Establishing shelter committees (in some communities known as ‘the Cordaid Committees’) ensured a participatory approach by a representative and legitimate community body. With the exception of Nan Cocteau whose committee members were drawn from existing community based organisations, the different communities elected their committees at community forums organised by Cordaid. By acting on committee recommendations Cordaid ensured an appropriate shelter design in the rural areas. Where participation was more problematic (e.g. in Sainte Marie as a result of the influence of the Foyer), beneficiaries value design less.
The significance of the community forums goes beyond the selection of the committee members. Through the forums the different communities created community action plans (CAP). While some of the issues identified by the CAP were beyond the scope of the Cordaid project, they nonetheless allowed the communities to come to a collective understanding of the major issues they faced and placed them in a better position to devise solutions to these problems in the future. The CAP process also provided communities with a tool for collective needs assessment and a concrete plan with which they can now lobby the state or other service providers.

The strategy is already bearing fruit, as the Villa Rosa committee recently became a community participation platform in the Haitian government’s 16/6 program, a new joint government and UN housing strategy aimed at providing permanent and integrated housing solutions to the population of 16 remaining tent camps in 6 neighbourhoods. Within this framework the committee have received further training and support in order to participate. This recognition of an informal Cordaid facilitated community forum as a legitimate formal community consultation platform is an important and remarkable achievement and a positive impact on governance issues in Haiti.

Most FGD participants report that they participated in the selection of committee members, but even those who did not are generally satisfied with the work of the committee.

However, in our meetings with the committees, members expressed a number of concerns about Cordaid:

- Lack of definition of their work and relationship with Cordaid:
  - While committee members were aware that their position would not be remunerated, they decried the fact that sometimes they felt that their work was taken for granted.
  - Some committee members claim that Cordaid did not take into account the expenses associated with their work (e.g. they had to use their personal phone to transmit messages to beneficiaries).

- Problems in the flow of information between Cordaid, Committee and beneficiaries.
  - Cordaid provided information late.
  - Committee members were harassed by beneficiaries who became impatient because of delays in the delivery of construction material.
  - Some beneficiaries were told to clear the land and take down their old houses and had to wait a long time for construction to begin. We have seen a couple of timber frames still wrapped with tarp because cement and sand had not been delivered.

19 “The proposed 16/6 has been designed to rehabilitate 16 neighborhoods to relocate residents of six large camps in the metropolitan area. Launched in August 2011, it will cost some 78 million [US] including 30 million [US] allocated by the Fund for the Reconstruction of Haiti (HRF) which mobilizes, coordinates and allocates including contributions from bilateral donors to finance priority reconstruction projects such as defined by the Haitian Government” (MINUSTAH.org)
We received a report that one committee member brokered the sale of a shelter. This is in itself an unfortunate incident and in no way a systemic problem. However, it may have contributed to a lack of confidence in the integrity of other committee members, as some of them reported being accused of doing the same thing especially in situations where people believe that they are qualified but did not receive shelters.

Committees perceive that Cordaid underutilised local human resources. Several committees suggested that, rather than bringing drivers, engineers and community workers from Port-au-Prince to Léogâne, community members believe that hiring workers from the local community would have gone a long way in terms of developing the community and providing work experience for the youth, unable to find employment.

Some committee’s members were self-appointed.

Sainte Marie Committee had no real mandate as the Foyer made all decisions.

Given the late start of Cordaid’s work in urban areas, it is interesting to note that the majority of the beneficiaries of the urban programme think that the timing of the intervention was on time and that less than 20% of the beneficiaries qualified the intervention as ‘too late’:

The programme did not prioritise locally available housing materials, but used a more technically appropriate approach. Environmental and supply considerations led the decision to import the timber for the frames. Other building materials were purchased locally not necessarily to build social capital, but because they were technically, environmentally and in terms of timing the best solution. Using local labour was maximised and surveys and interviews indicated that beneficiaries, local tradesmen and youths all feel they have acquired new technical skills, which they may well be able to use if the artisanal construction market continues to grow.

5.2.1 Gender

This section of the report answers the following key question:

- Appropriateness as perceived by target group/end users (make this gender specific)

We analysed the focus group discussion reports to see if we could detect any differences between men and women in the way they reflected on the results of the programme. Men and women appreciated the Cordaid shelter in similar ways and we only found differences in emphasis. Women tended to talk about family size and the fact that the houses were too small for the size of their families. Women also reported that before the earthquake children lived in separate rooms, whereas now they all sleep in the one room. Interestingly in Tisous women reported that they have good relationships with their neighbours, while the men reported increased arguments and tensions between neighbours.

These types of differences merely reflect the different interests and roles men and women have in Haitian society at large and perhaps the more harmonious nature of interpersonal communication between women, compared to that of men. In Haiti there may be gender
inequalities in a financial, familial, and interpersonal sense, but when it comes to social and community participation women are as well represented as men. This was also brought out by the active and equal participation of women in the committees both as members and in terms of voicing their opinions and concerns.

