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For more information about MIND follow the campaign:

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Translation by Frank van Lierde and Lisa van den Assem
Graphic design by Vanden Broele Group
Layout by Haagsblauw
Cover illustration by Jean Bernard Boulnois
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Migration is a fact of life. It has always existed, and will continue to exist during our lifetime and beyond. Historically, migration has brought great benefits to the Netherlands and to many other countries and places around the world. Therefore, we see migration first and foremost as an opportunity that can benefit the migrant, the country of destination, as well as the country of origin. This is why Cordaid has joined the Caritas Share the Journey campaign – launched by Pope Francis in September 2017. This global campaign promotes and inspires societies and communities to welcome, protect, promote, and integrate migrants and refugees.

Migration is a complex process, with multiple and very diverse causes and consequences. In 2008, the Dutch government launched its first ever migration and development policy. Part of its six pillars of focus was to promote the relation between migration and development, to facilitate the role of the diaspora and to decrease the costs of sending remittances. Five years later, this policy framework was reduced essentially to the promotion of returns of (irregular) migrants to their countries of origin. The current Rutte III government1 published its new “comprehensive agenda on migration” in March 2018, with policy intentions for again six pillars. This was followed in May 2018 by the launch of a new policy on Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation (Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingsaanwerking, BHOS) that would respond to “major changes and serious challenges: growing conflict and instability, large flows of refugees and migrants, the continued existence of extreme poverty in developing countries, high levels of population growth in certain regions, climate change, inequality of opportunity, rapid technological developments and digitalisation, rising protectionism, steep international competition and a looming trade war” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

Both policy frameworks are essential to the migration and development nexus, and to Cordaid’s advocacy efforts. Since 2014, Cordaid was one of six pioneers of the Migration and Development civil society network (MADE), leading the CSO campaign to integrate migrants and migration in the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development. In 2017 the MIND project was launched to create a better understanding of these complexities, and to respond to the challenges with humanity and respect. MIND, which stands for Migration, Interconnectedness, and Development, is a three-year European Caritas project supported by the European Commission and the Dutch foundation Porticus. It includes Caritas organisations in 11 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, as well as the regional secretariat of Caritas Europa.

MIND aims to improve public understanding of the relation between sustainable development and migration, the role of migration in EU member states, and the EU’s contribution in development co-operation. It intends to increase the engagement of European society, its actors and its institutions, including government authorities, civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector, faith-based actors, universities and knowledge centres, grassroots organisations, migrants and diaspora organisations, and refugee self-organisations.

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1 The Rutte III government is the third national government under Prime Minister Mark Rutte, in office since 26 October 2017 subsequent to the Dutch general election of 2017. It is a coalition government of the political parties: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD); Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA); Democrats 66 (D66); and the Christian Union (CU).
This research paper is part of a series of one European and eleven national publications. It provides an understanding of the conditions and issues that migrants and refugees face, and how these relate to migration and development policies in the Netherlands. It includes concrete recommendations on how to enable positive participation of migrants and their contribution to sustainable development, how to positively link migration to sustainable development, and on advocacy strategies particular to the Netherlands.

The Hague, May 2019
Kees Zevenbergen, CEO

It addresses three areas of concern:

■ Addressing root causes of forced migration: by identifying the reasons that force people to migrate, by contributing to the understanding of the relation between migration and sustainable development, and by addressing the immediate needs of forcibly displaced people.

■ Welcoming and integrating migrants and refugees: by identifying safe and legal pathways of migration, promoting humane asylum policies and migrants’ participation and long-term integration in our societies.

■ Facilitating migrants’ contribution to sustainable development: by involving migrants and diaspora communities as development actors in countries of origin and of destination.
Visies op migratie

Migratie is van alle tijden; het heeft altijd bestaan en zal altijd blijven bestaan. Wat sterk aan verandering onderhevig is, is het publieke en politieke debat rond migratie. De laatste jaren beheerst het onderwerp de actualiteit. De verhoogde aantallen vluchtelingen vanaf 2015 zorgden er voor dat de Nederlandse samenleving sterk verdeeld raakte tussen mensen die vluchtelingen verwelkomen en mensen die zich tegen hun komst verzetten, met daartussen een brede en diverse middengroep die opgeroepen werd om partij te kiezen. Xenofobie, stereotypering en angst namen toe. Populistische anti-migrantenpartijen en (sociale) media werden bepalend in deze polarisering van de Nederlandse maatschappij en in de vorming van de publieke opinie. In dit geparaliseerde debat zijn percepties niet altijd op feitelijkheden gebaseerd. Spreekt men tegenwoordig over migratie en migranten, dan bedoelt men bijna altijd vluchtelingen. Hoewel vluchtelingen slechts een klein deel vormen van de migranten in Nederland, krijgen zij verreweg de meeste aandacht.

De bijdrage van migranten


Daarnaast onderhouden migrantengemeenschappen en migrantenorganisaties in Nederland sterke banden met de landen van herkomst. Dat bevordert de bilaterale economische en handelsrelaties en biedt mogelijkheden voor lokale ontwikkeling van het thuisland. Je zou verwachten dat de Nederlandse overheid dat actief zou stimuleren. Maar in de praktijk blijkt dat de ondersteuning van de Nederlandse overheid voor dergelijke organisaties en gemeenschappen beperkt is. Professionele migrantenorganisaties werken soms samen met de Nederlandse overheid aan ontwikkelingsprojecten in landen van herkomst. Waar er vroeger specifiek beleid was om deze samenwerking, en ook de samenwerking met Nederlandse ontwikkelingsorganisaties, te bevorderen is daar vandaag de dag nauwelijks aandacht voor. Daarmee gaan kansen verloren om vanuit Nederland effectiever bij te dragen aan de aan ontwikkeling in de landen van herkomst.

Visie van Cordaid

Internationaal is er groeiende aandacht voor het creëren van meer kanalen en opties voor menselijke mobiliteit om zo de bijdrage van migratie aan ontwikkeling te verhogen. Ook Cordaid ziet migratie in eerste instantie als een kans: voor de migrant, voor het land van bestemming én voor het land van herkomst. Cordaid benadrukt ook de noodzaak van respect voor de mensenrechten en sociale bescherming voor migranten en vluchtelingen. Dit is ook de reden waarom Cordaid zich heeft aangesloten bij de Caritas Share the Journey-campagne die gelanceerd werd door de paus Francisca in 2017. De wereldwijde campagne is erop gericht solidariteit en gastvrijheid in samenlevingen en gemeenschappen te bevorderen. Zodat migranten en vluchtelingen beter worden beschermd en opgenomen, en sneller gaan deelnemen aan onze samenleving.

Bovendien is er in 2017 een migratieproject gelanceerd waarbij Cordaid één van de elf EU-deelnemers is. Het MIND-project – Migration, Interconnectedness, Development – heeft drie aandachtgebieden: het aanpakken van de grondoorzaken van gedwongen migratie, het gastvrij opnemen in de samenleving van migranten en vluchtelingen en het bevorderen van hun bijdrage aan duurzame ontwikkeling.
De inhoud van dit rapport


Obstakels die migranten ondervinden


Migratie en ontwikkeling in het Nederlandse beleid

Aanbevelingen

De 20 aanbevelingen in dit rapport richten zich op het aanpakken van de drijfveren en grondoorzaken van gedwongen migratie, het uitbreiden van veilige en legale migratieroutes en de integratie van migranten, en tenslotte het bevorderen van de bijdrage van migranten aan ontwikkeling. De aanbevelingen zijn in de eerste plaats bedoeld voor beleidsmakers, maar zijn ook gericht aan ngo’s en aan migranten en diaspora in Nederland.

Pak de drijfveren en grondoorzaken van gedwongen migratie aan:

1. Promoot de implementatie van de Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s), en in het bijzonder SDG 10.7 over veilige en legale migratie. Promoot de naleving van het Parijs-akkoord en de uitvoering van SDG 13 over klimaat. Promoot de naleving van SDG 16 over vrede en veiligheid, en de uitvoering van doelstelling 2 van Global Compact for Migration over het aanpakken van de grondoorzaken van gedwongen migratie.

2. Bevorder de implementatie van de andere SDG’s gericht op de verbetering van bestaanszekerheid (bijvoorbeeld SDG 1, 2, 8 en 11), toegang tot basisvoorzieningen (SDG 3, 4 en 6) en gendergelijkheid (SDG 5).

3. Besteed opnieuw 0.7 % van het Bruto Nationaal Inkomen aan ontwikkelingsaanpak (ODA); gebruik geen ODA voor de eerstejaarsopvang van asielzoekers, en bevorder beleidscoherentie voor ontwikkeling bij migratievraagstukken.

4. Steun ontwikkelingslanden die een groot deel van de opvang van vluchtelingen en ontheemden in de regio op zich nemen, zoals in Uganda, Ethiopië of Afghanistan. Zorg voor een groter aandeel van de Nederlandse bijdrage aan hervestiging, gezien de enorme druk op landen in de regio.


6. Creëer veilige en legale migratieroutes en bevorder de integratie van migranten

7. Ondersteun bewustmaken campagnes over discriminatie en xenofobie van vakbonden, politieke partijen en maatschappelijke organisaties in zowel de media, als sociale media.

8. Moedig politieke, sociale, educatieve, zakelijke, sportieve, religieuze en gemeenschapsleiders aan om met krachtige boodschappen op te roepen tot solidariteit, respect en gelijke behandeling voor iedereen en tegen alle racistische, xenofobe, religieuze of andere discriminatorende en haatzaaiende uitingen en vormen van geweld.


10. Roep de media op om op een verantwoordelijke wijze te berichten over de rechten en feitelijke bijdragen van migranten en vluchtelingen aan economie, cultuur en samenleving.

11. Ondersteun maatschappelijke organisaties en instanties die betrokken zijn bij migranten- en migratievraagstukken en die streven naar een meer gelijke en humanitaire houding ten opzichte van migranten en vluchtelingen.


Bevorder de bijdrage van migranten aan duurzame ontwikkeling

13 Zorg voor een snel en adequaat aanbod van taallessen, integratiecursussen en werkvergunningen voor nieuwkomers. Assisteer gemeenten waar mogelijk met kennis en advies over migranten. Zorg dat het lokale overheden makkelijker wordt gemaakt om migranten op te nemen en te laten integreren in de lokale gemeenschap.

15 Pleit voor ruimere en snellere erkenning van diploma’s en certificaten van vluchtelingen en migranten. Gebruik voorbeelden van goede en effectieve accreditatiesystemen, zoals in Duitsland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk – vooral in sectoren die kampen met een arbeidstekort.

17 Versoepel de regelgeving inzake dubbele nationaliteiten om contacten tussen Nederland en herkomstlanden te vergemakkelijken, waardoor migranten gemakkelijker kunnen handelen met het land van herkomst en voor werkgelegenheid kunnen zorgen.

19 Stimuleer de uitbreiding van circulaire migratieprojecten met inachtneming van lessen uit eerdere projecten en programma’s.

20 Vergroot de mogelijkheden en toegang voor laagopgeleide en jonge migranten om vaardigheden en kennis te verwerven en vergemakkelijk hun toegang tot tijdelijke vacatures in Nederland.
The Netherlands has a population of seventeen million inhabitants (2017). More than three million residents—nearly 20% of the population—have a non-Dutch background, counting immigrants and Dutch-born people with one or both parents born abroad. Just over half of the migrant-origin population, 1.7 million persons, are classified as having a non-Western origin. The majority, about 67%, of these non-Western immigrants originally came from Turkey, Surinam, Morocco, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. Some 1.4 million people have a Western immigration background. Most originally came from other European countries, the United States, Japan and Australia, as well as Indonesia, which, as a former Dutch colony, is classified as a country of ‘Western origin’. Most immigrants live in the West of the country. About 40% of the non-Western origin population of the Netherlands reside in the four major cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (UCL, 2018).

Dutch society shows different attitudes towards migrants and migration at different moments in time. Talking about migration and migrants in the Netherlands usually implies talking about refugees and asylum seekers. Whereas this group is only a small part of all migrants in the Netherlands, they receive most of the attention. With the increased inflow of refugees in 2015, the Dutch society became strongly polarised. Some people were welcoming refugees while others were against them—the vast majority in the middle not being heard. Moreover, stereotyping, fear and xenophobia became increasingly evident against all groups of migrants. Anti-migrant populist political parties and the media continue to play an important role in this division and in shaping public perceptions. However, the actual situation regarding migration in the Netherlands is quite different from these public perceptions, and how migration is portrayed and framed by populist discourses.

The research behind this publication shows the many ways in which migrants contribute to the development of the country, as well as to their countries of origin. This includes contribution to the economy and to society. All people who live in the Netherlands pay taxes, consume local products and services, and contribute to the Dutch economy and welfare system. Migrants fill up high numbers of positions that otherwise remain vacant. Furthermore, migrants and migrant organisations in the Netherlands develop strong ties with the countries of origin, all of which can be fruitful for bilateral businesses and the economy. However, the Dutch government only provides limited support and resources for such organisations. Professional migrant organisations work sometimes together with the Dutch government on development projects in the Netherlands, as well as in the countries of origin. Creating more channels and options for human mobility is seen as a solution for enhancing the contributions of migration to development, as well as ensuring the respect for human rights and social protection for the people concerned. Migration and mobility can contribute considerably to countries from which migrants are coming, as well as to the Dutch economy, as it already has for Europe’s development.

All groups of migrants coming to the Netherlands encounter different obstacles and difficulties when they arrive in Dutch society. For many, problems start already abroad, when they need to obtain a visa for the Netherlands. For certain regions around the world—mainly in Africa and Asia—obtaining a visa is complicated in terms of conditions and requirements. However, for high-skilled temporary migrants, such issues do not apply, but if migrants aim to stay in the Netherlands for a longer time, legal restrictions, and societal difficulties come...
INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL REPORT

This report is based on academic literature and policy review, data analysis as well as on interviews with migrants and migration experts. Chapter II shows Cordaid’s vision on development and migration. In Chapter III the national migratory context is provided. The migratory background of the Netherlands and the most recent statistics and figures are given. Next, in Chapter IV the contributions that migrants bring to the Netherlands are highlighted, as well as to their countries of origin. The chapter is divided in two sections. One is focussed on migrants’ contribution to development in the Netherlands, and the other on migrants’ contribution to development in their country of origin. Chapter V focuses on the obstacles that impede migrants’ contribution to development in the Netherlands and in the migrants’ country of origin. This chapter is also divided into two sections: a section about the obstacles for development in the Netherlands, and another one about the obstacles for development in their country of origin. After that, Chapter VI outlines how the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals’ agenda is incorporated into the Dutch development policy. The chapter gives an overview of Dutch migration and development policy from 2008 to 2018 and highlights successful and promising policies and practices of the national and local governments, as well as of NGOs and migrant organisations. At the end, Chapter VII provides the most important conclusions and sets out recommendations for policy and practise, for the Dutch government as well as other relevant stakeholders.

Methodology

This national publication for the Netherlands is based on the analysis of academic literature, national and international policy documents, and statistical data. To reflect the most up-to-date developments, interviews with experts possessing extensive knowledge and professional experience on migration were conducted. Relevant conference presentations were used as well. A total of 13 interviews were conducted throughout the Netherlands between August and October 2018, most of them face-to-face. Experts from the European Commission, the International Organisation for Migration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, academics, municipalities, diaspora organisations, civil society organisations and NGOs were interviewed. People interviewed included individuals with Dutch background, as well as with Western and non-Western migrant backgrounds. (Annex 2).
For Cordaid, a human-centred approach is fundamental to every policy. Cordaid’s vision, actions and views are rooted in the Catholic principles of human dignity, solidarity, social and economic justice, equality and non-discrimination and promotion of the common good. Moreover, our work is grounded in human rights principles and instruments, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN Human Rights Conventions, and the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees; and in development policy frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

THE URGENT CHALLENGE TO PROTECT OUR COMMON HOME INCLUDES A CONCERN TO BRING THE WHOLE HUMAN FAMILY TOGETHER TO SEEK A SUSTAINABLE AND INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT.”

POPE FRANCIS (LAUDATO SI’, 2015)

Development

The pledge to “leave no one behind” and to ensure human rights for all is one of the cornerstones of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 2030 Agenda, with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, 169 targets and 230 indicators, was adopted at a UN Summit and subsequently by the UN General Assembly representing all 193 UN Member States; it establishes their commitment to a “just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met.” The 2030 Agenda has led in many ways to paradigm shifts in the perception of development: development applies to all countries on the planet not only to the so called developing regions; protecting the environment and tackling inequalities are considered as development goals; peace and justice are seen as integral parts; and the commitment and participation of all groups within all societies and states are required in order to achieve sustainable development for all. The worldwide consensus on development is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all human rights treaties; therefore, if states do not make progress on the actual realisation of human rights for all, the SDGs cannot be reached.

When it comes to the relation between migration and development, it is important to first define what development means. The term development encapsulates the elaboration of productive means, forces, capacities, organisation and output of goods, services, technology and knowledge to meet human needs for sustenance and well-being. It comprises building the means for: extraction and transformation of resources; production of goods, services and knowledge; construction of infrastructure for production, transportation and distribution; growth of capital as well as skills and labour; and the foundations for human welfare/well-being in terms of housing, nutrition, healthcare, education, social protection, and culture in its broad sense.
Cordaid uses the concept of integral human development, which places the human person at the centre of the development process. It may be defined as an all-embracing approach that takes into consideration the well-being of the person and of all people in seven different dimensions. Cordaid emphasises that this concept goes beyond the economic dimension, which relates to aspects such as: level of GDP, distribution of wealth and income, sustainability of growth, structure of the economy, degree of industrialisation, and State capacity to obtain revenue for human services and social protection. It also encompasses the political dimension, which includes issues such as: existence of the rule of law; respect for human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; democracy, in particular as a representative, and above all, participatory tool. Equally important is the social dimension, which focuses on quality of life in terms of nutrition, health, education, employment, social protection and social participation as well as equality of treatment and non-discrimination on any grounds namely aspects affecting gender equality. The work and economic activity dimension is vital as the means of self-sustenance and those of kin, of socio-economic engagement, and of direct contribution to development for most adults in all populations.

Since the Rio UNCED conference in 1992, the ecological dimension has gained importance, which refers to the respect for the goods of creation and to ensure the quality of life for future generations without ignoring this generation’s cry for justice. Lastly, the all-embracing approach of integral human development also considers the spiritual and cultural dimensions, which are important to the well-being of the person, and relate to issues such as identity of communities and peoples, as well as the capacity for intercultural and interreligious dialogue and respectful engagement among cultures and identities. Taken together, those dimensions underpin an integral approach to development (Caritas 2010).

The promotion of integral human development demands coordinated action of every person and all states for the sake of humanity based on two grounds: 1) social questions are global, and 2) social inequalities are a danger for peace. In this sense, development is not an act of mercy of wealthier countries towards poorer countries but must be the concern of us all – the human community. Pope Francis has recently called for an inclusive dialogue about “how we are shaping the future of our planet”, questioning the current model of development and the current condition of global society where inequalities and injustices are numerous, and more and more people are deprived of fundamental human rights. He deplored the ‘globalisation of indifference’, where people no longer look after each other.

Moreover, in 2015 in his encyclical, Laudato Si’ – On care for our common home, Pope Francis (2015) reminded us that the Earth is “our common home”, and that we need to address economic, social, political and environmental challenges together in an integrated manner. Exclusion and poverty, warfare, global inequalities, climate change, unsustainable consumption and growth – as well as forced displacement and migration – demand our utmost attention and engagement. The encyclical quickly became a reference document for Catholic social service as well as for development agencies worldwide, drawing attention both in and outside the Catholic Church. Pope Francis (2015) has argued that “the urgent challenge to protect our common home includes a concern to bring the whole human family together to seek a sustainable and integral development.” This demands “prioritising the weakest members of society as a way of measuring progress” (CAFOD et al. 2018: 16). With the national and European “Common Home” publications, Caritas draws on these messages to explore the complex interconnectedness between migration and development with its faith-based ethical framework, which is respectful of human rights and dignity.

Migration

Migration is a major feature of today’s globalised world. In broad terms, migration is the movement of people from one place of residence to another. While the term migration covers population movement internal to a country – rural to urban or from one locality to another in a different jurisdiction, the MIND project addresses international migration. International migration is a distinct legal, political and social category, as people move from a nation-state in which they are citizen with the rights and protections that citizenship normally confers, to other countries where rights and protections of nationality, of access to social protection, and of common identity often do not apply and where social and cultural paradigms may be different.

While there is no international normative definition for migration, international conventions provide agreed definitions for refugees and for migrant workers and members of their families; the latter applicable to nearly all international migrants. The definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees is: “Someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UN General Assembly 1951: 3). All EU member States have ratified both the 1951 refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW) states that the term “migrant worker” refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national (UN General Assembly 1990: 2). That convention recognises frontier worker, seasonal worker, seafarer, offshore worker, itinerant worker, and other specific categories of migrant workers as covered under its provisions. The ICRMW iterates that all basic human rights cover family members present with and dependent on migrant workers (UN General Assembly 1990). Data from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) shows that nearly all international migrants, whatever their reasons for migration or admission, end up economically active – employed, self-employed or otherwise engaged in remunerative activity.

A specific definition and the statistical standards needed to obtain reliable and comparable data on international migrants have been agreed under UN auspices and are used by most governments. For statistical purposes, an international migrant is defined as ‘a person who has resided in a country other than that of birth or citizenship for one year or more, irrespective of the causes or motivations for movement and of legal status in the country of residence.’

There are an estimated 260 million foreign-born people residing today in countries other than where they were born or held original citizenship. However, this figure does not include persons visiting a country for short periods such as tourists, commercial or transportation workers who have not changed their place of established residence. Many other persons with temporary, short-term or seasonal employment, and/or in other resident situations are not counted in UN and other statistics on migrants when their sojourn is less than a year and/or if they retain formal residency in their home or another country – even though they may fit the definition of migrant worker. For an informed analysis of the interconnectedness of international migration and development, Cordaid uses a broad understanding of migration, inclusive of all those who are refugees and asylum seekers as well as migrant workers and members of their families.

Development and migration

The question of how development is linked to migration is by no means new. Rather it is a centuries-old juridical, political and practical question. Vast forced and voluntary population movements from the 17th century onwards provided the necessary people to develop the Americas. Large-scale population movements fostered agriculture, mining and the industrial development of several colonies in Africa and Asia. The industrialisation of European nation-states likewise relied on migration, whether from rural areas or across the region.

Since the end of World War II, migration and development has been the subject of intense discussions among policy-makers, academics, civil society and the public. In 1952, Pope Pius XII dedicated an encyclical on “migrants, aliens and refugees of whatever kind who, whether compelled by fear of persecution or by want, is forced to leave his native land” (Exsul Familia 1952), reaffirming that people have a right to a life with dignity, and therefore the right to leave their country of birth.

In recent years, under the impulse of international organisations, and spurred by geopolitical events that greatly affected human mobility on a global scale, the relationship between migration and development has since the 1990s and 2000s become fundamental in contemporary political debates. The first global development framework to recognise the role of migration and its immense contribution to sustainable development worldwide was the Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo in 1994.3

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (on Financing for Development) and the 2030 Agenda On Sustainable Development, both agreed in 2015, referred to the potential role of migrants and migration and its contribution to development. The overarching contemporary framework is the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals. While explicit reference to migration and development is laid out in SDG Target 10.7 on “safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility,” many other SDG targets apply to migrants, refugees, migration and/or migration-compelling situations. These include SDG 8 (economic growth and decent work), SDG 13 (climate change and environmental degradation) and especially SDG 16 (peaceful societies and access to justice). The New Urban Agenda adopted in Quito in October 2015 gives explicit attention to migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons in its global development and governance framework for cities — where most migrants and refugees reside.

1 Extrapolated from UNDESA (2017). As noted in UNDESA estimates, “The estimates are based on official statistics on the foreign-born or the foreign population, classified by sex, age and country of origin. Most of the statistics utilized to estimate the international migrant stock were obtained from population censuses. Additionally, population registers and nationally representative surveys provided information on the number and composition of international migrants.”

2 The ICPD was the biggest conference ever held on population, migration and development with 11,000 delegates from 179 countries and some 4,000 participants in the parallel NGO Forum. Two of the ten chapters of the Programme of Action were entirely about migration and development. Adopted by all participating 179 State/governments, the ICPD Declaration and 20-year Programme of Action (extended in 2010) continue to serve as a comprehensive guide to people-centred development progress. http://www.unfpa.org/files/node/9638. This year, Nairobi will host the ICPD+25 follow-up conference in November.
In 2016, in the wake of severe and protracted conflicts in the Middle East and the collapse of basic provision for refugees in neighbouring countries, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, calling for improved global governance of migration and for the recognition of international migration as a driver for development in both the country of origin and of destination. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), adopted in 2018, elaborated on principles in the New York Declaration and suggested ways for implementing them through political dialogue and commitments (the agreements are non-legally binding). In particular, objective two of the GCM is to “minimize the drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin” (United Nations, 2018, p. 5).

The factors go beyond conflicts and persecution, and they include poverty, hunger, unemployment and lack of good governance as much as the consequences of climate change that do not fall under the protection of international conventions. Seen in this way, forced migration therefore encompasses all migratory movements where an element of coercion exists. Refugees and asylum seekers fleeing conflicts and persecution naturally have a particular claim and right to international protection.

Caritas also recognises that the overwhelming proportion of migration into Europe reflects most EU member countries’ need for ‘foreign’ labour and skills to maintain viable work forces capable of sustaining their own development. This demand results from rapidly evolving technologies, changes in the organisation of work, its location, and the declining number of local people active in the workforce, all of which reflects the local population’s ageing and declining fertility.

Cordaid sees migration as an integral part of human history. When it is safe and voluntary, migration can be an opportunity for the integral human development of migrants as much as for societies in the countries of origin and destination. Migrants and refugees, if given proper opportunities, contribute to the well-being of the place where they settle and also tend to provide much-needed support to their families and communities in the region of origin. When looking at the relation between migration and development, Cordaid believes that promoting development means ensuring that everyone can live in dignity wherever they live. Promoting development means ensuring that migration becomes simply an option among many for people to move forward, rather than a survival strategy. Such a vision also implies the recognition that migration, regardless of its drivers, should be seen as an opportunity for our societies to build a more prosperous, global Common Home, where everyone can make a contribution and live with dignity.

We believe that, regardless of the legal status in a country, migrants and refugees, like any other human being, possess inherent human dignity and human rights that must be respected, safeguarded and met by all states at all times. In certain regions, people may be so poor and excluded from social and economic opportunities that they do not even have the resources to migrate. In Cordaid’s view, both people who migrate against their will and those who remain have the right to find in their own countries the economic, political, ecological and social conditions to live with dignity and achieve a fully realised life. Cordaid calls for a human response to these tragedies and to assume the responsibility for integral human development worldwide and for the protection of people on the move – i.e. migrants and refugees.

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In this chapter, an overview of the Dutch migratory context is provided. In order to understand certain trends in migrant in- and outflows, it is important to know about certain historical episodes in the Netherlands. In the first section, a brief historical context is provided in which the most significant events that have influenced migrant movements to the Netherlands in the past and today are outlined. Secondly, the current migrant stock and most recent movements to and from the Netherlands are presented. Thirdly, the categorisation and distribution of migrants in the Netherlands are outlined.

1. The Dutch historical context

The Netherlands has always been a country of immigration. From the 17th century onwards many immigrants arrived in the Netherlands. Between 1600 and 1900 tens of thousands of seasonal workers went from Germany to the Netherlands every year. In the 17th century labour migration led to the revival of the cloth industry in Leiden. At that same time, growth in Amsterdam depended on migration since the mortality rate was higher than the birth rate. About 50% of the inhabitants of Amsterdam came from outside the Dutch borders at that time. Due to the welfare of the country, Dutch people were not interested in certain types of work – like maritime shipping (SER 2014). The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie; VOC) counted as one of the biggest multinational trade corporations of that time and employed many people from foreign countries. In the 18th century, the Dutch labour market already had some strikingly modern features such as high wages and seasonal labour shortages.