Vulnerability criteria included pregnant women and female-headed households, illustrating that both Cordaid and the committees took gender into account in programme design. This is particularly significant in the cultural context of Haiti where one man may have more than one family and cannot or is unwilling to support them all equally. Committees provided women with a platform to voice their needs. FGD reports show that women committee members in particular emphasised the needs of vulnerable families. Given the difference in life expectancy between men and women, the focus on the elderly as vulnerability criteria also covers more women, as many are widowed and without the financial support of a partner. We also believe that an integrated neighbourhood would have provided an opportunity to create more women friendly public spaces, mitigating against the relatively high levels of social violence in the densely built bidonvilles of Port-au-Prince.

Humanitarian projects need to take any gender specific differences in needs into account and address them where possible, but again we have found no indications that the needs of men and women were significantly different: both needed shelter. Maybe women even more so than men and the choice to do shelter in itself may have contributed more to the needs of women.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Dilemmas

The Cordaid Haiti teams successfully managed complex dynamics and difficult dilemmas associated with the task of delivering urgent shelter services, whilst at the same being asked to build social capital. The need to implement a sizeable grant within a limited period of time required a rigorous up-scaling of implementation capacities, as these were not available with existing partners.

Social capital objectives have been largely realised, and well integrated in the shelter strategy. Committees are active, seen as legitimate community representative bodies by both beneficiaries and authorities. They are also beginning to work together on other issues, as Cordaid brought them together in a workshop inviting them to find solutions to remaining community needs. Any concerns that social capital development may have affected timely delivery have proven unjustified. Not one source made this connection.

Cordaid did not address underlying issues of poverty and inequity with its emergency shelter programme, nor was this the objective. It would require the type of political action and advocacy, which would not necessarily further the objective of supplying the population with urgently needed shelter solutions. Nor would it comply with humanitarian principles such as neutrality and impartiality.

20 Total SHO funds grant to Cordaid was €29 million
There is however a humanitarian obligation to avoid doing further harm or to avoid exacerbating social inequities. If Cordaid would not have been under pressure to meet the very urgent shelter needs of a very large group of people and to spend a large sum of money relatively quickly, it may have been in a position to choose a more rights based approach, less based on service delivery: identify and work with the most vulnerable: tenants, landless, and otherwise illegally settled groups with few employment opportunities and extremely susceptible to health hazards, such as a cholera infection. This would have meant working outside the government’s policies and MTPCT assessments.

6.2 Effectiveness

An overview of the adjusted objectives and realised shelter solutions as implemented by Cordaid until 12 June 2012\(^{21}\) indicates that Cordaid built 3,935 shelters and houses and repaired/retrofitted 876 houses, representing 81% and 40% respectively. Pipeline analysis shows that the adjusted targets of 4,856 shelters/houses and 1,177 repairs will most likely be met by the end of the Build Change contract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>objective</td>
<td>realised</td>
<td>objective(^{22})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>2,720</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600(^{21})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houses (ODH red)</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repairs</td>
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<td>204</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses (ODH yellow)</td>
<td></td>
<td>570</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>973</td>
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</table>

Not only will Cordaid achieve its temporary shelter output targets, it also delivered very high quality outputs as our survey and FGD results show. The five beneficiary appreciation indicators used for this evaluation show 80% to 90% satisfaction scores for both product and process, indicating the quality of Cordaid’s shelter outputs. The earthquake-affected population of Haiti required shelter, one of the priority needs for survival. It was also clear what those who donated to the SHO fundraising campaign expected Cordaid to deliver: houses. Cordaid can now rightly and proudly claim to be the Netherlands’ leading shelter provider in third world natural disasters.

\(^{21}\) Cordaid Monthly Report May 2012  
\(^{22}\) May monthly report  
\(^{23}\) implemented by CARE
The prioritisation of shelter inevitably caused other objectives to play second fiddle. Community feedback during FGDs, the survey, and committee meetings all confirm that water and sanitation objectives in particular remain largely unaddressed by Cordaid even if other actors incidentally came to the rescue. The integrated neighbourhood approach started late and only as pilot projects, meaning that drainage and sanitation problems for large numbers of people remain an important issue at the end of the project.

Cordaid also met its social capital building objectives. Beneficiaries and authorities reviewed the role of the committees as positive. Their role has been particularly critical in situations where state institutions were inactive and ill equipped. Grass roots social infrastructure was successfully developed around the shelter interventions and laid solid foundations for Cordaid’s other business units, Urban Matters, Resilient Livelihoods and Conflict Transformation for roll out their longer-term development strategies. It is unfortunate that Cordaid’s pre-existing development partners could only play a minor role in the shelter programme. On the other hand, Cordaid is now better positioned to strategically address social, economic and political problems directly with grass roots social organisations in the highly urbanised society of Haiti.

Feedback from key actors, including IOM, UN HABITAT, and key local authorities confirm the community feedback. It is now one of the most effective shelter providers in Haiti. Its sub-contracting and output driven model has greatly contributed to meeting housing needs in post earthquake Port-au-Prince and Léogâne.

Despite the effectiveness of the shelter programme, there is a lack of checks and balances in the project. This was managed by having the right staff in the right place, for most of the time. Due to a lack of technical shelter knowledge in The Hague, verification of programme content to ensure compliance with quality standards was insufficient. It was left to the discretion of the Cordaid Haiti-based staff, to judge the appropriateness of signing multi million euro contracts with partners and sub-contractors.

**Recommendation 1: Cordaid requires more technical shelter expertise in the emergency department to allow for policy development, quality assurance and risk management support for implementation managers in the field.**

The feedback from the Haiti field debriefing confirmed our observation that the basis for monitoring at HoM and HQ levels was inadequate, as data were not collected and analysed systematically until late in the programme. The system presently (from mid-2011) used for programme monitoring was developed after the first period of implementation by Léogâne based staff, supported by consultants. Early attempts to introduce Filemaker Pro failed, as did another attempt to develop a programme for assessments, in coordination with the shelter cluster. The result was a number of mismatching databases24. This meant that progress reports contained mainly anecdotal information and that Cordaid for a long time lacked data for project and approach evolution and decision-making, due to the lack of priority given to this by HQ, according to senior field staff.

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24 Information and explanation sheet
Programme managers reported the database to be extremely useful as it provides them with quality information for follow-up on progress and results. The database is accessible and updated by all relevant shelter staff, however the logistics department does not use it, even though this is an available option. Cross-checking and direct information sharing between departments is not possible.

**Recommendation 2: Cordaid needs to invest in a standardised data-base for shelter programmes in emergency settings, and prioritise the roll-out early in programming.**

One other function consistently mentioned as ‘weak’ by staff members both in The Hague and in Haiti, was logistics. Teams have learned that especially in challenging environments such as Haiti, Cordaid requires an experienced logistics team with good local knowledge and stated that they found Cordaid human resource department to lack the experience, knowledge and networks required for the recruitment of people with these skills and backgrounds. Cordaid hired external logistical support firm IPA to assist with the preparation, bid opening and evaluation of a tender for 1850 shelters.

**Recommendation 3: Cordaid needs to recognise the importance of a strong logistics function and elaborate the specifications in its emergency policy as well as ensuring that this function is supported by the recruitment of experienced field logistics staff.**

### 6.3 Appropriateness

**Appropriateness**

- Who has benefited from the program. Identify if / which vulnerable groups were not reached.
- Were the technical design decisions and – solutions (i.e. the choice for semi permanent shelters), appropriate for the end users?

- **Appropriateness at other levels**
- Was the intervention appropriate with regard to the specific characteristics of the disaster: (semi) urban setting, scale, weak governance, damage to institutional structures (government as well as NGOs)?
- Were the shelter program strategies and implementation choices coherent with the cluster system, national reconstruction plans and strategies?
- How do the achieved results and the manner in which they are achieved, compare against international quality standards Cordaid strives to adhere to as defined in the Sphere standards and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and NGOs in disaster response programmes.

The technical design of tents as an emergency shelter solution proved inappropriate and inefficient. Expensive to bring into the country, not suitable for the climatological conditions and impossible to integrate into the T-shelter solutions were given as the main arguments to avoiding the use of tents in the future.

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25 Information and explanation sheet
Recommendation 4: Cordaid should avoid the use of tents as an emergency shelter solution, unless they are already available in the disaster-affected locations and suit prevailing climate conditions.

Cordaid’s programme was well coordinated with both cluster and national policies. Beneficiary eligibility had a sound legal basis: home ownership. Cordaid worked within the government’s (MTPTC) assessment frameworks. Unfortunately this also inserted social problems inherent in government policies. Beneficiaries were only eligible for a Cordaid shelter if they had access to land in Cordaid operational areas. Tent camps continue to exist in these areas, indicating that many people did not benefit from the programme and that access to land was always the most pertinent vulnerability criteria especially in urban areas.

Cordaid especially struggled with an appropriate approach in the more complex political and physical urban situation. The feedback from the FGDs and individual beneficiaries shows that they are less satisfied about the size of the shelter. Using the average family size to determine a Sphere standard compliant shelter, created a shelter too small for larger than average families.

Recommendation 5: Cordaid should use Sphere standards as indicative and not as absolute standards. Indicators need to be contextualised in consultation with beneficiaries. Shelter solutions need to be modular so that beneficiaries can more easily adapt them to their needs (size). This would need to include the option to build two storeys in dense urban areas, allowing extended families to stay together or to rent out part of their house as part of a livelihoods strategy, whilst at the same time addressing the housing needs of tenants.

On the other hand the owner driven housing approach and integrated neighbourhood approach pilots in Tisous and Villa Rosa and CHF project in Ravine Pintade contributed to more appropriate shelter solutions and provided important opportunities to connect with a wider set of needs and potential for livelihoods development. However, due to the late start of this approach, it yielded only partial results.