Figure 1: Immigration timeline, the Netherlands, 19th-21st century
Source: Adapted from Rath 2009; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; De Vries and Van der Woude 1997
since the 16th Century was the global reach of the 'Dutch empire' and its monopoly on mercantile shipping in many parts of the world. Dutch people settled permanently in a number of now former Dutch colonies or trading enclaves abroad. Following World War II, large numbers of Dutch emigrants moved to “New World” anglophone countries. Cross-border migration to Belgium and Germany has become more common since the year 2000, driven in part by rising cost of housing in major Dutch cities. By some estimates, the Dutch diaspora, counting those with Dutch ancestry, amounts to over 15 million people, almost equivalent to the current population of the Netherlands itself. Countries with more than a million people of Dutch heritage include Brazil (part of which was once a Dutch colony), Canada, France, South Africa, and the United States. While not the subject of this report, it can be said that Dutch emigration contributed hugely to the development of the Netherlands through trade; obtaining raw materials; expanding markets for ‘made in Holland’ goods, services and technology; economic activity in Dutch colonies; remittances; and so on. As noted below, remittances to the Netherlands have consistently exceeded the equivalent of 1 billion dollars annually in recent years.

2. Recent migration trends

In the next two sections, an overview of the national migration trends is provided, including detailed migration statistical data. Most data come from the National Statistical Office (CBS) and international statistical offices. The years represented in the tables and data sets aim at providing a clear overview of the period 2008-2018. The time-series data presented in the report highlight data in 4-year intervals (2008-2012-2016), and if data for 2016 is not available the most recent available data is displayed. Tables that represent single data sets show the most recent data available.

The Netherlands was at that time dependent on neighbouring countries with much lower living standards and working conditions than in the Netherlands. Institutional settings such as minimum wages, union organisations and unemployment insurances made the country attractive to immigrants. The Netherlands was and remained a rich country (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997). The most significant migratory developments of the 19th - 20th century are outlined in figure 1 (Immigration timeline, the Netherlands, 19th-21st century).

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Dutch government developed an increasingly restrictive migration policy; anti-immigrant political parties arose. The first politician concerned about migrant issues was Pim Fortuyn who became the leader of the political party “Leefbaar Nederland” in 2001. The political discourse became openly racist and anti-immigrant which then led to a tougher public discourse (Van Heelsum 2008). Anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments further developed. The tough discourse continued and in 2006 the anti-immigration, anti-Islam political party “PVV” (Freedom’s Party) was established. The populist political party of Geert Wilders made good use of the media in which the party’s ideologies were widely spread and well-received. When high numbers of refugees from the Middle-East and Africa arrived at the European borders in 2015, the public opinion became more polarised. Geert Wilders obtained the majority of the votes during the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2017 (De Koning and Modest 2017). Since 2015, the discussion about migration, refugees and migrants in the Netherlands became a priority issue in politics, the media and subsequently in Dutch society. Among all citizens of Western Europe, the Dutch citizens seem the least supportive in generous judgements of asylum applications (Bolt and Wetsteijn 2018).

Dutch emigration

Intercontinental emigration from the Netherlands has been occurring for more than four hundred years. A major factor

Figure 2: Emigration, immigration and net migration flows by region, the Netherlands, 2017
Source: Statline CBS.


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The population of the Netherlands in 2017 was 17,081,507. This number includes migrants, refugees, returning nationals and all other residents in the Netherlands. According to the
National Statistical Office (CBS), the net movements of nationals and non-nationals in 2017 are presented in table 1 (Emigration, immigration and net-migration flows, the Netherlands, 2017).

The movements to and from the Netherlands resulted in a net immigration of 80,665 people. The net emigration of Dutch nationals in 2017 was 10,547. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2018), the stock of the foreign-born population exceeded 2 million for the first time in 2018. In terms of nationality, inflows from Asia (including the Middle-East as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria) grew from 49,000 in 2015, to 65,000 in 2016, before falling to 52,000 in 2017. Inflows of people born in another European Union (EU) country rose from 77,000 in 2015 to almost 93,000 in 2017, accounting for 50% of the total migration inflow (OECD 2018). According to the CBS, this figure consists of movements from the regions outlined in figure 2 (Emigration, immigration and net-migration flows by region, the Netherlands, 2017).

The main countries of origin of the foreign-born people arriving in 2017 in the Netherlands were Poland (23,700), Syria (16,800), Germany (10,600), India (8,800), the former Soviet Union countries (8,700), China (6,700), the United Kingdom (6,600), Italy (6,500) and the United States (6,300).

| Table 1: Emigration, immigration and net migration flows, the Netherlands, 2017 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                | Number          | Percentage      | Net migration   |
| Total (all nationalities)      |                 |                 |                 |
| Immigrants                     | 234,957         | 100 %           | 80,665          |
| Emigrants                      | 154,292         | 100 %           |                 |
| Dutch Nationals                |                 |                 |                 |
| Immigrants                     | 32,831          | 14 %            | -10,547         |
| Emigrants                      | 43,378          | 28 %            |                 |

Table 2: Inflow by country of origin, the Netherlands, in 2008, 2012 and 2016


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>2,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>3,006</td>
<td>3,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>2,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>5,493</td>
<td>5,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>3,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>3,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>2,849</td>
<td>4,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>3,723</td>
<td>6,566</td>
<td>7,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>8,949</td>
<td>9,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>2,973</td>
<td>2,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3,602</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>7,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>2,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>3,355</td>
<td>5,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>2,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>3,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14,149</td>
<td>18,675</td>
<td>23,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>2,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>28,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>5,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>4,392</td>
<td>6,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>5,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statline CBS.
Many of the recruited migrant workers from Morocco and Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s stayed in the Netherlands and have reunited with family members, or formed families ever since. This has in turn led to a significant part of the Dutch population being of Moroccan or Turkish descent (respectively 391,088 and 400,367 first- and second-generation migrants). The presence of immigrants from Surinam started mainly after independence from the Netherlands in 1975 which brought about many people leaving Surinam to settle in the Netherlands. Indonesian Dutch people settled in the Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s after Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands in 1945 (Rath 2009).

In 2015 a high number of asylum applications were registered. A total of 44,970 persons applied for asylum that year, mainly from Syria and Eritrea (Conley and Ruy 2018).

The most recent numbers of emigration destinations from the Netherlands date from 2011 and included a total of 133,200 people. In table 3 (Emigration from the Netherlands, differentiated by origin and region, 2011) the emigration destination and the migrant background of the emigrants are outlined.

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The terms first and second generation migrants are sometimes used to make this distinction between people born outside the Netherlands with at least one parent who is also born outside the Netherlands, and people born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. However, by legal and statistical definition, people born in and residing in the country are not migrants; referring to them as such tends to reinforce their exclusion and discrimination against them.

Figure 3: Migrant and migrant origin stock in the Netherlands by country of origin, 2016
Source: Statline CBS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>The Americas</th>
<th>Asia (including Middle East)</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Europe (excluding the Netherlands)</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Dutch background</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Western migrant background</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>32,900</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With non-Western migrant background</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>11,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>64,300</td>
<td>29,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Emigration from the Netherlands, differentiated by origin and region, 2011
Source: Statline CBS.
3. Migrants admissions by category and spatial distribution in the Netherlands

a. Migrants admissions by category

Migration to the Netherlands is mainly demand driven by needs for labour and skills. The Netherlands is interesting for migrants seeking employment because it has a strong and one of the largest open economies in Europe (OECD 2018b). Of all migrants, most are European citizens that use their right of free movement. The inflow of refugees from outside Europe was much smaller than in many other European countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, France or Sweden (Münz 2018). This is partly due to the fact that refugees, in general, cannot easily reach the Netherlands through the Schengen area. A more significant group than the refugees are migrants coming for family reunification or family formation (see figure 4: Number of registered migrants by admission category, the Netherlands, 2008-2012-2016). Yet, Dutch citizens overestimate the number of migrants in the Netherlands with 2% more than the actual percentage of the population, which is 9.1% (European Commission 2018).

Migrants who arrive in the Netherlands are categorised by the National Statistical Office (CBS) in the following categories: labour, asylum, family migration, study, no migration reason (this category migrants have the Dutch nationality and are, for example, emigrants who resettle in the Netherlands), and other/unknown. The category asylum does not include everyone who applied for asylum, but only those who after their application were registered in a Dutch municipality.

Later in this report, in chapter “IV.1 Towards the Netherlands”, it is emphasised that the largest share of these migrants become economically active after arrival to the Netherlands. In table 4 (Number of arriving migrants by country of origin and by admission category, the Netherlands, 2016), a selection of countries with significant inflows as well as focus countries is displayed in relation to migration reason.

![Figure 4: Number of registered migrants by admission category, the Netherlands, 2008-2012-2016](image)

Source: Statline CBS.
In 2016, the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) issued 24,804 resident permits for family migrants. The main nationalities were Syrian, Eritrean and Indian. Another 14,600 permits were granted to migrant workers including 9,100 for highly skilled migrants and 2,500 for researchers. In the academic year 2017-2018, a total of 122,000 international students were enrolled in Dutch Universities. Additionally, there were almost 5,000 foreign PhD students in the Netherlands.

Alterations in rules for high-skilled labour migration allow them to engage in entrepreneurship in the Netherlands as long as the basis for their residence permit remains their primary activity. In addition, researchers no longer need a work permit (IND 2017; OECD 2018; Ep-Nuffic 2017).

### Spatial distribution of migrants in the Netherlands

Migrants reside in towns and cities across the Netherlands. In table 5 (Geographical distribution of immigrants by province, the Netherlands, 2017), the total population of the 12 provinces in the Netherlands is given and the distribution of the 234,957 immigrants who arrived in 2017 is given by province.

As displayed in table 5, the inflow of migrants peaks in North-Holland, South-Holland and North-Brabant. These provinces have the largest populations in the Netherlands. Furthermore, some of the largest cities in the Netherlands with the biggest and fastest growing economic centres (The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Eindhoven) are identified, explaining the high migrant inflows.
In this chapter it is outlined how migrants contribute to development in the Netherlands and in the countries of origin of the migrants. Everybody who works, lives and consumes in the Netherlands, contributes to the Dutch economy and prosperity. The role of migrant organisations herein is highlighted as well. Such organisations bring important contributions to the Netherlands and their country of origin. In the Netherlands, this is because they can serve as a bridge for other migrants of the same nationality and because they are important for the Dutch economy. In the country of origin, they contribute in terms of financial, social and intellectual remittances. The chapter does not only concern recently arrived migrants, but also people in the Netherlands with second-generation migrant backgrounds. The first section is concerned with migrants’ contribution to development in the Netherlands while the second focuses on migrants’ contribution to their countries of origin.

### 1. Towards the Netherlands

#### a. Participation in the labour market and productive employment

The total Dutch labour force at the end of 2017 was 9,042,000 people. The labour force in the Netherlands comprises all persons between 15 and 75 years old who are employed, or unemployed but actively seeking employment and available to start work. Of this number, 7,130,000 have a Dutch background, 888,000 have a Western migrant background and 1,012,000 have a non-Western migrant background. The unemployment rates are respectively 3.5%, 5.3% and 9.6% (Statline CBS 2018). From the total population (labour force and non-labour force) with a Dutch background, Western migrant background and non-Western migrant background, the labour participation by age groups in 2017 is outlined in table 6 (Labour force participation rates by migrant background and age groups, The Netherlands, 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group (years)</th>
<th>Dutch background</th>
<th>Western migrant background</th>
<th>Non-Western migrant background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-25</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-45</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-65</td>
<td>85.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-75</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Labour force participation rates by migrant background and age groups, the Netherlands, 2017
Source: Statline CBS.

![Figure 5: Working hours per week by Dutch and migrant background, the Netherlands, 2017 (Q4)](https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/82809NED/table?ts=1533973795203)

Source: Statline CBS.

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1. According to OECD definition of Labour force. See [https://data.oecd.org/emp/labour-force.htm](https://data.oecd.org/emp/labour-force.htm)
Of these numbers, there is a variation in labour participation in terms of part-time or full-time work. Figure 5 (Working hours per week by Dutch and migrant background, the Netherlands, 2017 (Q4)) shows the variation of average hours per week worked by people with different migrant backgrounds in the last quarter of 2017.

Migrants participate in many sectors of the Dutch economy. The Netherlands is home to numerous multinational corporations in which business people from all over the world are employed. Furthermore, the Dutch educational system attracts many international students and PhD researchers. A considerable number of migrants contribute to the Dutch economy in the low-paid and labour-intensive sectors such as the cleaning, agricultural and construction sectors. These sectors cannot survive nowadays without migrants. A significant number of migrants are working in the hospitality and care sector (CBS 2016). Furthermore, migrant experts have pointed out that some groups of migrants often end up in the informal economy with undeclared jobs or unauthorized employment (what the government terms ‘illegal work’) or some in illegal activities, after encountering difficulties in finding a regular job. Most migrant domestic workers are employed in private homes, outside the formal economy and outside protection of labour law. (The Netherlands has not yet ratified ILO Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers).

Another recognised pattern in people who do undeclared work is evident in migrant-owned businesses. In order to survive, some business owners employ family members off the books (Kloosterman, Rusinovic and Yeboah 2016). For all these people it is important that they return to the formal economy in order to claim the rights and obligations of the state (e.g. state unemployment benefits or state pensions). Nevertheless, as table 6 shows (Labour force participation rates by migrant background and age groups, the Netherlands, 2017), the majority of the migrants in the Netherlands are economically active.

In 2014, about 20,000 asylum seekers received Dutch asylum residence permits. More than two thirds of this group came from Syria (10,000) or Eritrea (4,000). With this permit, one is allowed to work or to start a business. In mid-2017, 11% of this group in the age group 18-65 years old had a job or was self-employed. Among the afore mentioned 20,000 people, differences are visible; 6% of the Eritreans and 29% of the Afghans were employed. After 1.5 year, 90% of the people who received the asylum residence permit were dependent on government allowance (in Dutch: uitkering); 1 year later this number dropped to 86%. Of the Syrian and Eritrean population, 90% was still depending on government allowance 2.5 years after receiving their residence permit (CBS 2017; CBS 2018). Almost 50% of all employed asylum seekers were in the hospitality sector. Besides, many refugees with a permit have temporary jobs (85%) from out-sourcing agencies. Most have part-time employment contracts (89%) (CBS 2017).