Recommendation 6: Cordaid needs to adopt an owner driven housing and integrated neighbourhood approach to its shelter programming whilst addressing the broader needs of the population, in particular WASH and livelihoods and should implement this concept right from the beginning.

Cordaid’s implementation focused on providing shelters. Other needs were identified, but Cordaid’s attempts to address these were only successful in the two pilot projects in the urban programme. Nevertheless, the integrated approach piloted on a very limited scale generated promising results in owner driven housing, drinking water and infrastructure.

Beneficiary perspectives of programme outputs (shelters) are very positive. The quality and sustainability of the shelters, the self managed repairs and house reconstructions resulting from the owner driven approach, is higher than what normally would be considered T-shelter, suggesting that Cordaid can rightly claim to have provided permanent housing solutions.
6.4 Impact

Committees brought together members of the community from different CBOs who previously had had little interaction. In this way they performed an important bridging function between these groups, strengthening social capital and social infrastructure for the future development of their local community.

Their involvement in the Cordaid shelter programme provided individual committee members with skills and understanding of their community, strengthening their legitimacy and make them better advocates for their communities. Focus group respondents reported a high level of satisfaction with the work of their committees. Even those who did not participate in the selection of the committee members stated that no one could have represented them better than their current committee. The community action planning process provided them with an important experience. Nevertheless, Cordaid could have done more in terms of capacity building though training or facilitating meetings of the eight area committees to discuss common problems and solutions more systematically.

More impact may have come from an earlier and fuller implementation of other project components in particular livelihoods and social protection. Again, it needs to be pointed out that these are not necessarily components which can be implemented in an emergency phase, as they require longer-term commitments and specific expertise.

Recommendation 7: Cordaid business units with responsibilities in urban development, livelihoods and conflict transformation need to engage earlier and more proactively in order to ensure that future emergency programmes have even more impact.

6.5 Efficiency

The average cost (including all overheads) for each of the 6033 shelter solutions is USD 4475, which taking into account the social results, seems a relatively low cost per shelter solution.

Unfortunately, there is no basis for comparing direct implementation with outsourcing. The argument that extending the chain by paying partners’ overheads, requires additional transaction costs can be easily offset by the argument that Cordaid also outsourced and funded technical quality assurance and risk management.

Cordaid directors in The Hague clearly indicated during our interviews that there is no way that the incidental nature of emergency funding through channels such as SHO can be used as a basis for developing the required management infrastructure on a permanent basis.

26 based on an overall expenditure of €27 million.
## Annex 1: Key Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Paul Borsboom</td>
<td>Adjunct Sector Manager, Emergencies, Cordaid The Hague</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Michiel Mollen</td>
<td>Policy Advisor, DRR, Cordaid The Hague</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Edith Boekraad</td>
<td>Sector Manager, DRR and Emergencies</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Miranda Visch</td>
<td>Programme Officer Haiti, Cordaid The Hague</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Marten Tjaart Raadsveld</td>
<td>Financial Expert Haiti, Cordaid The Hague</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Jeannette Hamersma</td>
<td>Programme Officer DRR, Latin America, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Astrid Frey</td>
<td>Programme Officer Conflict Transformation, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Anna Wachtmeister</td>
<td>Project officer Urban Matters, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Henri van Eeghen</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Inge Leuverink</td>
<td>Policy Officer Emergency Aid, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Eric Van Der Horst</td>
<td>IT advisor, Cordaid The Hague</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Will de Wolf</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Team Leader, Haiti (January 2010 – 1 March 2010)</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Wim Piels</td>
<td>HoM Cordaid Haiti</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>Rene Grotenhuis</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer, Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Piet Spaarman</td>
<td>Head of Mission, Haiti</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Henk Meijerink</td>
<td>Shelter Manager, Haiti</td>
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<td>Koen Wagenbuur</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Jip Nelissen</td>
<td>Assistant Shelter Manager, Haiti</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>James Morgan</td>
<td>Rural Shelter Programme Manager, Haiti</td>
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<td>Agathe Nougaret</td>
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<td>Vera Kreuwels</td>
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<td>Océan Luckson</td>
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<td>Pierre Lenz Dominique</td>
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<td>Robert Phoa</td>
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<td>James Morgan</td>
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<td>Guet Saint Fleury</td>
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<td>Kees de Gier</td>
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<td>Niek de Goeij</td>
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<td>Jean Sorel</td>
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<td>Rob Padberg,</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Gordon Goodell</td>
<td>Team Leader Build Change, Haiti</td>
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<td>Madame Michel</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Flaucin Civile</td>
<td>CASEC, Lompre, Léogâne area</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Karine Fournier</td>
<td>Canadian Red Cross, Léogâne</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Jean Danton Leger</td>
<td>Depute, Leogane</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Jean Cristel Decine</td>
<td>Executive Secretary, Léogâne municipality</td>
<td>Cordaid The Hague</td>
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<td>Sarcossin Toure</td>
<td>Construction Manager, CARE Haiti</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Carolina Cordero-Scales</td>
<td>Programme Director, CARE Haiti</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Jean-Christophe Adrian</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Adeline Carrier</td>
<td>Urban Reconstruction Advisor, UNHABITAT</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Maggie Stephenson</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor, UNHABITAT</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Yvon Jerome</td>
<td>Mayor of Carrefour, Haiti</td>
<td>CARE Haiti</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Raoul Pierre Louis</td>
<td>Kazec Villa Rosa, Haiti</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Nancy Doran</td>
<td>Project Manager Architecture for Humanity, Haiti</td>
<td>CARE Haiti</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Benoit Berge</td>
<td>Head of Mission Architectes de d’Urgence, Haiti</td>
<td>CARE Haiti</td>
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
Evaluation of the Cordaid Haiti Shelter Program 2010-2012

1. Responsibilities and lines of communication

The evaluation was initiated by Paul Borsboom, Head Emergency Assistance

The evaluation process is managed by Piet Spaarman, Head of Mission in Haiti. He will coordinate the evaluation activities together with the Shelter Program senior management.

The evaluation will be implemented by a team of at least 2 external evaluators. Utmost effort will be undertaken to enlist the services of a Haitian consultant to be part of the team. The team will have a team leader reporting to Piet Spaarman.

The evaluation will be guided by a reference group consisting of Miranda Visch, desk officer Emergency Assistance, Inge Leuverink, Policy Officer, and a Monitoring and Evaluation Expert from the SHO Quality Working Group. The reference group advises the coordinating team. The reference group will comment on the draft Terms of Reference for the evaluation and on the draft final report. The reference group will convene at least two times during the course of the evaluation.

The results will be shared with:

- The Cordaid Haiti office and its shelter program staff
- Cordaid HQ: the Haiti Disaster Risk Reduction / Emergency Aid department, both at desk and management level, the working group on shelter, related departments/business units such as Conflict Transformation, Urban Matters, Entrepreneurship and Health.
- SHO back office and quality working group
- the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH) in particular
- Cordaid Haiti shelter partners and local coordinating mechanisms
- Beneficiaries

2. Context and history

For more than 30 years Cordaid has been supporting over 30 church and non-church organizations in Haiti in the domains of food security (Haiti North, Plateau Central and the South-East), disaster risk reduction, health & protection (especially themes related to gender based violence and HIV/AIDS), upgrading of slum areas and civil society capacity building. During the last few years this support had a size of some EUR 2.5 m per year (see annex 1, list of partner relations 2011).

Following the January 12 earthquake some of Cordaid’s partners became engaged in emergency activities, mainly food distributions through the BND school feeding program and the networks of other local partners. Caritas Jacmel (food, hygiene kits, clothing, medicine), SOE and URAMEL (primary health care services).

Many partners sustain heavy damage due to the earthquake and are unprepared and not equipped to embark on large scale emergency response activities in the sense of expertise, design logic, monitoring and adherence to sophisticated standards of accountability. Cordaid therefore opts to become operational and starts an emergency office in Haiti in March 2010. At the same time, Cordaid deploys a staff member to assist partners in damage assessment (including their own) and to undertake quick response interventions in the first weeks.
Cordaid’s operational presence in Haiti

Cordaid, now operational in Haiti, proceeds to design and implement a good number of interventions in the direct aftermath of the earthquake. Among the first response interventions in the first months after the tragedy, the provision of temporary shelter (next to food, water, medical care, partner support) constitutes a significant part of the activities.

From mid 2010 onwards, the overall Cordaid Haiti Program (excluding the so-called MFS-funds) amounts to EUR 37,665,000 and is allocated to five sectors (Shelter, Health, Livelihood, Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Preparedness, and Emergency Aid and Program Support).

The Shelter program consists of construction, repairs, neighbourhood improvement, and water & sanitation, it has a budget of EUR 21,852,689 and expects to raise another EUR 5,292,311.

Two operational shelter programmes are launched:

- the Rural Shelter program in the area around Leogane. Active from March 2010 the project targeted initially the rural communities of Lompré (1st and 2nd section) in Leogane and the 7th section of Grand Goâve commune. At a later stage Grand Goâve city was added when it was ascertained that this area was not covered by any agency, while the damage was very high.
- from November 2011 onward the Urban Shelter program in Carrefour and Turgeau, two sections of Port-au-Prince containing hard hit slum areas: Tisous and Cocteau and St Marie & Villa Rosa respectively.

The choice is made for high quality shelter construction, opting for ferro-cement walls and concrete floors that give the T shelters an expected lifespan of 15 years. For repairs, the option chosen was to retrofit damaged houses in order to build back better. The finished houses comply with technical standards and beneficiaries have expressed their satisfaction during regular monitoring visits.