This trend is not surprising considering the different backgrounds of refugees. Most Eritrean refugees, for example, received very limited education or other skills-training back home. This makes it hard for them to find a job in a completely new environment with an unknown language and culture. Additionally, Bakker, Dagevos and Engbersen (2017) described the “refugee entry gap” that refugees are dealing with. This gap makes labour market participation of refugees substantially lower than that of other migrants in the Netherlands because of the different migration reasons (flight) and context of reception (asylum procedure). Such a hindered start, compared to that of other migrants, has a negative effect on these people who often arrive with existing mental health problems. The limited rights they have during the asylum procedure puts them in an even more fragile position which expects them to have a quick start and swift participation. The contribution of older- and middle-aged people, first-generation refugees to the Netherlands is limited in general. The contribution of the second-generation refugees and/or migrants is more substantial. For the first generation, it appears to be difficult to find a job and to integrate well into society. They first have to create stability for their families. After that, they are expected to participate and contribute as well. Mostly, they are keen to work and be supported by the government and non-governmental organisations, but still encounter difficulties. The second generation is generally ready to make the best out of their lives and contribute to a flourishing Dutch economy due to high motivation and expectations of family members.9

b. Participation in business activity

In 2017 there were 1,429,000 self-employed people in the Netherlands. Of this number, 154,000 had a Western migrant background and 127,000 a non-Western migrant background. The rest (1,147,000) were citizens with a Dutch background (Statline CBS 201810). In general, the Netherlands has an abundance of self-employed migrants and migrants who started their own business. This is most evident in sectors such as the construction industry, with many East European migrants, and the food industry with entrepreneurs and self-employed people from all over the world but mainly from Southern Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle-East. Furthermore, research conducted among first- and second-generation migrants demonstrated that first-generation migrants have a more dominant presence in the services sector such as finance, real estate and insurance, while

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9 Personal communication with Mr. Han Baartmans – Refugees the Netherlands (Vluchtelingenwerk/ NGO)
second-generation migrants are more active in ICT-businesses and in the creative sector (Baycan, Sahin and Nijkamp 2012). Research Conducted among entrepreneurs from Ghana who arrived in the Netherlands highlighted that most entrepreneurs are highly-educated and speak English fluently. They contribute to the “new urban economy” with small businesses and cognitive-cultural activities (Kloosterman, Rusinovic and Yeboah 2016). Such cognitive-cultural activities are specified by Otieno Ong’ayo (2016) in his paper on Ghanaians in Dutch cities. He outlined that neighbourhoods with large migrant concentrations in big cities host many businesses owned by migrants. The Ghanaians have a dominant presence in specific neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Almere and The Hague. In such neighbourhoods, they have set up shops, churches and meeting places for clubs and associations. Such establishments foster the creation of close ties within the Ghanaian community and with the country of origin. But these networks also facilitate housing, jobs and social amenities.

c. Contribution to the welfare system

All the people who live and work in the Netherlands contribute to the Dutch economy. All people in the Netherlands, including people with a migrant background, who pay taxes and consume goods and services, are contributing to the national social security system and the country’s prosperity. According to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the net fiscal contribution of a household with two Dutch-born citizens was $9,940, families with a mixed household contributed with $21,303 and migrant families contributed with $2,544 from 2007-2009 (OECD 2013: 176).

In the Netherlands, people receive a basic state pension when they reach the pension-age of 67 years (in Dutch: AOW-leeftijd). People who work in the Netherlands contribute to this pension because they are automatically insured by the AOW. A full pension is received by people who have been insured for 50 years before they reach the pension-age. The average contribution of people with a Dutch background, a Western migrant and a non-Western migrant background to the social security system for elderly (AOW) of 2008, 2012 and 2015 is outlined in figure 6 (AOW contribution by migrant background, the Netherlands, 2008-2012-2015). The percentage displayed in the table is the average percentage of the contribution to the maximum amount (100%) of the AOW.

By contributing to the AOW insurance system, one contributes to one’s own pension. A higher contribution means a higher pension. Everybody who contributes to the pension is contributing to the Dutch welfare system. The main reason why people with a migrant background build up less AOW-rights than people without migrant backgrounds is that they generally reside for a shorter period of time in the Netherlands which automatically leads to less years in which they can build up their pension. Since 2013, the legal age for retirement has increased which gives people with migrant backgrounds an advantage since they have more years in which they can work and thus contribute to their pension. Within different migrant groups there are also significant differences. People from Surinam, Turkey, Morocco and from the Dutch Antilles have built up respectively 90.8%, 88.4%, 87.5% and 82.7% in 2015, whereas the average of people with non-Western migrant backgrounds was 79.2%. The decrease in AOW-contribution among people with Western migrant backgrounds can be attributed to Eastern European migrants who recently settled in the Netherlands (CBS 2017a).

d. Contribution to community

Migrants and refugees contribute to diversity in the Netherlands in terms of cuisine, art, literature and music. All these aspects are visible in the day-to-day-life in the Netherlands and is appreciated by many. Especially in the

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* Most recent data available

Source: Statline CBS.
bigger cities, one can sense the highly international mobility and the diverse character of the Netherlands. Besides the numerous restaurants, one finds hair-dressers, beauty salons or Thai massage shops. Additionally, international business people and highly skilled migrants shape the character of the urban social fabric (Foner, et al. 2014). Refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea, among other countries, arrive from places with an old and rich history. They transfer culture and traditions to Dutch society. Values such as respect and care for the elderly or addressing mass-consuming habits that have become the norm are examples of social contributions to the development of the Netherlands.

Such contributions were highlighted by all migrant experts who provided numerous examples of migrant and refugee contributions. One example included the story of a Syrian boy who had an IT-background in Syria. Upon his arrival to the Netherlands, he started to work as a mobile application-builder. He had built a prize-winning application that helps refugees who recently arrived in the Netherlands to find their way in the Dutch society, and it also teaches them the basics of the country. In this example, the contribution that migrants and refugees can deliver with specific and unique knowledge and experience becomes evident.

Demographic changes in which more immigrants arrive and settle in Europe led to growing political power for migrant groups. In the Netherlands, this is evident at the local and the national level. In Amsterdam, 29% of the City Council has a non-Western migrant background (Mügge and Van Stigt 2018). At the national level, this is most visible in migrants who join existing political parties or those established by migrants (Verkuyten 2018). The most significant shift came from the political, left-wing movement ‘Denk’ which was established in 2015. This movement defends the interests of many immigrants in the Netherlands and grew significantly over the last years. In 2017 they participated for the first time in the national elections and obtained 3 (of the 150) seats in the Dutch parliament.

e. Immigrant- and diaspora organisational presence and contribution

Migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands are seen as important institutions that can build bridges between migrants, the Netherlands and the country of origin (Frouws and Grimmius 2012). The report: “Shared Concerns, Inadequate Co-operation” of the Ministry of Justice and Security (San 2016) outlines how diaspora organisations operate in the Netherlands and how their co-operation with the government functions. The report highlights the following points:

- Diaspora organisations create various “integration improvement” activities, sometimes with the support from the government – sometimes not;
- They provide support for all people that belong to their diaspora, no matter how they have arrived or why they have come to the Netherlands;
- Some organisations have made the return process to the country of origin their core business while others are strictly against this process;
- The relation between diaspora organisations and the government is different from one organisation to the next. Whereas the organisations tend to be more critical of the government and complain in many cases about its absence, the government is more positive about their relation. However, the report shows that most government officials do not know much about the organisations and have little contact with them (San 2016).

According to the interviewed migrant and migration experts, migrant- and diaspora organisations bring direct contributions because they provide peer-to-peer education to people from the same diaspora. They transfer concrete and tacit knowledge about the Dutch society, which people without that background cannot transfer. Therefore, the importance of diaspora organisations for people who are new in the Netherlands is significant. They create future stability for families and for society by helping and guiding first-generation migrants in their integration into the Dutch system and society. Especially the “tips and tricks” to understand the Netherlands are valuable. Migrants who reside for many years in the Netherlands understand Dutch people and the Netherlands in a different way than people with Dutch background do. Preparing newcomers with this information contributes to a fluent start. Additionally, the migrants who develop a good understanding of the Netherlands can be an asset for the Dutch themselves in both internal and international relations.

1 Personal communication with Mr. Ilias Miftah – Diaspora expert/policy advisor local government
2. Towards place of origin and shared responsibility

a. Social and economic remittances

As a consequence of world-wide labour migration, people leave their families and communities behind, sometimes for many years, to earn money and support their families back home. Very often not an easy choice, but a direct result of economic differences worldwide. Financial remittances are an important contribution to the development of the migrants’ countries of origin. The annually estimated outflow of remittances from the Netherlands has decreased in the past years from $12,696 million in 2008, to $9,576 million in 2012 and $8,013 million in 2017 (World Bank 2018). (For comparison, the estimated inflow of remittances to the Netherlands was $1,640 million in 2012 and $1,453 million in 2017) Financial remittances from the Netherlands are still 3 times higher than Official Development Aid (ODA) and it is seen as more important and effective for development. People who live in a developing country and who have a family member in the Netherlands or another Western country can be expected to generally have better living conditions than those who do not have such family connections.¹³

Nevertheless, the way in which remittances are used is important for their development impact. Experts highlighted the positive effect of remittances if the senders are involved in how the financial assets are invested. This can ensure that the financial remittances are used productively (e.g. education, construction of houses, micro-credits etc.). However, it was mentioned that remittances also may have a negative side effect because they can lead to over-dependence of migrants’ families on the remittances, and that that could discourage the pursuit of schooling and work by family members.¹⁴

Mazzucato (2008) outlined how Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands are engaged in city, neighbourhood and (trans) national business activities, while also investing in Ghana in housing, education and businesses of relatives. Many Ghanaians in the Netherlands maintain a double engagement by contributing to the economy and the welfare of relatives in Ghana and in the Netherlands. Important contributions are recognised by the experts and include the contacts and networks that are established in the Netherlands. Ghanaian migrants have been motivated to start their own businesses and create networks between their country of origin and the Netherlands. Various Ghanaians have also returned to their country of origin and set up their businesses which created and create networks between their country of origin and the Netherlands. Important contributions by contributing to the economy and the welfare of relatives. Migrants who returned with skills and education obtained in the Netherlands and who have contributed to their country of origin were outlined by all migrant and migration experts. This was done in terms of practical jobs like construction and agriculture, but also in how to make and implement policies on administrative and governmental levels. Projects to stimulate exchange in knowledge and expertise are organised by the International Organisation for Migration (2017). They work closely with dominant diaspora organisations in the Netherlands; they organise exchange programmes of experts with their country of origin. They sent, for example, specialised and educated doctors from the Netherlands to Afghanistan to teach at Kabul University.

b. Involvement in society and the community at home

Nijenhuis and Zoomer (2012) conducted research among Moroccan, Surinamese and Ghanaian migrant organisation in the Netherlands. They evaluated to what extent these groups were involved in development projects in their country of origin. They looked at 60 organisations that have activities in their homelands. Of the 60 organisations, 36% have characteristics of being a charity organisation with the main focus in the country of origin. Besides doing integration activities in the Netherlands, 33% were organising activities in the country of origin, and 20% are “home-town organisations” with the main focus on integration in the Netherlands – sometimes and generally on request, they perform also activities in the country of origin. The organisations try to work together with local NGOs but if that is not possible, they start a “mirror-organisation” in the country of origin to work on activities that contribute to the strengthening of the civil society at a local level.

Migrant and diaspora organisations differ in size and focus. Some contribute to making newcomers feel at ease; others focus mainly on development in their home country. The “Foundation SAN” is an Afghan diaspora organisation who has its focus on supporting the reconstruction in Afghanistan. They provided wheelchairs to Afghanistan and translated and distributed the diary of Anne Frank in Afghanistan (San 2016). The Eritrean “Foundation Lemat”¹⁵ has its main focus on Eritreans in the Netherlands. This foundation helps people from Eritrea understand and embrace the Dutch society. With a team of young Eritreans, they provide training and empowerment workshops, and they offer advice and

¹³ Personal communication with prof. dr. Ton Dietz – Academic and former director of the African Studies Centre Leiden and Mr. Han Baartmans – Refugees the Netherlands (Vluchtelingenwerk/ NGO)
¹⁴ Personal communication with Mrs. Geesje Werkman – Kerk in Actie/ NGO
¹⁵ The term circular migration refers to a form of temporary migration in which the migrant circulates between the host country and the country of origin
¹⁶ Website of “Foundation Lemat”: http://www.stichtinglemat.com/
consultancy services. The Ghanaian “Okyeman Foundation” focuses on both, development in Ghana and integration of Ghanaians in the Netherlands. They also try to contribute to the Dutch cultural diversity and create awareness of culture and traditions in healthcare (San 2016).

Whereas most of the interviewed experts were positive, some were sceptical about migrant organisations’ contribution to development in the country of origin due to the unprofessional character and small size of most organisations. These characteristics were highlighted as a reason why many migrant organisations do not last long. Many organisations are set up by single persons with ambitious goals but in practice, these goals appear difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, migrants know both cultures and practices, the one of their country of origin and the Dutch. Migrants that are fully adapted and integrated in the Netherlands can serve as guides for the people in the home-community regarding economic and societal aspects. They can ensure mutual acceptance between the Netherlands and the Dutch, and the people in their country of origin. This mutual acceptance and contact often led to businesses and projects in the country of origin. Research has shown that successful organisations can bring important contributions to development (Otieno Ong’ayo 2016).
This chapter outlines the obstacles that hinder migrants’ contributions to development in the Netherlands, as well as in the migrants’ country of origin. Whereas attention is paid to migrants and migration as a whole, the main focus is on migrants who encounter more difficulties with integration and participation in Dutch society. Those obstacles not only undermine the human rights and life chances of migrants in the country, but also weaken their ability to contribute to the well-being of the society in which they live and work. The first section focuses on obstacles encountered in the Netherlands and the second on obstacles for development in the countries of origin. The analysis shows that obstacles can be found in Dutch legislation and policy, as well as in discriminatory and unequal practices in the housing market, the labour market, and in the educational system. Obstacles for development in the country of origin are highlighted in terms of unstable governments, climate change, and countries that face a brain-drain.