In August 2011 the Integrated Neighborhood Approach and Owner Driven Housing are adopted in the urban setting. In short, this entails neighborhood dwellers organizations take a holistic view of their environment and interventions being based on their priorities in an interlinked way. These interventions include, but are not limited to community-based mapping, rubble removal, WASH, DRR and infrastructure projects. Owner Driven Housing supposes that future house occupants take charge of construction or repair, receiving technical assistance and subsidies to complement their own funds, on the basis of verification of technical quality.

3. Purpose and intended use

The main objective of the Evaluation is to provide insight in the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of the shelter program in 2010 and 2011 and to learn from the process through which the results are achieved. Furthermore, the evaluation serves an accountability purpose by reporting how the funds provided by the Ministry and the general public in the Netherlands have been put to use and to what effect.

The evaluation will serve two purposes:


1. To provide lessons learned for Cordaid to improve the effectiveness of the processes and appropriateness and relevance of the shelter related interventions at both field level and headquarters in The Hague, The Netherlands.

2. To account for the results achieved with the program, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most notably on three aspects:
   a. Appropriateness of the intervention
   b. Efficiency
   c. Effectiveness and Timeliness of the intervention

Use

In order to ensure wide dissemination the final evaluation report and its summary (policy brief) will be published in English and French. Dissemination will take place through printed reports as well as electronically by posting the report on the websites of Cordaid Haiti and Cordaid The Hague, the SHO and ALNAP.

It is envisaged to organise a workshop in Haiti to validate the provisional results and a workshop in the Netherlands to discuss the evaluation report with Cordaid senior staff and SHO, staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested parties.

The evaluation will provide a comprehensive overview of the activities which have been implemented in 2010 and 2011 and will assess their results. Parts of the Cordaid shelter program are commissioned or subcontracted to local and international organizations such as IDEJEN, CARE, Build Change, Fondation Architects d’Urgence, Architecture for Humanity. The evaluation will assess the results obtained by these subcontractors and will look into the rationale and quality of the relationship with Cordaid Haiti.

4. Scope

The evaluation will create an overview (mapping exercise) of the expenditures, allocations and policy and implementation choices being made in 2010 and 2011. A first succinct overview is found in the introductory remarks above, under “context and history”.

Projects: the evaluation will include SHO funded Cordaid T-shelter interventions in Haiti, project nrs: 102233 (Emergency Shelter 2010), 102705 (Rural Shelter), 104606 (Urban Shelter).

The evaluation will also cover (attempted) activities related to direct construction and repairs, such as community development, WASH, DRR, Urban and regional planning and livelihood.

Timewise: All activities related to the above mentioned project in 2010 and 2011, whereby the end of December 2011 will be taken as a cut-off point. This is also the period covered by SHO’s 2010 and 2011 report which is expected in April 2012.

Geographical: The evaluation will in principle cover all SHO funded activities in all areas and neighbourhoods that form part of the shelter program geographic coverage. In scoping the evaluation, the relative importance of these areas will be taken into account. For instance, in terms of actual construction the rural program forms the bulk of the expenditure. The relative weight of various intervention modes will be expressed in the selection of areas to be reviewed in more detail.

5. Key questions

(note, “Cordaid” is taken to mean the Cordaid Haiti office and its affiliates/subcontractors)
**Appropriateness as perceived by target group/end users (make this gender specific):**

- Who has benefited from the program. Identify if / which vulnerable groups were not reached.
- How were beneficiaries selected and what are eventual side effects from beneficiary selection for communities.
- Were the technical design decisions and – solutions (i.e. the choice for semi permanent shelters) , appropriate for the end users?
- What are beneficiaries/communities perspectives about needs identified outside the scope of repairs and construction (f.e. WASH, DRR, Livelihood interventions)
- How successful were Cordaid’s efforts to engender it’s approach and interact with the beneficiaries?

**Appropriateness at other levels**

- Was the intervention appropriate with regard to the specific characteristics of the disaster: (semi) urban setting, scale, weak governance, damage to institutional structures (government as well as NGOs)?
- Were the shelter program strategies and implementation choices coherent with the cluster system, national reconstruction plans and strategies?
- How do the achieved results and the manner in which they are achieved, compare against international quality standards Cordaid strives to adhere to as defined in the Sphere standards and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and NGOs in disaster response programmes.

**Efficiency**

- Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources – taking into consideration the context in which the intervention had to be implemented, e.g. costs to be incurred to reach the beneficiaries, and application of benchmarks for the costing of support items? Take note that in some cases Cordaid opted for outsourcing, extending the chain of partners (international as well as local) , contractors, subcontractors and implementers. Compare efficiency of more direct implementation with outsourcing.
- Did the major policy and implementation choices correspond to the changing needs of the target population?
- Analyze the quality, efficiency and transparency of the decision making process for the main choices and major shifts. Decisions made by whom and on which grounds? Specify roles and responsibilities de facto held by HQ and Field levels and compare to de jure design of the process.

**Of specific interest:**

**Human resources**

The decision to become operational and engage in a fairly massive operation (>100 staff) is, as far as Cordaid is concerned, exceptional. Evaluate identification of HR needs ( capabilities needed for the programme) and HR deployment and how decisions in HR affected the programme process. On what basis and by whom was the decision reached to hire this large nr of staff? Were alternatives considered? By which levels in the organisation? The deployment of a number of young “barefoot” expatriate architects in management positions is also fairly unique. Evaluate expat and consultancy inputs for the projects and if/how these could have been more effective over time considering HR context ( national and international)
Social Capital

In its shelter program Cordaid Haiti aims to apply a support driven, people-centered reconstruction approach. Through community based interventions, involving national partner organization and community groups, Cordaid aims to strengthen social capital. The strategy also fosters an increase over time in the responsibility of local communities and partner organizations. It also aims to maximize the use of local materials, local labor and local skills/techniques. These objectives do not necessarily contribute to timeliness and efficiency of the operation. How were these objectives defined and by whom? How did strategic choices deal with possible conflicting objectives.

Contracting out

In later stages, more emphasis was placed on partnering with other international NGOs (Build Change, Fondation Architects d’Urgence, Architecture for Humanity, Care, etc.). What are consequences in terms of policy coherence and cost efficiency. How and by whom were these partners identified, what were criteria for selection? Was the contracting procedure cfm standing instructions?

Effectiveness & Timeliness

- Make an inventory of the assessment process and mention strengths and weaknesses. Look at following elements: - TOR for assessment formulated and agreed/shared HO/ Field?
- assessment methodologies used ; did they include participative assessment methodologies?
- relevance of and gaps (if any) in assessment data (in hindsight)
- describe how assessment data were used in decision making process? In which phase in the program, by whom?

- Was there an adequate system for monitoring and evaluation in place in Cordaid Haiti?
- Identify major effects (negative and positive) at beneficiaries, communities or other stakeholders (local government), fostered by the programme
- Were there any unintended side-effects (negative or positive)?
- Did Cordaid analyse existing capacities affiliates/partners and analyse required capacities or competences (HR needs assessment) in different project phases to achieve objectives? How did Cordaid use existing capacities of affiliates/partners?

Make this time and period specific: period March-November 2010, December-August 2011, September-December 2011.

- Analyze the effectiveness and timeliness of Cordaid’s efforts to access backdonor funding
- Compare the response time of Cordaid’s shelter interventions with similar shelter interventions of other NGOs in Haiti.

Lessons Learned

- On the basis of the evaluation outcome, formulate the most important recommendations for Cordaid’s shelter response. Distinguish between appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness & timeliness.
- What areas in the intervention or PM cycle including the decision making process could be approved in order to increase effectiveness of the intervention. Could decision making processes be designed differently for better results?
6. Methodology

It is the responsibility of the consultant, in collaboration with the Head of Mission and the reference group, to develop a methodology, in-line with NLRC standards. It is suggested at the moment to consider as a minimum:

1. Desk study
   a. Inventory of SHO funded shelter interventions implemented in 2010 and 2011
   b. Analysis of relevant programme documentation: Monthly reports, needs assessments, Community Action Plans, project/programme plans, progress and completion reports, reviews and evaluations which will enable to (partially) answer the evaluation questions.
      This information will be obtained from Cordaid Haiti, the contracted partners for the shelter program, Cordaid HQ.
   c. Analysis of reviews and evaluations which have been carried out (the Cordaid real time evaluation and the IOB evaluation, as well as other reviews and evaluations conducted or commissioned by other agencies) in order to be able to triangulate the findings of the current evaluation and put them into context.

2. Interviews
   With Cordaid Haiti staff and former staff, managers/ coordinators and technical advisers of each of the significant shelter partner organisations to discuss issues which emanate from the analysis of the documentation mentioned under 1a and 1b.
   Through historic analysis, trends and assumptions will become clear. The information gathered through secondary sources will be complemented and verified by conducting interviews at the headquarters level and, in view of the fast turnover of key staff, with former staff members. Consultants and advisers where possible. These interviews will amongst other things provide a perspective on the ways in which the interventions have evolved, what assumptions have been used and how the process of strategic decision making in program development has been structured.

3. Detailed investigation at field level
   Based on the insights obtained in the first stage, a purposive sample of activities will be selected for more detailed investigation at field level. The evaluation team will indicate which activities will be investigated, and how they are selected, as well as which method(s) for investigation will be deployed and inform Cordaid beforehand.
   The detailed investigation will entail a 3 week mission to Haiti aimed at probing deeper into the results and data on the ground, looking at the ways in which the activities have been implemented as well as bringing in a wide-range of stakeholder perspectives on the ground.