1. Obstacles that impede migrants’ contributions to development of the Netherlands

a. Legal framework and protection of migrants’ human and labour rights

The legal system regarding temporary or long-term migration to the Netherlands shows serious gaps. The most significant lacuna is the Netherlands’s non-ratification of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990. This Convention is “one of the core international human rights law instruments and reflects the need to more explicitly articulate the relation between the inclusive universality of human rights and the exclusive nature of State sovereignty” (Pécoud 2017: p. 59). This treaty ensures the protection of human rights of all migrant workers and their families, including returning migrants, cross-border commuters, seasonal labourers, frontier workers and other specific categories of migrant workers, including certain rights applying to all migrants regardless of legal status, providing the model regulation that deals with working migrants who do not have residence and/or work permits.

Another significant deficiency is that the 1975 ILO Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143) has not been ratified either. This convention has the triple objective to ensure rights protection for all migrant workers including those in irregular situations, to discourage irregular migration, and to facilitate the integration of long-staying immigrant workers in conditions of equality of treatment. It particularly aims to protect irregular migrant workers against abuses of all types (Vittin-Balima 2002). Yet, the Netherlands has ratified the ILO Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97), in May 1952, which served as the basis for hiring foreign workers for post-war reconstruction. An ILO committee of experts noted in 2016 that the government had been working with the country’s major cities and social partners to combat exploitation by fraudulent employers. An action plan was developed in 2013 to tackle sham contracting, which led to unequal terms of employment (ILO 2016). The main international legal conventions to protect migrants are outlined in table 7 (International Conventions and status of ratification by the Netherlands).

Dutch unions, civil society organizations, women’s groups and others have called for ratification of the ILO Convention (No. 189) on Decent Work for Domestic Workers. This is important given that many migrant women domestic workers in the country are at risk of abuse and exploitation in unprotected private home employment.
b. Integration and legal requirements

From 2013 onwards, the government shifted the responsibility for integration from the state to the people themselves, under the slogans of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-responsibility’ (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2013), resulting in declining caring and responsible presence of the state.

However, government discourse and policy have reflected a shift from a more multicultural approach to mutual accommodation in integration towards more assimilationist approaches in the last 15-20 years.

These shifts affected migrants and refugees who suddenly became responsible for their own integration and language programmes. These measures led, among other problems, to big debts for the affected migrants. Whenever non-European Union citizens want to apply for a long-term residence in the Netherlands, they have to be considered as having integrated legally (in Dutch: inburgeren). This concept of ‘legal integration’ includes learning the Dutch language and understanding the Dutch society. The trajectory starts outside the Netherlands with a “basic integration exam”, which has to be successfully completed.

Experts pointed at systems in other countries that can provide more desirable circumstances for migrants in the Netherlands. The green card system used in the United States of America facilitates regulated migration and can serve as a model to give impulse to the Dutch economy. Nevertheless, the current restrictive and conditional policy regarding migrants in the Netherlands from outside the European Union make migrants feel “not welcome”.

Table 7: International Conventions and status of ratification by the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ratified by the Netherlands</th>
<th>International instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention (No. 97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1951 Refugee Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1967 Refugee Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975 ILO Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011 ILO Convention (No. 189) on Decent Work for Domestic Workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from: United Nations 2014: Migration Profiles; OHCHR: Status of Ratification

Whereas some migrant-specific treaties are not ratified by the Netherlands, when migrants work in the Netherlands with or without a permit, whether in regular or in unauthorised employment, they have rights under the Dutch law. These rights are generally consistent with International Labour Standards that the Netherlands has ratified, as well as the relevant EU Directives. The employer is obliged to pay the employee the minimum wage for the executed work and to ensure a safe and healthy workspace. In general, employers always have to respect the Collective Labour Agreements (CAO). However, it was outlined by the co-ordinator of the National Support Centre for Undocumented Migrants, that these rights are rarely claimed by undocumented employees because of fear for repercussions. These rights are more often used as a bargain material before they start working for an employer.

Experts pointed at systems in other countries that can provide more desirable circumstances for migrants in the Netherlands. The green card system used in the United States of America facilitates regulated migration and can serve as a model to give impulse to the Dutch economy. Nevertheless, the current restrictive and conditional policy regarding migrants in the Netherlands from outside the European Union make migrants feel “not welcome”.

18 Personal communication with Mrs. Rian Ederveen – Co-ordinator of the National Support Centre for Undocumented Migrants (Stichting LOS/ NGO)
19 Personal communication with Mr. Han Baartmans – Refugees the Netherlands (Vluchtelingenwerk/ NGO)
20 Personal communication with Mr. Ilias Maitab – Diaspora expert policy advisor local government
concluded in the immigrant’s country of origin. Some people are exempted from this trajectory, including highly skilled migrants, people from Turkey or Switzerland, those over the age of 67, people who have lived in the Netherlands for 8 years or longer while under the age of 18, and people who have completed certificates or diplomas in the Dutch language from a Dutch educational institute. Also, if the municipality decides that someone does not have to participate in the trajectory or when someone is psychologically or physically unable to participate, s/he may be exempt, according to the Dutch Integration Act.21

After this legal integration process, migrants are free to move and work. However, problems can be recognised because many encounter difficulties in finding jobs. Major factors may include discrimination in access to employment (shown by empirical discrimination practice testing), spatial segregation that concentrates immigrants particularly of non-Western backgrounds in neighborhoods of poor quality housing, and inadequate public transportation between poor residential neighborhoods and areas of employment opportunities. Lack of recognition of migrants’ educational attainment and professional qualifications also hinder their possibilities of obtaining employment. Segregation in housing, absence of opportunities for decent work and for integrated social participation contribute to isolation of some migrant communities. Publicly expressed hostility towards migrants, especially when framed in terms of rejection of their ethnic, racial or religious identities, can only encourage self-protective isolation. The result can and does reinforce the “traditional values” within migrant communities that may be at odds with the predominant values and attitudes in Dutch society. The Dutch government introduced legislation for migrants to follow the mandatory integration trajectory if they arrived to the Netherlands after 1 October 2017 (Regulation Integration act/art. 3.3). In this legislation, it is stated that newcomers have to follow the “participation trajectory.” In this trajectory, people learn about core values as stated in the Dutch constitution. After the trajectory, participants have to sign the “declaration of participation” in which they acknowledge understanding these core values and state that they will respect them and actively contribute to Dutch society.

There was consensus among the migration experts that for most migrants who aim to stay in the Netherlands, integration is challenging. Additionally, a large part of Dutch society expects migrants and refugees to assimilate and fully become Dutch. Mahtab, a refugee, stated: “Integration has to come from two sides” (Mahtab, personal communication, 2018). With this quote, he highlights that mutual acceptance is necessary in order to feel at home in a society. The current imposition put upon foreign people complicates the whole process of feeling welcome. As it is currently organised, migrants have to “become Dutch” and this is too much to ask. “When we migrate to Syria, we won’t become fully Syrian either” (Den Dulk, personal communication 2018). As in all societies, hidden rules and norms are difficult to internalise. The language, but also Dutch society in general, are perceived as complex institutions. Temporary migrants do not have difficulties with this (part of) integration, but for people who want to build their lives in the Netherlands, it is difficult. Another difficulty highlighted by highly skilled migrants residing in the Netherlands with regard to Dutch language learning, is that even when they speak in Dutch, people always reply in English (Dirks 2018).

c. Inequality and discrimination towards migrants and refugees in accessing work, education and housing

People with a migrant background often experience inequality and discrimination in terms of opportunities, which is recognised across different sectors. Important empirical discrimination “practice-testing” studies showed widespread practice of employers in businesses and other organisations, who selected job candidates based on their last name. Hence, people with Arabic surnames were not invited for a job interview. Such examples are attributed by experts to discriminatory attitudes based on fear of the ‘other’ and ignorance across Dutch society. Many Dutch people without migrant backgrounds do not really know migrants, other than when they are exposed to them via the media. Media (and social media) presents mostly negative images about refugees and a small group of other migrants. The unfamiliarity with migrants, fuelled by media and the public opinion tends to create anxiety and segregation. Segregation harms development at the individual level and for society in general (Blommaert, Coenders and Van Tubergen 2013; Musterd 2005).

Furthermore, discrimination and inequality have been observed in education. This can be partly attributed to the demographic structure of big cities where neighbourhoods with low average socio-economic standards and high concentrations of people with a migrant background are all living together. When more than 60% of the students at a particular school have a migrant background, the school is controversially referred to as a “black school.” Such labels create negative attitudes towards both the schools and those with a migrant background. Educational segregation can lead to bigger social distance between ethnic groups and a lower self-esteem (Jongejan and Thijs 2010). Turcatti (2018) concluded in her research among educational experiences of Moroccan Dutch youth in the Netherlands that structural challenges are recognised in segregated schools.

where the Dutch tracking system hampers educational mobility and therefore leads to demotivating migrant pupils. This is strengthened by low expectations of teachers and the lack of informational, practical and emotional support from them. These low expectations in combination with the decision-making power of the teachers about the educational future of the students prevent them from developing their full potential and taking advantageous educational opportunities.

Dutch policy aims not to discriminate in the housing market. The central government, municipalities and housing corporations have worked together to create “mixed” neighbourhoods and to improve deprived and segregated areas (Ponds, Van Ham and Marlet 2015). Whereas in some provinces and cities this policy is implemented correctly, in other places migrants are still living all together in streets or in complete neighbourhoods. The population of Amsterdam, for example, is diverse in terms of people with migrant backgrounds and social economic background. Residential segregation can be recognised in different neighbourhoods. The most striking example is the South East of the city, the Bijlmer, which is since the 1980s populated mainly by people of Surinam descent. The Ghanaian migrants also settled down in this area which has led to a neighbourhood in which a small minority of the people has a Dutch background. The people who live in this neighbourhood are not integrating nor assimilating with people of Dutch background nor with Dutch society. Other neighbourhoods with high concentrations of migrants, such as Amsterdam West and Nieuw-West, have a more diverse population with numerous people of Dutch background. Research among newly arrived migrant children who attended schools in the different neighbourhoods in Amsterdam West and Nieuw-West showed more positive results than the children in the segregated South East (Crul 2016).

Refugees in the Netherlands encounter difficulties in education as well. The Educational Council of the Netherlands (in Dutch: Onderwijsraad) is an independent organisation that gives advice to the Dutch government about policy and laws regarding education. In their 2017 report, it was highlighted that refugees do not have enough access to schools, courses or other forms of education. The problems are visible in all phases of the refugees’ educational careers. Schools do not always have enough places and they are reluctant to accept refugees because they are afraid of the opinions of other parents at the schools. Additionally, schools lack sufficient knowledge about the group and are unsure about finances. Another highlighted problem in the school career of refugee children is the inefficiency of the trajectory; many times, the process dictates that they have to move to different cities, which results in them having to learn the same things over and over again. This causes frustration among the refugee children (Onderwijsraad 2017).

Furthermore, there are large gaps in the accreditation and recognition of diplomas and certificates (Engbersen et al. 2015). Some people arrive in the Netherlands with a university background and many years of professional experience, but in many sectors, they have to do everything over again. After finishing their educational trajectory again in the Netherlands, they find difficulties in obtaining jobs at a similar level they had in their country of origin. Experts recognised this and highlighted alarming cases linked to this issue. One expert highlighted that skilled Somali migrants with education and experience in the care-sector, moved to the United Kingdom because they could start working there much easier than in the Netherlands.22

Whereas the above problems are still prevalent, policy (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2016) has been introduced to stimulate employment opportunities for refugees, including:

- The mapping of refugees’ competences, study-history and work experiences at an early stage in order to guide them to new education or work opportunities;
- Extra money for the provision of early integration programmes to the responsible organisation that provide housing and basic needs for incoming refugees to the Netherlands (COA);
- The provision of “participation budgets” to municipalities to stimulate the integration and participation of newcomers in the municipalities; The participation-trajectory-declaration is included in the mandatory integration programme.

**d. Marginalisation and discrimination resulting in prolonged welfare dependency**

Refugees who arrive in the Netherlands receive a governmental allowance (in Dutch: leefgeld) of maximum €58 a week (2018). This allowance is meant to cover basic living expenses, such as food and clothes (Regulation on Benefits in Kind for Asylum Seekers and other Categories of Foreign Nationals 2005/Art. 14). When refugees receive their legal status, they receive different allowances from the government to settle down and to arrange all basic needs. When they receive their legal status, they are allowed to work. When people find a job, this allowance stops. After their stay in the Netherlands for nine years or longer, substantial portions of refugees/immigrants from Afghanistan (23.9%), Iraq (32.4%), Iran (21.4%) and Somalia (43.2%) still receive the allowance (CBS 2016).

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22 Personal communication with prof. dr. Ton Dietz – Academic and former director of the African Studies Centre Leiden
The dominant Dutch media, political and public discourse are mainly focussed on this group of people and less on the second-generation refugees/migrants and the contribution of those who do have a job. Certain policy measures and the public opinion make it complicated for this group to contribute to society. Overcoming these obstacles should entail much more recognition of those employed and integrated – the ones who constitute the large majority of all groups – and much more remedial attention to facilitating inclusion, employment and social integration of the long-term marginalised.

E. Lack of safe and legal pathways

It becomes increasingly difficult to obtain a Dutch visa to travel to the Netherlands. People from different sectors (scholars, students, business or NGOs) who want to travel from Africa or Asia, tend to encounter difficulties in receiving the necessary documents and are sometimes denied a visa to travel to the Netherlands.

Furthermore, migration has become more restricted over the years. When migrants have received the Dutch nationality besides the nationality of their country of origin, restrictions come into force. People who reside more than ten years outside the Kingdom of the Netherlands (including Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten and the municipalities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) will lose their Dutch nationality. These same restrictions apply to Dutch citizens abroad with a dual nationality. The exceptions are that people will not lose their nationality if they renew their passport before the time of expiration or if they request a declaration of Dutch citizenship (Dutch Nationality Act(3)). Whereas the Dutch government pursues policy against dual nationalities, the positive aspects of a dual nationality are underscored by most migrant and migration experts interviewed for this research. Dual nationalities can bring contributions to the Dutch economy and the economy in the countries of origin because it facilitates opportunities to work and start businesses in multiple countries. Research has been conducted on the effects of transnational activities in the country of origin on integration in the host society. The results showed that transnational activities are costly. Those who can afford such activities have implicitly a higher level of integration. People with fewer resources and who therefore are less involved in transnational activities can experience a feeling of exclusion from the home country and are therefore more likely to foster integration in the host society (Mügge 2016).

Gaps are recognised by migrant experts in legal pathways for migrant workers. Whereas high-skilled migrants find fewer difficulties for employment in the Netherlands, there is a vast group excluded from the policies that focus on high-skilled migrants. The large group of migrants who are educated, but who do not account as high-skilled migrants, is excluded from the rights and privileges of the high-skilled migrants. This large group of excluded migrants could be a partial solution for the demands of the labour market in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, in the Netherlands there are approximately 80,000 people whose nationality is not legally confirmed. Of these people, an estimate of 4,000 are stateless. Stateless people cannot claim the same rights and do not receive the same protection as other citizens or recognised migrants in the Netherlands. They also encounter difficulties when arranging identity documents and travel documents, and it causes a highly insecure future for the people concerned. The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) concluded in 2013 (ACVZ 2013) that the Netherlands lacks an appropriate procedure to recognise the nationalities of stateless migrants. They advised improving legislation regarding this group of people. In parliamentary documents from the Ministry of Justice and Security (2018), it was stated that new legislation is being designed and that it would come into force at the end of 2018.

Undocumented migrants include migrants whose asylum application is rejected and finalised, and students or tourists who have stayed in the Netherlands ever since their arrival. The group of undocumented migrants in the Netherlands is 35,530, according to an estimate of a WOCD report (Van der Heijden, Cruyff and Van Gils 2015). The National Support Centre for Undocumented Migrants (in Dutch: Stichting LOS) explained that of this estimate, there are only about 10% visible at the support centre. Life in the Netherlands is complicated, especially for the group of rejected asylum applicants. They are excluded from the formal economy and from protection of the state. However, rules and regulation regarding child-education, healthcare, and legal support are well organised. The burden of being undocumented is most evident for the migrants who cannot return to their country of origin. They can be detained for long terms and have to work in the informal economy to earn an income. Municipalities have taken an important role for this group of people and in some municipalities, they offer basic needs under the Bed-Bath-Bread-Regulation.4

F. Access to or exclusion from refugee system and protection

Migrant experts in the Nederlands agree that asylum seekers who arrive in the Netherlands have to wait too long. It is complicated to work and take the mandatory, time-consuming integration courses at the same time. This

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3 Dutch Nationality Act: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003738#2018-08-01
4 Personal communication with Mrs. Rian Ederveen – Co-ordinator of the National Support Centre for Undocumented Migrants (Stichting LOS/ NGO)
excludes refugees from society for a relatively long time, which is counterproductive for further societal and economic development. Good and personal guidance is also missing, which isolates these people even more.

Asylum seekers in the Netherlands who have not received an official refugee status can work 24 weeks per year if they have a permit (in Dutch: Tewerkstellingsvergunning - TWV). This permit can be applied for if an asylum application is in process for at least 6 months. Asylum seekers cannot work in the first 6 months after their asylum application. The process of the TWV is issued by the Institute of Labour Security (in Dutch: Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen - UWV). The UWV also checks if the employer pays enough to the asylum seeker. Besides being able to find a job, with this permit asylum seekers can start their own businesses in the Netherlands. Because the asylum seekers are housed and provided with basic resources by the central reception institution for asylum seekers (COA), they have to pay a contribution to COA. They can keep 25% of the earned money, up to a maximum of €185 per month. The asylum seeker is also allowed to work in one of the reception centres (AZC). For cleaning or maintenance work in an AZC they receive between €0.56 and €1.10 per hour with a maximum of €14 per week. As soon as an asylum seeker receives his/her residence permit from the Dutch Integration and Naturalisation Services (IND), (s)he obtains the same rights and duties as Dutch Citizens (Dutch Aliens Employment Act).

Legislation adopted in 2013 contains a provision concerning the loans that refugees and migrants have to contract in order to learn the Dutch language. They can contract a loan of up to €10,000 to finance their integration courses. Refugees can easily get in chronic financial problems due to this system because many of them never received proper education in general, and specifically on such issues, nor did they have to deal with financial loans or the administration of money. Additionally, for refugees who come from war-torn countries traumatising journeys might suffer from emotional and psychological problems, the Dutch language and bureaucratic loan procedures are in such situations too complicated. Financial problems are likely to disturb stable situations of individuals and their families.

The privatisation of the integration process led to a decrease in people passing their exams and a decrease in people starting with the courses. Under the legislation of 2007, the average success rate was 78% and with the new law from 2013, this rate dropped to 39%. Additionally, the quality of many course providers does not meet the requirements, and the sanctions on not passing the exams have become counterproductive (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017). New legislation is announced regarding integration. In 2020, the new Integration Law comes into force in which the refugees’ responsibility for their own integration becomes the responsibility of the municipality the refugee is residing in. The aim is to start as quick as possible with participating or working in Dutch society in order to learn and understand the Dutch system via a natural way. Additionally, the contested loan will be removed and financial sanctions will be mitigated (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2018).

If asylum seekers are rejected asylum in the Netherlands, gaps can be recognised in policy and practice. Many asylum seekers cannot be expelled from the Netherlands for various reasons and get “stuck” in the country where they become excluded from the rights and obligations of the state. This means that people that cannot work formally and neither receive state-support. The rationale is that such policy stimulates these people to leave the Netherlands voluntarily. In practice, this leads to destitution and homelessness. As a result, local governments and NGOs developed practices to provide shelter and basic needs for this group (Kos, Maussen and Doomernik 2016).

Furthermore, the Dutch language is difficult to learn and to master, especially for refugees and migrants from Arab or African countries. Policies are increasingly demanding more advanced language requirement levels from migrants and refugees as a condition for receiving a permit. A large proportion of refugees arriving from African or Arab countries is illiterate. For many in this group, especially for adults and elderly, full comprehension of the Dutch language is an unrealistic task, according to interviewed experts.

**g. Hostile public opinion**

With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, unstable governments and oppressive regimes in the Horn of Africa, the inflow of refugees in Europe has increased and led to a European political crisis with the rise of extremist and populistic governments as a result. The refugees that arrived in the Netherlands from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea accounted for 70% of all the asylum applications in 2013. Fewer refugees arrived at European borders since the beginning of 2016 – whether or not due to the European deal on migrants with Turkey, it is difficult to say. Nevertheless, political and public opinion has become increasingly polarised over the last decade. One term that contributed to this polarisation is the framing of “mass-(im)migration” as a threat to the Dutch society and economy. This term came to connote low-educated men from Muslim countries. Despite the fact that such a demographic represented a fraction of the total migrant arrivals in the Netherlands, the term nevertheless became a political tool which was effective for setting the national discourse (Lucassen 2018).

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Rising xenophobia, particularly towards refugees, is statistically unsupported. The Netherlands did not receive large numbers of refugees compared to other European countries (Münz 2018). Nonetheless, the Dutch citizens are the least supportive in the EU for generous asylum application judgements. Differences can be recognised within different population groups. On the one hand, higher educated people in general advocate for more generous judgements of applications than people who received lower education. On the other hand, income groups show the opposite effect: those with higher incomes advocate for less generous judgements. On the neighbourhood level, it appears that more interethnic exposure results in more generous asylum applicants (Bolt and Wetsteijn 2018). While there was not such a big "migrant-stream" as is imagined by the Dutch society, resistance and fear are reflected in Dutch government’s policies. The two peaks of the last years are not new for the Netherlands either. In the 1990s the Netherlands received similar numbers of refugees from former Yugoslavia, and at the beginning of 2000 from the Middle-East. The inflow of refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea has decreased since 2016. Nevertheless, polarisation and xenophobia in Dutch society are evident on the subject of migrants and refugees. Populist, nationalist and anti-migrant political parties are increasing in amount and size. The way these developments are reflected in policies and attitudes towards migrants and refugees has a negative effect on how these people can integrate in and contribute to society. These attitudes and opinions are further fed by media and social media (European Commission 2018; Maly 2018).

2. Obstacles that impede migrants’ contributions to development of the country of origin

a. Lack of rule of law and poor governance

A large group of immigrants in the Netherlands have fled their country of origin for fear of persecution, unstable governments or war. In the last decade, the Netherlands received refugees from, among other countries: Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. In some cases, refugees’ possibilities to contribute to the development of their homelands are directly constrained by the government in their country of origin. The Eritrean government, for example, levies a so-called “Diaspora-Tax” or “Recovery and Rehabilitation Tax” on Eritrean citizens in foreign countries. This tax is illegal, but if it is not paid by members of the diaspora it may have severe consequences. These consequences include the denial of consular services and punishment of relatives in Eritrea, including human rights violations. Coercion and intimidation methods are used for collecting the tax. Such practices, and the severe human rights situation in Eritrea, have split up Eritreans in pro-government and anti-government movements in Dutch society (DSP group 2017).

Furthermore, corrupt governments and institutions are recognised as obstacles for development in the migrants’ country of origin. Experts highlighted that corruption and bureaucracy are obstacles for migrants in the diaspora who want to invest or start businesses in their country of origin. Examples were given of entrepreneurs who encountered problems when they wanted to register their business at the local chamber of commerce. Money was demanded by officials, which made it difficult to start a business legally.

b. Climate change

Another increasingly important driver for migration is climate change, which increases scarcity of water and food resources and can undermine agriculture. Basic environmental conditions such as rainfalls and temperature have been disturbed, which causes crop failures and a lack of basic living resources in many areas worldwide, but predominantly on the African continent. Climate change is threatening a large part of the world population and has serious impact on the stability of affected nations (Werz and Hoffman 2016). Additionally, an increase in environmental disasters has made people leave their country. Every year since 2008 an average of 26.4 million persons around the world have been forcibly displaced by disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, storms or floods (Apap 2018). Such disasters hinder development disastrously in all aspects of life. Psychological and emotional damage can be irreversible. Also, the material damage can be permanent. Lives and livelihoods in delta areas and on small islands are also at risk, due to sea level rise and the sinking of land.

c. Brain-drain and high remittances costs

Incoming migrants to the Netherlands, especially high-skilled and educated migrants who are not going back to their home countries, result in brain-drain. This dynamic is negative in itself but when high-skilled and high-educated migrants arrive in the Netherlands and start working in a low-paid sector below their educational level, it is a lose-lose situation. Experts recognised the risks of brain-drain and highlighted that programmes from the government, as well as from the private sector concerned with attracting talent
and knowledge from developing countries, as well as circular migration programmes, should always consider these aspects and implement such programmes to minimise adverse impact on origin countries.

Another issue that hampers development in the migrants’ countries of origin are the high costs for sending remittances. Banks and transfer agencies impede development in migrants’ countries of origin by charging high percentages on the amounts of money sent. The average cost for sending remittances was 6.94% in the third quarter of 2018 (World Bank 2018a). In order to omit the high transaction costs, people are boarding planes with cash. This strategy of bringing money to one’s country of origin is also increasingly complicated due to restrictions and rules in the amounts of cash one can bring into another country. According to goal 10.c of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the transaction costs of migrant remittances should be less than 3% – and remittances’ corridors with costs higher than 5% should be eliminated by 2030 (United Nations 2015). Whereas this is a promising universal goal, for some countries this percentage will be complicated to reach. People from Eritrea cannot send remittances back home unless they pay 2% tax. The only official remittances’ channel goes through the Eritrean government who levies this illegal tax (DSP group 2017).

d. Dutch military engagement and arms exports in foreign conflicts

The role of the Netherlands military involvement in foreign conflicts is cause for concern, particularly in situations resulting in large-scale forced displacement of people. The Dutch military supports Iraqi forces with military training and advice. Additionally, there are Dutch F-16s active over Iraq and Eastern Syria. Since 2014, the Netherlands is making contributions to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (Minusma). These missions are the largest military contributions of the Netherlands. Further missions and activities where the Dutch contribute are in Afghanistan (100 soldiers), Somalia (incidental support for counter-piracy), South Sudan (6 officers), Bahrein (Navy cooperation with 25 countries), Lithuania (270 soldiers for NAVO presence), Gaza (European border-mission), Israel/Syria (2 soldiers for UN peace mission), Kosovo (15 soldiers), Lebanon/Syria/Israel (12 soldiers), United Arab Emirates (4 soldiers), Libya (1 soldier), Mali (1 soldier) and Uganda (yearly training). Serious concerns have been raised about the use of military aircraft, arms systems and ammunition exported from the Netherlands in contemporary refugee-producing conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. A Dutch Stop Wapenhandel (Stop Arms Trade) research found that arms and military systems that were sold from or transited through The Netherlands, including howitzers, tank communication systems, fighter jets and naval fire control systems were likely deployed in the war in Yemen (Stop Wapenhandel 2015). The latest annual report Trends in international arms transfers by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the Netherlands entered the top-10 of global arms exporters in the 2013-2017 period. Some 15% of Dutch arms exports went to Jordan, a country using its fighter aircraft in Syria, and in the Saudi led coalition against Yemen. Dutch weapons counted for 43% of Jordan’s major arms imports in 2013-2017. A report jointly published by the Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel in 2016 documented the involvement of the European arms industry that sells arms to the Middle East also profits from militarising the EU external borders.

See website Ministry of Defense: https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/missies/huidige-missies
See “Dutch arms exports and SIPRI ranking”, Stop Wapenhandel, at http://stopwapenhandel.org/node/2173
This chapter outlines the current situation in the Netherlands regarding facilitating migration and stimulating migrant contribution to and from the Netherlands. In the first section, the incorporation of and compliance with the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals are highlighted. Secondly, (inter)national policies and practices are presented. In this section, an overview is given of international conventions and national policies, and initiatives funded by the government that stimulate or hamper migration and migrant contributions to development. In the last section, attention is paid to promising (trans)national policies and practices for development of the Netherlands and for the migrants’ countries of origin. In this section not only government initiatives are highlighted, but also initiatives from within society, such as those from NGOs and CSOs.