7. Profile of the evaluation team

Experience

- Demonstrated experience with evaluating large scale emergency/reconstruction/recovery projects, preferably shelter programs
- Up-to-date knowledge of current (participatory) evaluation tools and methods for evaluation
- At least 5 years experience in Disaster Management
- Knowledge of Caritas structures and preferred ways of working is an advantage
- Knowledge of the Haitian context before and during the emergency intervention period

Skills

- Efficient communication
- Strong analytical skills
- Ability to process and analyse different types of data
- Excellent interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity
- Ability to work effectively in intercultural settings
- Excellent computer skills; the evaluator should be an advanced word-user and able to deliver attractive visual presentations.
- Fluency in English and French language, Creole is preferred
- Ability to write concise, yet comprehensive and attractive reports
- Ability to meet deadlines

A gender balanced team with at least one Haitian national is preferred. The team will be headed by a team leader.

8. Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timing/completion date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of ToR</td>
<td>7 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review by Shelter staff and policy/contracting parties</td>
<td>29 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(BC, FAU, AFH, )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of draft ToR by reference group</td>
<td>29 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalisation of ToR</td>
<td>15 March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage consultants</td>
<td>1 April 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk study phase (incl. interviews in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>9 April – 13 April 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of information to Cordaid Haiti on the field work stage (activities selected and field work approach and methods)</td>
<td>By last week of April 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field study phase</td>
<td>In the period 7 May – 17 May 2012 (NB. field work might be perturbed by territorial elections in May)</td>
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9. Deliverables

The evaluator will write a report in the English language and one in the French language on the conducted evaluation. The evaluation report shall contain no more than 25 pages (excluding annexes but including an Executive summary (‘Policy Brief’) of maximum 5 pages). The report must comply with OECD DAC Evaluation Quality Standards. The report must be submitted before 26 May 2012.

The report shall contain a general summary and sections covering methodology, analysis and findings. Recommendations will need to be concrete and applicable within the Cordaid resources and mandate and have clear responsibilities attached.

It is envisaged to organise a workshop in Haiti to validate the provisional results and a workshop in the Netherlands to discuss the evaluation report with Cordaid senior staff and SHO, staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested parties.
Annex 3: Role of Group 5

by Henk Meijerink

Cordaid emergency department contracted Group 5 (part of framework agreement / shelter advisory services – Henk Meijerink). Group 5 reported to Adjunct sector manager emergencies (Albert de Haan). The manager discussed (alternative) proposals from shelter advisor with the Taskforce as basis for strategic decision-making. As such the external shelter advisor provides the “on-call” technical shelter expertise to HQ (emergency dept/task force) up till June 2010 (see below).

In early February 2010 Cordaid decided to provide housing assistance (emergency, transitional shelter). Cordaid requested G5 to prepare a proposal to implement the first year programme (t‐shelters). G5 contacted potential candidates (young architects, engineers, logisticians). A week later Cordaid came back on this request and had decided (taskforce?) to implement the programme themselves, since it was the intention to establish a 3 to 5 year operational field office. The CVs of the young professionals were given to Cordaid. Cordaid recruited most of them (plus some additional staff).

Cordaid started the advertisement/recruitment process for a shelter manager. Since procedures were expected to take approx.. 3 months, Cordaid requested G5 to second consultants to Cordaid Haiti in the meantime. These consultants reported to the HoM – Paul Borsboom (no relationship with G5, apart from admin). The G5 shelter advisor reported to the HQ (Albert de Haan and Wim Piels being temporary PV) and assisted in the start up i.e. procurement (together with IPA).

In April 2010 Cordaid contracted a shelter manager (Stephen Adams). The seconded G5 consultants remained involved as asst. shelter manager Leogane and to assist in commencement urban programme. The shelter manager became in fact the Rural shelter manager (to further the t‐shelter construction programme). Stephen Adams left after 3 months (one of the main issues was the working relation with the HoM- Wim Piels, who took over the shelter manager position, and disagreement over the change in strategy regarding permanent walling versus tarpaulins).

The last mission of the shelter advisor (Henk M.) ended 15th June 2012 (with tenders for 1850 evaluated and contracts ready to sign) with a report (mission notes) to HQ.

In October 2012 the advisor was requested to return to Haiti, with the main task to advice the new HoM (Ron Langford) re-start the construction of t‐shelter programme. After one week it became evident that the HoM did not need an advisor but an implementer i.e. Shelter Manager. HQ agreed and the shelter advisor became (temporary) Shelter Programme Manager from then on. Cordaid succeeded to recruit an Urban Shelter Manager in December 2010 and long-term Shelter Programme Manager in January 2011 (plus a project manager).

Unfortunately the long-term Shelter Programme Manager resigned after 3 months and G5 (Henk M) was requested to take over that position again. Since the consultant could not be available full time (3 to 4 weeks max.) the HoM took over the position during his absence. From Oct. 2011 this was taken over by another consultant (Koen Wagenbuur). From January 2011 the Shelter Programme Management was outsourced to G5 (Henk M, Koen W, and Jip Nelissen). From 16th April 2012 this included also the rural shelter manager (James Morgan).