1. 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals

The 2018 policy from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation has a strong link with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030. With this universal agenda to address poverty, inequality and equal rights for consumption and production, climate change and conflict management, an integral framework is offered for an international approach. This agenda also offers chances to the private sector in terms of innovative opportunities for development with new profitable models. The agenda concerns the future of all countries. Therefore, it is important that all countries contribute to the 17 goals. The Dutch 2018 policy for Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation includes the implementation of 14 SDGs. The goals that are not specifically included in the policy are goal 10: “Reduce inequality within and among countries,” goal 14: “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development,” and goal 15: “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The National Statistical Office (CBS) published a report in 2018 in which the situation of the 17 goals after implementation of the agenda in 2015 in the Netherlands was outlined. The report illustrates that the majority of the indicators shows a positive development. Only in goal 1: “end poverty in all its forms everywhere” and goal 10 “Reduce inequality within and among countries,” did most indicators point at a negative development (CBS 2018a).

Interviewed migration experts had different views on the SDGs and global forums. While some highlighted the possible positive effects of such agendas, most affirmed that the issues regarding migrant development and integration in the Netherlands have to be solved at the local level with the help of local organisations and governments. Furthermore, they stated that the SDG agenda provides a desirable direction but that it’s too ambitious for its timeframe. The focus should be on selected points of separate goals in order to make the outcome realistic. The SDGs and other forums can contribute to making policy more systematic. In terms of migration, systematic policies are necessary throughout Europe.

2. National policies and practices

The movement of people across borders is as old as the existence of borders. This natural movement affects every state that is subject to such movement; the country of origin, the country of transit, and the country of immigration. The coexisting triangular relationship that coexists between the migrant, country of emigration and country of immigration comes naturally as well. The fragmentation of international law that comes into force is multifaceted and includes a wide array of legal norms from branches such as trade law, labour law, maritime law, national law, refugee law and so on. The various dimensions of migration, all having different regulations and a great variety of legal norms, can be captured as International Migration Law. International Migration Law does not constitute a self-contained regime but is built on norms existing in different legal fields. At the universal level there are multilateral treaties representing the three main groups of migrants; refugees and asylum-seekers, migrant workers and trafficked and smuggled migrants.

International law and global Conventions are supported by new forms of international collaboration that aim to have a more flexible executive management and control of migration. Two complementary processes are the
Global Migration Group (GMG) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). These forums have helped to shape the global debate about migration and development and explore synergies and joint solutions through partnerships (Chetail 2017). More recent initiatives are the intergovernmental Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in which non-binding agreements are made between governments regarding migrants, refugees and the regulation of these groups. Negotiation of the Global Compact on Migration was finalised in July 2018, and it was adopted at an intergovernmental conference held on December 8 and 9, 2018 in Marrakesh, Morocco. Both the GCM and the GCR were adopted by UN General Assembly Resolutions in December 2018. These international non-binding compacts and forums, as well as the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and the Sustainable Development Goals (2015), provide important principles for Dutch policy (Frouws and Grimmius 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

The New Urban Agenda adopted at Habitat III in Quito in 2015 is also worth mentioning with the increasing responsibility for migrant and refugee integration at the municipal level in the Netherlands. The New Urban Agenda comprises the agreed global framework for good governance of cities, elaborated and adopted under UN’s auspices with the participation of nearly all countries of the world. Its emphasis is on sustainable development of cities – where 80% of the worlds migrants and refugees reside – and it gives particular attention to migrants, refugees, and IDPs and their ‘right to the city’.

In 2008 the Dutch government placed new emphasis on migration and development. Six policy priorities regarding migration and development were outlined: first, to focus more on migration in development policy and on development in migration policy; second, to foster institutional development in migration management; third, to promote circular migration and prevent the negative effects of a brain-drain in countries of origin; fourth, by strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations; fifth, by strengthening the link between remittances and development; sixth, by encouraging sustainable return and reintegration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). The third, fourth, fifth and sixth points, however, were also focal points in the migration and development policy of 2004. The Dutch government also had an important position in the international forums and invested in co-operation with migrant organisations and foreign governments (Frouws and Grimmius 2012). The Dutch government did a circular migration pilot in 2009 to measure the feasibility of circular migration on a larger scale, known as the “Blue Birds” pilot. They planned to have 160 migrants working in the Netherlands by means of the pilot programme. After 15 months, only eight migrants were working in the Netherlands. The failure of the programme was attributed to the political environment not being conducive at the time, including a lack of flexibility throughout the project, unclear goals and objectives, an unclear focus, a missing advisory board with specialists from outside the government, and unclear criteria for implementation (Siegel and Van Der Vorst 2012).

More successful programmes funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programmes. The TRQN projects, developed and executed by the Organisation for International Migration (IOM), have launched three projects between 2006 and 2015. The last project of 2012-2015 aimed at placing 405 experts in nine target countries. In 2015, 212 experts participated in the project and 349 assignments were completed or started (Leith and Rivas 2015). The TRQN projects continued with the Connecting Diaspora for Development (CD4D) project, which is conducting circular migration projects with five partner countries. Criticisms have been received in regard to the circular migration programmes because of their association with lower standards of rights protection, minimal social protection and deregulated working conditions. However, legal pathways are much desired by migrants and sending
countries. The CD4D project stimulates regulated circular migration, whereby rights are being protected.

The 2010-2012 and the 2012-2017 governments made deep cuts in the development budget. During the 2010-2012 period, the focus of the foreign affairs policy was narrowed down to economic development while reducing the emphasis on other areas such as education. In 2012, also due to the economic crisis, the development budget was cut by about €1 billion (15% of the total budget). Additionally, the costs for hosting in-country refugees became part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) expenditure (Conley and Ruy 2018).

Dutch migration policy in 2013 emphasised the importance of co-operation between countries and the protection and provision of shelter in the region. Therefore, the government supported the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the policy brief of 2013 migrants were mainly approached in the category of refugees. The government outlined that for migrants who were granted permission to stay, it was expected that they do their best to integrate into society. In this policy, it was also emphasised that the Netherlands actively pursued return policies for people who were not granted permission to stay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). Furthermore, from 2013, the Netherlands started investing in long-term humanitarian emergency assistance. In 2014, a three-year Emergency Relief Fund was established with a budget of €570 million. The goals of the fund were to provide additional resources, improve flexibility and enable multi-year financing for crisis-hit regions. Priorities included improving the living conditions of refugees in countries of first-asylum, building disaster-preparedness, and fostering innovation in delivering assistance. In 2015, the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) was launched and administered by the Netherlands. The funds from the projects were aimed to assist refugees and host communities in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the Netherlands is a donor for the RDPP project of 2014 in the Middle-East (Conley and Ruy 2018). In 2013 the in-donor refugee costs amounted to €281 million, in 2014 €705 million, and in 2015 €1,195 million. This sharp increase of ODA expenditure in 2014 and 2015 can be ascribed to the increase in costs spent on refugee reception inside the Netherlands (Knoll and Sheriff 2017).

The Dutch government increased its spending on migration prevention in other countries after the increased migrant inflow of 2015. Funds included the Addressing the Root Causes Fund (ARC) and the Local Employment in Africa for Development Fund (LEAD). The ARC Fund was established to address the drivers for migration and displacement. The fund resulted in a concentration of humanitarian and development funds on key regions in North Africa and Syria. LEAD was launched in order to address youth unemployment in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tunisia. The Emergency Relief Fund 2015 channelled additional funds to Syria, and in 2016 additional multi-year resilience support went to Syrian refugees and the hosting communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (Conley and Ruy 2018).

In 2018, the Dutch government put more effort into migration co-operation with third countries as an integrated approach to curb irregular migration. The priorities within this approach are the protection of human rights, the prevention of irregular migration, combating human trafficking and human smuggling, improving border security and improving return- and reintegration programmes for migrants. The main focus of these priorities is on important transit countries and countries of origin in North Africa, the Middle-East and West Asia. Via programmes of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Dutch government helps with the return and reintegration of migrants in North African transit countries. Also, return and reintegration within the Netherlands will be accommodated for people who do not reside legally in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) is an independent advisory group of 10 experts. This committee advises the Dutch government about issues regarding migration. The ACVZ analyses existing Dutch migration policy and provide suggestions where necessary. They presented 3 visions regarding migration and migrants that were most dominant in Dutch policy in 2017, and expected to remain in the upcoming years. These visions are:

- **The Dutch economic interest.** This vision aims at making economic profit from migration to the Netherlands.
- **A humanitarian mission.** This vision aims at protecting all refugees and migrants and to strengthen their legal position in the Netherlands.
- **A burden for society.** This vision aims at restricting immigration as much as possible because it is considered as unfavourable for society.

Policy regarding skilled migrants contains most of the characteristics of the first vision, and policy regarding asylum seekers contains most aspects of the second and third visions; on the one hand, the government provides residence permits to refugees who need protection (and who are already in the Netherlands). On the other hand, the Dutch government pursues a restrictive entrance policy for refugees – by not providing legal routes to the Netherlands (ACVZ 2018).

Another principle of the current migration policy is addressing the root causes of migration. The focus herein is mainly on poverty and climate change in Asia and Africa. The reason is that these are the assumed causes of why many, mainly young men, are migrating to Europe (Lucassen 2018). Some experts showed resistance to the term ‘root causes’ because it does not describe what it is actually meant by that. Drivers and causes of migration were suggested as a definition that allows for analysing what the actual reasons and causes are for migration.
Restrictive policies regarding migrants and refugees hamper the development of migrants, as well as the development of the Netherlands. When people who arrive in the Netherlands and are excluded from society and the labour market because of exams and bureaucratic procedures, they encounter many more difficulties to integrate. Additionally, such processes make migrants feel unwelcome in society and can pull them into social isolation. Controversial and counterproductive policies include the loans that people have to contract to pass their integration-exams. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment (2018) acknowledged that the current approach regarding refugees is counterproductive and highlighted that the new Integration Law 2020 address latter issues. He also highlighted that the control will go back to the municipality and that the central government will provide more money for participation and integration activation programmes.

3. Promising national and transnational policies and practices for development

In March 2017, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in the Netherlands, launched the programmes: “Connecting Diaspora for Development” (CD4D) (see chapter: VI.2 National policies and practices) and “Work in Progress”.

The programmes are continuations of the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) project that pursued circular migration via temporary return programmes for high-skilled migrants. The CD4D project enables diaspora professionals to use their knowledge and expertise for the reconstruction and development of their country of origin. Experts residing in the Netherlands are linked to institutions and experts in their country of origin. The project’s participating countries are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Somalia (Ghana and Morocco phased out in 2017). The project targeted yearly floods that destroy crops in Afghanistan, endanger life and destroy property. Under the CD4D project, a water expert from the diaspora worked with the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to transfer Dutch water management techniques to Afghanistan. Because of the expert’s Afghan roots, he was able to communicate and work closely with local communities. Another successful example of CD4D with Afghanistan are telephone conferences with medical institutions in Afghanistan and with diaspora organisation in the Netherlands. During such conferences, issues and concerns were discussed with counterpart professionals in the Netherlands and beyond which led to a knowledge-transfer platform (International Organisation for Migration 2017).

The “Work in Progress!” project is an alliance initiative between migrant organisations, the IOM, various NGOs in the Netherlands, and local organisations in Somalia, Egypt and Nigeria. It is a three-year programme funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project prepares youth with training and provides small and medium business enterprises with business development services so that the business can grow and provide more jobs for the unemployed youth. In

3. Role of the Dutch government in humanitarian assistance in conflict situations

Armed conflicts in South Sudan, Syria and Yemen, among others, led to an extreme increase in the shortage of food and other basic resources. Sometimes starvation, destruction of crops and water sources are war-tactics. The Netherlands has called upon the UN Security Council for joint action and to bring the people responsible for these actions to justice. The Netherlands contributes to the distribution of water and food in conflict areas. Partners herein are the UN, the Red Cross, Dutch Relief Alliance and others who receive flexible and long-term financial resources. Besides, the Dutch government responds to long-term crisis as in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the African Great Lakes and the Rohingya (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). However, the role of the Netherlands – and other countries herein – is not uncontested even in humanitarian assistance. Because of the strict conditions for development aid or humanitarian relief, a significant part of people in need of help is not included. This can be recognized in Raqqa in Syria where the international community in 2018 did not want to deliver support with reconstructing activities because it is part of the regime of Assad. Such issues are evident in development aid from governments and organisations who all require different conditions and standards, which are hard to meet for those who are in need of aid.
Somaliland, they have set up a centre where unemployed youth can go and interact with experts from the diaspora in the Netherlands. They can obtain career advice and gain entrepreneurial skills to start their own businesses (IOM 2017).

In 2018, some of the African diaspora organisations worked together to realise a mutual development and trade agenda and presented this agenda and recommendations to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation (Africa in Motion 2018). They established a list of recommendations that address the root causes of poverty on the African continent and aim for the kind of co-operation that could lead to integral development. The five-point agenda includes:

- The establishment of a Diaspora Taskforce within the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation that should organise, co-ordinate and facilitate the use of diaspora in development projects;
- The creation of an “incentive fund” which should improve co-operation between migrant entrepreneurs and Dutch middle and small businesses;
- Strengthen the co-operation between migrant organisations and development projects;
- Stimulate Dutch NGOs to work together with diaspora organisations and aim for strategic partnerships among them;
- And, to facilitate a collective investment fund of African migrants to finance start-ups in the Netherlands and invest in profitable activities in Africa and the Netherlands.

At the municipality level, co-operation with diaspora and migrant organisations is increasingly being initiated. Especially in big cities with high concentrations of migrants, the need for co-operation becomes ever more evident. Subsidies are very limited which makes it complicated for the organisations to last long.

The municipality of The Hague, together with the African Community Initiative Group The Hague, organised expert meetings on integration and participation. The municipality recognised the increasing number of African migrants who are in disadvantaged positions compared to other citizens. They started dialogues with policymakers at the municipality, civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs, and diaspora- and migrant-organisations in order to improve the migrants’ position and situation in The Hague, and therefore the municipality’s situation (Otieno Ong’ayo et al. 2017).

CSOs in migrants’ countries of origin can contribute to steer the focus of development aid and support from the Netherlands and other countries more towards the actual needs of society instead of the needs imposed by the governments of donor and recipient countries themselves. NGOs and civil society organisations who are concerned about migration are increasingly working together, which is positive in terms of sharing ideas and knowledge about people’s actual needs, and decreasing the naïve perceptions about developing countries.

Recent policy changes in which the organisation and reception of refugees became more the tasks of the municipality instead of the central government are promising. Therefore, processes can go quicker and people can participate at an earlier stage in society. This shift in organisation existed naturally because of the chaotic situations that existed at municipalities where refugees and migrants had to wait until the central government made progress in their procedures. Another important aspect of this development is that trajectories are increasingly providing integration courses alongside participation and work-finding activities instead of all these trajectories separately, one after the other. This has a positive effect on the integration of refugees (Dagevos 2018).

Furthermore, the role of associations and clubs is recognised as an important bridge between migrants and Dutch society. In such establishments, migrants can learn the unwritten rules of Dutch society. For example, in the Netherlands, it is common to do volunteer work or activities (this can be at the school of someone’s children or with the elderly or refugees); if people do not know this, and it is not the norm in the country of origin, it can be difficult to understand. The role of churches herein is also important. They can link migrants to sport clubs or neighbourhood associations (Otieno Ong’ayo 2016; Frouws and Grimmius 2012).

With the increased inflow of refugees in 2015-2016, various initiatives arose throughout the Netherlands. Initiatives to support the newcomers came from migrant organisations, as well as from organisations and people within society. In May 2016, the Social Economic Council (SER) launched the website www.werkwijzervluchtelingen.nl. The website came online with the goal to contribute to the integration and participation of refugees and focus in the first place on employers, educational institutions and societal organisations who work with refugees. On this website, one can find various initiatives which strengthen the social cohesion and community feeling in the Netherlands.

Projects such as “In my Backyard” bring people from all different backgrounds and refugees together in so-called “neighbourhood-groups” where people can drink coffee, talk and learn from each other. Another example is “Foundation Queridon” which combines language with hospitality.

29 Personal communication with Mr. Han Baartmans – Refugees the Netherlands (Vluchtelingenwerk/ NGO)
30 Website of “In My Backyard”: https://www.inmybackyard.nl/
31 Website of “Queridon”: http://www.queridon.nl/
In this language-café refugees learn Dutch and cook typical meals from their home country. They demonstrate to Dutch and foreign visitors to the café what they have learned and share their meal. These are just two examples of the many initiatives started by people with Dutch backgrounds, migrant backgrounds, refugees and a combination of these across the country.

People who come from other places than the Netherlands maintain sometimes different habits, norms and values than Dutch people. Some of these are seen as valuable contributions to the Netherlands. As outlined earlier, refugees from the African continent can address mass-consuming habits in a particular way to Dutch citizens. Such norms and values are especially transferred in situations where refugees come together with Dutch citizens. Projects to facilitate this have arisen over the years. One example is student housing in big cities where students live together with refugees for a low house rent. Via this project, both parties learn each other’s culture and habits. This project addressed two other issues: housing shortage and high costs for student-housing, and natural and harmonious integration of young refugee migrants.  

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See website pilot project Student-Refugee Community: https://www.sshxl.nl/en/refugees

Photo: Bob van Dillen
Migrants are contributing economically, socially and culturally to the Netherlands. Cultural migrant contributions are mostly visible in cities which cannot be imagined nowadays without diverse migrant-owned businesses (Foner, et al. 2014). Furthermore, the ties between migrants abroad and people in the countries of origin are strong and facilitate networks in which information, financial resources and ideas are shared. In economic terms, all people that work and consume in the Netherlands are contributing to the Dutch financial and security system. Over the last years, the Netherlands received many students, high-skilled migrants, as well as (temporary) short-term and long-term migrant workers. Temporary migrant workers mainly arrived from Eastern European countries. In 2015, an increase in the inflow of refugees from Syria and Eritrea emerged and led to societal turmoil and a European political crisis. The unrest in society was further fed by far-right political parties and the media which in turn led to xenophobia and a sharp division in Dutch society (Conley and Ruy 2018; Rath 2009; OECD 2018).

The main issues that became evident after the analysis relate to issues of discrimination and inequality. Migrants with non-Western migrant backgrounds encounter discrimination in the labour market. Studies demonstrated that migrants with an Arab or African surname have lower chances to be invited for a job-interview than people with a Western surname (Blommaert, Coenders and Van Tubergen 2013). Besides discrimination in the labour market, discrimination is recognised in the housing market and in the education system. Dense concentrations of people with migrant backgrounds are located throughout the Netherlands, especially in cities. Residential segregation, especially in big cities, contributes to difficulties in integration and to newcomers’ understanding of Dutch society. In such neighbourhoods, educational segregation is also prevalent, which leads to even more distance between ethnic groups and less respect towards one another (Jongejan and Thijs 2010). Here, it should be noted that the responsibility for integration is largely placed on the migrant newcomer and a multi-layered integration approach is not necessarily a given. Without such structures in place, the emphasis is placed more in adaptation.

Significant difficulties and obstacles are encountered by people who want or need to stay in the Netherlands for the long term or permanently, partly due to the time-consuming and expensive integration trajectory, which for some migrant groups is rather unrealistic. Refugees especially encounter difficulties in settling down and integrating into Dutch society. Many are processing traumas and experience stress because of the new situation and due to concerns about family members abroad. Hence, considering the pressures to adapt, to conform to the Dutch cultural and behavioural norms, and to learn the Dutch language, the integration process is quite difficult for refugees, who are struggling to cope with their flight-related traumas and are trying to regain control of their lives. The entry gap for refugees identifies why they encounter more difficulties and it highlights that the gap is linked with the motivations for leaving their country of origin (flight/forced migration) and with the reception conditions in the Netherlands (asylum procedure) (Bakker, Dagevos and Engbersen 2017). Nevertheless, migrants, and especially refugees, can play an important role for other arriving migrants with the same nationality, as well as helping Dutch people in the process of supporting newcomers in the integration process. This is especially true if the migrants are already perceived as being “integrated” and aware of Dutch societal norms. In such cases, they are known to support newcomers and serve as a bridge between both cultures.

Obstacles that impede migrants’ contribution to development in the home countries are evident when countries are war-torn or when they have corrupt governments and legal systems. The Eritrean government, for example, levies illegal taxes on all incomes of Eritreans in the diaspora. Coercion and intimidation are the methods used to collect these taxes. These methods destabilise the social fabric in its whole and hamper development in all aspects of life (DSP group 2017). Additionally, climate change is increasingly complicating
development because people leave their country when droughts or floods destroy crops or other basic resources (Werz and Hoffman 2016).

Migration and development are important pillars in the development agenda of the Netherlands. Shifts in policy can be recognised during an economic crisis or in times when many refugees are arriving at the European borders. National spending on migration outside the Netherlands and refugee protection abroad, as well as inside the Netherlands increased from 2013 onwards, after falling down in 2012 (Conley and Ruy 2018).

Furthermore, the Dutch government aims at incorporating the Sustainable Development Goals throughout their policies and it has a focus on international co-operation. Various promising practices can be recognised throughout the country in times of high refugee inflow. Inventive ideas come from foundations, CSOs and NGOs, and from migrants and Dutch people themselves.

Planned legislation regarding refugees is promising, but gaps in policy have been identified. An important issue that hampers migrant contribution in the Netherlands can be attributed to negative attitudes towards migrants, which are fed by anti-migrant political parties and by the media.

The Recommendations

The analysis in this report led to 20 recommendations that could tackle the drivers and causes of forced migration, expand safe and legal pathways of migration and help migrant integration, and enhance migrants’ contributions to development. The recommendations on these issues are intended for Dutch policy makers but extend to Dutch stakeholders in civil society:

Address drivers and causes of forced migration
1. Promote the implementation of SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries and in particular on promoting safe, regular and responsible migration. Promote compliance with the Paris Agreement and realisation and implementation of SDG 13 on climate change. Promote the realisation of SDG 16 on peaceful societies and goal 2 of the ‘Global Compact for Migration’ on addressing drivers of forced migration.
2. Promote implementation of all SDGs related to enhancing peoples’ livelihood security (for example SDG 1, 2, 8 and 11), access to basic services (SDG 3, 4 and 6) and gender equality (SDG 5).
3. Respect international commitments by allocating 0.7% of Gross National Income to Official Development Aid (ODA); do not count the reception costs of asylum seekers as ODA, and ensure policy coherence for development in the areas of migration.
4. Provide adequate support for countries in the global south hosting large numbers of IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers. Take into account the increasing global resettlement needs caused by pressures in the region, and increase the Dutch resettlement quotas accordingly.
5. End Dutch arms exports to areas of conflict, including Saudi Arabia and other areas where Dutch-exported or traded arms are being used in military operations in Syria, Yemen and South Sudan.

Promote safe and legal pathways for migration, and promote migrant integration
6. Strengthen the enforcement of anti-discrimination, anti-racism and equality legislation to eradicate discrimination and racism from the most evident and alarming arenas: in housing, in employment, and in the education system.
7. Support awareness-creating campaigns of labour unions, political parties and civil society organisations in the media, as well as on social media.
8. Urge political, social, educational, business, sports, religious and community leaders, and public figures to speak up with strong messages of solidarity, respect and equality of treatment for all, and to condemn all racist, xenophobic, religious or other forms of discrimination, hate speech and violence.
9. Advocate for a proactive communication and policy that welcomes migrants and refugees and encourages integration in the labour market and in Dutch society.
10. Call for media responsibility in disseminating ‘fact-based’ news and awareness of the rights and contributions of migrants and refugees to economy, culture and society.
11. Support political parties and other relevant actors who are concerned with migrant and migration issues, and who aim for a more equal and humanitarian attitude against migrants and refugees.
12. Promote ratification of the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) and the ILO Migrant Workers Convention 1975, (No.143), and ILO Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers.
13. Ensure that labour inspection in the Netherlands has adequate capacities to reach all workplaces where migrants are employed in order to ensure compliance with decent work and occupational safety and health standards.
14. Advocate a wider and quicker recognition of diplomas and certificates of arriving refugees and migrants. Use examples of good and effective accreditation systems such as in Germany and the United Kingdom – especially in sectors that suffer from a shortage of labour.

15. Promote the availability of immediate language classes, integration courses and work permits for newcomers/recent immigrants. Assist municipalities where possible with knowledge and advice about migrants. Strengthen the roles and actions of local governments in promoting and facilitating migrants’ inclusion and integration.

16. Include diaspora organisation, churches, associations and labour unions in local integration policy to better provide migrants with a swift start in the Netherlands, and contribute to mutual understanding between migrants and Dutch society.

Facilitate migrants’ contribution to sustainable development

17. Promote the improvement of facilities and lower the transaction costs for sending financial remittances to migrants’ countries of origin. Use SGD 10. c as a directive for reducing the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3%.

18. Ease the regulations on dual nationalities to facilitate contacts between the Netherlands and the countries of origin. A migrant could conduct business with the country of origin and create jobs with the ease of these regulations.

19. Promote the expansion of circular migration projects while taking into account lessons from previous projects and programs.

20. Enhance possibilities and accessibility for low-educated and young migrants to obtain skills and knowledge, and facilitate their access to temporary vacant job positions in the Netherlands.


DSP group and Tilburg School of Humanities, Department of Culture Studies. 2017. The 2% Tax for Eritreans in the diaspora: Fact, figures and experiences in seven European countries. Amsterdam, NL: DSP group BV.

Dirks, Bart. 2018. “Tot hun grote frustratie worden expats vaak in het Engels aangesproken, maar aankomende zaterdag even niet! [To their great frustration, expats are often approached in English, but not next Saturday],” De Volkskrant, October 13, pp. 13.

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Dutch government: https://wetten.overheid.nl/zoeken


Foner, Nancy, Jan Rath, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Rogier Van Reekum, eds. 2014. New York and Amsterdam: immigration and the new urban landscape. NYU Press.

Foundation Lemat: http://www.stichtinglemat.com/

Foundation Queridon: http://www.queridon.nl/


Global Forum on Migration and Development: https://gfmd.org/

Global Migration Group: http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/


In My Backyard: https://www.inmybackyard.nl/


Social Economic Counsel (Refugee Work Guide): http://www.werkwijzervluchtelingen.nl/


Student Refugee Community: https://www.sshxl.nl/en/refugees


### Annexes

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACVZ</td>
<td>The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (in Dutch: Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOW</td>
<td>Social Security Act for Elderly (in Dutch: Algemene Ouderdomswet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Addressing the Root Causes Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZC</td>
<td>Asylum Seekers Reception Centre (in Dutch: Asielzoekerscentrum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>National Statistical Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD4D</td>
<td>Connecting Diaspora for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (in Dutch: Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Collective Labour Agreement (in Dutch: Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>EEPA</td>
<td>Europe External Policy Advisors</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GCMR</td>
<td>Global Compact for Migration and Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMG</td>
<td>Global Migration Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (in Dutch: Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAD</td>
<td>Local Employment in Africa for Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDPP</td>
<td>Regional Development and Protection Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Social Cultural Planning Agency (in Dutch: Sociaal Cultuureel Planbureau)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>Social Economic Council (in Dutch: Sociaal-Economische Raad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRQN</td>
<td>Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWZ</td>
<td>Employment Permit (in Dutch: Tewerkstellingsvergunning)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVW</td>
<td>Institute of Labour Security (in Dutch: Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNG</td>
<td>Association of Dutch Municipalities (in Dutch: Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOCID</td>
<td>Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NGO: Stichting LOS (National Support Centre for Undocumented Migrants) – Co-ordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Han Baartmans (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>NGO: Vluchtelingenwerk (Refugees the Netherlands) – Teamleader/ Manager services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Karel Junghem and Mr. Laurens den Dulk (Face to face interviews)</td>
<td>NGO: Kerk in Actie (Church in Action) – Specialist refugees and migrants, and Emergency aid specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Geesje Werkman (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>Retired. Formerly Specialist refugees and migrants for Kerk in Actie (Church in Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ilias Mahtab (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>Policy advisor local government/ Diaspora expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Sonja Avontuur (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs – Senior advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Koos Richelle (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs – Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Antony Otieno Ong’ayo (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>International Institute of Social Sciences – Academic/ Diaspora expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. dr. Ton Dietz (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>African Studies Centre Leiden (ASC) – Academic/ Former director of ASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Nathalie Lintvelt (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Head Migration and Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Adri Zagers (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration – Head of Migration and Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Bosch (Face to face interview)</td>
<td>European Commission – Advisor to the Deputy Director-General</td>
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